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Abstract	
	Is	the	musically	aesthetic	an	objective	property,	or	an	effect	that	emerges	from,	and	 is	 dependent	 on,	 our	 perceptual	 apparatus?	 Certain	 things	 clearly	 do	 not	depend	on	perception:	 concrete	physical	 objects	 like	 the	 screen	 in	 front	 of	me	continue	 to	 exist	 whether	 they	 are	 perceived	 or	 not.	 However,	 other	 things	 I	perceive	 do	 not	 persist	 beyond	 their	 perception,	 most	 obviously	 perceptual	illusions	 such	 as	 the	 Waterfall	 or	 Muller-Lyer	 illusions,	 or	 the	 illusion	 that	 is	created	when	I	stare	at	an	object	and	press	the	side	of	my	eye.	This	thesis	offers	a	novel	 cross-disciplinary	 approach	 to	musically	 aesthetic	 experience,	where	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	 presented	 as	 an	 effect	 of	 perception	 similar	 to	 such	illusions;	this	is	in	opposition	to	the	prevailing	view	in	musicology	and	aesthetics	that	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 objects	 that	 listeners	 become	acquainted	with.		The	perception-dependent	view	 is	 characterised	as	what	 I	 call	 the	phenomenal	conception.	This	is	contrasted	with	the	abstract	conception,	where	the	musically	aesthetic	 is	 taken	 to	be	 independent	of	perception.	Scruton’s	arguments	on	 the	separation	of	tone	 from	sound	are	used	to	characterise	the	latter,	abstract	view	as	 involving	 acquaintance	 with	 a	 conceptual	 order	 that	 is	 independent	 of	 any	particular	 instance	 of	 perception.	 The	 contrasting	phenomenal	 view	 is	 initially	argued	 for	 in	 the	 case	of	musical	movement	 specifically:	 by	demonstrating	 that	such	movement	can	be	understood	as	psycho-acoustic	using	several	models	from	music	 psychology,	 and	 elucidating	 musical	 movement	 as	 nonconceptual	 by	showing	that	our	beliefs	about	how	music	moves	conflicts	with	our	experience.	The	thesis’	purview	is	widened	to	the	musically	aesthetic	generally	and	various	issues	 relating	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 phenomenal	 and	 abstract	 views	 are	discussed,	 including:	 internalism	 and	 externalism	 about	 aesthetic	 experience,	concessions	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 makes	 to	 certain	 putatively	 formalist	notions	and	 the	 explanatory	 problems	 that	 manifest	 when	 approaching	 musically	aesthetic	value.	
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Chapter	1		
	
	
Conceptions	of	the	Musically	Aesthetic,	an	
Introduction:	abstract	and	phenomenal,	
conceptual	and	nonconceptual.			
1.	1	Introduction	to	Thesis.		This	 thesis	 develops	 a	 distinction	 between	 two	 conceptions	 of	 the	 musically	aesthetic,	abstract	and	phenomenal:	conceptions	where	the	musically	aesthetic	is	taken	 to	 be	 independent	 of	 perception	 (abstract)	 and	 conceptions	 where	 the	musically	aesthetic	is	taken	to	be	dependent	on	perception	(phenomenal).	When	I	perceive	a	tree	I	have	an	experience	of	that	tree,	but	when	I	look	away	the	tree	continues	to	exist:	it	exists	independently	of	whether	I	perceive	it.	Conversely,	if	I	perceive	a	tree	and	then	press	on	the	side	of	my	eye	so	that	the	tree	appears	to	double	 and	 distort,	 I	 have	 an	 experience	 of	 two	 identical	 distorted	 trees,	 but	when	 I	 release	 the	 pressure	 on	 my	 eye	 and	 perceive	 a	 single	 normal	 tree	 I	assume	 that	 those	 distorted	 trees	 that	 had	 been	 experienced	 no	 longer	 exist:	they	 exist	 only	 insofar	 as	 I	 perceive	 them,	 and	 as	 such	 are	 dependent	 on	 my	perception	of	them.			Characterisations	of	abstract	and	phenomenal:	
-Abstract:	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	 an	 aspect	 of	musical	 objects	whose	nature	and	 operation	 is	 independent	 of	 any	 particular	 instance	 of	 perceiving	 music–	
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obtaining	 in	 a	 conceptually	 defined,	 imagined	 or	 transcendent	 space	 that	 a	suitably	encultured	listener	becomes	acquainted	with.		
	
–Phenomenal:	 the	musically	aesthetic	 is	an	effect	of	nonconceptual	psychology–	obtaining	 in	 an	 illusory	 space	 that	 depends	 on	 a	 listener	 becoming	psychologically	engaged	with	sound	in	a	way	that	is	not	understood	in	terms	of	the	listener’s	concepts.		The	former	is	widely	assumed	in	fields	outside	the	psychology	of	music,	but	has	not	been	made	explicit	in	its	opposition	to	the	latter,	in	the	terms	given	above.	I	argue	 for	 the	 latter,	phenomenal,	conception	partly	because	 it	coheres	strongly	with	 recent	 work	 in	 music	 analysis	 and	 psychology	 and	 partly	 because	arguments	for	abstract	conceptions	are	open	to	various	criticisms.			Eduard	Hanslick	(1891),	who	defines	music	 in	 terms	of	movement,	commits	 to	the	 abstract	 view	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘specifically	 musical	 beauty’:	 in	 being	
specifically	musical,	musical	beauty	cannot	depend	on	anything	non-musical	like	perception.	It	requires	training	to	come	to	appreciate	specifically	musical	beauty	on	this	view,	but	 this	act	of	appreciation	merely	serves	to	acquaint	 the	 listener	with	 a	 beauty	 that	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 object,	 independent	 from	 any	 particular	experience.	 Conversely,	 work	 by	 the	 music-psychologist	 Eric	 Clarke	 on	 the	ecological	 perception	 of	 musical	 movement,	 drawing	 on	 ecological	 theory	originally	wrought	by	James	Gibson,	suggests	the	musically	aesthetic	depends	on	
perceptual	 effects.1	On	 this	 view,	 movement	 is	 heard	 in	 music	 by	 the	 same	perceptual	 functions	 that	 movement	 is	 heard	 in	 the	 environment,	 with	 the	important	difference	 that	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	understood	as	a	perceptual	
illusion:	the	listener’s	true	beliefs	conflict	with	her	perceptual	experience,	given	that	the	listener	correctly	believes	that	the	ordinary	musical	object–	independent	of	her	experience–	does	not	have	the	features	perceived.		
																																																								1	See	chapter	3	for	a	discussion	of	ecological	theory.	2	See	Iseminger	2003.	3	See	chapter	2.	4	See	Chalmers	2006;	Block	1990;	Nagel	1974.	5	See	Shelley	2015.	
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This	distinction	relates	to	that	given	by	Andy	Hamilton	where	he	describes	music	as	 ‘abstract	 in	 form	but	humane	 in	utterance’	 (2007:	 114),	with	 the	 important	difference	that	‘humane’	is	a	broader	term	than	‘phenomenal’,	being	inclusive	of	global	aspects	of	culture.	The	distinction	also	draws	on	Iseminger’s	juxtaposition	of	 ‘epistemic’	 with	 ‘phenomenological’:	 ‘epistemic’	 conceptions	 describe	music	experience	 as	 involving	 a	 form	 of	 non-inferential	 knowledge,	 while	‘phenomenological’	 conceptions	 characterise	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘what	 it	 is	 like’	 to	undergo	 the	 experience.2	‘Epistemic’	 is	 a	 more	 exclusive	 term	 than	 ‘abstract’	since	 it	 entails	 a	 kind	 of	 personal	 acquaintance	 with	 an	 object,	 even	 if	 this	acquaintance	is	conceptual	and	as	such	dissociable	from	any	particular	instance	of	listening;	‘abstract’	entails	‘epistemic’	acquaintance	but	also	includes	any	view	that	conceives	of	musical	movement	independently	of	any	particular	instance	of	listening	 experience,	 such	 as	 those	 that	 impart	 a	 dualism	 between	 music	 and	world.3	‘Phenomenal’	 is	 intended	 to	 share	 the	 reference	 to	 ‘what	 it	 is	 likeness’	with	‘Phenomenological’,	but	is	not	intended	to	imply	the	particular	continental	tradition	of	Husserl,	Heidegger,	Sartre	and	others	that	is	commonly	referred	to	as	Phenomenology.	The	term	‘phenomenal’	has	a	usage	in	analytical	philosophy	of	mind	that	means	subjective	feels,	what	it	is	like,	qualitative	feeling	or	qualia.4		A	 final	 terminological	 distinction	 of	 relevance	 is	 made	 by	 James	 Shelley,	 who	compares	 ‘externalist’	 with	 ‘internalist’	 views.5	The	 meaning	 of	 these	 terms	relates	 to	 that	 intended	 by	 ‘abstract’	 and	 ‘phenomenal’,	 with	 the	 internalist	appealing	to	features	internal	to	experience–	typically	the	phenomenology	of	the	experience–	and	the	externalist	appealing	to	features	external	to	the	experience–	typically	 features	 of	 the	 object.	 ‘Abstract’	 and	 ‘phenomenal’	 entail	 ‘externalist’	and	 ‘internalist’	 respectively,	 although	 ‘abstract’	 may	 include	 aspects	 of	experiences,	such	as	concepts,	 that	are	dissociable	 from	particular	experiences,	and	 ‘phenomenal’	 is	 cashed	 out	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 nonconceptual	psychological	 processes	 shape	 the	 perception	 of	music	 perception,	 rather	 than	the	 phenomenological	 tradition	 of	 introspection	 and	 intuition.	 This	 final	 point																																																									2	See	Iseminger	2003.	3	See	chapter	2.	4	See	Chalmers	2006;	Block	1990;	Nagel	1974.	5	See	Shelley	2015.	
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regarding	 the	 base	 from	 which	 support	 for	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 is	 garnered	represents	the	principle	point	of	divergence	between	the	approach	adopted	here	and	the	aforementioned	philosophical	approaches.			As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 abstract	 view	 is	 widely	 assumed	 outside	 of	 music–psychology:	 in	 philosophy	 Scruton,	 Budd,	 Hamilton,	 Levinson,	 Boretz	 and	Hanslick	 are	 examples;	 within	 musicology	 examples	 include	 Schoenberg,	Schenker,	Cook	(insofar	as	they	assume	musical	experience	generally	to	be	such	and	consider	movement	 to	be	part	of	 that	experience);	 in	aesthetics	 in	 the	 late	20th	century	there	was	a	shift	from	conceiving	aesthetic	experience	generally	in	terms	 of	 properties	 of	 the	 experience–	 Beardsley	 (1958)	 following	 Dewey	(1934–	 to	 conceiving	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 properties	 of	 the	 object	 that	 perceivers	become	acquainted	with–	Dickie	(1969)	influencing	Beardsley	(1982).	So	Dewey	and	early	Beardsley	can	provide	examples	of	the	somewhat	pertinent	view	that	aesthetic	experience	is	characterised	by	the	properties	of	the	experience	rather	than	 the	 object,	 even	 if	 this	 is	 not	 identical	 to	 the	 narrower	 view	 I	 argue	 that	musical	movement	is	dependent	on	perception.		From	the	outset	it	is	important	to	note	the	circumscription	of	a	cross-disciplinary	approach.	 Where	 an	 attempt	 is	 made	 to	 bring	 together	 issues	 belonging	 to	several	distinct	areas	of	study	there	is	an	acute	danger	of	straying	outside	fields	of	 expertise	 and	 thus	 of	 drawing	 conclusions	without	 proper	 grounding	 in	 the	relevant	 discipline.	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 the	 conclusions	 I	 draw	 below	 will	 be	primarily	ones	 for	musicology	and	the	 fairly	narrow	field	of	musical	aesthetics,	while	support	will	come	both	from	within	these	areas	and	from	further	afield	in	music	psychology	and,	in	later	chapters,	certain	of	the	less	contentious	issues	in	philosophy	of	mind.	Music	is	a	cross-discipline	topic	and	a	cross-cultural	artefact,	an	aspect	of	the	human	experience	that	is	peculiarly	pervasive	given	the	various	complex	problems	it	raises.6	As	such	it	is	reasonable	to	adopt	a	diverse	approach	that	 reaches	 across	 music-studies,	 touching	 on	 music	 as	 aesthetic	 experience,	intellectual	endeavour	and	cultural	artefact.																																																									6	For	a	discussion	of	cross-cultural	agreement	and	normativity	see	Pryer	2013.		
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1.2	Summary	of	Chapters.		Chapter	1	 introduces	 the	 thesis,	 giving	an	outline,	overall	 aim	and	summary	of	chapters.	The	remainder	of	the	chapter	gives	characterisations	of	certain	terms	that	will	be	relied	upon	in	the	thesis.	Metaphor	is	defined	as	it	relates	to	musical	movement–	 the	 central	 topic	 of	 chapters	 2	 and	3–	 and	 a	 discussion	 of	 concept	and	 nonconceptual	 provides	 some	 background	 to	 these	 terms	 that	 will	 be	frequently	referenced	throughout	in	developing	a	phenomenal	view.	In	order	to	suitably	define	concept/nonconceptual	it	 is	necessary	 to	draw	on	philosophy	of	mind	literature,	but	with	the	caveat	that	no	novel	claims	are	made	that	relate	to	this	literature.		Chapter	2	 introduces	 the	 topic	of	musical	movement,	 suggesting	 that	music	has	been	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 movement	 for	 centuries.	 A	 phenomenal	 view	 is	argued	in	relation	to	this	particularly	significant	and	well-reported	feature	of	the	musically	aesthetic.	Key	to	arguing	against	abstract	views	of	musical	movement	is	the	advancement	of	a	psycho-acoustic	conception,	whereupon	the	neat	division	between	 the	 acoustic	 and	 the	 musical	 is	 challenged	 with	 an	 account	 of	 the	musical	 that	 invokes	 both	 acoustic	 and	psychological	 features.	Roger	 Scruton’s	theory	of	 the	metaphorical	basis	of	music	and	movement	 is	 taken	as	a	vantage	point	 from	 which	 to	 discuss	 the	 relation	 between	 music	 and	 sound	 (the	emergence	 of	 ‘tone’),	 and	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 listeners	 engage	 with	 music–	conceptually	 or	 nonconceptually.	 The	main	 portion	 of	 the	 chapter	 discusses	 a	range	 of	 studies	 that	 suggest	 musical	 movement	 can	 be	 understood	 under	 a	psycho-acoustic	conception.	(Clarke,	Johnson,	Acitores.)		Chapter	 3	 considers	 the	 relation	 between	 musical	 movement	 and	 veridical	movement.	 Three	 contrasting	 positions	 on	 this	 relation	 are	 outlined,	 the	 first	prescribing	a	dualism	between	musical	 and	veridical	movement	 (abstract),	 the	second	suggesting	there	is	no	conflict	between	musical	movement	and	veridical	movement	 (humanist),	 and	 a	 third	 suggesting	 that	 musical	 movement	 is	 a	
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perceptual	 illusion	 (phenomenal).	 The	 chapter	 begins	 by	 outlining	 some	 of	 the	precedents	 for	a	psychological	 theory	of	 the	sort	 I	 am	arguing	and	also	 frames	the	 discussion	 within	 some	 of	 the	 broader	 literature	 on	 musical	 movement,	continuing	 from	the	discussion	of	Scruton	 in	chapter	1.	Given	 that	 the	abstract	view	 is	 challenged	 elsewhere,	 only	 brief	 notes	 are	 offered	 against	 it.	 The	humanist	 position	 is	 challenged	 for	 its	 rejection	 of	 metaphor	 and	 illusion	 but	aligned	with	 the	phenomenal	view	 for	placing	music	 in	 the	realms	of	everyday	human	 life.	 The	 phenomenal	 view	 is	 defended	 against	 some	 challenges	 in	 the	literature	 before	 three	models	 from	 psychology	 are	 discussed	 to	 evidence	 the	claim	that	musical	movement	is	a	perceptual	illusion:	ecological	theory,	cognitive	categorisation	and	image	schemata	(the	latter	revisited	from	chapter	1.)		Chapter	4	suggests	that,	following	chapter	3,	expounding	a	phenomenal	theory	of	musical	 movement	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 viability	 of	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 of	 the	musically	aesthetic	generally.	This	chapter	thus	introduces	the	terms	internalist	and	externalist	to	stand	for	more	general	formulations	of	conceptions	of	musical	experience.	 After	 defining	 these	 terms	 the	 lineage	 of	 conceptions	 of	 aesthetic	experience	 is	 traced	 from	Dewey	 through	 to	 Beardsley	 and	 Dickie,	 identifying	certain	key	distinguishing	claims	of	the	externalist	versus	internalist	conceptions	while	 critiquing	 the	 former	 at	 the	 service	 of	 the	 latter.	 Possibly	 the	 most	important	 objection	 to	 the	 internalist	 view	 being	 argued	 is	 that	 it	 suggests	 an	intolerably	narrow,	formalist	conception	of	music	experience.	Certain	examples	of	 this	 objection	 are	 considered	 (Walton,	 Danto,	 Iseminger)	 and	 a	 more	moderate	alternative	is	offered	in	the	form	of	a	view	on	acousmatic	listening.		Chapter	5	suggests	that	the	aspect	of	musical	movement	that	can	be	elucidated	using	psychological	and	analytic	models	is	the	descriptive	rather	than	evaluative,	implying	that	the	value	of	musical	movement	is	intrinsic	and/or	non-explicable.	After	 reviewing	 issues	 concerning	 normativity	 and	 the	 relation	 of	 musically	aesthetic	value	to	other	values,	a	bespoke	characterisation	of	value	is	given	that	does	not	have	normative	implications.	Definition	of	terms	used	in	aesthetics	such	as	 intrinsic	 and	 extrinsic	 value	 is	 given	 before	 criticising	 externalism	 about	intrinsic	value	and	a	version	of	externalism	that	is	internalist	only	about	intrinsic	
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value.	 Musically	 aesthetic	 value	 is	 then	 posited	 as	 a	 contingent	 fact	about	 the	musically	aesthetic,	since	it	seems	that	our	functional	accounts	are	very	effective	in	explicating	the	descriptive	element	but	make	no	reference	to	value.	The	final	sections	argue	that	our	common	nonconceptual	psychology	can	account	for	the	intersubjectivity	 of	 musically	 aesthetic	 value,	 and	 demonstrates	 these	commonalities	 amongst	 experiences	 by	 providing	 an	 analysis	 linking	 free	conceptual	 description	 in	 the	 literature	 with	 the	 nonconceptual	 psychological	processes	that	are	coextensive	with	experience	of	the	musically	aesthetic.			
1.3	Understanding	the	term	‘metaphor’.		One	 way	 to	 view	 musical	 movement	 is	 as	 a	 metaphor,	 but	 this	 view	 clearly	depends	 on	 what	 ‘metaphor’	 is	 taken	 to	 mean.	 Some	 of	 the	 disagreement	surrounding	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 metaphor	 of	 musical	 movement	 may	 be	attributable	to	the	ambiguity	of	this	word	‘metaphor’.	It	is	generally	agreed	that	metaphor	 involves	 a	 mapping	 across	 domains,	 although	 it	 seems	 that	 not	 all	cross-domain	mappings	are	metaphors:	 if	 I	represent	an	election	result	using	a	bar	chart,	 I	map	votes	cast	onto	geometrical	shape;	 for	this	representation	to	be	successful	the	underlying	structure	of	number	and	space	must	cohere,	in	spite	of	these	being	distinct	domains.	It	seems	unhelpful	to	call	this	metaphor,	although	the	 points	 of	 distinction	 between	 such	 graphical	 representation	 and	metaphorical	representation	are	not	immediately	obvious.		The	definition	of	 ‘metaphor’	 is	 a	 point	 of	 dispute	 in	 the	debate	between	Budd,	Scruton	and	Davies	considered	in	chapter	2,	and	while	Scruton	(2004)	concedes	that	to	explain	what	a	metaphor	‘involves’	would	entail	explaining	other	complex	issues	 like	 ‘double-intentionality’,	 Budd	 identifies	 the	 pertinent	 sense	 of	metaphor	as	pertaining	 to	 ‘characterisation’	and	gives	a	set	of	 conditions	 to	be	satisfied	if	a	characterisation	is	to	count	as	‘metaphorical’:	7																																																									7	Along	with	Roger	Scruton’s	conception	of	music	as	metaphor	(1997,	1999),	numerous	other	aestheticians	have	given	careful	consideration	to	metaphor,	including	Beardsley	(1967),	Goodman	(1968),	and	Levinson	(2001);	see	Cohen	(2003)	for	a	review.	
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	 The	 first	 is	 that	 it	 indicates	 a	 feature	 of	 something	 by	 using	 a	 term	 or	phrase	 the	 primary	 application	 of	 which	 is	 restricted	 to	 a	 different	domain.	 The	 second	 is	 that	 no	 secondary	 application	 to	 the	 domain	referred	 to	 by	 the	 characterization	 has	 so	 established	 itself	 as	 to	constitute	 a	 different	 sense,	 another	 (literal)	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 or	phrase,	one	 that	 could	 in	principle	be	 fully	mastered	without	a	 grasp	of	the	primary	application	informing	that	mastery.	By	an	aesthetic	metaphor	I	mean	a	metaphorical	characterization	of	some	 item	that	 is	 intended	to	indicate	 some	 aesthetically	 significant	 feature	 or	 aspect	 of	 the	 item,	 the	experience	of	which	constitutes	part	of	 the	aesthetic	appreciation	of	 the	item.8		These	 conditions	 may	 provide	 something	 of	 a	 starting	 point,	 although	immediately	 the	 notion	 of	 characterisation	 invites	 a	 contrast	 with	 the	preconceptual	metaphorical	 schemata	 considered	below.	Leaving	 this	 aside	 for	the	 moment,	 the	 first	 condition	 seems	 essential	 in	 prescribing	 some	 transfer	across	domains.	The	 second	 suggests	 that	 once	 a	mapping	 across	domains	has	established	a	standard	use	in	language	it	ceases	to	be	a	metaphor.	In	this	sense,	spatial	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘high’	 and	 ‘low’	 are	 not	 used	 metaphorically	 when	describing,	say,	the	stock	market	or	a	mental	state.		To	 first	 consider	 the	 condition	 that	 a	 metaphor	 can	 only	 obtain	 where	 the	secondary	use	of	 the	term	cannot	be	mastered	without	 first	gaining	mastery	of	its	primary	usage.	Consider	the	metaphor	Leo	Tolstoy	depicts	in	War	and	Peace,	conflating	 the	 line	 that	divides	 two	armies	with	 the	 line	 that	separates	 life	and	death:		 The	 enemy	 ceased	 firing,	 and	 that	 stern,	 threatening,	 inaccessible,	 and	intangible	 line	 which	 separates	 two	 hostile	 armies	 was	 all	 the	 more	clearly	felt.	One	 step	 beyond	 that	 boundary	 line	 which	 resembles	 the	 line																																																									8	See	Budd	2008.	
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dividing	 the	 living	 from	 the	 dead	 lies	 uncertainty,	 suffering,	 and	 death.	And	what	is	there?	Who	is	there?–	there	beyond	that	field,	that	tree,	that	roof	lit	up	by	the	sun?	No	one	knows,	but	one	wants	to	know.	You	fear	and	yet	 long	 to	 cross	 that	 line,	 and	 know	 that	 sooner	 or	 later	 it	 must	 be	crossed	 and	 you	 will	 have	 to	 find	 out	 what	 is	 there,	 just	 as	 you	 will	inevitably	have	to	learn	what	lies	the	other	side	of	death.9		This	 is	 truly	 a	metaphor	 in	 that	 Tolstoy	 is	 suggesting	 that	 to	 cross	 a	 physical	terrain	 is	 just	 to	cross	over	 to	death,	 rather	 than	 the	 literal	 sense	 that	 to	cross	such	terrain	may	result	in	death.	This	being	said,	the	metaphor	does	owe	much	of	its	poignancy	to	the	aptness	of	the	source	domain	(death.)		To	map	the	concept	of	death	onto	that	of	traversing	a	terrain	is	to	imagine	life	as	one	space	and	death	as	another,	with	the	progression	from	life	to	death	imagined	as	locomotion	across	this	space.	This	metaphor	is	a	characterisation	of	an	event,	a	 transfer	 of	 concepts	 across	 domains,	 but	 one	 that	 has	 also	 developed	 a	normative	 sense	 in	 the	 term	 ‘to	 cross	 over’.	 The	 phrase	 ‘to	 cross	 over’	encompasses	Tolstoy’s	metaphor	but	would	seem	to	fail	to	satisfy	Budd’s	second	condition,	 given	 that	mastery	 of	 the	 phrase	 ‘crossing	 over’	 does	 not	 appear	 to	demand	mastery	of	 the	 concept	of	 traversing	a	 space.	 Indeed	 the	 term	 ‘passed	away’	 has	 similarly	 spatial	 connotations,	 suggesting	 travel	 from	 this	 life	 to	elsewhere,	 although	 the	 claim	 to	 normativity	 of	 this	 use	 of	 the	 phrase	 is	particularly	strong	given	that	its	lineage	goes	at	least	as	far	back	as	The	Lay	Folks	Mass	Book,	published	in	1375.10		The	 Tolstoy	 passage	 can	 show	 that	 the	 normativity	 of	 a	 term	 that	 derives	meaning	from	a	domain	other	than	that	to	which	it	is	applied	does	not	extinguish	the	potential	of	the	equivalent	mapping	across	domains	to	operate	as	metaphor.	The	term	‘crossing	over’	or	perhaps	‘crossing	from	life	to	death’	may	be	mastered	
																																																								9	Tolstoy	1869/2007:110.	10	1375;	Lay	Folks	Mass	Book	(MS.	B)	112:	“God	lord	graunt	..	rest	and	pese	Þat	lastis	ay	to	christen	soules	passed	away.”			
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without	 knowledge	of	 the	 source	domain–	 that	 of	 traversing	 a	 physical	 space–	but	 Tolstoy	 may	 still	 construct	 a	 metaphor	 with	 the	 mapping	 of	 ‘death	 is	movement	through	space’.	Analogously,	a	melody	may	be	characterised	in	spatial	terms	 such	 as	 contour,	 ascending,	 descending	 etc.,	 but	 the	 normativity	 of	 the	secondary	 usage	 of	 such	 terms	 does	 not	 thus	 eliminate	 the	 potential	 of	 us	imagining	 a	 melody	 as	 moving	 in	 a	 manner	 accordant	 with	 such	characterisations.	 Just	 as	 a	 supposedly	 ‘dead’	 metaphor	 like	 ‘crossing	 over	 is	death’	 can	be	 revived	 in	Tolstoy’s	 imagining	 of	 crossing	 a	 line	 on	 a	 battlefield,	there	are	innumerous	ways	in	which	music	reinvents	or	revives	the	supposedly	dead	metaphors	comprising	much	of	the	musicologist’s	lexicon.		The	next	element	of	Budd’s	description	of	metaphor	to	consider	is	the	notion	of	‘characterisation’;	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 this	 sense	 of	 metaphor	 is	 wholly	inappropriate	in	understanding	metaphor	in	music.	It	seems	that	by	adopting	the	notion	 of	 metaphorical	 characterisation	 Budd	 circumvents	 the	 issue	 of	experience	to	target	discourse	about	music:	 ‘It	has	often	been	stressed	that	the	non-technical	characterization	of	the	materials	of	music…	is	mostly	in	terms	the	primary	application	of	which	is	to	non-audible	sensible	and	other	qualities,	and	the	 ordinary	 language	 of	 musical	 description	 is	 rife	 with	 metaphor	 and	 other	forms	 of	 figurative	 language.’	 (Budd	 2008:	 2.)	 However,	 while	 terms	 used	 to	characterize	 music	 are	 important	 indictors	 as	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 musical	experience,	it	should	be	made	clear	that	the	way	that	sound	references	another	domain	is	distinct	from	the	way	that	linguistic	concepts	do.		I	 will	 argue	 that	 musical	 movement	 operates	 as	 an	 embodied	 metaphor	 in	experience,	which	would	restrict	characterisation	to	matters	of	music-discourse	rather	 than	 experience.	 But	 without	 relying	 on	 the	 discussion	 of	 psychology,	music	can	still	be	presented	as	a	phenomenon	that	resists	explanation	in	terms	of	 metaphor	 as	 characterisation.	 Since	 music’s	 domain	 is	 sound,	 it	 will	 meet	Budd’s	 first	 condition–	 that	 it	 reference	 something	 ‘the	 primary	 application	 of	which	is	restricted	to	a	different	domain’–	just	when	it	refers	to	something	that	is	not	 sound.	 As	 such,	 under	 the	 view	 that	 metaphor	 entails	 characterisation–	which	 itself	 entails	 some	 conceptual	 ascription–	 it	 becomes	 impossible	 to	
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distinguish	a	metaphorical	relationship	from	other	relationships	that	might	more	usefully	 be	 described	 as	 literal.	 With	 a	 view	 of	 metaphor	 as	 entailing	 some	conceptual	 or	 lingual	 representation	 across	 domains,	 all	 discourse	 on	 music,	indeed	all	that	music	can	reference	beyond	itself,	is	metaphorical.		However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 sounds	 can	 characterise	 non-sounds	 in	 a	 way	 that	should	 be	 understood	 as	 literal	 rather	 than	 metaphorical.	 Most	 obviously,	 a	sound	 can	 characterise	 its	 source	 in	 a	 literal	 way:	 an	 instrument	 can	 be	understood	in	terms	of	its	sound;	for	example	the	frequency	range	and	sustain	of	the	 sound	 of	 a	 guitar	 will	 characterise	 the	 guitar	 itself.	 But	 the	 difference	between	literal	and	metaphorical	reference	is	relevant	to	music	more	generally.	To	what	degree	was	Jimi	Hendrix’s	The	Star	Spangled	Banner	a	metaphor	of	war,	and	to	what	degree	a	direct	reference	to	war?	Did	his	guitar	represent	accurately	enough	 the	 sounds	 of	 bombs	 falling,	machine	 gun	 fire	 and	 explosions	 that	we	might	say	he	simulated	the	sounds	of	war	literally?	Or	did	he	draw	on	the	toxic	feeling	surrounding	the	Vietnam	War	to	attack	established,	traditional	American	ideals,	 just	 by	 counter-positioning	 the	 national	 anthem	 with	 guitar	 effects?	Granting	 that	Hendrix	 does	 attempt	 to	 simulate	 the	 sounds	 of	war,	 it	 could	be	objected	 that	 he	 doesn’t	 reference	 ‘The	 Vietnam	 War’	 but	 in	 fact	 merely	references	‘the	sound	of	the	Vietnam	War’,	so	valorising	the	position	that	this	is	not	 a	 case	 of	 literal	 reference	 to	 non-sound	but	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 literal	 reference	 to	sound.	However,	this	position	would	have	the	consequence	that	Hendrix’s	piece	is	not	about	the	Vietnam	War	but	is	rather	about	the	sounds	of	the	Vietnam	war,	which	seems	absurd.	An	image	of	an	object	references	that	object,	not	the	sense-modality	of	that	object:	a	picture	of	a	car	is	a	literal	representation	of	a	car;	it	is	not	 a	 literal	 representation	 of	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	 car.	 The	 effect	 of	 The	 Star	
Spangled	 Banner	 lies	 in	 its	 reference	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘The	 Vietnam	 war’	 as	juxtaposed	with	the	famous	notes	of	the	national	anthem.		Steve	 Reich’s	 Different	 Trains	 provides	 another	 important	 example,	 where	various	 aspects	 of	 the	 piece	 make	 references	 to	 trains.	 Different	 Trains	 has	 a	central	 conceptual	 theme–	 that	 of	 the	 stark	 contrast	 between	 the	 long	 train	journeys	Reich,	a	Jew,	made	across	America	during	WWII	and	those	he	may	have	
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been	making	were	he	living	in	Europe	at	the	time.	This	narrative	is	constructed	using	both	samples	of	trains	and	speech,	and	by	analogizing	the	sounds	of	trains	through	 music.	 It	 is	 arguable	 that	 certain	 tonal	 aspects	 are	 metaphorical	representations	 of	 trains,	 at	 least	 in	 a	 sense	 of	 ‘metaphor’	 that	 would	 be	serviceable	when	describing,	say,	the	musical	score	as	a	metaphor.	For	example,	the	violin	parts	that	oscillate	between	fourths	in	semi-quavers	through	much	of	the	piece,	mimicking	 the	 sound	of	 a	 train	 travelling	 along	 a	 track,	 seem	 to	use	tonal	music	to	point	towards	the	narrative	of	the	piece.	While	these	tonal	aspects	may	 be	more	 obviously	metaphorical,	 the	 audio	 samples	 used,	 conversely,	 are	paradigmatic	 literal	 references,	 given	 that	 they	 reproduce	 the	 target	 domain	exactly.	The	difficulty	with	an	account	of	metaphor	as	characterisation	is	that	it	is	not	clear	how	this	distinction	would	be	made,	given	that	both	audio	samples	and	tonal	 music	 make	 reference	 beyond	 the	 domain	 of	 sound	 to	 a	 domain	 of	concepts.		Music	can	utilise	an	endless	range	of	references	beyond	itself,	and	as	such	Budd’s	decision	 to	 promote	 a	 notion	 of	 metaphor	 as	 ‘characterisation’	 has	 limited	instructiveness.	 Indeed,	 we	 can	 generalise	 beyond	 metaphor	 to	 posit	 that	extrinsic	 reference	 is	 analytically	 problematic	 due	 to	 its	 contingency.	 Consider	the	introduction	to	‘Willie	the	Pimp’	by	Frank	Zappa.	This	passage	can	reference	the	instrumentation	of	solo	violin,	and	the	true	referent	is	indeed	a	solo	violin	on	the	 1969	 recording.	 However,	 the	 introduction	 to	 Dweezil	 Zappa’s	 version	 of	‘Willie	the	Pimp’,	played	with	his	band	Zappa	Plays	Zappa	and	with	tremendous	fidelity	to	the	original,	will	also	reference	solo	violin	when	in	fact	the	introduction	is	played	on	electric	guitar	with	modelling	effects	and	techniques	that	simulate	a	violin	 timbre.	The	two	 introductions	are	very	similar,	and	Dweezil	will	actually	go	on	to	play	both	the	guitar	part	and	violin	part	in	the	verse	on	a	single	guitar	using	 an	 octave	 pedal.	 Were	 both	 versions	 heard	 at	 a	 live	 performance,	 two	distinct	experiences	would	be	expected–	one	that	ascribes	the	violin	sound	to	a	violin	and	another	that	ascribes	it	to	a	guitar–	but	were	the	two	versions	heard	from	a	recording,	without	preeminent	knowledge	of	the	background	or	context,	both	experiences	would	be	identical	with	respect	to	instrumentation.	This	then	is	an	example	of	how	the	same	musical	sound	can	afford	a	range	of	experience	that	
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defies	 its	 own	 internal	 structure.	 There	 just	 cannot	 be	 an	 account	 of	 these	references	in	terms	of	the	musical	sound	that	supports	them,	since	the	potential	of	musical	sound	to	reference	is	not	determined	by	its	own	structure	but	by	the	chaos	of	culture	in	which	it	is	found.		For	 these	 reasons,	 then,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 distinguish	 the	 sense	 of	 metaphor	relevant	 to	music	 from	 other	 forms	 of	metaphor	 and	 from	 literal	 reference.	 A	view	of	metaphor	as	characterisation	will	not	be	narrow	enough	to	exclude	the	abundance	 of	 literal	 references	musical	 sound	makes,	whereas	 the	 clause	 that	normativity	 of	 metaphoric	 terms	 negates	 them	 as	 true	 metaphors	 can	 be	disputed	 with	 examples	 of	 mappings	 across	 domains	 pertinent	 to	 such	 terms	operating	 as	 metaphor	 irrespective	 of	 the	 particular	 usage	 of	 the	 secondary	term.	 I	have	also	argued	that	musical	sound	resists	explanation	 in	 terms	of	 the	references	 it	makes	beyond	sound,	given	that	almost	 identical	sounds	can	have	distinct	references.		The	concept	of	metaphor	favoured	here	avoids	these	problems	by	prescribing	an	embodied,	 nonconceptual	 source,	 thus	 setting	 the	 relevant	 sense	 of	 metaphor	against	 other	 cross-domain	 representation.	 By	 making	 the	 source	 and	experiencer	co-terminous,	the	problems	associated	with	extrinsic	reference	can	be	 overcome.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 relevant	 sense	 of	metaphor	 splits	 not	 just	 from	conceptual	 representation	 but,	 I	 argue,	 from	 representation	 tout	 court.	 Music	does	not	 represent	 listeners’	own	psychological	 structures,	but	 rather	 listeners	execute	 those	 structures	 when	 listening	 to	 sound.	 The	 following	 chapter	 will	discuss	 several	 approaches	 from	 music-psychology	 that	 account	 for	 the	experience	of	musical	movement	with	nonconceptual	metaphorical	structures.			
1.4	Understanding	the	term	‘concept’.		The	 phenomenal	 view	 assumes	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 musical	 movement	 is	nonconceptual,	and	is	contrasted	with	the	abstract	view	where	the	experience	of	musical	 movement	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 conceptual.	 How	 ‘conceptual’	 and	
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‘nonconceptual’	 are	 characterised	 is	 therefore	 central	 to	 how	 the	 distinction	between	a	phenomenal	 and	abstract	view	 is	 to	be	understood.	While	adequate	characterisation	 of	 both	 terms	will	 require	 drawing	 on	work	 in	 philosophy	 of	mind,	 this	 should	not	be	seen	as	 tangential	 to	music-study.	 I	argue	 that	a	clear	understanding	of	these	terms	is	instructive	in	describing	music	experience	since:	firstly,	a	phenomenological	view	can	provide	insight	into	musical	movement	and	rests	 on	 the	meaning	of	 the	 terms	 ‘concept’	 and	 ‘nonconceptual’;	 secondly,	 the	terms	are	in	use	in	musicology	and	music	psychology	to	describe	types	of	music	experience	or	conceptions	of	music	experience,	and	as	such	warrant	clarification;	thirdly,	 matters	 concerning	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 musical	 movement	 have	substantive	 links	 to	 certain	 paradigms	 within	 the	 philosophy	 of	 mind,	 thus	affording	fresh	insight;	and	lastly,	the	philosophy	of	perception	will	improve	our	understanding	of	musical	movement	insofar	as	musical	movement	is	perceptual	and	the	philosophy	of	perception	improves	our	understanding	of	the	perceptual.	It	should	be	stressed	that	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	not	to	make	claims	about	the	philosophy	of	mind	but	to	make	claims	about	musical	movement.		This	 section	 explores	 the	 literature	 in	 some	 detail	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	 following	characterisations:		
concept:	 a	 constituent	 of	 thought;	 a	mental	 particular,	 identified	with	 a	mental	representation,	 that	 is	 specifiable	 in	 terms	 of	 contents	 understood	 as	 abstract	objects	(e.g.	properties,	types,	relations,	propositions,	sets,	etc.),	enabling	mental	representations	to	be	true	or	false.	
nonconceptual:	pertaining	to	an	experience	that	is	inconsistent	with,	and	cannot	be	captured	by,	a	subject’s	concepts.		Given	that	‘nonconceptual’	is	fundamentally	a	contrastive	term,	it	is	necessary	to	begin	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘concept’.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 first	 identify	 a	 sense	 of	‘concept’	 that	 does	not	 imply	 a	 psychological	 entity:	 on	 this	 view	 concepts	 are	understood	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 framework	 created	 by	 mathematician	 and	philosopher	Gottlob	Frege.	Concepts	are	 identified	as	 ‘senses’–	abstract	objects	pertaining	to	propositions–	and	mediate	between	experience	and	the	world	(or,	
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more	precisely,	between	‘modes	of	presentation’	and	‘referents’.)	One	prominent	supporter	 of	 this	 view	 is	 Christopher	 Peacocke,	 who	 makes	 the	 case	 that	concepts	 should	 be	 distinguished	 from	 mental	 representations	 as	 there	 are	concepts	that	will	never	be	possessed	by	any	thinker:		 ‘There	 are	 concepts	 that	will	 never	 be	 acquired’	 cannot	mean	 or	 imply	‘There	are	mental	representations	which	are	not	mental	representations	in	 anyone's	 mind’.	 If	 concepts	 are	 individuated	 by	 their	 possession	conditions,	on	the	other	hand,	there	is	no	problem	about	the	existence	of	concepts	 that	 will	 never	 be	 acquired.	 They	 are	 simply	 concepts	 whose	possession	conditions	will	never	be	satisfied	by	any	 thinkers.	 (Peacocke	2005:	169).		While	this	view	may	solve	a	problem	concerning	the	existence	of	concepts	that	are	 never	 acquired,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 a	 view	 of	 concepts	 as	 mental	representations	 is	 equipped	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 same	 problem	 by	 using	 a	type/token	distinction,	where	a	concept	that	is	never	acquired	would	be	a	‘type’	that	is	never	‘tokened’.11	But	indicating	this	view	of	concepts	as	Fregean	senses	is	useful	 in	 carving	 out	 the	 relevant	 sense	 of	 ‘concept’,	 since	 it	 allows	 the	elimination	of	one	possibility.		Given	that	the	relevant	sense	of	‘concept’	to	a	phenomenal	view	is	that	pertaining	to	 a	 psychological	 entity,	 there	 are	 two	 main	 views	 to	 consider:	 concepts	 as	mental	representations	and	concepts	as	abilities.	On	the	latter	view,	concepts	are	not	given	as	mental	representations	or	as	abstract	objects	existing	independently	of	 minds,	 but	 are	 abilities	 unique	 to	 a	 psychological	 agent.	 A	 concept	 can	 be	understood	as	an	ability	 to	discriminate	objects	or	 to	respond	appropriately	 to	objects.	The	abilities	view	is	associated	with	Ludwig	Wittgenstein	(1953/1958),	who	argued	 that	 the	meaning	of	a	word	 is	not	 found	 in	an	abstract	object	or	a	mental	representation	but	in	its	use.	A	word	like	 ‘game’	may	be	unyielding	to	a	classical	analysis	of	concepts	in	terms	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions,	and	arguably	 making	 reference	 to	 a	 mental	 representation	 of	 ‘game’	 only	 adds																																																									11	Margolis	&	Laurence	2014.	
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another	 thing	 to	be	 explained.	However,	 the	word	has	meaning	 in	 virtue	of	 its	usage:	it	operates	in	the	sphere	of	human	interactions	and	that	is	its	meaning.		The	main	motivation	 for	 the	 abilities	 view	derives	 from	certain	problems	with	the	representational	theory	of	mind,	so	in	order	to	understand	the	benefit	of	an	abilities	 view	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 understand	 the	 view	 of	 concepts	 under	 the	representational	 theory	 of	 mind.	 An	 important	 characterisation	 of	 concepts	under	this	view	is	as	mental	particulars.	This	view	can	be	attributed	to	both	John	Locke	(1690/1975)	and	David	Hume	(1739/1978),	for	whom	concepts–	or	their	corresponding	 term,	 ‘ideas’–	 were	 mental	 images.	 More	 recent	 commentators	tend	not	to	imagine	mental	representations	as	images	but	rather	as	constituents	of	a	symbolic	system	with	a	syntax	and	semantics,	described	by	 Jerry	Fodor	as	the	language	of	thought.	12		The	representational	theory	of	mind	is	the	prevailing	theory	in	cognitive	science,	having	found	considerable	support.	One	strength	of	this	theory	is	 its	efficacy	in	combatting	problems	such	as	the	productivity	of	 thought–	the	human	ability	to	produce	 an	 endless	 range	 of	 thoughts–	 and	 the	 systematicity	 of	 thought–	 the	manner	 in	 which	 thought	 is	 ordered	 in	 a	 way	 that	 reflects	 the	 structure	 of	propositions.	The	other	main	 advantage	 to	mental	 representations	 is	 that	 they	can	demonstrate	how	semantic	and	physical-causal	properties	can	be	combined,	since	computers	provide	a	robust	model	of	how	these	properties	are	coordinated	in	a	representational	system.	A	computer	will	make	changes	to	its	physical	state	in	a	way	that	reflects	the	interpretation	of	its	internal	representations.	As	such,	that	human	rationality	can	be	realised	in	a	physical	system	like	the	brain	can	be	understood	 by	 maintaining	 that	 mental	 states	 are	 computations	 over	 internal	representations.13		Eric	 Margolis	 and	 Stephen	 Laurence	 illustrate	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 language	 of	thought	version	of	representational	theory	in	accounting	for	the	productivity	of	
																																																								12	See	Fodor	1975.	13	See	Margolis	and	Laurence	2007:	564.	
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thought.	Following	work	by	the	psychologist	George	Miller	(1995),	they	ask	us	to	consider	how	many	20-word	sentences	can	conceivably	be	understood:		 Assuming	 conservatively	 that	 there	 are	 on	 average	 10	 words	 to	 draw	from	for	each	word	choice	as	a	sentence	is	constructed,	the	implication	is	that	we	understand	at	least	1020	20-word	sentences.	That’s	one	hundred	million	trillion	of	them.	By	comparison,	the	human	brain	contains	roughly	1011	neurons,	and	the	number	of	seconds	in	the	history	of	the	Universe	is	estimated	 to	 be	 on	 the	 order	 of	 1017.	 So	 assuming	 that	 each	 sentence	corresponds	to	a	distinct	thought,	and	sticking	only	to	20-word	sentences	(that	 is,	 ignoring	 not	 just	 longer	 sentences	 but	 also	 shorter	 ones),	 the	number	of	thoughts	we	arrive	at	is	more	than	a	billion	times	the	number	of	 neurons	 in	 the	 brain	 and	 about	 a	 thousand	 times	 the	 number	 of	seconds	in	the	history	of	the	Universe.14		While	 this	 may	 be	 somewhat	 hyperbolic–	 given	 all	 the	 duplications,	redundancies,	etc.–	implication	is	that,	with	the	20-word	constraint	removed,	the	human	mind	can	understand	a	limitless	range	of	novel	sentences,	even	though	it	understands	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 words.	 A	 great	 success	 of	 the	 language	 of	thought	version	of	 representational	 theory	of	mind,	 then,	 is	 that	 it	 can	account	for	 this	 productivity	 in	 a	 simple	way:	 by	 ascribing	 to	mental	 states	 features	 of	language	 like	 compositional	 semantics,	 a	 subject/predicate	 distinction	 and	certain	logical	devices.	It	is	difficult	to	see	how	a	view	of	concepts	can	account	for	these	 features	of	 thought	without	 incorporating	a	 system	of	mental	particulars	with	functions	between	them.		Arguments	 for	 the	 abilities	 view	 will	 take	 the	 form	 of	 objections	 against	 the	representational	 theory	 of	 mind,	 including	 for	 example,	 the	 vicious	 regress	 of	representational	 states:	 if	 a	mental	 state	 represents	 an	 object	 it	 seems	 that	 to	have	a	function	it	would	need	to	be	read	by	another	state,	which	would	need	to	represent	the	representation	and	so	on	ad	infinitum.	Relatedly,	and	as	mentioned	above,	some	have	argued	that	the	representation	simply	adds	another	step	to	be																																																									14	Margolis	and	Laurence	(2007:	563).	
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explained.	Daniel	Dennett	 argues	 that	we	have	many	beliefs	 that	may	not	 ever	obtain	 as	 mental	 representations,	 such	 as	 the	 belief	 that	 Zebras	 don’t	 wear	
overcoats	 in	 the	wild	 (Dennett	 1977.)	 Finally,	 successes	 in	 embodied	 cognition	and	 psychological	 models	 like	 connectionism	 have	 provided	 explanatory	frameworks	 that	 do	 not	 imply	 representation.15	Margolis	 and	 Laurence	 (2007)	offer	a	defence	to	these	objections.		To	 summarise:	 concepts	 can	 either	 be	 understood	 as	 (i)	 Fregean	 senses,	 (ii)	abilities	 of	 psychological	 agents	 or	 (iii)	mental	 representations.	 Given	 that	 the	phenomenal	 view	 I	 am	 advancing	 proceeds	 from	 an	 argument	 about	 the	psychology	of	music	experience,	it	should	be	noted	that	both	(i)	and	(ii)	will	offer	nothing	 substantive,	 save	 for	 helping	 define	 (negatively)	 the	 relevant	 sense	 of	concept.	 This	 is	 because	 (i)	 and	 (ii)	 say	 nothing	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 mental	processes,	nor	of	the	relation	between	mental	states	and	the	world.	The	Fregean	view	conceives	of	perceptual	states	in	terms	of	‘modes	of	presentation’	which	do	not	help	explain	characteristics	of	thought	but	rather	how	thought	can	map	onto	the	 world	 outside	 it;	 the	 abilities	 view	 has	 currency	 as	 an	 anthropological	framework	but	again	offers	no	insight	into	mental	processes	themselves,	even	if	it	might	allow	that	concepts	are	cognitive	entities.	A	theory	that	utilises	mental	representation	 can	 give	 an	 account	 of	 the	 properties	 of	mental	 processes	 just	because	such	a	view	can	claim	that	mental	processes	represent	the	properties	of	objects	or	language.		Concepts,	then,	are	mental	particulars,	identified	as	mental	representations,	that	are	 subject	 to	 rules	 similar	 to	 natural	 language	 such	 as	 compositionality	 and	syntactical	structure.	 In	developing	an	argument	 for	a	phenomenal	view	I	have	included	 views	 that	 construe	 musical	 movement	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 inferring	concepts	under	the	rubric	of	 ‘abstract	views’,	which	needs	clarifying	as	it	 is	not	immediately	 clear	 how	 a	mental	 representation	 can	 be	 called	 abstract.	Mental	representations	 are	 subjective	 and	 private,	 but	 while	 particular	 mental	
																																																								15	See	Shapiro	(2010)	for	review	of	recent	work	in	embodied	cognition	and	see	chapter	1	for	discussion	of	connectionism.	
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representations	may	be	unique	to	their	possessor,	they	can	still	belong	to	a	type.	Consider	the	sentence:		
Rose	is	a	rose	is	a	rose	is	a	rose		In	 one	 sense	 of	 ‘word’	 this	 sentence	 contains	 10	 words,	 in	 another	 sense	 it	contains	3.	The	first	sense	of	‘word’	here	refers	to	tokens	while	the	second	sense	refers	to	types.	If	I	write	down	the	word	rose	on	a	pad,	the	ink	on	the	page	will	be	a	unique	token	of	a	type	of	word.	The	same	type	of	word	will	be	a	token	if	I	utter	the	word	rose,	or	if	I	type	it,	or	if	someone	else	writes	or	utters	it.	Tokens	need	not	resemble	each	other	to	belong	to	the	same	type:	for	example	the	letter	a	and	the	letter	A.	 In	this	way,	we	can	imagine	how	my	concept	x	 is	distinct	from	any	other	person’s	concept	x	while	being	of	the	same	type–	having	the	same	content.	Types	are	independent	of	minds,	are	sharable	and	are	not	tied	to	a	place	in	time:	they	are	abstract	and	unique.	Tokens,	on	the	other	hand,	are	concrete	particulars	like	 pixels	 on	 the	 computer	 screen,	 ink	 on	 the	 page	 or	 my	 mental	 states.	 If	concepts	 did	 not	 have	 the	property	 of	 being	 abstract–	what	 Laura	Duhau	 calls	‘the	 Publicity	 Constraint’–	 communication	 would	 be	 impossible. 16 	On	 this	understanding	of	concepts	as	mental	representations,	then,	concepts	are	tokened	as	subjective	mental	representations	but	belong	to	types,	making	them	abstract	in	the	senses	alluded	to.	A	theory	that	construes	musical	movement	in	terms	of	conceptual	content	thus	construes	musical	movement	as	abstract.			
1.5		Understanding	the	term	‘Nonconceptual’.		Some	 initial	 caveats:	 the	 phenomenal	 view	need	 only	 commit	 to	 the	 view	 that	perception	 can	 be	 nonconceptual,	 not	 the	 view	 that	 all	 perception	 is	nonconceptual.	 The	 weaker	 position	 is	 sufficient	 to	 permit	 the	 claim	 that	 a	phenomenal	 view	 does	 need	 to	 commit	 to–	 that	 musical	 movement	 is	nonconceptual.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 emphasised	 that	 I	 am	 here	 dealing	 with	 the	
																																																								16	See	Duhau	2011:364.	
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experience	of	nonconceptual	perception,	implying	that	nonconceptual	perception	occurring	at	a	sub-personal	level	is	not	relevant.		The	 experience	 of	 nonconceptual	 perception	 is	 characterised	 as	 an	 experience	that	is	in	some	sense	inconsistent	with	the	experiencer’s	propositional	attitude:	i.e.	 the	 attitude	 determined	 by	 the	 experiencer’s	 concepts,	where	 concepts	 are	mental	 particulars	 or	 representations.	 There	 are	 several	 senses	 in	 which	 a	subject’s	propositional	attitude	might	be	 inconsistent	with	her	experience.	 It	 is	apt	 to	 list	 some	of	 these	here,	with	 the	note	 that,	 for	 reasons	pertaining	 to	 the	cross-disciplinary	nature	of	this	thesis,	only	two	issues	will	be	dealt	with	in	any	detail	thereafter:	it	has	been	argued	that	(1)	perceptual	experience	is	analogue	where	conceptual	content	is	digital	(Dretske	1981:	Ch.6);	(2)	perceptual	experience	is	unit-free,	making	it	impossible	to	express	in	propositional	terms	(Peacocke	1986,	1989);	(3)	 without	 recourse	 to	 the	 nonconceptual,	 it	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	acquisition	or	learning	of	concepts	can	be	explained	given	that	an	account	that	precludes	 the	nonconceptual	would	need	 to	presuppose	possession	of	the	very	concepts	that	are	acquired	in	perception;	(4)	perceptual	experience	is	determined	by	situation	in	a	way	that	is	not	captured	 by	 the	 subject’s	 concepts,	 for	 example	 the	 experience	 of	 the	colour	red	differs	greatly	under	different	light-conditions	in	a	way	that	is	not	captured	by	the	concept	‘red’	(Kelly	2001);	(5)	a	powerful	utility	for	proponents	of	nonconceptual	perception	can	be	found	 in	 the	 argument	 from	 infant/animal	 cognition,	 which	 claims	 that	infants	 and	 animals	 appear	 to	 have	 perceptual	 experiences	 of	 objects	commensurate	with	 our	 own	 but	 do	 not	 adopt	 a	 propositional	 attitude	towards	such	objects	(Peacocke	2001);	(6)	 perception	 may	 present	 states	 of	 affairs	 that	 are	 contradictory	 or	impossible,	such	as	perceptual	illusions	or	Escher	drawings;	(7)	 perceptual	 experience	 may	 be	 more	 fine	 grained	 than	 a	 subject’s	concepts	allow.		
	 26	
An	overview	of	each	position	is	given	by	Bermudez	and	Cahen	(2008).	Given	the	remit	 of	 this	 essay,	 that	 most	 attention	 has	 been	 given	 to	 (6)	 and	 (7)	 in	 the	literature,	and	that	(6)	and	(7)	are	directly	relevant	to	the	argument	developed	below,	I	will	not	discuss	(1)-(5)	further.		The	 recent	 debate	 on	 the	 nonconceptual	 has	 been	 shaped	 in	 large	 part	 by	arguments	 concerning	 illusion.	Tim	Crane	 (1988)	gives	an	early	account	of	 the	nonconceptual	proceeding	from	reflection	on	the	Waterfall	Illusion.	This	type	of	illusion,	known	as	‘motion	aftereffect’,	presents	an	experience	of	movement	in	an	object	that	does	not	move.	Since	the	subject	holds	the	belief	that	the	object	does	not	move	but	experiences	it	as	moving,	she	holds	a	belief	that	contradicts	some	aspect	of	her	experience.	Insofar	as	a	subject	cannot	hold	contradictory	beliefs–	i.e.	the	belief	that	the	object	is	moving	and	that	it	is	not	moving–	some	aspect	of	the	experience	of	motion	aftereffect	 is	nonconceptual,	namely	the	aspect	of	 the	appearance	of	motion.	I	consider	this	contradiction	further	below	in	the	section	on	musical	movement	as	perceptual	illusion.17		(7)	 above	 also	 provides	 a	 useful	 characterisation	 of	 the	 nonconceptual	 as	experience	that	is	at	a	finer	grain	than	a	subject’s	concepts	can	allow.	Bermudez	and	Cahen	summarise	thus:		 Arguably,	 I	 can	perceptually	discriminate	many	more	 colors	 and	 shapes	than	 I	 currently	 have	 concepts	 for.	 Although	 I	 may	 be	 capable	 of	discriminating	 between	 two	 color	 chips	 of	 very	 similar	 shades	 of	 red,	
red27	and	red29,	not	being	an	expert	on	colors	I	will	not	have	the	concepts	
red27	 and	 red29.	 With	 my	 limited	 conceptual	 repertoire,	 I	 will	 correctly	judge	both	color	chips	to	be	red.	However,	I	will	so	judge	on	the	basis	of	experiences	whose	contents	are	much	more	specific	and	fine	grained	in	a	way	that	cannot	be	captured	by	my	conceptual	capacities.	(Bermúdez	and	Cahen:	2008)																																																										17	For	further	discussion	see	Mellor	(1988),	Crane	(1988),	Crane	(1992),	and	Gunther	(2001),	Bermudez	and	Cahen	(2008).	
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It	seems,	then,	that	we	can	discriminate	between	colours,	shapes,	sounds	etc.	in	a	way	that	 is	 limited	only	by	the	physiology	of	our	relevant	perceptual	capacities	and	 not	 by	 our	 conceptual	 capacities.	 The	 fineness	 of	 grain	 of	 nonconceptual	discrimination	 as	 it	 applies	 to	 music	 perception	 is	 considered	 below	 on	 the	section	on	cognitive	categorisation.		It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 proponents	 of	 the	 nonconceptual	 occupy	 one	 side	 of	 a	debate,	 where	 proponents	 of	 the	 opposing	 side	 argue	 that	 all	 perceptual	experience	is	conceptual.	The	most	important	argument	against	the	notion	of	the	nonconceptual	 relates	 to	 what	 Wilfred	 Sellers	 termed	 the	 myth	 of	 the	 given.	Sellers	was	aiming	his	 critique	at	 a	 form	of	 foundationalism,	 the	 thesis	 that	 all	knowledge	 rests	 on	 some	basic	 foundation	of	 justified	belief	 or	non-inferential	knowledge.	This	foundationalist	view	of	epistemology	deflects	scepticism	about	the	possibility	of	certainty	in	knowledge	by	invoking	a	semantic	given–	a	concept	or	 concepts	 that	 do	 not	 rely	 on	 prior	 knowledge	 but	 has	 meaning	 derived	immediately	 from	sensation.	However,	while	 the	meaning	of	 such	concepts	are	given	in	perception,	they	must	also	occupy	the	‘space	of	reasons’–	they	must	be	able	 to	 relate	 to	other	concepts	and	share	similar	properties	 like	propositional	form.	Simply	put,	the	‘given’	is	a	cognitive	state	that	has	some	positive	epistemic	status–	 i.e.,	 constitutes	 knowledge	 or	 some	 function	 of	 knowledge	 (like	justification)–	and	 that	 is	both	epistemically	 independent–	does	not	depend	on	prior	 knowledge–	 and	 also	 holds	 in	 some	 inferential	 relation	 with	 prior	knowledge.	 According	 to	 John	 Mcdowell,	 ‘Givenness	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 Myth	would	 be	 an	 availability	 for	 cognition	 to	 subjects	 whose	 getting	 what	 is	supposedly	Given	 to	 them	does	not	draw	on	capacities	 required	 for	 the	sort	of	cognition	in	question’	(2008:	1.)		
The	 myth	 of	 the	 given,	 then,	 presents	 a	 major	 obstacle	 to	 the	 idea	 of	nonconceptual	 content,	 motivating	 conceptualism:	 the	 view	 that	 all	 perceptual	experience	 is	 conceptual.	 Since	 all	 cognitive	 states	 must	 occupy	 the	 space	 of	reasons,	all	cognitive	states	would	appear	to	need	to	be	of	a	homogeneous	kind,	and	 since	 we	 are	 thinkers	 whose	 thought	 has	 concepts	 as	 constituents,	 all	cognitive	states	must	be	conceptual.	Again,	it	is	not	in	the	remit	of	this	essay	to	
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weigh	in	on	such	a	debate,	but	it	is	clear	that	both	sides	have	a	burden	of	proof.	An	 argument	 for	 nonconceptual	 perception	 must	 establish	 how	 the	nonconceptual	can	enter	the	space	of	reasons	and	so	link	with	the	conceptual.	An	argument	 for	 conceptual	 perception	 must	 explain	 the	 fineness	 of	 grain	 of	perceptual	experience,	how	a	homogeneous	content	of	perception	can	contradict	itself	 in	 illusory	 experience,	 the	 cognition	 of	 non-human	 animals	 who	 do	 not	appear	to	have	concepts,	and	those	other	claims–	(1)-(4)–	to	the	nonconceptual	above.18		The	 final	 point	 that	 must	 be	 noted	 to	 clarify	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 ‘concept’	 and	‘nonconceptual’	 is	 that	 nonconceptual	 experience	 can	 be	 cast	 as	 a	 form	 of	representational	content,	such	that	to	perceive	a	shade	of	red	nonconceptually	is	to	 represent	 a	 particular	 content.	 Indeed,	 the	 nomenclature	 ‘nonconceptual	content’	 is	 preferred	 by	most	 philosophers	 writing	 on	 the	 nonconceptual.	 But	this	 is	 not	 just	 a	 terminological	 issue,	 since	 the	 employment	 of	 a	 system	 of	content	 and	 representation	 in	 describing	 the	 nonconceptual	 would	 render	opaque	the	distinction	with	conceptual,	understood	as	a	mental	representation.	Significantly,	 the	 psychological	 models	 I	 review	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 phenomenal	view	 are	 united	 by	 their	 resistance	 to	 this	 commitment	 to	 representational	content	 (with	 the	 possible	 exception	 of	 cognitive	 categorisation	 below,	 when	unqualified),	 where	 nonconceptual	 is	 opposed	 to	 conceptual	 understood	 as	entailing	mental	representation.		It	is	thus	necessary	to	consider	just	one	other	way	of	distinguishing	the	notion	of	nonconceptual	 from	 that	 of	 mental	 representation,	 so	 as	 to	 deflect	 both	 the																																																									18	Conceptualists	have	rebutted	the	fineness	of	grain	argument	by	appeal	to	demonstrative	
concepts	(McDowell	1994,	2006,	Brewer	1999,	2005).	According	to	this	view,	we	are	being	overly	general	in	restricting	the	contents	of	perception	to	concepts	such	as	red27	or	red28,	since	perception	may	have	as	its	content	demonstrative	concepts	like	that	shade.	This	tactic	attempts	to	show	that	conceptual	capacities	are	as	fine	grained	as	discriminatory	capacities.	Some	information	is	clearly	lost	when	a	demonstrative	concept	transitions	to	a	belief	(e.g.	‘that	is	red27’),	but	this	is	due	to	a	transition	from	a	more	determinate	concept	to	a	less	determinate	concept.	A	key	objection	to	this	argument	is	that	concepts	must	be	constituents	of	thoughts,	which	implies	that	they	must	be	available	independently	of	the	presence	of	a	particular	perceptual	object.	This	has	been	called	‘the	re-identification	condition’	on	concept	possession	(Kelly	2001).	See	Bermudez	and	Cahen	(2008)	for	further	points	against	demonstratives.	For	arguments	for	the	nonconceptual	against	the	myth	of	the	given	see	Heck	(2000),	Peacocke	(2001),	Lerman	(2010.)	
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problem	 of	 distinguishing	 nonconceptual	 from	 mental	 representation	 and	 the	problem	of	the	myth	of	the	given.	This	is	to	appeal	to	a	content/state	distinction.19	On	 this	 view,	 all	 content	 is	 conceptual	 but	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 enter	 into	 a	nonconceptual	 mental	 state;	 as	 such,	 the	 myth	 of	 the	 given	 evaporates	 and	conceptualists	 can	 be	 appeased.	 Heck	 (2000)	 introduced	 the	 state/content	distinction,	suggesting	that		 one	might	think	that	there	is	no	reason	we	must	distinguish	the	kinds	of	contents	 beliefs	 and	 perceptions	 have:	 Whatever	 one	 might	 take	 the	contents	of	beliefs	to	be–	Fregean	Thoughts,	say–	there	is	no	reason	that	perceptions	 cannot	have	 the	 same	sorts	of	 things	as	 their	 contents;	 it	 is	just	 that	 the	 contents	 of	 a	 thinker's	 perceptual	 states	 can,	 while	 the	contents	 of	 her	 beliefs	 cannot,	 involve	 concepts	 she	 does	 not	 possess.	(p.485)		A	 ‘concept-dependent	 state’	 cannot	 be	 entered	 unless	 the	 subject	 has	 the	concepts	 necessary	 to	 specify	 its	 content	 (where	 ‘content’	 is	 understood	 as	 an	abstract	object	and	bearer	of	truth	that	is	irrespective	of	a	subject	or	context);	a	‘concept-independent’	state	can	be	entered	when	the	subject	does	not	have	the	concepts	required	to	specify	its	content.20		Philosophers	 have	 tended	 to	 favour	 the	 content	 view	 of	 nonconceptual	perception,	since	 the	burden	of	 truth	 is	 to	suggest	how	a	state	can	be	concept-independent.	By	appeal	to	nonconceptual	content	it	is	clear	how	a	state	might	be	concept-independent:	 it	 is	a	bearer	of	nonconceptual	content.21	However,	Laura	Duhau	 (2014)	 makes	 a	 case	 for	 the	 state	 view	 by	 suggesting	 that	 a	 Fregean	semantics	 can	 be	 maintained	 to	 account	 for	 a	 subject’s	 cognitive	 relationship	with	the	world	(or	truth-conditions)	but	that	the	distinction	between	states	is	at	a	psychological	level,	concerning	mental	representations.																																																										19	For	more	on	the	state/content	distinction	see	Byrne	2005;	Crowther	2006;	Heck	2000,	2007;	Speaks	2005,	Duhau	2014.	20	On	Fregean	Thoughts	see	Noonan	1984.	21	See	Bermudez	2007.	
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For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 essay,	 the	 state	 view	 of	 the	 nonconceptual	 can	 be	adopted,	 and	 the	 distinction	 between	 a	 concept-dependent	 and	 a	 concept-independent	 state	 can	be	given	as	a	distinction	between	a	 state	mediated	by	a	mental	 representation	 and	 a	 state	 that	 is	 not	 mediated	 by	 a	 mental	representation.	 The	 psychological	 studies	 reviewed	 from	 embodied	 cognition	and	ecological	theory	support	the	view	that	the	notion	of	representation	is	idle	in	explanations	 of	 perceptual	 experience.	 If	 perceptual	 experience	 is	minimally	 a	conscious	 psychological	 response	 to	 something	 we	 become	 acquainted	 with	through	our	senses,	 it	 is	not	clear	why	it	must	be	understood	in	terms	of	some	other	thing,	such	as	a	sentence	or	proposition.	If	I	look	at	a	green	desk,	what	is	it	to	 say	 that	 I	 ‘nonconceptually	 represent	 that	 it	 is	green’;	 if	 this	 does	 not	mean	that	I	entertain	the	thought	that	it	is	green,	or	the	utterance	‘it	is	green’–	both	of	which	must	be	conceptual–	what	is	it	‘to	represent	that	it	is	green.’	It	may	be	that	making	my	experience	about	the	greenness	of	the	desk,	without	entertaining	any	thoughts	concerning	its	description,	takes	great	concentration,	and	only	follows	from	 the	 thought	 ‘what	 is	 it	 to	 experience	 greenness	 nonconceptually?’	 The	ascription	of	mental	representation	to	such	an	experience	cannot	be	justified	in	the	way	 that	such	an	ascription	 to	conceptual	 states	 is	 justified,	given	 that:	my	nonconceptual	 experience	 of	 greenness	 does	 not	 have	 the	 characteristics	 of	thought	such	as	productivity	and	systematicity;	and,	insofar	as	I	do	not	take	up	a	propositional	attitude–	such	as	belief–	towards	the	green	desk,	there	are	no	truth	conditions	for	a	semantics	to	deal	with.		The	point	at	which	an	explanation	of	nonconceptual	content	would	bottom	out	is	likely	the	point	at	which	the	constituents	of	propositions	are	explained,	meaning	recourse	to	models	like	Russellian	or	possible-world	semantics.	But	considering	this	 area	will	 not	 greatly	 enrich	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	abstract	and	phenomenal	views	of	musical	movement,	given	that	the	purposes	of	this	section	are	to	indicate	the	relevant	sense	of	concept–	psychological,	mental	representation–	 and	 give	 reasons	 why	 recourse	 to	 nonconceptual	 content	 is	instructive–	e.g.	illusion	and	fineness	of	grain	of	perceptual	experience–	with	the	intention	 of	 using	 the	 terms	 ‘conceptual’	 and	 ‘nonconceptual’	 (or	 their	derivatives)	to	apply	to	conceptions	of	musical	movement.	
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1.6	Concluding	Summary.		Concepts	 are	 mental	 particulars,	 identified	 with	 mental	 representations,	 that	belong	to	types	and	so	are	sharable	and	abstract.	This	is	the	default	position	in	philosophy	of	mind,	associated	with	the	representational	theory	of	mind,	and	is	to	be	distinguished	from	two	other	distinct	views–	that	concepts	are	abilities	and	that	 concepts	 are	 Fregean	 senses.	 The	 view	 of	 concepts	 as	 mental	representations	can	account	for	the	systematicity	and	productivity	of	thought	by	giving	mental	representations	rules	consistent	with	language,	such	as	syntax	and	compositionality.	 Representational	 theory	 of	mind	 can	 also	 draw	 on	 extensive	research	 in	 artificial	 intelligence	 to	 show	 how	 a	 physical	 form	 can	 carry	 out	computations	over	representations.		Arguments	that	perception	is	or	can	be	nonconceptual	are	given	above	in	(1)-(7),	but	I	focused	on	the	argument	that	illusion	presents	a	contradiction	that	cannot	obtain	over	a	homogeneous	content	and	the	argument	that	a	subject’s	perceptual	experience	has	a	finer	grain	than	her	conceptual	capacities	allow.	The	myth	of	the	
given	 presents	 an	 obstacle	 to	 a	 view	 of	 perception	 as	 nonconceptual	 by	suggesting	 that	 the	 content	 of	 perception	 must	 be	 of	 a	 homogeneous	 kind	 to	permit	of	inferential	relations	between	perception	and	a	subject’s	concepts.	This	problem	 that	 the	 nonconceptual	 seems	 excluded	 from	 the	 space	 of	 reasons	serves	 to	 motivate	 the	 view	 that	 all	 cognitive	 content	 is	 conceptual.	 The	 last	point	can	be	conceded	to	the	conceptualist	 if	appeal	 is	made	to	a	state/content	distinction	 where	 all	 content	 is	 given	 as	 conceptual	 but	 concept-independent	states	 are	 possible.	 A	 state/content	 distinction	 is	 also	 useful	 in	 developing	 the	sense	of	nonconceptual	pertinent	to	this	essay,	which	does	not	employ,	or	have	use	for,	the	notion	of	mediating	representations.		The	extended	discussions	of	both	concept	and	nonconceptual	also	help	elucidate	the	 key	 point	 that	 characterises	 the	 distinction	 between	 phenomenal	 and	abstract	views,	made	 in	 the	beginning	of	chapter	1:	 that	 the	 latter	conceives	of	the	musically	aesthetic	as	independent	of	perception	while	the	former	conceives	of	the	musically	aesthetic	as	dependent	on	perception.	In	the	view	given	above,	
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the	contents	of	concepts	are	abstract	particulars	and	so	are	independent	of	any	particular	instance	of	perception,	while	nonconceptual	experience	is	understood	as	 a	mental	 state	 that	 does	 depend	 on	 a	 particular	 instance	 of	 perception.	 No	further	 focused	 treatment	 of	 issues	 in	 philosophy	 of	mind	will	 be	 given	 in	 the	thesis,	 but	 the	 above	 serves	 to	 clarify	 key	 terms	 that	 will	 be	 used,	 including:	conceptual,	nonconceptual,	experience,	mental	representation,	abstract,	content,	syntax,	semantic.		Chapter	2	makes	use	of	the	terminological	definition	wrought	above	by	giving	an	account	 of	 the	 psycho-acoustic	 basis	 of	 musical	 movement.	 While	 developing	terms	from	philosophy	of	mind	and	cognitive	science	is	useful	in	understanding	how	music	 is	 perceived	 and	experienced,	 the	primary	 focus	of	 the	 following	 is	the	 musically	 aesthetic,	 conceived	 either	 as	 a	 musicological,	 analytical	 or	aesthetic	object.		 	
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Chapter	2		
	
	
The	Psycho-acoustic	Basis	of	Musical	Movement.	
	
	
2.1	Introductory	Summary.	
	Since	the	ancients,	those	who	have	devoted	their	thoughts	to	music	have	tended	to	 rely	 on	 the	 idea	 of	movement	when	 lending	 description	 to	 their	 experience.	There	is	evidence	that	movement	has	been	identified	as	a	fundamental	aspect	of	music	for	several	millennia,	the	concept	having	a	place	in	Aristoxenus’s	treatise	
Elementa	harmonica,	dated	c.300	B.C.22	Concepts	of	motion	and	space	are	central	to	 our	 understanding	 of	 music,	 in	 analysis,	 aesthetics	 and	 psychology.	Philosophers	 have	 long	 seen	movement	 as	 a	 primary	 research	 area	 in	musical	aesthetics,	 with	 Eduard	 Hanslick	 coining	 the	 phrase	 ‘tönend	 bewegte	 Formen’	(sonically	 moving	 forms)	 in	 the	 19th	 century.	 Today,	 musicological	 analysis	employs	a	lexicon	steeped	in	reference	to	motion	and	space,	with	these	concepts	also	being	given	extensive	attention	in	the	field	of	empirical	psychology.		That	the	concept	of	musical	movement	has	such	utility	suggests	 its	significance	to	musical	experience.	To	describe	a	melody	as	ascending	is	not	just	to	employ	a	given	lexicon,	but	to	reference	a	feeling	attendant	with	a	particular	kind	of	tonal	sequence.	The	sense	of	 rising	up	 through	several	plateaus	 in	 space	 is	powerful	when	listening	to	the	cyclic	modulations	of	the	refrain	of	Golden	Lady	by	Stevie	Wonder.	Relatedly,	a	V7b9	chord	will	seem	to	subject	a	force	towards	the	I	chord	in	 a	 manner	 the	 (suitably	 encultured)	 listener	 perceives	 as	 transparent	 and																																																									22	See	Lee	Rothfarb,	2002.	
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unproblematic.	 Such	 fundamental	 musical	 effects	 suggest	 equally	 fundamental	questions:	who	or	what	moves	and	how	is	this	apparent	movement	possible?	
	The	first	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	develop	the	distinction	between	a	phenomenal	
view	 and	 an	 abstract	 view	 of	 musical	 movement.	 This	 approach	 focuses	 on	 a	particular	 feature	 of	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 so	 as,	 firstly	 to	 circumscribe	 an	initial	explanandum	narrower	than	just	‘the	musically	aesthetic’,	and	secondly	to	develop	the	distinction	in	relation	to	a	particularly	significant	and	well-reported	feature	of	the	musically	aesthetic.	The	phenomenal	view	advanced	suggests	that	musical	movement	is	rooted	in	nonconceptual,	embodied	experience.		A	second,	related,	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	develop	a	distinction	between	acoustic	and	psycho-acoustic.	While	it	has	been	claimed,	notably	by	Roger	Scruton	(1997),	that	the	phenomenon	of	musical	movement	cannot	be	captured	adequately	by	an	account	of	the	acoustic	properties	of	sound,	this	does	not	support	the	claim	that	musical	movement	is	specifically	musical	or	irreducible:	explanations	in	terms	of	acoustic	properties	do	not	exhaust	the	possibilities	of	explanation	in	non-musical	terms,	 since	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 account	 that	 entails	 listener	 psychology	 is	available;	certain	features	of	musical	experience	such	as	the	sense	of	movement	may	be	opaque	under	an	acoustic	conception	of	musical	sound	but	transparent	under	a	psycho-acoustic	 conception.	The	main	portion	of	 this	 chapter	argues	a	psycho-acoustic	 conception	 by	 finding	 evidence	 in	 recent	 researches	 in	music-psychology;	the	phenomenal	view	offered	rests	on	a	psycho-acoustic	conception.		Chapter	structure:		 1. Describing	music	as	movement.	2. Discussion	and	characterisation	of	the	abstract	view.	3. Further	 characterisation	 of	 the	 abstract	 view	 by	 considering	 the	distinction	between	musical,	acoustical	and	psycho-acoustical	accounts	of	musical	movement.	4. Drawing	on	existing	work	in	music-psychology	to	give	a	psycho-acoustic	account	of	musical	movement.	
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5. Giving	a	psycho-acoustic	account	of	the	functions	of	music	perception	that	underlie	musical	movement.	6. Concluding	Summary.			
2.2	Describing	music	as	movement.		Consider	 the	 first	 phrase	 of	 the	 nursery	 rhyme	 ‘Twinkle	 Twinkle	 Little	 Star.’	Beginning	on	C,	the	melody	progresses	through	G	and	A	before	a	minim	count	on	G,	and	 then	 through	F-E-D	 to	return	 to	C.	There	are	a	number	of	musicological	statements	 to	make	 about	 this	 tune,	 e.g.:	 intervals	 between	 adjacent	 notes	 are	limited	to	seconds	along	the	C	major	scale	and	one	instance	of	a	fifth	(C-G);	the	only	rhythmic	subdivisions	employed	are	crotchet	and	minim,	the	phrase	being	composed	 of	 two	 identical	 rhythmic	 themes;	 the	 underlying	 harmony	 of	 the	phrase	is	I-V-I,	serving	as	a	function	of	the	opening	tonic	note	(C),	the	dominant	minim	 at	 the	 end	 of	 bar	 two	 and	 the	 tonic	minim	 at	 the	 end	 of	 bar	 four;	 the	phrase	is	perfectly	diatonic	and	is	closed	perfectly	by	the	V-I	harmony.		Correlated	 with	 this	 plausible	 musicological	 account	 is	 an	 equally	 plausible	account	 in	terms	of	physical	movement.	We	hear	a	 jump	in	the	melody	between	the	second	C	and	the	G,	while	the	other	notes	seem	to	move	in	step;	the	melody	
rests	on	 G	 in	 the	 second	 bar	 but	 the	 instability	 of	 this	note	 enacts	 a	pull	away	from	 it	 before	 the	 descent	 in	 stepwise	 fashion	 towards	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 C	where	 we	 once	 again	 rest.	 There	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 movement	 over	 a	 contoured	domain-	 rising	 up	 to	 an	 A	 with	 leap	 and	 step–	 and	 becoming	 situated	 in	 the	harmonically	close	note	of	the	dominant.	A	path	is	seemingly	traversed,	from	C	to	G	and	back	to	C,	and	movement	away	from	C	is	balanced	by	its	return	in	virtue	of	the	 inertial	 rhythmic	 theme.	 Throughout	 the	 melody	 there	 is	 a	 kind	 of	
momentum,	 a	 premonitory	 assumption	 of	 progress	 predicated	 on	 the	immediately	 perceived,	 whereby	 any	 sudden	 halt	 during	 the	 phrase	 would	destroy	it	as	music.	This	momentum	is	exhausted	only	once	the	music	has	passed	
through	the	second	rhythmic	period	and	the	melody	has	found	its	way	back	to	the	
home	pitch	of	the	tonic.	
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	The	 strict	 musicological	 account	 is	 at	 best	 dry	 and	 esoteric,	 at	 worst	 an	ineffective	analysis.	Conversely,	the	latter	account	is	far	more	descriptive	of	the	experience	 of	 ‘Twinkle	 Twinkle,’	 purely	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 reference	 to	 motion.	Effective	 musicological	 analyses	 will,	 invariably,	 reference	 motion	 in	 order	 to	render	an	experience	while	drawing	on	tight	analytical	terminology	to	properly	delineate	 the	 subject	 matter.	 But	 the	 distinction	 between	 these	 two	 accounts	illuminates	the	distinction	between	projecting	a	bespoke	lexicon	onto	music	and	making	 a	 metaphorical	 characterization.	 There	 is	 a	 great	 divide	 between	 a	phenomenon	that	permits	of	a	lexicon	and	one	that	operates	as	a	metaphor,	and	the	richness	of	 this	metaphor–	 journey	through	physical	space–	suggests	a	great	leap	indeed.	Not	only	are	motional	references	intricate	in	music-studies,	they	are	also	 necessary.	 G5	 is	 no	 higher	 than	 C5,	 but	 rather	 has	 a	 shorter	 wavelength.	Even	 when	 we	 describe	 a	 passage	 as	 fast	 or	 slow	 we	 use	 a	 metaphor	 of	movement:	 there	 is	 no	 distinction	 in	 pace	 between	 fast	 and	 slow	 music;	 the	distinction	pertains	to	periods	of	change	e.g.	 the	number	of	beats	that	fit	 into	a	unit	of	time.23			
2.3	Discussion	and	characterisation	of	the	abstract	view.	
	One	of	the	points	of	significance	of	the	metaphor	of	movement	is	that	it	implies	a	gap	 between	 physical	 accounts	 of	 sound	 and	 music-experience.	 Describing	‘Twinkle	Twinkle’	as	 journey	through	physical	space	defies	 the	physical	account	of	 the	 acoustical.	Within	 one	 of	 the	 simplest	 examples	 of	 unified	 and	balanced	music,	a	litany	of	perceptual	features	can	be	postulated	that	depart	not	just	from	the	physics	of	sound	but	also	from	musicology	(and	all	of	which	have	been	given	a	generous	showing	in	music-studies	literature.)	The	apparent	disparity	between	descriptions	of	musical	motion	and	rigorous	empirical	explanation,	coupled	with	the	 plausibility	 and	 indeed	 indispensability	 such	 descriptions	 have	 garnered,	emboldens	 those	 who	 believe	 that	 musical	 matters	 are	 incompatible	 with	science.																																																									23	See	Larson	2012:	chapt.	3.	
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	It	seems	intuitive	to	separate	musical	sound	from	sound	per	se,	and	there	are	of	course	persuasive	 reasons	 to	do	 this.	 In	The	Aesthetics	of	Music,	Roger	 Scruton	defines	 tone	 as	 distinct	 from	 sound;	 tone	 in	 this	 sense	 extends	 well	 beyond	 a	conventional	 conception	 of	 a	 tone	 as	 a	 singly	 distinguishable	 pitch,	 essentially	standing	 for	 the	 elements	 of	 conventional	 musicology–	 rhythm,	 melody	 and	harmony–	along	with	metaphor.	It	could	be	argued	that	when	sound	is	arranged	in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 permit	 of	 description	 in	 terms	 of	 tone,	 the	 acoustical	description	becomes	redundant.		 When	we	hear	music,	we	do	not	hear	sound	only;	we	hear	something	 in	the	 sound,	 something	 which	 moves	 with	 a	 force	 of	 its	 own.	 This	intentional	 object	 of	musical	 perception	 is	 what	 I	 refer	 to	 by	 the	 word	‘tone.’	(1997:	19-20)		For	Scruton,	the	metaphorical	basis	of	music	is	not	limited	to	movement	and	can	be	gleaned	from	most	conventions	of	Western	Art	Music	(even	if	movement	is	at	the	 centre	 of	 his	 argument.)	 The	 role	 of	 metaphor	 in	 Scruton’s	 view	 can	 be	grasped	 by	 considering	 the	 term	 ‘intentional.’	 The	 philosophical	 concept	 of	intentionality	has	been	conflated	with	 ‘representational’,	but	 can	more	 roughly	be	defined	 as	 a	mind’s	 ability	 to	be	 about	 or	 to	 stand	 for	 things,	 properties	 or	states	of	 affairs.	An	 ‘intentional	object’	 is	 then	an	abstract	object	 that	 a	mental	state	 is	about	when	 it	has	 that	 intentional	object.24	The	notion	of	 intentionality	can	 redefine	 tone	 in	 relation	 to	 sound,	 since	 once	 sound	 is	 introduced	 to	 the	human	 sphere	 of	 experience,	 knowledge	 and	 imagination,	 its	 acoustical	properties	pale	in	significance.	Indeed,	it	is	only	when	a	person	listens	to	sound	that	 music	 happens,	 and	 the	 term	 ‘intentionality’	 may	 seem	 to	 capture	 this	transformation	between	sound	and	tone.		‘Intentionality’	 has	 a	 very	 wide	 circumscription,	 being	 inclusive	 of	 most	 any	experience	 that	 is	 about	 or	 represents	 something.	While	 the	 term	 is	 useful	 in	highlighting	 the	 import	of	 the	human	element,	 it	 can	also	 seem	something	of	a																																																									24	Chalmers	(2004)	seems	to	use	‘representational’	and	‘intentional’	interchangeably.	
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blunt	tool.	Ultimately	Scruton	wishes	to	inflate	the	realm	of	musical	possibility	to	cover	all	that	life	identifies	as	meaningful,	with	the	consequence	that	life	may	be	presented	in	musical	form.		 When	we	 attend	 to	 an	 appearance	 for	 its	 own	 sake,	 the	world	 that	we	have	bracketed	comes	back	in	another	form,	as	a	conceptual	order	in	the	thing	perceived.	The	world	is	on	holiday,	and	our	concepts	with	it,	looking	for	the	place	of	rest	 in	the	imagined	picture.	We	should	never	enjoy	this	experience,	 if	 it	 did	 not	 in	 some	way	 communicate	 to	 us	 the	 life	 that	 is	ours—either	 through	 representation,	 or	 through	 some	 system	 of	metaphor	which	implants	our	life	in	the	thing	that	we	perceive.	(Scruton	1997,	229)		This,	 then,	 is	 the	 view	 that	 tone	 communicates	 life,	 and	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	perspicacious	reflection	of	a	full	life	it	has	value.		Scruton’s	 position	 is	 that	 tone	 exists	 only	 in	 an	 imagined	 space,	 formulating	concepts	of	‘virtual	causality’	and	‘phenomenological	force’;	however,	a	view	that	casts	 music	 perception	 as	 consisting	 in	 intentional	 states	 or	 objects	 will	 by	implication	characterise	movement	as	something	a	listener	comes	to	know	about	the	 object–	 a	 ‘conceptual	 order’.	 The	 pertinent	 conception	 of	 metaphor,	 for	Scruton,	 is	 one	 where	 the	 source	 domain	 might	 be	 a	 concept–	 such	 as	 the	concept	of	movement	or	agency–	and	the	artwork	brooking	projection	of	such	a	concept	is	characterized	just	as	a	novel	exploration	of	such	a	concept.	Scruton’s	view	can	thus	be	treated	as	abstract	in	how	it	describes	music	experience	as	an	experience	 of	 representing-as:	 musical	 movement	 is	 a	 feature	 a	 listener	understands	 the	 object	 as	 having,	 and	 this	 understanding	 is	 wrought	 through	ascription	 of	 intentional	 objects	 or	 concepts.25	As	 such,	 musical	 movement	 is	independent	 of	 any	 particular	 instance	 of	 perception	 on	 this	 view.	 Such	 an	experience	 is	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 that	 described	 by	 a	 phenomenal	 view,	where	musical	movement	is	an	effect	that	is	engendered	through	perception	and																																																									25	‘Intentional	objects’	can	be	subsumed	under	the	sense	of	‘concept’	wrought	in	the	section	on	concepts/nonconceptual	insofar	as	an	intentional	state	is	a	representational	state	and	intentional	objects	are	abstract	objects.	
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for	which	any	conscious	ascription	of	movement	to	the	object	is	contingent.		Scruton	thus	gives	us	a	further	characterisation	of	the	abstract	view,	in	perhaps	a	more	nuanced	form	than	that	attributed	to	Hanslick	in	the	thesis	introduction:		 1. Musical	movement	is	an	intentional	object	of	perception.	2. Musical	 movement	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 concepts	 or	 a	 conceptual	order.	3. When	sound	becomes	music,	sound	is	represented	as	musical	movement.	4. Musical	movement	is	an	abstract	object-	i.e.	is	independent	of	a	particular	instance	of	perception.26		While	 1	 and	 2	 are	 paraphrases	 of	 Scruton,	 3	 and	 4	 are	 implications	 I	 am	attributing.		An	initial	objection	to	this	position	is	that	an	experience	of	movement	need	not	be	understood	as	an	experience	of	a	concept;	indeed,	proprioceptive	movement	is	a	paradigm	embodied	experience.	Below	I	will	make	a	case	for	the	phenomenal	view	 by	 gathering	 evidence	 from	 psychology	 which	 suggests	 that	 music	 can	provoke	a	sense	of	movement	without	a	listener	coming	to	know	or	understand	this	movement.	 Suffice	 it	 for	 now	 to	 note	 that	 human	 interaction	 is	 not	 solely	characterised	by	 intentionality;	 listening	 to	 sound	 is	 the	wedding	of	 sound	and	psychology.	As	such,	the	distinction	between	tone	and	sound	can	be	understood	as	a	distinction	between	a	physical	account	of	 sound–	conceived	as	patterns	of	air	convection–	and	a	psychological	account	of	sound–	conceived	as	a	repertoire	of	 psychological	 responses	 wrought	 by	 a	 perceiver	 on	 encountering	 physical	sound.	A	psychological	 account	of	 sound,	 I	 argue,	will	 include	experiences	 that	are	 not	 limited	 to	 intentionality.	 Responsible	 for	 the	 great	 conceptual	 chasm	between	‘sound’	and	‘tone’	is	the	great	complexity	of	the	human	perceiver.	There	will	always	appear	to	be	a	poverty	of	theory	when	only	the	physical	nature	of	a																																																									26	While	Scruton	may	appear	to	speak	more	generally,	in	terms	of	music	perception	or	music	experience	rather	than	musical	movement,	musical	movement	is	central	to	his	account	of	music	experience	and	it	is	clear	that	his	claims	about	music	experience	imply	identical	claims	about	musical	movement.	
	 40	
manifestly	psychological	phenomenon	is	addressed;	this	is	nothing	special	about	music.		Scruton’s	argument	can	be	adopted	if	adapted	so	as	to	suggest	that	the	artwork	does	not	in	fact	proffer	a	picture	of	the	world	in	unworldly	form,	but	provides	the	conditions	under	which	our	own	perceptual	apparatus	can	be	explored.	It	is	less	a	picture	out	onto	the	world	than	a	cognitive	mirror,	giving	an	exhibition	of	our	own	expectancies,	projections,	mental	order	and	auditory	specifications.	 It	may	be	that	the	world	is	reflected	in	aesthetic	experience	through	the	ordering	of	the	aesthetic	 object	 but	 this	 is	 not	 the	world	 of	 things,	 beliefs	 and	 desires	 but	 the	outline	structure	of	such	things,	emptied	of	their	concepts.	Indeed,	the	structure	of	 an	 aesthetic	 object	 is	wrought	 for	 the	 act	 of	 perception	 rather	 than	 for	 the	navigation	 of	 the	 environment.	 The	 aesthetic	 object	 is	 a	 physical	 object	 so	designed	and	manipulated	as	to	present	a	kind	of	perceptual	bonanza–	an	object	with	features	that	complement	the	inner	workings	of	the	mind	and	so	allow	the	listener	to	engage	in	an	intense	experience.			
2.4	Further	characterising	the	abstract	view	by	considering	the	
distinction	 between	 musical,	 acoustical	 and	 psycho-
acoustical	accounts	of	musical	movement.		Many	 have	 dismissed	 empirical	 enquiry	 into	 musical	 sound	 as	 either	 wrong-headed	 or	 heresy.	 To	 make	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 aesthetic	 is	 far	 removed	 from	empirical	 methodologies,	 philosophers	 have	 often	 constructed	 an	 opposition	between	the	musical	and	the	physical.27	Scruton	hints	at	this	division	here:		 When	 we	 hear	 consonance,	 we	 hear	 the	 tones	 as	 resting	 together,	belonging,	 as	 though	 something	 in	 each	 were	 satisfied	 by	 the	 others.	Consonance	 is	something	that	we	hear	 in	 the	sounds:	and	 it	 is	 therefore	maximally	sensitive	to	context,	 like	every	musical,	as	opposed	to	merely																																																									27	See	chapter	5	for	more	examples	in	the	literature	that	separate	the	musical	from	the	empirical.	
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acoustical,	phenomenon	(Scruton	1997:	62)		There	 are,	 as	 Scruton	 makes	 plain,	 major	 divergences	 between	 musical	 and	acoustical	 phenomena.	 Along	 with	 (I)	 the	 context-dependence	 of	 musical	features,	Scruton	instructs	of	various	other	characteristics	tone	has	which	sound	does	not:	(II)	‘quasi	spatial	organisation’	(partitioning	of	sounds	into	tones	with	phenomenal	 verticality);	 (III)	 a	 sense	 of	movement	or	 force;	 (IV)	 arrangement	over	perceptual	dimensions	of	foreground	and	background;	(V)	virtual	causality;	(VI)	maintenance	 of	 clear	 boundaries	between	 features	 like	 phrases;	 (VII)	 and	musical	 individuals,	 like	 repeated	 themes	 or	 harmonies.	 These	 disparities	between	the	musical	and	acoustical	 lead	Scruton	to	make	the	claim	that	within	music	there	resides	an	order	which	‘contains	no	information	about	the	physical	world,	which	stands	apart	 from	the	ordinary	workings	of	cause	and	effect,	and	which	 is	 irreducible	 to	 any	 physical	 organization’	 (1997:	 39.)	 This	 provides	another	initial	characterisation	of	the	abstract	view–	(a)	that	musical	movement	is	irreducible	and	therefore	(b)	musical	movement	is	specifically	musical.28		These	are	unquestionably	persuasive	reasons	to	separate	the	acoustical	from	the	musical,	 although	 they	 are	 not	 clearly	 persuasive	 in	 making	 the	 far	 stronger	claim	Scruton	advances:	couching	music	in	opposition	to	the	acoustic	properties	of	 sound–	understood	 as	 the	 physical	 properties	 of	 sound–	does	not	 justify	 its	opposition	 to	 ‘the	 ordinary	 workings	 of	 cause	 and	 effect’	 or	 ‘any	 physical	organisation’.	 This	 is	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 accounts	 of	 musical	 sound	 are	 not	restricted	 to	 either	 acoustic	 or	musicological	 theory,	 but	 can	 invoke	 theory	 on	the	psycho-acoustic.	It	is	only	if	music	has	features	that	are	non-explicable	under	both	 physical	 and	 psychological	 paradigms	 that	 the	 view	 that	 music	 is	 non-physical	 is	 feasible.	 This	 section	will	 give	 some	 indications	 of	music’s	 psycho-acoustic	nature,	positing	that	 features	of	 tone	can	be	equated	with	non-musical	features	 of	 our	 bodies	 and	 minds,	 before	 the	 next	 section	 gives	 a	 detailed	argument	drawing	on	extensive	research	in	music-psychology.																																																										28	This	characterisation	links	to	that	given	by	reference	to	Hanslick	in	the	introduction	and	is	discussed	in	some	detail	in	chapter	5	when	considering	transcendent	views.	
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Various	 instances	 of	 the	 experience	 of	musical	movement	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 an	embodied	basis.	For	example,	the	terminology	pertaining	to	ascent	of	a	scale	can	be	 tied	 to	 a	 change	 in	 proprioceptive	 phenomenology	 consistent	 with	 an	upwards	movement:	lower	frequencies	are	felt	in	lower	parts	of	the	body	while	higher	 frequencies	 are	only	 registered	by	 the	 ears;	when	an	ascending	 scale	 is	sung	the	attendant	phenomenology	will	register	the	origin	of	each	note	as	rising	up	 through	 the	 singer’s	 body–	 from	 the	 chest	 up	 to	 the	 larynx.	 These	may	 be	tenuous	grounds	for	music’s	sense	of	movement	(as	 is	Scruton	view,	1997:	96)	but	 they	 need	 be	 no	 more	 robust.	 All	 that	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 metaphorical	mapping	 of	 one	 domain	 onto	 another,	 in	 the	 sense	 I	 intend	 it	 here,	 is	 some	relation	between	embodied	experience	and	auditory	experience.		It	can	be	made	apparent,	I	suggest,	that	various	musical	constraints	are	related	to	physical	 constraints	of	a	moving	body.	A	 tone	can	be	distinguished	 in	 isolation	while	 being	 accompanied	 by	 other	 sounds,	 and	 a	 tone	 can	 change	 some	 of	 its	characteristics	while	retaining	others:	a	melody	line	will	typically	contain	notes	of	 different	 pitches	 and	 durations	 but	 maintain	 a	 frequency	 range	 that	differentiates	 it	 from	 other	 parts	 and	 a	 common	 timbre	 resultant	 of	 the	particular	instrument	that	plays	it.	These	characteristics	are	analogous	with	the	movement	 of	 an	 object	 in	 space.	 Imagine	 a	 body,	 perhaps	 a	 person	 or	 animal,	moving	through	an	environment.	This	body	is	distinguished	by	its	own	physical	and	appearance	characteristics,	by	colour	and	shape;	its	aspects	give	it	definition	and	 allow	 a	 perceiver	 to	 identify	 it	 as	 a	 unitary	 body,	 distinguished	 from	 the	landscape	 in	 which	 it	 is	 situated	 and	 yet	 impeccably	 coherent	 in	 its	environmental	interaction.	But	as	the	body	moves,	it	goes	through	changes	both	with	 respect	 to	 its	 own	 characteristics	 and	with	 respect	 to	 its	 surroundings.	A	physical	object	can	only	move	in	a	way	that	adheres	to	the	rules	of	the	physical	world	and	in	accordance	with	its	own	constraints	as	they	reconcile	with	those	of	the	 environment.	 These	 constraints	 bind	 the	 body	 to	 a	 particular	 range	 of	 its	environment	and	imbue	a	rightness	and	order	to	movement,	whether	the	moving	object	is	human,	animal	or	inorganic	matter.		Constraint	permeates	 the	 spatial	world	 in	much	 the	way	 it	 does	music.	Things	
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progress	through	points	in	space,	much	as	music	progresses	through	pitches	and	harmonic	 centres;	 it	would	 be	 a	 perceptual	 confusion	 to	watch	 a	 body	 change	positions	in	an	environment	without	traversing	some	path	between	points,	 just	as	 it	 would	 were	 a	 piece	 to	 change	 key	 every	 few	 beats	 without	 evincing	progression	 between	 target	 keys.	 That	 free	 organic	 movement	 invariably	involves	a	form	of	ambulation	or	oscillation	ensures	that	the	periodicity	we	find	in	rhythm	is	apparent	in	just	about	every	creature	that	moves	in	space.	This	kind	of	 movement	 cannot	 happen	 without	 the	 periodicity	 of	 footsteps	 or	 flapping	wings,	just	as	melody	cannot	happen	without	the	periodicity	of	rhythm.	Musical	themes	or	physical	bodies	are	only	established	where	boundaries	and	categories	are	 established,	 and	 both	music	 and	 animal	 change	 only	within	 the	 particular	parameters	 set	 by	 their	 own	 characteristics	 and	 those	 of	 the	 surrounding	musical/physical	environment.		When	we	watch	something	moving	through	an	environment	we	might	reflect	on	the	 deep	 levels	 of	 structure	 and	 order	 at	 play	 in	 the	 physical	world,	 but	more	likely	we	will	take	them	for	granted.	Music	can	be	a	metaphor	for	movement	not	because	 music	 shares	 substantive	 properties	 with	 movement,	 but	 because	 it	affords	 an	 analogue	 structure.	 The	 link	 between	 points	 in	 space	 and	 music	 is	tenuous,	and	it	seems	the	basic	elements	of	music	could	be	a	metaphor	for	many	other	 things.	 But	 it	 is	 for	 the	 fact	 of	 movement	 being	 so	 fundamental	 an	experience	 that	 music	 can	 potentially	 induce	 an	 experience	 of	 the	 unreal	 by	being	grounded	in	basic	facilities	of	spatial	perception.	It	could	be	argued,	along	with	 Scruton,	 that	 this	 kinship	 of	 music	 and	 movement	 renders	 music	 a	metaphor	 of	 the	world	 in	which	we	 live.	 But	 it	 is	 not	 the	material	 world	 that	music	presents,	it	is	the	underlying	order	through	which	the	world	is	perceived.	Music	 is	 composed	 of	 elements	 that	 serve	 as	 surrogate	 material	 objects–	 and	have	 structural	 consistencies	 with	 real	 perceptual	 objects–	 but	 by	 being	conceptually	empty	these	elements	can	stretch	perceptual	capacities	far	beyond	their	real-world	remit,	and	 it	 is	on	this	widening	of	perceptual	boundaries	 that	music's	aesthetic	value	depends.		The	 distinction	 between	 literal	 representation	 and	 metaphor,	 then,	 is	 here	
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presented	 as	 a	 distinction	 between	 conceptual	 representation	 and	nonconceptual	perception.	When	the	relation	between	music	and	world	is	borne	out,	 it	 is	 the	 nonconceptual	 perceptual	 processes	 that	 come	 to	 the	 fore	 as	substantive	 links,	 while	 the	 higher	 cognitive	 objects	 conflict:	 periodicity,	entrainment,	 categorization,	 embodiment,	 Gestalt	 perception,	 discrimination,	grouping	 and	 ecological	 perception	 are	 all	 true	 common	 aspects	 of	music	 and	non-music;	whereas	trains,	war,	politics	and	personal-level	experience	of	life	are	merely	contingent,	ad	hoc	relations.			
2.5	 Drawing	 on	 existing	 work	 in	 music-psychology	 to	 give	 a	
psycho-acoustic	account	of	musical	movement.		It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 nonconceptual	 perceptual	 elements	 of	 music	 can	operate	in	metaphorical	relationships.	In	chapter	one,	‘metaphor’	was	considered	under	Budd’s	view	in	terms	of	‘characterisation’,	which	parallels	what	is	perhaps	the	 typically	 assumed	 sense	 of	 ‘conceiving	 an	 object	 as	 something	 it	 is	 not.’	Under	 this	 view,	metaphor	may	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 entailing	 a	 concept	 (or	 three	concepts	–	two	incompatible	ones	plus	the	concept	of	incompatibility).	However,	metaphor	 also	 has	 a	 sense	 within	 cognitive	 science.	 The	 main	 points	 of	distinction	 of	 the	 cognitive	 science	 sense	 of	 metaphor	 are	 1–	 metaphor	 is	 a	projection	 from	embodied	experience	and	2–	the	source	domain	of	metaphor	 is	
nonconceptual	(or	preconceptual).29		Were	I	to	utter	the	phrase	‘I	feel	down	today	for	hearing	the	bad	news’,	I	would	expect	the	utterance	to	pass	without	misunderstanding;	I	would	also	not	expect	any	abnormal	attention	be	paid	 to	my	wording.	But	within	 this	 sentence	 is	 the	metaphor	of	emotional	state	as	verticality:	 ‘I	feel	down’	 is	used	to	refer	not	to	a	spatial	position	but	to	a	state	of	mind.	This	is	an	example	of	a	‘metaphor	we	live																																																									29	It	should	be	said	that	to	accept	this	sense	of	metaphor	the	reader	will	need	to	accept	the	possibility	of	embodied	nonconceptual	experience,	a	discussion	of	which,	including	the	arguments	given	by	certain	pertinent	cognitive	scientists	and	music-psychologists,	is	given	below.	
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by’,	wrought	by	Lakoff	and	Johnson	(1980,)	and	is	one	example	of	many.	For	the	metaphor	HAPPY	IS	UP	–	SAD	IS	DOWN,	Lakoff	and	 Johnson	give	 the	 following	examples:		 I'm	 feeling	 up.	 That	 boosted	my	 spirits.	 My	 spirits	 rose.	 You're	 in	 high	spirits.	 Thinking	 about	 her	 always	 gives	me	 a	 lift.	 I'm	 feeling	 down.	 I'm	depressed.	He's	really	 low	these	days.	 I	 fell	 into	a	depression.	My	spirits	sank.	(p.16)		There	are	similar	lists	given	for	consciousness–	e.g.	woke	up–	and	health–	e.g.	fell	ill.	 Indeed,	 Lakoff	 and	 Johnson	 produce	 a	 litany	 of	 examples	 that	 pervade	language	and	as	such	support	their	claim	that	metaphor	can	be	understood	not	merely	as	a	literary	device–	nor	even	just	as	a	lingual	device–	but	as	fundamental	to	our	ordinary	cognitive	system,	in	terms	of	which	we	both	think	and	act	(p.4.)	Metaphorical	projection,	in	other	words,	is	something	that	typically	accompanies	everyday	cognition,	indeed,	is	necessary	for	it.30		The	growing	body	of	literature	surrounding	metaphor	in	this	sense,	both	within	cognitive	 science	 and	 music	 psychology,	 has	 made	 extensive	 use	 of	 the	preconceptual	structures,	image	schemata.	31	Coined	by	Mark	Johnson	in	his	The	
Body	 in	 the	Mind	 (1987),	 ‘schema’	 is	 formulated	 with	 parallels	 to	 the	 Kantian	term,	as	an	imaginative	structure	that	serves	to	bridge	concept	and	percept	via	patterns	 of	 embodied	 experience.	 By	 projecting	 bodily	 experience	 onto	 other	domains,	 image	 schemata	 help	 reduce	 the	 field	 of	 cognitive	 possibilities.	 The	PATH	schema,	 for	 instance,	 can	operate	under	 an	 indefinite	 range	of	 concepts:	from	 getting	 a	 degree	 to	 building	 a	 house	 to	 starting	 a	 business.	 We	conceptualise	 such	 disparate	 experiences	 by	 utilising	 a	 common	 structure,	consistent	 with	 traversing	 a	 path	 between	 two	 points.	 In	 this	 way,	 Johnson	argues,	 metaphor	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 part	 in	 our	 day-to-day	 cognitive	practice,	 ‘carving	up’	 our	world	 into	manageable	 chunks	by	mapping	 structure																																																									30	For	a	review	of	the	empirical	evidence	supporting	metaphor	as	a	basic	cognitive	process,	see	Raymond	W.	Gibbs	(1994).	31	In	music-psychology	see,	for	example:	Brewer:	2000;	Cox:	1999;	Echard:	1999;	Marconi:	2001;	Saslaw:	1996;	Spitzer:	2004;	Zbikowski:	1997;	Moore:	2010;	Larson	and	Van	Handel:	2005.	
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from	the	bodily	domain	onto	the	conceptual.		Under	this	conception	of	metaphor,	the	metaphor	of	musical	movement	is	more	transparent.	Nothing	moves	in	music,	just	as	I	am	no	higher	in	space	when	I	say	‘I’m	feeling	up’;	structures	are	mapped	across	domains	throughout	our	cognitive	life.	In	which	case,	it	is	not	an	implication	of	the	metaphor	of	musical	movement	that	 it	 must	 consist	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 concepts	 and	 as	 such	 is	 irreducible,	 since	listeners	may	 project	 their	 embodied	 experience	 of	movement	 onto	 sound.	 As	Alicia	 Acitores	 suggests,	 image	 schemata	 are	 felicitous	 in	 giving	 accounts	 of	aspects	of	music	in	terms	of	embodied	experience:		 In	 music,	 for	 instance,	 the	 cycle	 schema	 helps	 us	 understand	recapitulation	in	a	sonata,	or	the	cycle	of	fifths	(Brower	2000:	343);	and	Saslaw	 (1996:	 222-3)	 shows	 how	 path	 and	 container	 metaphors	 are	projected	in	the	understanding	of	a	cadence…	and	how	major	and	minor	chords	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	balance.	(2011:	216-7)		Certain	 of	 Scruton’s	 attributes	 of	music,	 given	 to	 be	 distinctly	musical,	 can	 be	understood	 by	 reference	 to	 such	 image	 schemata–	 the	 path	 and	 container	metaphor	 providing	 an	 account	 for	boundaries	 in	 phrases	 or	 sections,	 and	 the	cycle	schema	suggesting	how	a	part	can	be	individuated	through	repetition.		Steve	Larson	has	worked	extensively	on	embodied	metaphor	in	music,	providing	the	following	list	of	motional	bases	for	musical	features:			Source	(Physical	Motion)	 	 								è 	 Target	(Music)	Physical	Object	 																		è Musical	Event	Physical	Motion	 	 è		 Musical	Motion	Speed	of	Motion		 	 è		 Tempo	Location	of	Observer	 	 è		 Present	Musical	Event	Objects	in	Front	of	Observer	 								è		 Future	Musical	Events	Objects	Behind	Observer	 					 								è		 Past	Musical	Events	
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Path	of	Motion	 	 	 								è		 Musical	Passage	Starting/Ending	Point	of	Motion														è		 Beginning/End	of	Passage	Temporary	Cessation	of	Motion	 								è		 Rest,	Caesura	Motion	over	Same	Path	Again	 								è		 Recapitulation,	Repeat	Physical	Forces	 	 	 								è ‘Musical	Forces’	Fig.	2.1	(Larson:	2012,	112)		The	relation	between	musical	sound	and	points	 in	space	has	been	borne	out	 in	some	detail	above,	with	transparently	motional	metaphors	like	PITCH	IS	UP	AND	DOWN	being	the	simplest	to	link	to	an	embodied	basis.	However,	while	most	of	the	mappings	laid	out	by	Larson	explicate	in	terms	of	delimited	concepts	of	space	and	time,	one	 is	a	mapping	of	causality.	 ‘Musical	 forces’	are	more	obscure	 than	‘verticality’,	 being	 concerned	 not	merely	with	 relations	 in	 space	 but	with	 goal	orientation	between	points	 in	 space.	There	 is	an	 important	difference	between	labelling	C	higher	than	B,	and	suggesting	that	B	directs	a	force	towards	C.		
	
2.6	Musical	Forces:	an	example.	
	One	 of	 the	most	 successful	 applications	 of	 image	 schemata	 in	music-study	 has	been	in	understanding	force	or	compulsion.	There	is	nothing	so	conducive	to	the	generation	of	expectancies,	tension	and	climax	than	the	apparent	forcefulness	of	musical	sound,	and	as	such	this	force	makes	a	particular	contribution	to	the	view	that	musical	movement	 is	 irreducible.	 It	 is	music’s	 impulse	 towards	 and	 away	from	itself,	the	phenomenal	weight	that	pulls	it	back	down	from	higher	reaches,	or	its	potential	to	direct	towards	a	goal	that	motivates	claims	of	a	closed	musical	domain.	Musical	forces	seem	to	strengthen	the	position	that	music	cannot	be	lent	empirical	 explanation	 since	 they	 are	 suggestive	 not	merely	 of	 spatial	 relations	but	of	causal	relations.		The	finale	of	King	Crimson’s	Fracture	provides	a	vivid	example.	After	descending	into	an	arrhythmic	passage	of	unusual	instrumental	effects,	where	tonal	centre	is	lost	 (6:36),	 the	 track	 emerges	 as	 a	 series	 of	 splintered	 themes,	 harmonized	
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within	 the	 whole	 tone	 scale	 and	 making	 somewhat	 oblique	 reference	 to	 past	material.	 Within	 this	 re-emergence	 a	 metrical	 tension	 is	 established	 between	lead	 guitar	 part	 and	 rhythm	 section	 (7:56)	where	 the	 highly	 syncopated	main	melody	in	Robert	Fripp’s	guitar	part	is	parsed	as	two	bars	of	5/4	followed	by	2	bars	of	4/4,	all	the	while	Bill	Bruford	plays	a	fairly	simple	2/4	beat	on	the	drum	kit.	As	the	highest	frequency	band	begins	to	be	filled	by	atonal	noise	elements	the	bass	 guitar	moves	 to	 the	 front	 of	 the	mix	with	 a	heavily	distorted	 tone	 (8:22),	further	pushing	at	 the	 limits	of	 rhythmic	 coherence.	The	bass	phrases	 a	bar	of	10/4	 to	 begin	 on	 the	 final	 beat	 of	 the	 guitar’s	 four	 bar	 cycle,	 accented	 by	 the	drums	to	give	the	impression	of	a	3/4	final	bar,	followed	by	10/4,	5/4	and	4/4	to	bring	 the	 bass	 phrase	 back	 in	 line	 with	 the	 guitar.	 The	 tensile	 stress	 of	 this	passage,	based	within	the	highly	chromatic	movements	of	 the	whole	tone	scale	and	the	prevalence	of	conflicting	asymmetrical	metres,	ultimately	collapses	into	a	fairly	conventional	bass	solo	using	the	pentatonic	scale	in	4/4.		It	 would	 be	 implausible	 to	 attempt	 a	 meaningful	 description	 of	 this	 passage	without	recourse	to	the	notion	of	force.	Each	part	seems	to	act	on	those	around	it	by	imposing	distinct	accents	and	boundaries,	at	once	pushing	away	from	parallel	subjects	 and	 holding	 onto	 them	 as	 part	 of	 a	 unified	 structure.	 The	 extreme	tension	 of	 this	 passage	 plays	 on	 the	 listeners’	 perception	 of	 the	 finale,	 which	enters	 after	 the	 bass	 solo	 and	 a	 bridging	 passage	 of	 whole-tone	 themes	 in	 a	unison	 4-bar	 metre	 of	 4/4	 –	 4/4	 –	 5/4	 –	 6/4.	 This	 bridge	 consolidates	 all	instrumentation	onto	common	metrical	and	 thematic	ground,	but	 is	smothered	by	 the	 use	 of	 simple	 whole-tone	 intervals	 and	 rhythms.	 Now	 the	 finale,	composed	 of	 two	 distinct	 time	 signatures	 coalescing	 under	 a	 global	 metre	 of	15/4,	 can	 bring	 a	 sense	 of	 freedom	and	 exhilaration.	 The	 entrance	 of	 the	 bass	(9:15)	using	only	the	whole	tone	scale	and	phrasing	over	cycles	of	7/4–8/4,	with	drum	 kit	 accompaniment,	 would	 be	 an	 angular	 and	 tense	 introduction	 to	 any	track,	but	in	its	place	in	Fracture	it	generates	momentum.	When	the	guitar	joins	in	 3-bar	 cycles	 of	 5/4	 the	 sound	 of	 a	 perfect	 fifth	 interval	 within	 the	 melody	disinhibits	 the	movement	of	 the	passage,	producing	enormous	 intensity	and	an	urging	 forward.	 This	 is	 further	 heightened	 by	 periodic	 modulation	 up	 major	thirds,	ultimately	resulting	in	a	path	of	the	tonic	from	C#	to	A	in	what	could	be	
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described	as	Lydian	dominant.	But	coupled	with	 the	release	of	 the	 finale	 is	 the	instability	of	a	whole-tone	bass	 line	and	cross-metrical	asymmetry.	 It	 stretches	our	ability	to	rhythmically	entrain	and	find	key-centre	but	also	brings	the	music	to	climax	with	a	coherence	that	seems	transparent.	The	force	of	this	conflict	finds	ultimate	 resolve	 in	 the	 final	 crescendo	 of	 the	 track	 (10:00),	 where	 metrical	ambiguity	gives	way	to	short	pounding	subdivisions	in	the	rhythm	section	and	a	complete	unveiling	of	the	centrepiece	melody	in	the	guitar.		Through	 different	 stages	 of	 metrical	 and	 rhythmical	 complexity	 and	 tonal	chromaticism,	 Fracture	 lavishes	 musicological	 curiosities	 on	 the	 analyst,	 and	surely	much	pleasure	can	be	derived	from	dissecting	the	various	feats	of	design	there	 embedded.	 However,	 precise	 statements	 about	 Fracture	 are	 generally	restricted	to	analytical	sums	pertaining	to	metre	and	the	musicological	 lexicon,	where	the	experience	of	intent	listening	can	give	far	more	than	this.	In	describing	an	experience	of	Fracture	it	is	my	wont	to	use	metaphor,	to	conjure	an	image	of	violent	 altercation	 between	 subjects	 trapped	 in	 close	 company	 giving	 way	 to	flight	 of	 some	 great	 machine;	 or	 perhaps	 I	 feel	 the	 metrical	 complexity	 and	defiant	tonality	as	forces	pulling	my	body	away	from	its	axes	while	compelling	it	in	a	forward	or	upward	direction.	Whatever	metaphor	is	used,	it	is	arguable	that	without	employing	some	causally	grounded	terminology	the	description	will	fall	flat.	Within	this	passage	of	music	lies	all	manner	of	phenomenological	forces	that	swell	and	are	dispelled	in	an	experientially	lucid	way.		If	 the	nature	 of	musical	 forces	 could	not	 be	 granted	 empirical	 access,	 it	would	mean	 the	 failure	 of	 music-psychology	 and	 veneration	 for	 those	 claiming	 a	uniquely	aesthetic	experience.	This	 is,	however,	a	burgeoning	 field	of	empirical	enquiry,	 and	 there	 have	 been	 numerous	 attempts	 to	 reconcile	 the	 causally	affective	 interaction	 of	 musical	 elements	 with	 non-musical	 perception	 and	embodied	 cognition.	 Steve	 Larson	 delineates	 three	 types	 of	 musical	 force:	
gravity,	 magnetism	 and	 inertia. 32 	Through	 extensive	 musical	 analysis	 he	demonstrates	 the	musical	 correlate	 to	 such	 forces.	 Indeed,	 we	 can	witness	 all	three	forces	in	the	nursery	rhyme	Twinkle	Twinkle	considered	above:	when	the																																																									32	See	Larson	(2012).	
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melody	 rises	 up	 to	 rest	 on	 G,	 it	 is	willed	 to	 descend	 back	 towards	 its	 starting	point	(gravity);	the	D	before	the	final	C	seems	as	if	it	is	pulling	towards	the	tonic	(magnetism);	 and	 the	 rhythmic	 theme	 imbues	 the	 passage	 with	 a	 comforting	stability	in	virtue	of	the	perfect	repetition	(inertia.)		Much	 of	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 Fracture	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 these	 metaphorical	forces.	Through	the	cycle	of	upward	modulation	in	the	first	section	of	the	finale,	the	 listener	 can	 experience	 heightened	 intensity;	 musical	 gravity	 offers	 an	account	 of	 this	 experience	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	 climb	 from	 the	 keys	 of	 C#	Lydian	dominant	up	to	A	suggests	a	great	expenditure	of	energy–	a	workload.	It	is	 as	 if	 a	 force	 is	 needed	 to	 push	 the	music	 up	 through	 different	 key	 centres.	Correlatively,	when	we	are	 at	 our	most	 exhilarated	we	 stand	at	 full	 height,	we	jump	 up	 from	 the	 floor,	 punching	 the	 air	 above	 our	 heads.	 When	 we	 feel	psychologically	 powerful	we	 defy	 gravity,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 a	 fundamental	 aspect	 of	our	everyday	experience	from	which	we	cannot	escape.		Perhaps	the	most	distinctive	aspect	of	Fracture	is	its	metrical	complexity	and	the	sense	 of	 opposition	 and	 conflict	 this	 brings.	 The	 clash	 between	 phrases	 in	 the	finale’s	 first	 section	 creates	 a	 pull	 towards	 rhythmic	 coherence;	 as	 the	 bass	phrase	 extends	 its	 bar-line	 over	 that	 of	 the	 guitar,	 its	 strong	 accents	 and	periodicity	undermine	 those	of	 the	simple	5/4	guitar	 theme.	Fortification	 from	the	 drums	 and	 a	 common	 pulse	 ensures	 that	 the	 bass	 theme	 is	 not	 lost,	 but	rather	 acts	 on	 the	 metrical	 and	 rhythmical	 balance	 of	 the	 melody	 to	 create	 a	strained	separation,	ever	heightening	the	drive	towards	coalescence	of	metrical	order	 that	only	arrives	after	a	 full	15	beats.	This	pull	 towards	reconciliation	of	metre	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	metaphorical	 projection	 of	 goal-directed	behaviour.	There	is	nothing	that	is	truly	strained	through	a	clash	of	metre,	nor	is	there	 truly	 a	 resolve	 of	 tension	 after	 15	 beats.	 However,	 listeners	 can	 derive	significance	for	this	musical	technique	from	their	own	experience	of	being	drawn	towards	 and	 away	 from	 goals	 as	 is	 at	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 musical	
magnetism.		Central	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 phrasing	 and	 theme	 is	 the	metaphor	 of	 inertia,	 where	
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sequences	 are	 expected	 to	 continue.	 The	 momentum	 and	 climax	 of	 Fracture	depends	 on	 the	 listener’s	will	 for	 patterns	 to	 repeat	 so	 as	 to	 brook	 resolution	between	parts.	Continuity	and	periodicity	in	our	embodied	lives	provides	a	basis	on	 which	 to	 create	 an	 experience	 from	 sequential	 patterns	 of	 sound,	 and	 the	feasibility	of	an	art	of	sound–	perhaps	art	in	general–	is	contingent	on	a	work’s	ability	to	tease	out	a	response	from	the	depths	of	our	perceptual	machinery.			
2.7	The	embodied	basis	of	Musical	Forces.		It	 seems	 uncontentious	 to	 posit	 gravity,	 magnetism	 and	 inertia	 as	 musical	metaphors,	 their	 correlates	 in	music	 theory	 being	 abundant.	 Larson,	 however,	offers	 these	 concepts	 not	 simply	 as	 analytical	 tools	 but	 as	 aspects	 of	 the	psychological	theory	of	embodied	cognition	originating	with	Lakoff	and	Johnson.	Notions	 like	 musical	 gravity	 are	 wrought	 not	 only	 to	 elucidate	 the	 internal	workings	of	music,	 such	 effects	 having	been	 identified	 for	decades,	 but	 to	 give	some	commentary	on	the	psychological	underpinnings	thereof.	Larson	produces	a	 number	 of	 data	 that	 evince	metaphorical	 forces	 in	music	 (2012	 chpt.	 3),	 but	also	 claims	 that	 such	 forces	 operate	 as	 embodied	 schematic	 structures	 along	Johnson’s	paradigm.		The	forces	that	permeate	our	bodies	provide	a	deep	reservoir	of	structure	to	our	cognitive	 systems.	 ‘We	 easily	 forget	 that	 our	 bodies	 are	 clusters	 of	 forces	 and	that	 every	 event	 of	 which	 we	 are	 a	 part	 consists,	 minimally,	 of	 forces	 in	interaction’	 (Johnson	 1987:	 42.)	 Johnson’s	 insight	 was,	 of	 course,	 to	 show	 the	import	of	 these	 forces	 in	our	higher	conceptual	enterprise–	 that	 they	 ‘manifest	structures	 that	 are	 very	 much	 a	 part	 of	 our	 having	 coherent,	 meaningful	experiences	 that	we	can	call	 into	consciousness,	understand,	reason	about,	and	communicate	 in	 language’	 (Johnson	 1987:	 42-3.)	 It	 can	 be	 said	 that	 forces	pervade	 both	 experience	 of	music	 and	 experience	 of	 our	 bodies;	 the	 points	 of	contact	between	musical	and	bodily	 inertia,	say,	are	so	numerous	as	to	suggest	that	a	common	level	of	structure	is	manifest.	It	might	seem	that	the	looseness	of	the	 notion	 of	 ‘inertia’	 suggests	 a	 correspondingly	 loose	 commonality	 between	
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musical	and	bodily	 ‘inertia’,	given	that	the	term	appears	to	stand	minimally	 for	something	like	‘tendency	to	repeat	or	continue.’	However,	there	is	in	fact	a	range	of	constraints	on	the	collective	structure	of	force	schemata:	interaction	between	objects;	a	vector	quality	(or	directionality);	a	path	of	motion;	evidence	of	origins	or	 sources;	degrees	of	power	or	 intensity;	 and	 finally,	 a	 structure	or	 sequence	of	
causality	(Johnson	1987:	43-4.)		Deconstructing	 image	 schemata	 in	 this	 way	 seems	 to	 violate	 their	 nature	 as	
gestalt,	pre-conceptual	 structures,	 but	 the	 reduction	 is	 of	 course	 necessary	 to	consider	how	they	operate.	The	embodied	root	of	musical	forces	are	perhaps	not	explored	quite	as	deeply	as	could	have	been	in	Larson’s	study,	most	likely	due	to	the	 other	 formidable	 ambitions	 of	 the	 book	 coupled	 with	 the	 extensive	secondary	 literature	on	 Johnson.	Here	 I	will	 consider	more	 closely	 the	basis	of	these	 three	 musical	 forces–	 gravity,	 magnetism	 and	 inertia–	 of	 which	 two-	gravity	and	magnetism–	employ	the	BALANCE	schema.33		When	 there	 is	 a	 symmetrical	 or	 proportional	 arrangement	 of	 forces	 around	 a	point	or	 axis	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 forces	 are	 in	balance	 (Johnson	1987:	85.)	All	bodily	movement	involves	balance,	the	most	obvious	example	being	walking	or	locomotion.	But	 even	when	 I	 reach	out	my	hand	 to	grasp	a	 glass	 I	must	 find	a	balance	between	opposing	forces	of	gravity	and	muscle	tension:	I	must	adjust	the	force	of	my	grip	and	the	lifting	force	of	my	arm	to	account	for	the	extra	weight	of	the	glass,	and	I	may	need	to	shift	the	weight	of	my	body	backwards	to	maintain	the	 same	 centre	 of	 gravity.	While	 the	 balance	 schema	 is	 based	 in	 such	 bodily	experience,	 its	 extension	 in	 language	 suggests	 that	 communication	 would	 be	heavily	 restricted	without	 its	 use:	 I	weigh	up	decisions,	 address	 the	balance	 of	contrasting	arguments,	talk	of	a	need	for	emotional	release	in	order	to	return	my	psychological	 stability,	 am	 subject	 to	 the	 scales	 of	 justice,	 attempt	 to	 reach	
equilibrium	between	sides	of	a	mathematical	equation	or	complain	of	the	power-
imbalance	within	the	political	system	of	a	society.		Balance	is	immediately	relevant	to	music–	musicologists	have	used	the	term	for																																																									33	See	Saslaw	(1996)	for	an	in-depth	discussion	of	the	BALANCE	schema.	
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centuries–	 but	 image	 schemata	 theory	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 the	 pertinent	application	of	this	term	is	not	to	a	musical	object	but	to	a	musical	experience,	that	the	 mechanism	 for	 the	 experience	 can	 be	 grounded	 in	 the	 body	 and	 that	 the	same	mechanism	has	great	utility	in	non-musical	life.	It	is	noteworthy	that	so	far	I	have	been	invoking	what	Johnson	refers	to	as	a	‘prototypical	BALANCE	schema’,	although	 he	 lists	 three	 others–	 TWIN	 PAN,	 POINT	 and	 EQUILIBRIUM–	 each	referring	 to	 various	 different	 systems	 by	which	 forces	 can	 come	 into	 balance.	The	 musical	 forces	 of	 gravity	 and	magnetism,	 then,	 may	 employ	 one	 of	 these	types	 of	 BALANCE	 schema	along	with	other	metaphorical	 structures.	 Here	 are	the	formulations	of	gravity,	magnetism	and	inertia:		Magnetism:		 CONTAINER,	 SOURCE-PATH-GOAL,	 CENTRE-PERIPHERY,	EQUILIBRIUM.		Inertia:		 COMPULSION,	CYCLE,	CONTAINER.		Gravity:		 COMPULSION,	VERTICALITY,	CENTRE-PERIPHERY,	BALANCE		We	 can	 experience	 inertia	 not	 only	 in	 the	 tendency	 for	 rhythms	 to	 repeat	 or	melodies	to	continue	in	the	same	direction,	but	in	the	movement	of	walking	and	breathing.	 Breathing	 is	 a	 repeated	 bodily	 function	 that	 we	 feel	 as	 a	 two-stage	cycle	comparable	to	periodic	peaks	and	troughs;	it	is	a	cycle	I	compel	to	continue	but	 also	 one	 that	 is	 contained	within	 the	 confines	 of	 my	 body.	 The	 INTERTIA	schema	helps	 facilitate	 rhythm	by	projecting	 these	embodied	experiences	onto	repeated	patterns	of	sound	and	the	constraint	of	metre	and	tempo.			
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	Fig.	2.2	(Brower	2000:	330)		
Gravity	 is	 a	 somewhat	more	 complex	metaphor,	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 image	schemata	involved	given	in	figure	1	courtesy	of	Candace	Brower.	Coordination	of	these	schemata	accounts	 for	 the	sense	of	grounded	stability	 felt	when	standing	upright	along	 the	horizontal	 axis,	 the	 tension	of	pushing	our	bodies	up	against	the	force	of	gravity,	and	the	relaxation	of	allowing	ourselves	to	fall	back	towards	the	 ground.	 All	 musical	 tones	 are	 subject	 to	 gravity,	 with	 the	 tonic	 having	 a	variable	 pull	 factor	 depending	 on	 its	 vertical-relation	 with	 another	 tone	(Arnheim,	 1986.)	 Brower	 follows	Rudolf	 Arnheim’s	work	 on	musical	 forces	 by	suggesting	‘that	these	two	pulling	forces	act	to	reinforce	or	oppose	one	another,	the	downward	force	of	gravity	 lessening	the	upward	pull	 to	8	[scale	degree]	 in	the	 motion	 from	 7	 to	 8,	 while	 strengthening	 the	 downward	 pull	 to	 1	 in	 the	motion	 from	2	 to	 1’	 (Brower	2000:	 334.)	 This	 phenomenon	 also	 helps	 explain	why	 melodies	 tend	 to	 have	 an	 arched	 contour	 where	 ascent	 is	 followed	 by	descent,	but	no	 tendency	 for	 the	 inverse	 (Huron	2006.)	The	embodied	basis	of	musical	 gravity	 also	 provides	 some	 elucidation	 of	 the	 heightening	 of	 tension	created	 by	 the	 rising	 modulations	 in	 Fracture,	 and	 conversely,	 the	 soothing	effects	 of	 many	 lullabies	 who’s	 melodic	 contours	 have	 downward	 trajectories	(ibid.)		The	 notion	 of	 melodic	 magnetism	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 complex,	 given	 its	fundamental	 role	 in	 melodic	 and	 harmonic	 tension	 coupled	 with	 the	 relative	
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obscurity	 of	 ‘embodied	 magnetism.’	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	magnetism	 is	 not	sourced	from	embodied	experience	since	it	is	already	used	metaphorically	when	applied	 to	 bodily	 action.	 Indeed,	 within	 the	 literature	 definition	 of	 the	 term	couched	 in	 embodied	 experience	 is	 lacking	 relative	 to	 the	 other	 forces,	 even	though	 the	musical	 correlate	 is	well	 studied.34	Larson	 and	Brower	 ground	 this	force	 in	 our	 bodily	 experience	with	magnets,	 and	 indeed	 the	 relevant	musical	effects	 do	 have	 commonalities	 with	 the	 behaviour	 of	 magnets.	 For	 example,	
proximity	 is	a	key	 factor	 in	both	 true	magnetism	and	 the	musical	variety;	as	of	course	 is	attraction.	However,	 gravity	 and	 inertia	 seem	 far	 deeper	 elements	 of	the	 human	 experience	 than	 does	 magnetism,	 the	 danger	 being	 that	 the	 latter	drifts	 towards	a	 conceptual	 ascription	 rather	 than	projection	 from	 the	body.	 It	would	 be	 a	 major	 limitation	 of	 the	 embodied-empirical	 project	 if	 such	 a	fundamental	virtual	force	operated	in	isolation	from	embodied	experience.		While	the	embodied	basis	of	magnetism	is	less	transparent	than	that	of	the	other	musical	 forces,	 it	 seems	 that	 its	 reduction	 into	 source-path-goal	and	 container	schemata	dissolves	much	of	 the	obscurity.	 Janna	Saslaw	(1996)	has	written	on	how	 these	 two	 structures	 combine	 to	 prepare	 modulation,	 underlie	 harmonic	progression	 and	 create	 a	 pull	 towards	 stable	 pitches,	 while	 Brower	 has	suggested	 an	 OVERTONE-VERTICALITY	 schema	 (fig.	 2)	 to	 account	 for	 the	relation	between	pitch	intervals	and	harmonic	stability	in	terms	of	the	overtone	series.	A	melody	or	harmony	 can	be	understood	as	having	 a	 source	(first	 note,	typically	 tonic),	 a	 path	 (intermediate	 progression)	 and	 a	 goal	 (closure	 on	 the	tonic	 or	 closure	 by	modulation	 to	 a	 new	 tonic).	 The	 CONTAINER	 schema	 also	operates	in	this	experience:	while	the	melody	is	in	progress	we	can	talk	of	it	as	
open,	and	a	cadential	device	will	bring	about	closure.	The	tension	of	a	dominant-seventh	 in	 a	 I-V7-I	 cadence	 pulls	 towards	 the	 final	 I	 through	 the	 OVERTONE-VERTICALITY	schema	combined	with	the	GOAL	schema	and	CONTAINER.	A	I-V7-I	cadence	closes	a	container	and	thus	creates	a	boundary	in	the	music,	a	boundary	
																																																								34	E.g.	Larson	2012;	Ortmann	1926;	Merriam	1956;	Brower	2000;	Arnheim	1986;	Bharucha	1996;	Lerdahl	1996,	2001.	For	a	detailed	analysis,	see	Larson’s	computer	models	(e.g.	Larson		2004),	which	use	an	algorithm	to	‘represent	magnetism	as	the	difference	between	the	inverse	squares	of	the	semitone	distances	between	opposing	attractors’	(Larson	2012:	147.)		
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pre-empted	 by	 the	 periodicity	 of	 phrasing	 throughout	 (operation	 of	 INERTIA	schema.)	 In	 other	words,	 an	 account	 of	musical	magnetism	 can	 be	 reduced	 to	kinaesthetic	 schemata	 by	 a	 fairly	 direct	 terminological	 substitution	 of	 image	schematic	for	musicological.	
	Fig.	2.3	(Brower	2000:	335)			There	are	broader	points	to	be	made.	Through	life	we	do	feel	attraction	towards	people	and	things	and	life	is	meaningless	without	goals,	so	there	is	in	this	sense	a	wealth	 of	 bodily	 experience	 to	 draw	 on	 to	 compel	 one	 pitch	 towards	 another.	Research	 in	 visual	 perception	 has	 also	 provided	 an	 analogue	 for	 musical	magnetism	 that	 has	 suggested	 virtual	 magnetism	 between	 points	 can	 be	understood	 in	 terms	 of	 balance.35	Rudolf	 Arnheim	 makes	 the	 point	 that	 our	visual	 space	 is	 organised	 to	 relieve	 tensions	 between	 shapes:	 designers	 and	architects	pore	over	the	proper	distance	between	buildings,	windows,	pieces	of	furniture	 etc.	 (Arnheim	 1974:	 13.)	 Figure	 3	 attempts	 to	 capture	 this	phenomenon	of	 visual	 tension.	 The	disk	 and	 square	 are	perceived	 as	 a	 unified	
gestalt,	but,	Arnheim	argues,	the	disk	is	not	merely	perceived	as	off-centre-	as	a	static	 aspect	 of	 the	 scene.	 Rather,	 the	 visual	 experience	 of	 figure	 3	 is	dynamic.	Arnheim	writes	of	the	disk:																																																									35	See	Arnheim	(1974:	chapt.	1)	and	Johnson	(1987:	chapt.	4.)	
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	 There	is	something	restless	about	it.	It	looks	as	though	it	had	been	at	the	center	 and	wished	 to	 return,	 or	 as	 though	 it	wants	 to	move	 away	 even	farther.	And	 the	disk's	 relations	 to	 the	edges	of	 the	square	are	a	 similar	play	of	attraction	and	repulsion.			
	Fig.	2.4	(Arnheim	1974:	10)			The	 tension	 created	 by	 such	 positional	 relationships	 can	 be	 represented	 with	some	precision	by	considering	the	lines	of	symmetry	about	the	square:	as	well	as	the	 centre,	 diagonal,	 vertical	 and	 horizontal	 axes	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 points	 of	stability	 along	 with	 points	 along	 the	 square’s	 sides.	 There	 has	 been	 some	empirical	 research	 into	 this	 effect,36	and	 it	 does	 seem	 apt	 to	 apply	 canonical	musicological	terms	to	scenes	like	figure	3:	e.g.	tension,	instability,	compulsion.		
	
2.8	Summary	of	Movement	and	Forces.		The	 breadth	 of	 these	 researches	 should	 weigh	 heavily	 on	 any	 conception	 of	musical	 movement,	 supporting	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 world	 of	 musical	 space	 and																																																									36	Hubbard	and	Ruppel	(2000)	cite	a	number	of	relevant	studies;	Bryant	and	Subbiah	(1994)	call	this	the	‘landmark	attraction	effect.’	See	Larson	(2008:	326).		
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motion	 is	 an	 embodied	 world	 of	 nonconceptual	 psychological	 structures.	 A	phenomenal	 view	 is	 grounded	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 music	 experience	 is	nonconceptual,	and	the	above	should	go	towards	making	this	claim	by	outlining	an	account	of	musical	movement	and	force	as	projection	of	embodied	structures.	It	may	seem	a	subtle	difference	to	conceive	a	process	of	projecting	out	from	the	body	 rather	 than	one	of	 ascribing	 concepts,	 given	 that	both	are	 conceptions	of	living	through	music.	But	to	regard	the	body	as	the	source	of	projection,	rather	than	 abstract	 objects,	 is	 to	 better	 reconcile	 our	 thinking	 about	 music	 with	experience	thereof.	Lines	can	and	should	be	drawn	between	the	intentional	and	the	 embodied,	 allowing	 musical	 movement	 to	 be	 related	 to	 sound	 and	psychology;	more	empirically	based	research,	with	a	basis	in	the	non-musical,	is	a	useful	 tool	 in	understanding	music	and	 is	made	available	when	the	picture	 is	one	of	psychological	rather	than	intellectual	engagement.		I	 have	 considered	 many	 forms	 of	 musical	 motion–	 both	 spatial	 and	 causal–	pertaining	 to	 pitch,	 melody,	 rhythm,	 harmony,	 metre	 and	 phrasing.	 Scruton’s	argument	 that	 musical	 movement	 is	 irreducible	 and	 specifically	 musical	 is	greatly	weakened	 by	 the	 researches	 discussed.	 To	 recap,	 the	 characteristics	 of	
tone	 are:	 (I)	 the	 context-dependence	 of	 musical	 features;	 (II)	 ‘quasi	 spatial	organisation’	 (partitioning	 of	 sounds	 into	 tones	 with	 phenomenal	 verticality);	(III)	a	sense	of	movement	or	force;	(IV)	arrangement	over	perceptual	dimensions	of	 foreground	and	 background;	 (V)	 virtual	 causality;	 (VI)	 maintenance	 of	 clear	
boundaries	between	features	like	phrases;	(VII)	musical	individuals,	like	repeated	themes	or	harmonies.		I	have	given	direct	accounts	for	(II),	(III),	(V),	(VI)	and	(VII)	using	the	framework	from	 embodied	 schemata,	 leaving	 only	 (I)–	 context	 dependency–	 and	 (IV)–	presentation	 of	 foreground	 and	 background.	 (I)	 is	 accounted	 for	 with	 a	connectionist	 architecture	 below,	 and	 it	 seems	 highly	 likely	 that	 (IV)	 could	 be	offered	a	psycho-acoustic	account.	Even	were	an	account	of	(IV)	not	forthcoming,	appeal	to	presentation	of	foreground	and	background	alone	would	mount	a	weak	argument	for	Scruton’s	abstract	view,	and	it	should	follow	that	image	schemata	present	 an	 effective	 challenge,	 providing	 an	 embodied	 basis	 for	 arguably	 the	
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most	 significant	 characteristics	 of	 musical	 movement–	 organisation	 in	 space,	causality	and	force.			
2.9	 Giving	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 account	 of	 the	 functions	 of	music	
perception	 that	 underlie	 musical	 movement:	 Neural	 Network	
models	of	music-perception.		This	section	argues	a	phenomenal	view	of	musical	movement	by	giving	attention	to	 the	 broader	 perceptual	 features	 of	 music	 that	 underlie	 or	 constitute	experiences	of	musical	movement.	It	is	necessary	to	show	that	basic	features	of	music	can	be	understood	in	a	way	compatible	with	the	phenomenal	view	if	it	is	to	be	defended.		When	it	is	noted	that	the	scale-degree	B	will	appear	compelled	up	one	semi-tone	to	C	when	heard	in	the	key	of	C,	a	musical	force	is	described;	but	while	the	above	has	argued	for	a	phenomenal	account	of	a	musical	force	such	as	compulsion,	it	has	not	argued	for	a	phenomenal	account	of	basic	musicological	elements	like	‘scale-degree’	or	‘key.’		Below	I	consider	various	perceptual	features	of	music,	arguing	that	they	can	be	explained	with	psychological	models	 that	do	not	use	or	 imply	 representational	states	 (concepts).	 The	models	 referenced	 are	connectionist,	 involving	networks	of	 nodes	 that	 activate	 according	 to	 certain	 rules	 or	 learning	 patterns	 so	 as	 to	model	cognitive	responses.	Before	providing	more	depth	as	to	the	mechanics	of	connectist	approaches,	I	will	summarise	some	relevant	researches:	sophisticated	perceptual	 processes	 pertaining	 to	 categorization	 (Gjerdingen,	 1990),	 tonal	hierarchy	 and	 key	 centre	 (Tillman	 et	 al.	 2000)	 have	 been	 modelled	 in	 a	connectionist	architecture,	along	with	more	fundamental	 features	such	as	pitch	perception	 (Taylor	 &	 Greenhough,	 1994),	 octave	 equivalence	 (Bharucha	 &	Mencl,	1996),	chord	classification	(Laden	&	Keefe,	1991),	and	melodic	sequence	learning	(Bharucha	&	Todd,	1989;	Krumhansl,	Louhivuori,	Toiviainen,	 Jarvinen,	&	 Eerola,	 1999).37 	Philosophically	 contentious	 issues	 like	 emotion	 are	 also																																																									37	See	Tillman	et	al.	(2000).	
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potentially	amenable	to	this	approach:	Eduardo	Coutinho	and	Angelo	Cangelosi	(2009)	created	a	connectionist	model	 that	can	predict	 the	emotional	responses	of	 listeners	 based	 on	 a	 fairly	 rich	 set	 of	 musical	 parameters–	 dynamics,	 pitch	level,	pitch	variations,	timbre,	texture,	and	tempo.		The	profile	of	connectionism	within	cognitive	science	has	risen	steadily	since	its	renaissance	 in	 the	 1980s,	 now	 rivalling	 classicalist	 representation-based	computational	paradigms	for	dominance	and	being	found	increasingly	felicitous	in	music-study	as	a	model	for	music-perception	and	cognition.	These	systems	are	made	up	of	 layers	of	 interconnected	units,	each	 in	a	specific	state	of	activation.	When	 data	 is	 inputted,	 activation	 will	 spread	 across	 each	 layer	 in	 a	 pattern	determined	by	the	constraints	implemented	on	each	unit	by	the	operator	and	by	the	properties	of	the	data.	One	of	the	great	benefits	of	this	modelling	technique	is	that	the	constraints	on	individual	units,	and	therefore	their	interconnections,	will	change	passively	through	exposure	to	data	so	as	to	adapt	their	output	in	a	way	that	 parallels	 perceptual	 learning	 (bottom-up	 configuration).	 Connectionism,	then,	 is	 often	 implemented	 for	 artificial	 neural	 networks,	 since	 the	 spread	 of	activity	 amongst	 units	 coupled	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 compartmentalized	 data	processer	renders	it	a	powerful	representation	of	a	neural	network.		Unsurprisingly,	 the	 connectionist’s	 purview	 is	 far	 narrower	 than	 the	philosopher’s,	and	there	are	many	features	of	music	an	aesthetician	can	point	to	that	 a	 cognitive	 scientist	 cannot	 model	 with	 connectionist	 architecture.	 This	limitation	can	either	be	attributed	to	a	paradigm	failure	or	to	technological	and	developmental	 constraints.	 A	 philosopher	 or	 musicologist	 could	 object,	 for	example,	 that	 Coutinho	 and	 Cangelosi’s	 claim	 to	 have	 modelled	 emotional	responses	to	music	fails	given	that	all	input	and	output	data	must	be	interpreted	by	an	observer	to	be	ascribed	the	correct	values	and	that	there	is	clearly	nothing	close	to	an	aesthetic	experience	happening	within	the	latticework	of	nodes	and	connections.	I	will	indeed	argue	in	chapter	4	that	transplanting	the	musical	from	the	sonic	domain	 is	an	effective	deletion	of	 the	musical.	And	there	 is	clearly	no	music	happening	in	Coutinho	and	Cangelosi’s	experiment.		
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However,	while	experience	is	omitted	from	such	an	experiment,	 it	remains	that	Coutinho	and	Cangelosi’s	experiment	is	a	success	from	a	purely	functional,	third-person	 perspective.	 The	 physical	 properties	 of	 sound	 are	 translated	 into	numerically	 identical	 values	which	 are	 then	 used	 to	 ‘tune’	 the	 network	 to	 the	appropriate	 response.	 The	 ‘weighting’	 between	 units–	 the	 degree	 to	 which	activity	 is	 attenuated	 on	 connection–	 changes	 automatically	 so	 as	 to	 adapt	patterns	 of	 activity	 to	 an	 input	 corpus.	 A	 model	 such	 as	 this,	 then,	 can	 give	reports	to	the	observer	that	are	in	line	with	real	listeners’	reports	when	provided	with	 information	 that	 closely	 matches	 that	 given	 to	 real	 listeners,	 if	 all	information	is	encoded	into	a	numerically	identical	form;	and	this	is	true	of	novel	inputs.	 While	 an	 analyst	 is	 required	 to	 interpret	 the	 responses	 of	 the	 model,	arguably	this	would	also	be	true	of	human	subject:	the	difference	is	in	terms	of	the	symbols	or	‘language’	used	by	a	connectionist	model	versus	a	human	subject.	It	can	be	said,	then,	that	connectionist	systems	will	 independently	learn	how	to	behave	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 a	 real	 listener	 when	 asked	 questions	 about	 an	experience	of	an	artwork.	Even	if	there	is	no	experience,	from	the	perspective	of	the	observer,	listener	and	model	are	functionally	indistinguishable.		Models	 such	as	 this	 that	 can	 create	 functional	 analogues	 to	human	subjects–	 if	only	 in	 the	 highly	 conditioned	 environment	 of	 the	 laboratory–	 provide	 a	challenge	 to	 the	 view	 that	 aesthetic	 judgements	 are	 subjective,	 and	 opaque	 to	analytical	method.	 Conceding	 that	 connectionist	models	might	 explain	musical	aesthetics	is,	of	course,	a	highly	unattractive	prospect	for	those	who	value	music	highly.	 But	 ignoring	 the	 explanatory	 role	 of	 these	 models	 should,	 I	 think,	 be	equally	 unattractive.	 It	 is	 instructive	 to	 unpack	 this	 explanatory	 role	 and	 thus	describe	the	prima	facie	inadequacies,	and	strengths,	of	a	functional	explanation	of	 music	 perception.	 The	 view	 given	 here	 is	 that	 the	 perspicacity	 of	 some	connectionist	 approaches	 suggests	 that	 many	 musicological	 concepts	 will	 not	deflect	empirical	inquiry,	but	have	the	potential	to	be	reduced	to	psychology.		In	 an	 attempt	 to	 unpack	 the	 explanative	 role	 of	 connectionist	 models,	 I	 will	consider	 Barbara	 Tillman,	 Emmanuel	 Bigand	 and	 Jamshed	 J.	 Bharucha’s	 study	
Implicit	 Learning	 of	 Tonality:	 A	 Self-Organizing	 Approach	 (2000).	 The	
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dependence	 of	 the	 imminently	 perceived	 on	 musical	 context	 shapes	 listener	experience,	and	is	a	phenomenon	at	the	core	of	musicological	models	pertaining	to	tonal	hierarchy	and	key	centre.	The	role	of	each	pitch-class	will	depend	on	the	context	 of	 key	 and	 underpinning	 harmony:	 the	 note	 B	 will	 provoke	 a	 very	different	phenomenological	response	in	the	key	of	E	than	it	would	in	the	key	of	F,	and	 yet	 it	 is	 acoustically	 constant.	 Scruton	 argues	 that	 this	 contextual	dependence	 of	 musical	 features–	 given	 as	 (I)	 above–	 reduces	 the	 force	 of	empirical	methods	 since	 it	 cannot	be	 reconciled	with	 the	physical	paradigm	of	acoustics.	However,	research	in	the	psychology	of	music	does	seem	to	delineate	the	perceptual	basis	of	contextualized	relationships,	using	modelling	techniques	that	derive	from	general	perceptual	learning.		Tilman	et	al.’s	model	is	organized	to	represent	pitch	chroma	both	as	a	universal	constraint	 (through	 the	 fixed	 input	units	 themselves)	 and	as	 culturally	 specific	constraint	 (through	 the	 favoured	 combination	 of	 the	 input	 units.)	 The	 model	learns	these	constraints	automatically	through	exposure	to	the	input	in	virtue	of	a	 set	 of	 general	 constraints	 within	 the	 system	 that	 are	 related	 to	neuropsychological	 processes:	 ‘frequency-tuned	 units	 in	 auditory	 cortex,	 a	layered	architecture,	plasticity	 in	auditory	cortex,	 and	Hebbian	 learning	 (Hebb,	1949)’	(p.907.)	(Hebbian	learning	is	the	principle	that	connections	between	two	neurons	 will	 be	 strengthened	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 strength	 of	 correlation	between	both	neurons’	output.)	Tillman	et	al.	claim	that	‘[w]ith	the	help	of	these	constraints,	the	model	adapts	to	the	specific	rules	of	Western	harmony	through	mere	 exposure	 to	 typical	 musical	 exemplars’	 (ibid.)	 There	 is	 no	 specific	knowledge	representation	at	the	outset	of	the	learning	process,	all	weightings	of	connections	being	randomly	set,	and	there	is	no	 ‘teaching’	of	the	system	by	the	researcher–	 all	 learning	 relies	 on	 ‘bottom-up’	 information	 and	what	 is	 termed	‘reverberation’	 (where	 activity	 spreads	 through	 the	 system	 repeatedly,	 thus	being	 subjected	 to	 repeated	 adjustment	 from	 existing	 connections;	‘reverberation’	 is	 often	 compared	 to	 automatic	 top-down	 configuration.)	What	can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 this	 organization	 is	 that	 no	 rules	 or	 concepts	 are	 stored	within	 the	 system.	 The	 learning	 protocol	 of	 the	 system	 is	 set	 by	 algorithms	grounded	in	general	psychological	processes,	permitting	a	similar	architecture	to	
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be	applied	to	other	realms–	such	as	language	or	object-recognition–	with	similar	success.	Such	features	add	value	to	this	model	since	they	disassociate	the	human	analyst.	 Raw	data	 can	 be	 fed	 into	 a	model	 that	 has	 not	 had	 the	 rules	 of	music	engineered	into	it	to	produce	data	in	line	with	conventional	musicology.		A	crucial	consideration	in	evaluating	the	explanative	role	of	this	model,	however,	is	the	data	itself:	what	exactly	such	a	model	can	do	with	particular	information.	It	could	be	said	that	the	input	corpus	consists	only	of	natural	properties	of	sound	and	canonical	properties	of	Western	Art	music.	 In	other	words,	no	 instructions	are	 given	 as	 to	what,	 say,	 a	 key,	 the	 circle	 of	 fifths,	 or	musical	 tension	 is.	 The	training	 procedure	 is	 roughly	 as	 follows:	 Each	 pitch-class	 is	 assigned	 an	 input	unit,	then	each	chord	(triads	only)	is	inputted	individually	to	train	the	next	layer;	the	output	is	then	‘calibrated’,	meaning	the	correct	label	is	given	to	the	‘winning’	output	unit	after	training	has	taken	place	(e.g.	the	label	‘C	major	chord’	is	given	to	 the	winning	 unit	 of	 input	 C-E-G.)	 This	 protocol	 is	 implemented	 to	 train	 the	next	 layer	 to	 recognise	 sets	of	 chords	 (or	keys)	and	also	 to	 tune	 the	 system	 to	other	aspects	of	tonal	music,	such	as	the	overtone	series.	Diatonic	sequences	of	chords	are	also	inputted,	with	higher	frequencies	of	the	more	stable	chords	such	as	 I	 and	 V–	 since	 they	 appear	 more	 frequently	 in	 diatonic	 music–	 and	 all	sequences	ending	with	either	a	V-I	or	IV-I	cadence.		Tillman	 et	 al.’s	 model	 will	 establish	 the	 key	 centre	 of	 sets	 of	 melodies	 or	harmonies	 in	a	way	that	does	not	depend	on	the	tonic	note	being	 inputed–	e.g.	the	 correct	 key	 unit	 will	 be	 activated	 when	 the	 subdominant	 and	 dominant	chords	are	inputted	without	the	tonic	chord.	One	of	the	most	impressive	features	demonstrated	 is	 computation	 of	 hierarchical	 stability.	 Along	 with	 the	 primary	activation	 (the	 winning	 units	 of	 chord	 and	 key),	 the	 other	 activated	 units	coincide	with	 the	degree	of	 tension	 that	a	 transition	 to	 the	respective	chord	or	key	would	engender.	When	the	key	of	C	major	 is	established	within	the	system	and	a	C	major	chord	is	inputted,	the	units	representing	the	chords	of	G	major	and	A	minor	will	 be	 in	 a	higher	 activation	 state	 than	will	 the	 chords	of	E	minor,	D	minor	 or	 F	major,	 and	will	 have	 a	 far	 higher	 activation	 than	will	 an	 F#	major	chord.	 The	 hierarchy	 demonstrated	 mirrors	 the	 cycle	 of	 fifths	 along	 with	 key	
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centre,	and	is	an	emergent	function	of	the	model.		Tonal	 hierarchy	 is	 central	 to	 (I),	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 contextual	 difference	 in	music–	 the	 same	 sound	 induces	 different	 phenomenology	 according	 to	 its	relation	 to	 a	 background	 key	 and	 harmony.	 Further	 to	 this,	 Tillman	 et	 al.	 ran	simulations	 that	 mimicked	 empirical	 data	 on	 listeners’	 ability	 to	 observe	alterations	in	two	musical	passages	when	each	is	played	in	a	different	harmonic	context–	we	find	it	more	difficult	to	identify	changes	or	errors	in	passages	when	the	 context	 has	 changed	 (Bharucha	 and	 Krumhansl,	 1983),	 and	 the	 model	represents	this	role	of	harmonic	context.	In	addition,	the	model	will	predict	the	next	 key	 in	 a	 piece,	 representing	 harmonic	 expectation,	 and	 can	 represent	 the	psychological	distance	between	keys	in	modulation.		It	 seems	arbitrary	 to	 ignore	 studies	 like	Tillman	et	 al.’s	when	 considering	how	music	is	experienced,	at	least	insofar	as	music	experience	is	conceived	in	relation	to	musicological	theory.	The	explanatory	role	of	this	form	of	empirical	study	is	to	explicate	 conventions	 of	music	 theory	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 non-musical:	 perceptual	models	 that	 can	 relate	 music-perception	 to	 non-music-perception.	 There	 are	numerous	 shortfalls	with	Tillman	 et	 al.’s	 experiment,	 such	 as	 the	 resolution	 of	learning	 processes	 being	 far	 removed	 from	 that	 of	 real	 human	 exposure	 to	music–	the	model	processes	a	poverty	of	information	relative	to	a	real	listener–	along	with	the	complete	absence	of	rhythm	from	the	scheme.	However,	these	are	not	 paradigm	 failures	 but	 rather	 practical	 limitations.	Numerous	musicological	studies	focus	on	particular	aspects	at	the	expense	of	others,	Schenkerian	analysis	being	an	example	of	a	model	that	fails	to	account	for	rhythm.		The	strength	of	connectionism	is	that	it	can	successfully	model	aspects	of	music	that	 are	 well-defined	 by	 the	 musicological	 paradigm–	 such	 as	 dissonance,	rhythm,	 key	 and	 hierarchical	 structure.	 It	 can	 produce	 a	 computational	model	that	will	 give	 responses	 resembling	 those	of	a	human	 listener,	 and	 it	 can	 learn	conventions	 or	 rules	 automatically,	 without	 being	 actively	 programed	 or	‘trained’	 by	 the	 analyst.	 This	 supports	 two	 claims:	 (i)	 that	 features	 distinctly	associated	 with	 the	 musicological	 model	 of	 tonal	 music	 can	 be	 understood	 in	
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terms	of	perceptual	functions	that	are	themselves	understood	without	reference	to	 music	 (ii)	 the	 perception	 of	 features	 of	 music	 associated	 with	 the	musicological	model	of	tonal	music	can	be	understood	on	a	non-representational	model.	 (i)	 challenges	 the	 claim	 that	music	 experience	 should	 be	 distinguished	from	 sound	 experience,	 and	 (ii)	 claims	 that	 music	 perception–	 or,	 given	 the	narrower	 remit	 of	 this	 essay,	 the	 perceptual	 functions	 underlying	 musical	movement–	is	nonconceptual	,	in	the	sense	given	above.			
2.10	Concluding	Summary.		The	 argument	made	 in	 this	 chapter	 has	 been	 for	what	 I	 termed	 a	phenomenal	
view,	 and	 has	 opposed	 an	 abstract	 view,	 where	 the	 former	 assumes	 musical	movement	 is	 dependent	 on	 perception	 and	 the	 latter	 assumes	 musical	movement	is	independent	of	perception.	1) Musical	movement	was	introduced	as	a	particularly	significant	and	well-reported	aesthetic	feature.	2) An	 abstract	 view	 was	 considered	 in	 some	 detail,	 drawing	 on	 Roger	Scruton’s	metaphorical	conception	of	music.	I	attributed	certain	claims	to	an	 abstract	 view	 that	 derived	 from	 Scruton’s	 writings:	 the	 claims	 that	experience	of	musical	movement	is	intentional	and	thus	representational,	and	that	it	is	thus	an	abstract	object.	3) A	 section	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 terms	 psycho-acoustic	 and	
acoustic	outlined	Scruton’s	attempt	to	draw	a	distinction	between	musical	features	 and	 acoustic	 features,	 summarising	 the	 proposed	 musical	features	 that	 are	 not	 reducible	 to	 acoustic	 features.	 This	 argument	 led	Scruton	 to	 claim	 that	musical	 features	 are	 irreducible	 in	 the	 sense	 that	they	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 empirical	 science.	 The	 claims	 that	musical	movement	 is	 irreducible	and	 therefore	 specifically	musical	 were	then	associated	with	the	abstract	view.	4) After	 some	 initial	 counter-argument,	 an	 extensive	discussion	of	work	 in	embodied	 psychology	 on	 the	 metaphorical	 cognitive	 structures,	 image	
schemata,	 looked	 to	 reject	 Scruton’s	 claims	 by	 detailing	 how	 a	 psycho-
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acoustic	model	 can	 account	 for	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 Scruton’s	 proposed	specifically	 musical	 features,	 most	 importantly	 the	 sense	 of	 motion,	compulsion	and	the	notion	of	metaphor.	The	utility	of	image	schemata	in	accounting	 for	 features	 of	musical	movement	 supports	 the	 phenomenal	position	 that	 the	 perception	 of	 musical	 movement	 is	 nonconceptual,	depending	on	perception,	and	weakens	the	abstract	position	that	musical	movement	is	specifically	musical.	5) An	extended	discussion	of	connectionist	approaches	to	music	perception	concluded	 that	 the	 features	 of	 music	 that	 underlie	 musical	 movement–	understood	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 musicological	 model	 of	 tonal	 music–	 can	 be	modelled	 using	 a	 computational	 architecture	 that	 does	 not	 employ	internal	 representations	 and	 that	 explicates	 perceptual	 functions	 not	specific	to	music.		The	 abstract	 view	 discussed	 above	 assumes	 that	 musical	 movement	 is	independent	 of	 perception	 insofar	 as	 it	 takes	 musical	 movement	 to	 be	
conceptual:	representing	the	object	as	being	a	particular	way,	where	this	way	is	something	 sharable,	 communicable	 and	 understood	 in	 aesthetic	 experience	 as	being	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 object.	 This	 view	 of	 musical	 movement	 as	 being	conceptual	 suggests	 that	empirical	accounts	will	not	 impinge	on	such	aesthetic	issues,	 since	 it	 is	 unclear	 how	 these	 imagined	 scenarios’	 listeners	 supposedly	represent	 music	 as	 undergoing	 or	 as	 being	 can	 be	 related	 to	 non-musical	behaviours	or	objects.	As	such,	an	abstract	view	 implies	some	closure	between	the	musically	aesthetic	and	the	non-musical;	it	can	be	said	that	an	abstract	view	thus	posits	a	specifically	musical	domain	or	experience.		This	 view	 can	 be	 countered	 by	 giving	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 account	 of	 musical	movement.	 It	was	argued	that	Scruton’s	seven	musically	aesthetic	 features	that	were	 intended	 to	 illustrate	 the	 dichotomy	 between	 sound	 and	 tone	 could	 be	almost	entirely	accounted	for	using	models	from	music-psychology	that	explicate	nonconceptual	perception.	Understanding	musical	movement	as	a	phenomenon	that	 is	 based	 in	 nonconceptual	 psychology	 supports	 the	 phenomenal	 view	insofar	as	nonconceptual	perceptual	experience	is	apt	to	conflict	with	conceptual	
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perceptual	experience:	when	I	project	the	embodied	schemata	of	balance	onto	a	harmonic	device,	I	may	concurrently	entertain	the	thought	that	there	are	in	fact	no	 real	 objects	 in	 balance.	 The	 experience	 of	 balance	 I	 have	 depends	 on	 my	perception,	in	the	same	way	as	when	I	induce	an	illusion	when	pressing	the	side	of	 my	 eye:	 just	 as	 when	 I	 relieve	 the	 pressure	 on	 my	 eye	 the	 doubled	 and	distorted	 object	 I	 perceive	 disappears	 from	 existence	 entirely,	 when	 I	 am	 no	longer	 perceptive	 of	 this	 particular	 harmonic	 device	 the	 balance	 I	 perceive	disappears	 from	 existence	 entirely.	 Illusion	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 musical	movement	is	considered	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.	
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Chapter	3		
		
Musical	Movement	as	Perceptual	Illusion:	
accounting	for	the	conflict	between	conceptual	
and	nonconceptual	experience.			
3.1	Introductory	Summary.		The	previous	chapter	characterised	two	distinct	views,	abstract	and	phenomenal,	as	 opposites	 that	 describe	 musical	 movement	 either	 in	 terms	 of	 scientifically	irreducible	 concepts	 that	 the	 object	 represents	 (former)	 or	 as	 an	 effect	 of	nonconceptual	psychological	processes	(latter).	I	advocate	the	phenomenal	view,	arguing	that	perceived	motion	in	music	experience	should	be	conceived	in	terms	of	 embodied	 or	 nonconceptual	 psychological	 engagement.	 This	 argument	 was	wrought	by	critiquing	the	contrasting	abstract	position	and	by	delineating	those	psychological	models	that	can	provide	a	positive	phenomenal	account	of	musical	movement.	 This	 chapter	 strengthens	 the	 distinction	 and	 expands	 on	 the	phenomenal	 view	 by	 investigating	musical	movement	 in	 its	 relation	 to	 real	 or	veridical	 movement.	 The	 contrasting	 positions	 respectively	 posed	 by	 abstract	and	phenomenal	views	are	considered	along	with	a	third	position–	humanism.		That	 music	 perception	 seems	 to	 cross-pollinate	 with	 spatial-perception	 is	 a	challenging	 fact	 of	 the	 matter,	 since	 musical-movement	 is	 a	 specious	 notion.	Music	has	no	moving	parts;	it	is	made	up	of	sounds	the	most	of	which	can	be	said	
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is	that	they	change	and	are	ordered,	but	they	do	not	move	in	the	relevant	sense.38	The	 conflict	 between	 the	 sense	 of	 musical	 movement	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 real	movement	can	be	approached	in	three	ways:		
Abstract:	 (i)	 musical	 movement	 is	 specifically	 musical	 and	 thus	 irreducible:	 it	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	non-musical	movement.		
Humanist:	(ii)	musical	movement	is	not	paradoxical;	it	emerges	from	day-to-day	interpersonal	experience	and	discourse		
Phenomenal:	(iii)	musical	movement	 is	a	perceptual	 illusion,	based	on	a	conflict	between	perceptual	experience	and	belief.		In	support	of	(i)	it	has	been	argued	that	musical	movement	resists	explanation	in	non-musical	terms–	that	aesthetic	features	like	movement	are	outside	the	purely	acoustic	field	of	possibilities,	and	that	as	such	approaches	that	attempt	to	reduce	the	 aesthetic	 to	 the	 non-aesthetic	 are	 implausible.	 View	 (ii)	 suggests	 that	 the	word	 ‘literal’	 is	 misused	 when	 it	 is	 said	 that	 nothing	 literally	 moves.	 This	humanist	view	holds	that,	while	listeners	do	not	infer	real	movement	from	their	experience,	 language	 is	 such	 that	meanings	 are	mapped	 across	 domains	 in	 all	manner	of	experiences,	not	just	the	musical.	In	which	case	it	seems	that	musical	movement	may	just	be	a	jot	on	the	far	larger	landscape	of	human	behaviour	and	language,	 where	 meanings	 and	 experiences	 flow	 back	 and	 forth	 from	 their	sources	and	where	‘literal’	becomes	a	far	more	restricted	term.	Finally,	(iii)	can	be	 directly	 opposed	 to	 (i)	 since	 on	 this	 view	 musical	 movement	 is	 an	 effect	understood	in	terms	that	extend	beyond	the	aesthetic	or	musicological,	into	the	empirical	realms	of	psychology.		I	 argue	 that	 each	 of	 these	 contrasting	 positions	 has	 persuasive	 elements.	However,	 the	 following	 chapter	 is	 committed	 to	 the	 phenomenal	 view,	 and	conceiving	 musical	 movement	 as	 a	 perceptual	 illusion	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 this																																																									38	Of	course,	sounds	do	in	fact	move	in	the	sense	that	sound	waves	physically	move	across	space	to	our	ears,	although	this	is	an	unrelated	phenomenon	to	the	perception	of	musical-movement.	
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view.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 1,	 the	 phenomenal	 view	 posits	 that	 musical	movement	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 specifically	musical	 features:	 the	 experience	 of	movement	 is	 a	 product	 of	 day-to-day	 psychological	 mechanisms.	 That	 music-aesthetic	features	might	be	understood	in	terms	of	quotidian	human	behaviours	is	a	notion	in	line	with	humanism,	but	the	view	offered	is	clearly	distinguished	by	the	central	claim	that	movement	apparent	in	music	is	an	illusion.	The	illusion	of	musical	movement	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	 conflict	 between	 nonconceptual	 and	conceptual	perceptual	abilities.			 - The	 following	 begins	 by	 outlining	 some	 of	 the	 precedents	 for	 a	psychological	theory	of	the	sort	I	am	arguing	and	also	frames	the	current	discussion	within	 some	of	 the	broader	 literature	 on	musical	movement,	continuing	from	the	discussion	of	Scruton	in	chapter	1.		 - Section	two	reiterates	the	options	(i),	(ii)	and	(iii)	given	above	and	gives	a	brief	overview	of	(i)	in	continuation	from	chapter	1.		 - The	discussion	moves	to	humanism,	finding	exemplars	in	Andy	Hamilton	and	Roger	Scruton.	A	phenomenal	view	can	be	aligned	with	humanism	in	part,	but	diverges	on	the	central	point	of	describing	musical	movement	as	perceptual	illusion.		 - In	the	fourth	section	the	notion	of	perceptual	illusion	is	developed,	taking	Gregory	 Currie’s	 formulation	 as	 a	 starting	 point.	 Ecological	 theory,	pioneered	by	James	Gibson	and	applied	to	music	by	Eric	Clarke,	is	used	to	demonstrate	 how	 the	 experience	 of	 movement	 and	 space	 in	 music	 is	owed	 in	 part	 to	 processes	 concerning	 the	 ecological	 perception	 of	movement	 and	 space.	 Ecological	 theory	 provides	 a	 framework	whereby	the	 conflict	 between	 nonconceptual	 perceptual	 function	 and	 knowledge	can	be	better	understood.		
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- The	next	section	discusses	the	importance	of	the	temporal	aspect	of	music	in	 the	 experience	 of	musical	movement,	 how	 the	 experience	 of	musical	time	departs	from	what	Susanne	Langer	calls	‘clock	time’,	and	how	it	can	be	 elucidated	 using	 work	 from	 cognitive	 science	 on	 cognitive	
categorisation,	again	positing	a	nonconceptual	psychological	account.			
3.2	Psychological	Theories	of	Aesthetic	experience.		A	key	aspect	of	the	phenomenal	view	is	that	it	approaches	questions	pertaining	to	music	experience	using	 scientific	psychological	 theory.	This	view	 thus	 relies	on	 a	 multi-disciplinary	 approach	 where	 issues	 are	 framed	 using	 work	 in	aesthetics,	 musicology	 and	 philosophy	 but	 rely	 on	 support	 from	 psychology.	Such	 an	 approach	 is,	 I	 argue,	 less	 common	 than	 one	 that	 frames	 and	 supports	arguments	within	 a	 single	discipline,	 and	 rarer	 still	 for	 particularly	 connecting	philosophical	 or	 aesthetic	 issues	 with	 psychological	 research.	 Chapter	 4	considers	 a	 range	 of	 views	 in	 aesthetics	 and	musicology	 that	 take	 an	 abstract	position	 towards	 musical	 movement	 without	 making	 connections	 with	psychology.	 However,	 an	 approach	 that	 connects	 questions	 pertaining	 to	 the	aesthetics	 or	 philosophy	 of	 music	 with	 psychological	 models	 does	 have	 some	important	precedents	in	the	literature,	and	it	is	the	role	of	this	section	to	provide	this	background.		The	phenomenal	view	is	psychological	in	as	much	as	it	attributes	a	central	aspect	of	musical	experience	to	a	perceptual	ability	understood	by	reference	to	a	model	of	 human	psychology.	 Contrasting	 views	 can	be	 described	 as	 conceptual,	 given	that	 they	 attribute	 aspects	 of	 musical	 experience	 to	 properties	 of	 the	 object,	understood	 by	 reference	 to	 a	 musicological	 or	 philosophical	 model,	 that	 a	listener	 becomes	 acquainted	 with.	 Musicologists	 will	 tend	 to	 imply	 the	 latter	view–	 Heinrich	 Schenker	 and	 Arnold	 Schoenberg	 being	 pertinent	 examples–	along	with	philosophers	and	aestheticians	such	as	those	considered	in	chapter	2	and	chapter	5.	However,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	first	psychological	theory	of	
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music	 experience	 belonged	 to	 the	 most	 eminent	 writer	 in	 modern	 aesthetics,	Immanuel	Kant.		It	 was	 noted	 in	 chapter	 2	 that	 Mark	 Johnson	 derived	 his	 concept	 of	 ‘image	schemata’	 from	 the	 Kantian	 concept	 ‘schemata’,	 denoting	 nonpropositional	structures	of	the	faculty	of	imagination.	In	The	Critique	of	Judgement,	Kant	wrote	that	 such	structures	could	mediate	between	 the	 faculties	of	understanding	and	sensation	 by	 consisting	 of	 elements	 of	 both.	 While	 Kant	 initially	 intended	‘schemata’	to	fill	certain	gaps	in	our	comprehension	of	perception	and	cognition,	their	 nature	 as	 nonconceptual	 mental	 structures	 also	 provides	 opportunity	 to	elucidate	aesthetic	experience.	For	Johnson’s	reinterpreted	image	schemata,	this	opportunity	fell	to	music-psychologists	composing	a	secondary	literature,	while	for	Kant	the	schematising	function	of	imagination	comprised	a	central	element	in	his	aesthetics.		In	 the	 Critique	 of	 Judgement,	 Kant	 notes	 that	 a	 judgement	 of	 the	 beautiful	proceeds	 from	a	subjective	 feeling	and	as	such	 is	not	dependent	on	subsuming	the	 perceived	 object	 under	 a	 concept,	 thus	 suggesting	 that	 such	 judgements	should	be	aligned	with	 judgements	of	 the	agreeable–	of	a	kind	where	someone	claims	to	find	something,	e.g.	food,	good	or	pleasing.	However,	a	judgement	of	the	beautiful	 also	 has	 characteristics	 of	 objective	 or	 cognitive	 judgements,	 most	significantly	 the	 character	 of	 a	 normative	 claim	 to	 universal	 agreement.	 Given	these	 dual	 affinities,	 Kant	 was	 led	 to	 postulate	 the	 conception	 of	 a	 ‘free	 play’	between	 imagination	 and	understanding.	 This	 ‘free	 play’,	 or	 ‘free	 harmonising’	occurs	 without	 the	 object	 being	 subsumed	 under	 any	 particular	 concept	 but	involves	the	schematising	function	of	 imagination	and	understanding	operating	as	if	they	were.	Kant’s	notion	of	free	play	allows	him	to	explain	certain	ostensible	truths	of	aesthetic	experience	by	recourse	to	elements	of	a	subject’s	psychology,	the	basic	functions	of	which	are	described	independently	of	the	aesthetic.		While	 the	 notion	 of	 free	 play	 is	 seemingly	 reserved	 for	 judgements	 of	 beauty	only,	 it	 remains	 that	 Kant	 seeks	 to	 account	 for	 aesthetic	 experience	 using	 a	model	of	psychology	that	extends	well	beyond	that	of	aesthetic	perception	and	is	
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in	 this	 sense	 a	 psychological	 theory	 of	 aesthetic	 experience,	 even	 if	 there	 are	major	differences	between	Kant’s	approach	to	psychology	and	modern	empirical	psychology.	The	force	of	his	view	rests	on	the	intelligibility	of	the	notion	of	free	play,	 an	 issue	 that	 is	 revisited	 in	 chapter	5.	 Furthermore,	Kant’s	 focus	on	pure	beauty–	that	which	excludes	any	form	of	representation–	prior	to	the	Antinomy	
of	Taste,	along	with	the	notion	of	disinterestedness	and	a	free	play	of	cognition	that	 has	 no	 concept,	 could	 suggest	 an	 overly	 narrow,	 formalist	 view.39	Issues	concerning	Kant’s	view	such	as	 those	of	putative	 formalism,	 the	universality	of	aesthetic	judgement	and	free	play	of	cognition	will	be	given	further	attention	in	the	ensuing	chapters.		Kant’s	aesthetics	explicated	particular	aesthetic	experiences	with	 recourse	 to	a	kind	 of	 mental	 process	 that	 cannot	 be	 captured	 in	 terms	 of	 culture,	 belief	 or	objective	 judgements,	 akin	 to	 a	 phenomenal	 view.	However,	 the	 grounding	 for	his	theory	was	not	the	empirical	but	rather	was	what	could	be	described	as	the	metaphysical,	 thus	 suggesting	 a	 divergence	 from	 the	phenomenal	 view	offered	here.	Leonard	Meyer	provides	an	example	of	a	cross-disciplinary	approach	that	couches	claims	within	the	area	of	musical	aesthetics	while	supporting	them	with	research	drawn	from	empirical	psychology.		Meyer	developed	a	psychological	view	of	emotion	in	music	that	drew	on	work	by	philosophers	such	as	 John	Dewey,	Henry	D.	Aiken,	Susanne	Langer,	and	George	Mead	 to	 cast	 the	 particular	 issue	 of	 how	 the	 violation	 and	 fulfilment	 of	expectancies	 produces	 feeling	 in	 a	 subject.	 By	 describing	 Dewey’s	 ‘Conflict	theory	 of	 emotions’	 as	 the	 point	 of	 origin	 for	 contemporaneous	 theories	 of	expectancy,	Meyer	suggests	that	his	psychological	theory	of	emotion	has	its	roots	in	 philosophical	 thinking.	 However,	 he	 also	 demonstrates	 the	 efficacy	 of	empirical	psychology	in	appraising	such	thinking.		Three	 ‘Principles	of	Pattern	Perception’,	based	in	Gestalt	psychology,	are	posed	in	 Meyer’s	 Emotion	 and	 Meaning	 in	 Music	 (1956)	 to	 help	 account	 for	 our	emotional	 responses	 to	 music.	 The	 first	 principle,	 ‘The	 Law	 of	 Good																																																									39	See	Guyer	(1979),	chs.	5	and	6.	
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Continuation’	 is	 fundamental	 to	 Gestalt	 psychology:	 ‘A	 shape	 or	 pattern	 will,	other	things	being	equal,	tend	to	be	continued	in	its	 initial	mode	of	operation…	Among	other	things	this	law	helps	to	account	for	our	being	able	to	hear	separate,	discrete	 stimuli	 as	 continuous	 motions	 and	 shapes’	 (p.92.)	 Principle	 two,	‘Completion	 and	 Closure’,	 denotes	 the	 Gestalt	 precept	 that	 objects	 that	 appear	incomplete	will	be	completed	in	perception.	The	final	principle,	‘The	Weakening	of	Shape’,	discusses	the	features	of	grouping,	similarity,	difference	and	proximity	in	the	perception	of	shape,	and	the	manner	in	which	these	features	can	coalesce	along	with	the	principle	of	continuance	to	destroy	shape.		These	 principles	 were	 applied	 to	 various	 aspects	 of	 tonal	 music,	 including	melody,	 counterpoint,	 phrasing,	 structure,	 pitch,	 harmony,	 rhythm	 and	instrumentation.	 Meyer’s	 argument	 was	 that	 Gestalt	 principles	 of	 perception	operate	 at	 many	 levels	 of	 music	 perception,	 alongside	 encultured	 and	 learnt	meaning.	 This	 approach	was	developed	by	Eugene	Narmour	 (1990),	 certain	 of	his	claims	having	been	supported	with	empirical	testing,	notably	by	Jamshed	Bharucha	and	Keiko	Stoeckig	(1986)	who	examined	basic	 listener	responses	to	expectation.	 David	 Huron	 makes	 the	 claim,	 identical	 to	 Meyer’s,	 that	expectancies	 function	 in	music	 to	provoke	emotion,	using	 a	 complex	 five-stage	theory	of	expectation.40		There	 are	 notable	 similarities	 between	 Meyer’s	 psychological	 theory	 and	 the	phenomenal	 approach:	 firstly,	 the	 methodology	 of	 drawing	 on	 a	 multi-disciplinary	corpus	that	 includes	aesthetics	and	philosophy	to	 formulate	claims	while	 relying	 heavily	 on	 researches	 in	 psychology	 to	 support	 those	 claims;	secondly,	 the	 position	 that	 our	 understanding	 of	music	 should	 proceed	 from	 a	psycho-acoustic	perspective	of	music	listening.	Indeed,	the	objection	to	Scruton’s	segregation	of	musical	tone	given	in	chapter	2,	whereupon	a	clear-cut	distinction	between	 the	 acoustical	 and	 musical	 is	 rejected,	 echoes	 Meyer’s	 thinking	 on	
																																																								40	See	Huron	2006.		
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musical	 universals:	 ‘The	 universals	 central	 for	 music	 theory	 are	 not	 those	 of	physics	or	acoustics	but	those	of	human	psychology.’41			
3.3	 Available	 positions	 on	 Music	 and	 Movement	 in	 the	
Literature.		Musical	 movement	 has	 increasingly	 become	 a	 target	 for	 psychological	approaches	 over	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 many	 such	 approaches	 having	 been	discussed	 in	 chapter	 2	 and	 to	 be	 further	 considered	 in	 the	 section	 below	 on	psychology.	 However,	 thinking	 about	 music	 and	 motion	 is	 arguably	 as	 old	 as	formalised	thinking	about	music.	Lee	Rothfarb	suggests	that	the	earliest	writers	in	music-studies,	in	ancient	Greece,	conceived	the	temporal	character	of	music	as	a	form	of	motion:		 The	extraordinary	ethical	power	of	music	was	thought	to	derive	from	its	inherent	motion	–	motion	being	 the	 recognized	 foundation	of	 existence.	Aristoxenus,	the	first	author	to	attempt	a	sustained	technical	discussion	of	music,	is	also	the	first	to	go	beyond	metaphysical	speculation	and	theorize	concretely	about	musical	motion	(2002:	930)		Over	2000	years	ago,	Aristoxenus	wrought	a	conception	of	distinguishable	scale	degrees	with	their	own	functional	identity	and	tendencies	towards	or	away	from	each	other–	a	concept	of	musical	force.42		Rothfarb	plots	music	and	movement	 through	history,	evincing	key	conceptions	from	 the	ancients	 through	medieval,	Baroque	and	Classical	periods	up	 to	early	20th	 century	 examples	 in	 August	 Halm,	 Heinrick	 Schenker,	 Ernst	 Kurth	 and	Arnold	Schering.	The	influence	of	the	conceptions	of	musical	movement	wrought																																																									41	See	Meyer	2000:	276.	E.	Glenn	Schellenberg	has	provided	some	experimental	evidence	for	the	notion	that	Gestalt	principles	have	universal	applicability	by	studying	and	comparing	the	expectancies	of	Chinese	and	American	students	as	they	listen	to	music	of	both	their	own	and	foreign	cultures.	42	Aristoxenus,	Elementa	Harmonica,	Book	II,	in	Barker,	Greek	Musical	Writings,	vol.	ii,	p.	180.	
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by	these	analysts	can	be	felt	in	more	recent	writing	by	those	working	in	music-psychology,	 such	 as	 Larson	 and	 Van	 Handel,	 Krumhansel	 and,	 perhaps	 most	famously,	Lerdhal	and	Jackendoff	with	their	 ‘Generative	Theory	of	Tonal	Music’	(1983)		A	focal	point	in	the	recent	debate	within	aesthetics	has	been	the	extended	back-and-forth	 between	 Malcolm	 Budd	 and	 Roger	 Scruton;	 whether	 description	 of	music	 as	 movement	 can	 be	 called	 metaphorical,	 and	 as	 such	 the	 role	 the	metaphor	 of	 movement	 has	 in	 experience	 are	 the	 principle	 points	 of	disagreement.	 Budd	 (1985)	 poses	 the	 issue	 of	 musical	 movement	 as	 a	 binary	choice:		 The	 first	 declines	 to	 take	 the	 talk	of	movement	 seriously	 and	maintains	that	when	we	speak	of	an	ascending	phrase	all	we	mean	is	that	later	notes	of	the	phrase	increase	in	pitch.	The	second	construes	as	metaphorical	the	description	of	music	in	terms	that	stand	for	forms	of	movement.	(p.45)		The	first	position	attributes	the	notion	of	musical	movement	to	a	terminological	error,	and	is	held	by	Budd,	while	the	second	permits	that	description	of	music	in	terms	 of	 movement	 is	 metaphorical,	 and	 is	 associated	 with	 Scruton.	 N.b.	 the	above	may	 suggest	 Budd	 is	 attending	 to	musical	description	rather	 than	music	
experience,	 and	 the	notion	 that	we	describe	music	as	a	metaphor	of	movement	can	be	separated	 from	the	notion	 that	we	experience	 is	as	 such.	However,	 it	 is	clear	that	Budd	is	not	attending	only	to	description	in	his	proceeding	argument;	for	example	his	almost	immediate	characterisation	of	the	second	interpretation	as	 one	 ‘that	 assigns	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 movement	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	experience	and	description	of	music’	(ibid.)	I	will	give	some	space	to	the	points	Budd	makes	for	his	view	and	give	a	rebuttal	before	considering	Scruton’s	view.		Responding	 to	 Carroll	 C.	 Pratt’s	 thesis	 that	 a	 basic	 character	 of	music,	 both	 in	experience	 and	 description,	 derives	 from	 its	 operating	 as	 a	 metaphor	 for	movement,	Budd	argues	that	the	analogue	between	each	domain	is	too	weak	to	
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support	metaphor.43	For	 example:	while	 a	body	moves	 smoothly	 and	gradually	through	space,	a	melody	 is	composed	of	 tones	 that	change	abruptly,	 traversing	musical	 space	with	sudden	changes	of	position–	a	closer	sonic	analogue	would	be	a	siren	where	pitch	fluctuates	smoothly.	Relatedly,	Budd	argues,	it	is	plausible	that	a	particular	high	note	could	in	fact	appear	phenomenologically	lower	than	a	particular	 low	 note–	 that	 a	 particular	 high	 note’s	 sounding	 higher	 than	 a	particular	low	note	is	contingent.44		Terms	that	imply	bodily	movement–	such	as	‘agitated’	or	‘restless’-	may	have	an	intuitive	 rightness	 when	 applied	 to	 music,	 but	 this,	 Budd	 argues,	 does	 not	suggest	that	music	might	share	the	same	character	of	the	movements	implied	by	such	terms.	Rather,	the	aptness	of	such	terms	stems	from	its	capacity	to	provoke	just	those	emotions	that	in	turn	provoke	a	bodily	response.	On	Budd’s	view,	we	misconstrue	 our	natural	 response	 to	 the	 felt	 emotion	of	music	 listening	 as	 the	immediate	embodied	response	to	music,	whereas	in	fact	the	embodied	response	is	secondary	to	the	emotional	response.	This	argument	denies	that	the	sense	of	movement	 felt	 when	 listening	 to	 music	 is	 a	 response	 to	 hearing	 music	 as	 a	metaphor	movement	(Scruton’s	claim)	and	is	also	in	opposition	to	the	view	that	the	 sense	 of	movement	 emerges	 from	 certain	 aspects	 of	 embodied	 psychology	(phenomenal	 view).	That	 said,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 a	 sense	of	musical	movement	 is	 an	 aspect	 of	 Budd’s	 view,	 but	 is	 conceived	 as	 secondary	 to	 an	emotional	response.		A	 final	 point	 Budd	 makes	 against	 the	 view	 that	 musical	 movement	 is	metaphorical	is	that	use	of	the	concept	of	metaphor	is	misleading	given	that	the	‘function	of	metaphor	is	manifold	[so]	unless	the	underlying	point	of	a	metaphor	is	understood	its	characterisation	as	a	metaphor	is	unrevealing’	(p.45.)	I	devoted	an	 extended	 discussion	 to	 the	 definition	 of	metaphor	 in	 chapter	 1	 so	will	 not	revisit	this	here.	Budd’s	conclusion	is	that	movement	provides	a	highly	felicitous	
analogy	of	music	 but	 is	 not	 basic	 to	music	 perception	 or	 description.	 As	 such,	
																																																								43	Pratt	1931,	157.	44	Budd	1985:	44.	
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spatial	 vocabulary	 can	 be	 reduced	 to	 non-spatial	 terms,	 rendering	 spatial	references	eliminable.		Before	 revisiting	 Scruton’s	 alternative	 view,	 I	 will	 present	 a	 short	 rebuttal	 of	Budd’s	 position,	 summarized	 as:	 (1)	 description	 of	 the	 metaphor	 of	 musical	movement	 is	 reducible	 to	 non-spatial	 terms	 and	 (2)	 the	 experience	 of	musical	movement	is	secondary	to	emotion.	Firstly,	it	can	be	said	that	it	is	open	to	debate	as	 to	 what	 kind	 of	 relation	 is	 necessary	 between	musical	 characteristics–	 like	melodic	 contour–	and	motion	 characteristics–	 like	 linear	motion	along	a	 single	axis–	for	that	relation	to	be	held	as	metaphorical.	Indeed,	this	issue	is	central	to	understanding	 musical	 movement.	 Without	 relying	 on	 the	 conception	 of	metaphor	 as	 a	 projection	 of	 embodied	 structures	wrought	 in	 chapter	 1,	 it	 can	still	 be	 argued	 that	 for	metaphor	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	other	 relationships,	like	that	of	literal	representation,	a	metaphor	will	be	an	incomplete	specification,	both	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 it	 represents	 the	 target	 domain	 (music)	 and	 the	 source	domain	 (movement).	 Tones	 can	 have	 properties	 that	 distinguish	 them	 from	bodies	moving	 through	 space	while	 still	 operating	 as	metaphors	of	movement.	There	are	more	serious	disparities	between	tones	and	moving	bodies	than	those	Budd	 notes,	 most	 obviously	 the	 difference	 in	 sensory	 modality,	 given	 that	movement	 tends	 to	 be	 primarily	 perceived	 visually	 or	 kinesthetically.	 Certain	conflicts	are	to	be	expected	given	that	music	is	not	designed	solely	with	respect	to	the	metaphor	of	movement:	certain	properties	of	music	such	as	discrete	pitch-classes	 are	 determined	 by	 the	 constraints	 of	 sound	 and	 the	 human	 auditory	system.	As	such,	the	point	that	progress	through	distinct	scale	degrees	differs	to	progress	of	a	body	through	an	environment	is	not	enough	to	discredit	the	view	that	melodic	contour	is	a	metaphor	of	movement.		Further,	 now	with	 recourse	 to	 the	 arguments	 given	 for	 the	 phenomenal	 view,	there	is	a	plethora	of	psychological,	physiological	and	analytical	data	available	to	link	music	with	movement–	much	of	this	work	was	done	in	chapter	1,	although	further	 pertinent	 researches	 will	 be	 discussed	 below.	 These	 data	 then	 serve	equally	 to	 debunk	 Budd’s	 suggestion	 that	 the	 sense	 of	 musical	 movement	 is	secondary	 to	 an	 emotional	 response,	 given	 that	 they	 suggest	 embodied	
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experience	 of	motion	 and	 related	 characteristics	 have	 primacy	 concerning	 the	sense	of	musical	movement.		Contrary	 to	 the	view	given	 in	Budd	(1985),	Scruton	presents	 the	experience	of	movement	as	irreducibly	metaphorical.45	When	I	hear	a	melody	I	hear	a	series	of	temporally	 parsed	 periodic	 sounds,	 but	 I	 also	 hear	 a	movement	 up	 and	 down,	towards	and	away	from	a	harmonic	centre.	In	this	sense	musical	experience	has	‘double	intentionality’:		 You	hear	a	 succession	of	 sounds,	ordered	 in	 time,	and	 this	 is	 something	you	believe	to	be	occurring–	something	you	‘literally	hear’.	And	you	hear	
in	 those	 sounds	 a	 melody	 that	 moves	 through	 the	 imaginary	 space	of	music.	This	is	not	something	you	believe	to	be	occurring,	but	something	you	imagine.46		As	Budd	(2003)	claims,	and	Scruton	(2004)	admits,	‘double	intentionality’	is	not	given	adequate	delineation	and	so	renders	problematic	any	response	to	the	issue	of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 say	 something	 ‘involves’	 metaphor,	 although	 Scruton	suggests	 that	 to	 resolve	 this	 issue	 we	 would	 need	 to	 resolve	 a	 bedrock	 issue	pertaining	to	intentionality	generally.		Budd	argues	that	the	general	import	of	the	metaphor	of	movement	in	Scruton’s	view	 is	 overstated,	 noting	 that	 while	 timbre	 can	 be	 described	 in	 terms	 of	movement	(‘forceful’,	‘driving’,)	we	would	be	far	less	likely	to	bring	to	mind	such	descriptions	 in	 experience,	 or	 indeed	 attempt	 to	 explain	 our	 experience	 with	such	 descriptions.	 Movement	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 musical	experience,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 but	 motional	 and	 spatial	 terms	 are	 not	irreducible.	 This	 argument	 that	 all	musical	 terms	 that	 seem	 to	 ascribe	motion	can	 in	 fact	be	 reduced	 to	 the	non-spatial	 is	 queried	by	Stephen	Davies	 (2008),	who	advances	the	example	of	the	octave	as	a	theoretical	concept	that	could	not	obviously	 be	 described	 without	 reference	 to	 movement	 or	 space.	 However,																																																									45	Scruton	(1983;	1997;	2004);	see	chapter	1.	46	Scruton	2004:	184.	
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Davies	 (1994)	does	posit,	 contra	Scruton	and	Budd,	 that	all	 spatial	and	motion	terms	 are	 in	 fact	 used	 in	 their	 literal	 instantiation,	 akin	 to	 the	 way	 we	 use	equivalent	 terms	 in	normal	 language–	 shares	have	 gone	 ‘up’	 or	 ‘down’,	mental	state	 is	 ‘high’	 or	 ‘low’,	 etc.	 Andy	 Hamilton	 (2007)	 also	 seems	 to	 indicate	 this	position.	 This	 is	 a	 view	 that	 is	 discussed	 in	 full	 below	 in	 the	 section	 on	humanism.		On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 literature	 considered	 so	 far,	 the	 occupied	 positions	 with	regard	 to	 musical	 movement	 seem	 to	 be:	 (a)	 the	 experience	 of	 musical	movement	 is	 an	 imagined	metaphor	 that	 is	 irreducible;	 (b)	musical	movement	has	 phenomenal	 veridicality	 but	 any	 description	 in	motion	 or	 spatial	 terms	 is	reducible	to	non-spatial	terms;	(c)	terms	used	to	describe	musical	movement	are	in	fact	used	literally	but	to	refer	to	movement	in	a	secondary	sense	that	includes	temporality.	 These	 positions	 can	 be	 clearly	 situated	 within	 the	 three	 broad	responses	 to	 the	 problem	 of	musical	movement	 given	 in	 the	 introduction.	 (a),	Scruton’s	view	that	the	role	of	imagination	and	metaphor	renders	movement	an	irreducible	phenomenon,	 is	 an	 example	of	 (i)	 above–	 a	dualistic	 view	of	music	and	 world	 that	 separates	 musical	 movement	 from	 other	 forms	 of	 movement,	from	the	body	and	from	empirical	study.	Both	(b)–	Budd’s	view	that	the	sense	of	musical	motion	 is	 central	 but	 all	 reference	 to	motional	 terms	 can	be	 reduced–	and	 (c)–	 Davies’s	 view	 that	 motional	 terms	 are	 used	 literally	 but	 may	 not	 be	reducible–	are	examples	of	(ii)–	the	argument	that	the	apparent	conflict	inherent	in	the	notion	of	musical	movement	is	misconceived	or	soluble.		The	final	option	given	in	the	introduction,	(iii)–	that	musical	movement	consists	in	 perceptual	 illusion–	 is	 not	 represented	 in	 the	 discussion	 above	 but	 has	considerable	support	in	psychology.	This	support	will	be	considered	below	after	further	discussion	of	the	abstract	and	humanist	positions.	These	options,	(i),	(ii),	(iii),	will	be	important	points	of	reference	below	and	in	the	ensuing	chapters.					
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3.4	Three	approaches	to	musical	movement.		The	remainder	of	this	chapter	develops	and/or	addresses	the	three	approaches	to	musical	movement	distinguished	in	the	introduction:	
	
Abstract:	 (i)	 musical	 movement	 is	 specifically	 musical	 and	 thus	 irreducible:	 it	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	non-musical	movement.		
Humanist:	(ii)	musical	movement	is	not	paradoxical;	it	emerges	from	day-to-day	interpersonal	experience	and	discourse.		
Phenomenal:	(iii)	musical	movement	 is	 a	perceptual	 illusion,	based	 in	a	 conflict	between	perceptual	experience	and	belief.		
	
3.5	Abstract	view.		As	 noted	 in	 chapter	 1,	 Andy	 Hamilton	 distinguishes	 abstract	 and	 humane	conceptions	of	music,	 suggesting	 that	music	 is	 ‘abstract	 in	 form	but	humane	 in	utterance’	 (2007:	 114.)	 He	 describes	 the	 ‘abstractionist	 position’	 as	 one	 that	‘detaches	music	from	the	world,	making	it	the	most	abstract	of	the	arts–	a	pure	“art	of	tones”’	(p.95.)	This	use	of	‘abstract’	aptly	characterises	the	abstract	view	as	wrought	in	this	thesis,	suggesting	the	position	as	one	that	invokes	an	idealised	domain	 outside	 the	 physical	 world.	 To	 take	 an	 abstract	 view	 on	 music	 is	 to	prescribe	that	musical	features	such	as	those	described	by	musicological	analysis	are	specific	to	a	closed	musical	domain	with	independence	from	the	non-musical.	By	 contrast,	 to	 claim	 that	 music	 is	 ‘humane’	 is	 to	 claim	 that	 music	 should	 be	reconciled	with	the	human	sphere	of	culture,	society	etc.		I	 have	 given	 some	key	 examples	 of	 the	 abstract	 view	above,	most	 significantly	Scruton’s	 view	 that	 the	metaphorical	 nature	 of	musical	movement	motivates	 a	separation	 of	 sound	 from	 tone	 (chapter	 1).	 Other	 famous	 examples	 include	
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Heinrich	 Schenker’s	 analytical	 model,	 which	 formalises	 music	 in	 terms	 of	 a	fundamental	tonal	line–	or	Ursatz–	deep	in	the	background	of	the	harmonic	and	melodic	 form.	 Hanslick	 and	 Schoenberg	 offer	 other	 important	 abstract	 views,	which	will	be	discussed	in	full	in	chapter	4.	Central	to	such	views	is	the	notion	of	the	 specifically	 musical–	 the	 musical	 is	 in	 some	 important	 sense	 independent	from	the	non-musical	and	as	such	the	former	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	latter.	Given	that	considerable	attention	has	been	given	to	the	abstract	view	above,	 that	 the	 connections	 so	 far	 made	 between	 music	 and	 psychological	structures	 is	 itself	 a	 direct	 critique	 of	 the	 abstract	 view,	 and	 that	 the	 view	 is	considered	in	more	detail	in	chapter	4,	I	will	not	give	any	more	space	to	it	here.			
3.6	Humanism.	
	A	humanist	will	 seek	 a	 role	 for	human	experience	 in	 a	 theory	of	 the	 aesthetic,	and	 cast	 the	 line	 between	music	 and	 other	 human	 affairs	 as	 permeable	 if	 not	erroneous.	 While	 Scruton	 argues	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 musical	 movement	consists	in	an	aesthetic	transformation	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	sum	of	its	physical	 parts,	 he	 nonetheless	 gestures	 towards	 a	 humanist	 standpoint	 when	detailing	the	nature	of	this	transformation:	‘[w]hen	we	attend	to	an	appearance	for	its	own	sake,	the	world	that	we	have	bracketed	comes	back	in	another	form’	(Scruton	 1997,	 229.)	 This	 view,	 where	 the	 aesthetic	 draws	 on	 the	 worldly	 to	create	 the	 otherworldly,	 can	 be	 distinguished	 from	 a	 strong	 humanism	 that	prescribes	 an	 unconstrained	 inter-relation	 of	 artwork	 and	 world.	 Indeed,	 a	humanist	 conception	 can	 suggest	 that	 the	 whole	 enterprise	 of	 music	 and	metaphor	is	misjudged–	that	music’s	position	in	the	wider	cultural	space	renders	ascriptions	 of	 musical	 movement	 literal	 rather	 than	 metaphorical.	 Andy	Hamilton	(2007)	offers	this	view,	arguing	that	much	musical	terminology	is	not	reserved	 exclusively	 for	 music	 but	 is	 universally	 applicable.	 Rhythm	 is	 the	paradigm	 case:	 we	 attribute	 rhythm	 to	 normal	 speech,	 to	 walking,	 to	 sexual	intercourse;	and	rhythm	is	essential	to	poetry	as	well	as	dance	(Hamilton	2007:	126.)	 The	 non-musical	 applications	 of	 rhythm	 lead	 Hamilton	 to	 claim	 that	‘human	 bodily	 movement	 is	 as	 much	 the	 target	 of	 metaphorical	 projection	 as	
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music	itself’	(2007:	145.)		Rhythm	is	an	aspect	of	 life,	not	merely	an	aspect	of	music,	so	by	employing	the	term	in	descriptions	of	the	non-musical	we	seem	to	draw	on	musical	experience.	This	 humanistic	 sentiment	 blocks	 claims	 about	 musical	 movement	 being	irreducible	by	exposing	the	bidirectionality	of	the	metaphor.	 ‘Music	and	life	are	interfused’	as	Hamilton	says	(ibid).	Rather	than	the	unidirectionality	of	Scruton’s	view,	 where	 the	 spectacle	 of	 life	 is	 revealed	 in	 musical	 form,	 Hamilton’s	humanism	 uncovers	 the	 imprint	 of	 music	 on	 our	 day-to-day	 language	 and	thought.	 The	 pervasiveness	 of	 features	 like	 rhythm	 in	 the	 non-musical	 shows	that	life	is	lived	in	music	and	vice-versa.		However,	while	the	bi-directionality	of	the	metaphor	of	musical	movement	might	curtail	attempts	to	isolate	musical	metaphor	from	other	experience,	it	is	not	clear	why	 it	 thus	 renders	projection	 across	domains–	 either	 from	 space	 to	music	 or	vice	 versa–	 literal	 rather	 than	metaphorical.	 It	might	 be	 asked	why	metaphors	cannot	permit	a	potential	two-way	projection	and	remain	metaphors.	Making	do	with	clichés:	if	I	see	an	old	oak	tree	as	a	weary	and	life-worn	man,	can	I	not	also	represent	the	steely	resilience	of	an	aging	relative	with	reference	to	an	old	oak?	The	various	instances	of	anthropomorphic	oaks	in	literature	and	cinema	suggest	that	the	relation	between	the	domains	of	human	subject	and	tree	is	robust	and	transparent	for	the	audience,	and	there	seems	no	obvious	reason	to	promote	one	direction	 of	 projection	 above	 the	 other.	 This	 bi-directionality	 does	 not	 thus	render	the	representation	literal.	Hamilton’s	objection	seems	to	be	that	the	fact	that	 bodily	 movement	 is	 projected	 in	 musical	 experience	 does	 not	 constitute	evidence	that	metaphoric	projection	of	bodily	movement	 is	a	source	of	musical	experience,	since	music	also	acts	as	a	source	for	metaphors	of	bodily	movement.	While	the	bi-directionality	of	metaphor	is	an	instructive	point,	it	is	unclear	why	it	should	weigh	against	a	conception	of	metaphoric	projection	in	either	direction.		Humanism	as	Hamilton	presents	it	can	be	reconciled	with	the	phenomenal	view:	by	 recourse	 to	 Johnson’s	 theory	 of	 image	 schemata,	musical	movement	 can	be	understood	as	metaphorical	 in	the	same	way	that	everyday	metaphors	like	 ‘I’m	
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feeling	down’	can	be	so	understood.	The	phenomenal	view	posits	that	the	sense	of	 musical	 movement	 emerges	 from	 the	 operation	 of	 psychological	 structures	that	derive	 from	embodied	experience	and	are	utilised	 in	day-to-day	cognition.	When	the	relevant	sense	of	metaphor	accords	with	Lakoff	and	Johnson’s	(1980)	‘metaphors	we	live	by’,	the	crux	of	humanism–	understood	as	couching	musical	movement	 in	terms	of	human	life	and	discourse–	 is	endorsed	while	retaining	a	conception	of	musical	movement	as	metaphorical.		Hamilton’s	humanism	can	be	separated	from	a	phenomenal	view	in	a	similar	way	to	Scruton’s	weaker	version	of	humanism:	by	its	implication	that	experiences	of	musical	movement	entail	grasping	aspects	of	a	musical	work	as	concepts.	When	Hamilton	 discusses	 ‘rhythm’	 he	 implies	 a	 concept,	 and	 experiencing	 rhythm	 is	conflated	with	gaining	mastery	of	ascriptions	of	rhythm.	The	implicated	form	of	metaphor	seems	to	be	characterisation,	as	considered	in	chapter	1.		 The	 universality	 of	 rhythm	 means	 that	 human	 bodily	 movement	 is	 as	much	 the	 target	 of	metaphorical	 projection	 as	music	 itself…	 In	 order	 to	learn	to	ascribe	emotions,	one	does	not	have	to	experience	music	as	well	as	 human	 reactions	 and	 behaviour;	 emotion-ascriptions	 to	 music	 are	secondary	compared	with	those	to	people.	In	contrast,	we	do	not	project	from	a	primary	sense	of	rhythmic	bodily	movement	to	a	secondary	sense	of	musical	rhythmic	bodily	movement	because	we	have	already	reached	the	musical	level	of	description	in	describing	human	bodily	movement	as	rhythmic.	(ibid)		This	 is	 the	 argument	 that	 rhythm	 is	 not	 based	 in	 embodied	 experience	 of	movement	 and	 then	 projected	 onto	 music,	 since	 we	 have	 a	 ‘musical	 level	 of	description’	 of	 rhythm	 prior	 to	 any	 sense	 of	 non-musical	 rhythm.	 However,	 it	should	 be	 conceded	 that	 there	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 ‘learning	 to	 ascribe’	emotions	 and	merely	 experiencing	 emotions–	 ascription	 is	 not	 a	 condition	 on	emotion.	 Indeed,	 the	 same	 is	 true	 of	 music,	 which	 is	 experienced	 beyond	 the	descriptive	powers	of	most	experiencers.	So	claiming	that	the	necessary	‘level	of	description’	 of	 ‘rhythmic	 bodily	 movement’	 is	 achieved	 through	 mastery	 of	
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‘musical	 rhythmic	 bodily	 movement’	 is	 not	 equivalent	 to	 claiming	 that	 our	
experience	of	bodily	rhythm	originates	from	musical	experience.		There	 is	 experience	 that	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 being	 available	 to	 description,	exemplified	by	the	various	psychological	models	considered	in	chapter	1	and	in	the	 following.	 One	 might	 experience	 what	 we	 describe	 as	 ‘rhythm’	 without	having	the	descriptive	perspicacity	necessary	to	use	the	term	correctly.	In	which	case,	 any	 humanism	 must	 acknowledge	 the	 boundary	 between	 epistemic	acquaintance,	 typified	 through	 descriptive	 mastery,	 and	 nonconceptual	experience.		To	 continue	 this	 theme	 on	 rhythm:	 a	 picture	 of	 how	 a	 capacity	 for	 rhythm	 is	achieved	can	be	imagined	without	reference	to	explicit	knowledge.	From	birth	if	not	before	we	feel	our	heartbeat	and	that	of	our	parents;	we	feel	the	pulse	in	our	veins	and	 the	cycle	of	breathing;	we	experience	 footsteps	 through	our	parent’s	body	when	carried,	via	audition	as	people	move	around	us	and	then	through	our	own	 locomotion.	 Periodicity	 is	 pervasive	 in	 the	 experiential	 corpus	 from	 the	start	of	life,	and	the	gift	of	abstract	thought	allows	us	to	be	interested	in	displays	of	designed	periodicity	that	compound	pulse	into	rhythm.	At	a	more	basic	level,	humans	categorise,	group	and	segment	the	environment,	the	description	of	these	psychological	 capacities	 being	 ancillary	 to	 the	 capacities	 themselves.	 To	 hear	rhythm	 is	 to	 exploit	 these	 most	 fundamental	 capacities,	 thus	 inviting	 the	question	 not	 of	whether	 rhythm	 is	 learned	 through	 explicit	 knowledge,	which	seems	 absurd,	 but	 of	 what	 this	 freewheeling	 of	 psychological	 capacities	 can	provide–	a	point	developed	in	chapter	4	in	the	discussion	on	value.			
3.7	Phenomenal	view.		The	 view	 that	 musical	 movement	 is	 a	 perceptual	 illusion	 emerges	 from	 the	rejection	of	both	the	abstract	view	and	the	humanist	notion	that	music	literally	moves,	 since	 these	 exclusions	 close	 the	 possibility	 of	 conceiving	 musical	movement	in	terms	of	belief.	Consider	again	the	example	given	at	the	beginning	
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of	the	thesis:	if	I	stare	at	an	object	and	proceed	to	put	pressure	on	the	edges	of	both	eyes	the	object	may	appear	to	distort	and	become	doubled.	I	never	come	to	believe	that	another	object	has	appeared	or	that	the	original	object	has	changed	in	a	way	accordant	with	its	appearance,	but	my	visual	experience	is	exactly	that	of	 two	 identical	 objects.	 This	 is	 a	 simple	 illusion	 that	 demonstrates	 how	belief	and	perception	can	conflict.	Here	I	will	give	some	characterisations	of	perceptual	illusion,	and	offer	some	examples	of	how	musical	sound	engenders	a	perceptual	effect	of	movement	independently	of	thought.		In	 discussing	 film,	 Gregory	 Currie	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 perceptual	illusion	and	cognitive	illusion.47	A	cognitive	illusion	entails	that	the	subject	forms	a	 false	 belief:	 if	 I	 watch	 a	 nature	 documentary	 and	 on	 viewing	 footage	 of	 a	ferocious	 tiger	 approaching	 I	 come	 to	 believe	 that	 a	 ferocious	 tiger	 is	approaching,	it	can	be	said	that	I	am	subject	to	a	cognitive	illusion.	On	the	other	hand,	a	perceptual	illusion	occurs	when	a	subject’s	experience	seems	to	conflict	with	what	she	knows	to	be	the	case.	A	popular	example	of	a	perceptual	illusion	is	the	 Muller-Lyer	 illusion	 where	 two	 identical	 lines	 appear	 to	 be	 of	 different	lengths:	
	Fig.	3.1																																																										47	Currie	1995:	19-48.	
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Here	the	direction	of	the	arrowhead	shapes	on	the	ends	of	each	line	affects	how	the	length	of	each	line	appears,	even	though	a	ruler	can	confirm	the	equivalence	of	length.		It	 is	 important	 to	 establish	 the	 role	 of	 belief	 in	 distinguishing	 cognitive	 and	perceptual	illusion.	If	I	am	under	the	illusion	that	a	ferocious	tiger	is	approaching	when	in	reality	I	am	merely	viewing	footage	on	a	screen,	my	illusion	is	based	on	a	 false	 belief	 such	 that	were	 I	 subsequently	 to	 come	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 object	before	me	is	in	fact	not	a	tiger	but	merely	a	screen,	I	would	no	longer	be	under	an	illusion.	The	Muller-Lyer	illusion	does	not	depend	on	the	subject’s	belief	 in	this	way.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 on	 first	 viewing	 the	 Muller-Lyer	 illusion	 a	 subject	 does	believe	 that	 the	 bottom	 line	 is	 longer	 than	 the	 top,	 and	 as	 such	 her	 belief	 and	experience	 cohere	 in	 a	 manner	 accordant	 with	 a	 cognitive	 illusion.	 However,	once	it	is	demonstrated	that	both	lines	are	in	fact	equal	in	length,	and	the	subject	comes	to	believe	this	fact,	the	lines	will	still	appear	to	be	of	different	lengths.	This	represents	a	conflict	between	experience	and	belief.	As	Jesse	Prinz	has	claimed,	if	an	illusion	‘persists	even	after	we	learn	that	it	is	an	illusion,	then	it	resides	in	a	processing	 system	 that	 is	 not	 directly	 influenced	 by	 knowledge.’	 (Prinz:	 2004;	233)		I	argue	that	musical	movement	is	a	perceptual	illusion.	Analogous	to	the	Muller-Lyer	illusion,	the	belief	that	musical	sound	does	not	move	has	no	impact	on	the	sense	of	movement.	The	effect	of	musical	motion	does	not	consist	in	the	listener	believing,	say,	a	rising	melody	presents	a	rising	object.	Indeed,	an	experience	of	musical	 movement	 lacks	 the	 central	 signifier	 of	 object-movement	 in	 having	 a	source	 (or	 sources)	 fixed	at	one	point	 in	 space,	 and	 lacks	 the	bodily	 responses	attendant	 with	 experiences	 of	 self-movement,	 such	 as	 proprioceptive	 and	vestibular	 feedback.	 The	 effect	 could	 not	 be	mistaken	 as	 real	 by	 a	 reasonable	listener,	and	thus	could	not	operate	as	a	cognitive	illusion.		One	 approach	 to	 perception	 that	 has	 garnered	 considerable	 interest	 in	 music	analysis	 and	 music-psychology	 in	 recent	 years	 pertains	 to	 ecological	 theory,	
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attributable	 to	 the	 work	 of	 psychologist	 and	 philosopher	 James	 Gibson.48	This	theory	 presents	 perception	 in	 terms	 of	 function	 rather	 than	 what	 is	 now	 the	traditional	cognitive	science	approach	where	perception	is	understood	in	terms	of	 representation.	 Gibson	 argued	 that	 our	 perceptual	 functions	 are	 shaped	reciprocally	by	the	structure	in	our	environment,	such	that	we	perceive	changes	in	 the	 environment	 not	 by	 computing	 over	 numerical	 or	 representational	information	 but	 by	 taking	 cues	 from	 fixed	 structure	 in	 the	 environment.	 For	example,	 on	 an	 ecological	model	 I	 perceive	 that	 the	 glass	 on	 the	 table	 affords	grasping	 with	my	 left	 hand,	 not	 because	 I	 perceive	 that	 the	 glass	 has	 a	 20cm	radius,	but	because	my	hand	has	evolved	and	developed–	both	ontogenetically	and	phylogenetically–	in	an	environment	where	there	are	glass-sized	things	and	where	manipulating	them	has	a	survivalist	benefit.	In	Gibsonian	terminology:	the	environment	 is	 inherently	 structured	 and	 perceivers	 resonate	 with	 invariant	features	 of	 this	 structured	 environment;	 a	 perceiver	 has	 developed	phylogenetically	 and	 ontogenetically	 to	 reciprocate	 the	 structure	 of	 the	environment	such	that	particular	environmental	conditions	can	be	said	to	afford	particular	 behaviours	 by	 particular	 perceivers	 (the	 concept	 of	 affordance	 is	implemented	 by	 the	 principle	 of	 specification,	 which	 is	 similar	 in	 style	 to	 the	semiotic	principle	of	signification.)		Two	terms	that	may	attract	most	attention	 in	 this	approach	are	 ‘structure’	and	‘resonate’.	 ‘Resonance’	 is	 a	 term	 used	 to	 contrast	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 internal	representation	in	perception,	and	is	tailored	to	the	view	that	the	external	world	is	not	in	fact	 ‘one	great	blooming,	buzzing	confusion”,	as	William	James	argued,	but	 is	 full	 of	 invariants	 or	 structure.49	Perceivers	 do	not	 interpret	 a	 poverty	 of	information	with	 their	own	top-down	processes	but	rather	reconcile	 their	own	structure	with	that	of	the	environment	and	act	on	the	environment	accordingly,	thus	engendering	a	perception-action	cycle.	Gibson	makes	little	headway	on	the	concept	of	‘resonance’	other	than	to	say	that	it	might	also	be	termed	‘tuning’,	that	it	is	‘self-reinforcing’	and	that	it	has	as	its	analogue	a	self-tuning	radio.	Lawrence	
																																																								48	For	ecological	approaches	to	music	study	see	Clarke	2005,	Moore	(2010),	Windsor	(2000),	Borgo	(2007), ,	DeNora	(2000),	Ansdell	(2004)	and	Leman	(2008).	49	James,	William,	The	Principles	of	Psychology	(1890:	462).	
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Shapiro	 has	 attempted	 to	 provide	 elucidation	 using	 psychology	 and	 neuro-psychology.50		It	could	be	argued	that	to	demand	a	full	account	of	 ‘resonance’	is	to	demand	an	account	 of	 the	mechanism	by	 which	 organisms	 perceive,	 and	 that	 as	 such	 the	issue	does	not	disturb	 the	conceptual	 coherence	of	Gibson’s	 theory.	One	of	 the	best	defences	of	this	approach	to	perception	is	acknowledgement	of	the	field	of	embodied	cognition	that	has	grown	from	it,	particularly	the	successes	in	A.I.	and	robotics	 where	 machines	 are	 built	 without	 using	 top-down	 processes	 or	centralised	processing	units.51		The	concept	of	structure	will	be	elucidated	using	an	example	of	the	perception	of	motion	 that	 has	 been	 described	 using	 ecological	 theory:	 approach.	 Certain	particular	changes	to	the	perceptual	array	characterise	or	‘specify’	the	approach	to,	or	of,	an	object.	As	Gibson	writes,	regarding	visual	perception:		 Approach	to	a	solid	surface	is	specified	by	a	centrifugal	flow	of	the	texture	of	the	optic	array.	Approach	to	an	object	is	specified	by	a	magnification	of	the	closed	contour	in	the	array	corresponding	to	the	edges	of	the	object.	A	
uniform	 rate	 of	 approach	 is	 accompanied	 by	 an	 accelerated	 rate	 of	magnification…	 The	 magnification	 reaches	 an	 explosive	 rate	 in	 the	 last	moments	before	contact.	This	accelerated	expansion…	specifies	imminent	collision.52		There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 elements	 described	 here	 that	 will	 be	 invariant	 in	 any	perception	of	an	approaching	object	 to	 the	point	of	 contact:	 centrifugal	 flow	of	the	 optical	 array;	 accelerated	 rate	 of	 magnification;	 explosive	 rate	 of	magnification	 just	 before	 impact.	 Features	 such	 as	 these,	 then,	 help	 exemplify	and	thus	elucidate	the	concept	of	‘structure’.		
																																																								50	Shapiro	2010:	35-7.	51	See	Randy	Beer	(2014)	and	Shapiro	(2010	chapter	5	for	review)	52	Gibson	1979:	231,	cited	in	Clarke	2005.	
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The	first	book-length	study	to	offer	an	ecological	approach	to	music	perception	is	Eric	Clarke’s	Ways	of	Listening.53	Clarke	uses	the	work	of	James	Gibson	to	explain	aspects	of	music	by	their	relation	to	environmental	sounds;54	certain	properties	of	audio-perception	that	reflect	an	organism’s	relationship	with	its	environment	play	 important	 roles	 in	 music	 perception.	 Ordinary	 perceptual	 functions	 are	engaged	 during	 music	 listening–	 the	 same	 functions	 that	 facilitate	 basic	perceptual	 abilities	 like	 those	 pertaining	 to	 space	 or	 movement–	 and	 as	 such	some	 of	 the	 psychological	 mechanisms	 that	 come	 into	 play	 when	 listening	 to	music	 are	 those	 that	 have	 developed	 to	 respond	 in	 a	 structured	 way	 to	structured	elements	of	the	environment.		The	direct	relevance	of	ecological	theory	to	this	essay	is,	of	course,	its	potential	to	explicate	the	sense	of	motion	engendered	in	music	perception	and	its	nature	as	 a	 perceptual	 illusion.	 Clarke	 has	 made	 certain	 substitutions	 to	 Gibson’s	account	 of	 the	 visual	 perception	 of	 approach	 to	 render	 it	 pertinent	 to	 audio	perception:	 dynamic	 increase	 for	 flow	 of	 optical	 texture	 and	 pitch	 stasis	 for	centrifugal	quality	 (Clarke	2005:	77.)	However,	 ‘harmonic	 inertia’	or	 ‘harmonic	stasis’	may	substitute	just	as	well	for	the	centrifugal	quality,	given	that	the	only	characteristic	 that	 is	 being	 adopted	 from	 the	 visual	 aspect	 of	 ‘centrifugal	 flow’	pertains	 to	 an	 inertial	 or	 static	 quality.	 More	 important	 are	 the	 features	 of	magnification	(volume	swell),	accelerated	magnification	and	the	explosive	rate	of	magnification	before	impact.	Another	invariant	characteristic	of	an	approaching	sound	 source,	 in	 contrast	 to	 visual	 perception,	 is	 the	 change	 in	high-frequency	range.	 High	 frequencies	 are	 attenuated	 across	 distance,	 meaning	 that	 an	approaching	sound	source	will	not	only	increase	in	dynamic	but	also	in	intensity	of	high	frequencies.		It	can	be	argued	that	these	structural	elements	are	evident	in	passages	of	music	that	 have	 corresponding	 motional	 effects	 for	 the	 listener.	 As	 an	 example,	consider	 the	 introduction	 to	 ‘Blackened’	 by	 American	 heavy	 metal	 band	
Metallica.	The	 first	 audible	 sound	 is	 two	 guitar	 parts	 playing	 in	 sixth-intervals																																																									53	Clarke	2005.	54	See	Gibson	1972,	1977	and	1979.	
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towards	 the	 upper	 range	 of	 an	 electric	 guitar;	 the	 parts	 swell	 in	 volume	 from	silence	and	as	such	it	is	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	indicate	the	precise	point	at	which	 they	 become	 audible.	 They	 also	 have	 a	 ‘pinched’	 or	 ‘squeezed’	 sound	which	 is	 partly	 attributable	 to	 the	 scooped	 guitar	 tone	 (where	 a	 large	 band	 of	mid-range	 frequencies	 are	 eliminated	 almost	 entirely)	 and	 the	 high	 level	 of	compression	 produced	 by	 the	 high-output	 Mesa/Boogie	 amplifiers	 that	 were	used,	but	also	due	to	a	high-cut	 filter	applied	to	the	overall	mix.	As	the	volume	swells	 the	 harmony	 can	 be	 heard	 as	 a	 4-bar	 progression	 in	 block	 fifths	 on	distorted	guitar	rooted	along	an	Eminor	scale	from	B1	to	E2;	the	high-cut	filter	gradually	 opens	 in	 tandem	 with	 the	 dynamic	 increase	 to	 allow	 more	 high	frequencies	 through	across	 the	mix.	A	new	melody	part	 is	heard	around	29sec,	which	 is	 distinguished	 from	 the	 earlier	 melody	 by	 not	 having	 another	 part	shadowing	a	sixth	below.	Over	the	next	7	seconds	we	hear	the	final	4-bar	cycle	with	 the	 more	 prominent	 melodic	 guitar	 part	 and	 an	 accelerating	 rate	 of	dynamic	increase.	At	around	35	sec,	on	the	final	(tonic)	note	of	the	introduction,	the	 rate	 at	 which	 the	 volume	 swells	 and	 the	 filter	 is	 opened	 increases	exponentially	for	the	three	beats	of	that	final	note	until,	without	interruption,	the	full	 band	 enters	 at	 top	 volume	 and	 equalised	 to	 fill	 the	 range	 of	 audible	frequencies,	 and	we	 hear	 a	 tutti	of	 drums,	 bass	 and	 layers	 of	 unison	 distorted	guitar.		This	passage	has	many	of	the	features	associated	with	the	approach	of	a	sound	source	such	that	it	could	be	said,	in	the	language	of	ecological	theory,	to	specify	approach:	 the	 gradual	 increase	 in	 dynamic	 coupled	 with	 an	 increase	 of	 high	frequencies;	 the	short	harmonic	cycle	providing	a	correlate	 to	centrifugal	 flow;	an	 accelerated	 rate	 of	 dynamic	 increase	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 passage;	 an	exponential	 increase	 of	 dynamic	 and	 high	 frequencies	 before	 immediate	introduction	of	a	 full	 texture	melody	performed	by	 the	 full	band	 in	unison.	We	could	 extend	 the	 theme	 further	 and	 suggest	 that	 the	 indistinct	 opening	 of	 the	introduction,	 with	 attenuated	 high	 frequencies,	 specifies	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	sound	source	in	the	distance;	perhaps	the	new	lead-guitar	melody	in	the	final	4-bar	cycle	could	also	specify	the	movement	from	background	to	foreground:	the	
	 92	
foregrounded	 melody	 specifying	 the	 arrival	 of	 a	 clear	 unitary	 body	 in	 close	proximity,	before	that	body	makes	violent	impact.		Whether	 this	 passage	 of	 ‘Blackened’	 is	 construed	 as	 either	 self-movement	 or	object-movement	 seems	 to	be	open.	The	homophonic	 texture	coupled	with	 the	global	 treatment	 in	 production	 of	 all	 parts	 suggests	 some	 form	 of	 unified	 or	singular	motion,	but	not	distinctly	motion	of	 either	 the	 listener	or	 the	music.55	My	own	experience	is	a	powerful	sense	of	an	approaching	object:	when	listening	with	headphones	or	through	a	high	quality	sound	system,	there	is	an	impulsion	to	draw	back	as	the	passage	develops,	the	arrival	of	the	tutti	causing	a	jolt	of	the	head	backwards	as	if	the	music	has	made	impact.		The	points	of	correlation	between	an	ecological	specification	of	approach	and	the	opening	 of	 ‘Blackened’	 may	 be	 somewhat	 remarkable,	 but	 many	 instances	 of	‘motional	and	gestural	invariants’	in	music	will	hold	a	more	meagre	resemblance	to	 their	 environmental	 counterparts	 (Clarke	 2005:	 74.)	 However,	 as	 discussed	above,	music	experience	may	derive	many	of	its	qualities	from	spatial	perception	while	 the	 relation	 between	music	 and	 environment	 remains	 tenuous.	 But	 this	tenuousness	should	be	expected:	were	music	experience	to	have	a	strong	basis	in	some	particular	mode	of	perception	or	life,	agreeing	on	an	account	of	that	basis	would	 be	 far	 simpler.	 And	 to	 reinforce	 the	 theme	 of	 this	 essay,	 musical	movement	is	not	conceptual	but	rests	on	perceptual	processes	that	can	operate	independently	 of	 concepts	 and/or	 belief.	 In	 lacking	 the	 robust	 belief	 (true	 or	otherwise)	 that	 an	 object	 is	 approaching,	 the	 sense	 of	 approach	 a	 musical	passage	 can	 deliver	 will	 be	 of	 a	 different	 order	 to	 an	 experience	 of	 real	movement	or	a	cognitive	illusion	of	movement.		An	 ecological	 approach	 can	 extend	 to	 proposing	 music	 specify	 a	 ‘virtual	environment’	 that	 consists	 of	 a	 constellation	 of	 ‘virtual	 sources.’	 Each	 distinct	sound	 in	 a	 piece	 of	music	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 its	 own	 virtual	 source,	 and	 the																																																									55	Clarke	would	likely	conclude	on	this	basis	that	this	is	self-motion,	but	does	acknowledge	the	difficulty	of	distinguishing	self-	and	object-motion	with	the	example	of	sitting	on	a	train	at	a	station	and	being	unsure	of	whether	the	train	opposite	is	beginning	to	depart	or	the	train	on	which	you	are	sitting	is.		
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qualities	 of	 the	 sound	 reflect	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 source.	 These	 virtual	 sources	create	 an	 effect	 of	movement	 by	 sharing	 structural	 properties	with	 real	world	moving	 sound	 sources.	 Clarke	 has	 usefully	 enumerated	 some	 of	 the	means	 by	which	 sound	 can	 specify	 motion:	 “Virtual	 motion	 is	 specified	 by	 a	 number	 of	different	properties	of	sound,	among	them	rhythm	(rate	and	manner	of	motion),	dynamic	 (approach,	 withdrawal),	 pitch	 (direction)	 and	 articulation	 (weight,	force)”	(ibid	p.184).		It	is	not	pertinent	to	go	into	greater	depth	on	further	examples	of	the	ecological	specification	 of	motion	 in	music,	 given	 that	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 tasks	 of	 Clarke’s	book.	Ecological	theory	provides	a	framework	within	which	the	sense	of	motion	in	music	can	be	analysed	as	a	perceptual	phenomenon	based	in	the	perception	of	motion	 in	 an	 environment.	 This	 approach	 not	 only	 allows	 for	 a	 separation	 of	perception	 from	 belief	 but	 demands	 it,	 supporting	 the	 characterisation	 of	 the	sense	 of	 musical	 motion	 as	 a	 perceptual	 illusion	 by	 suggesting	 a	 form	 of	perception	 that	both	operates	 independently	 from	belief	 and	appears	 active	 in	music	listening.	
		
3.8	How	the	model	of	Cognitive	Categorisation	can	help	elucidate	
the	sense,	or	illusion,	of	time	in	music.		The	 illusion	 of	 musical	 movement	 is	 based	 in	 large	 part	 on	 music’s	 use	 of	
temporality–	of	 references	across	 time	or	of	 the	generation	of	 expectancy.	This	section	 develops	 the	 above	 view	 of	 illusion	 to	 elucidate	 this	 central	 feature	 of	musical	movement.	The	musicologist	Philip	Bohlman	argues	that	music	‘exists	in	the	conditions	of	a	process.	Because	a	process	is	always	in	flux,	it	never	achieves	a	fully	objective	status,	it	is	constantly	becoming	something	else.’56	In	a	sense,	the	metaphor	 of	 movement	 and	 space	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 analytically	motivated	response	to	this	ontological	condition.	Sound	arrives	and	passes	by	in	an	instant,	so	cannot	be	represented	in	a	fixed	form	like	a	painting,	sculpture	or																																																									56	Bohlman,	Philip	V.	‘Ontologies	of	Music’	in	Rethinking	Music,	18.	
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building	 can	 be	 by	 photography.	 Our	 analytical	 object	 is	 not	 a	 literal	representation	 but	 a	metaphorical	 one.	57	The	 score	 displaces	musical	 qualities	with	 spatial	 qualities–	 sounds	 originating	 from	 relatively	 small	 media	 are	depicted	 as	 ‘high’	 while	 sounds	 originating	 from	 large	 media	 are	 depicted	 as	‘low’;	 the	 progressivity	 of	 music	 becomes	 a	 linear	 directionality	 across	 the	horizontal	plane	and	durations	 for	notes	are	symbolised.58	Hence	 Jim	Samson’s	comment	that		 [w]hen	 contemporary	 commentators	 expose	 the	 contingency	 of	 music	analysis,	 its	 dependence	 on	 models	 and	 metaphors	 drawn	 from	 other	disciplines–	 indeed,	 its	essential	character	as	metaphor–	they	are	 in	 fact	describing	the	age	old	condition	of	music	theory.59		The	 sense	 in	 which	 the	 metaphor	 of	 movement	 and	 space	 is	 analytically	motivated,	 then,	 is	 purely	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 processual	 nature	 of	 music	prohibits	a	literal	representation	of	it.		Hanslick’s	 renowned	 characterisation	 of	 music	 as	 ‘Tönend	 Bewegte	 Formen’–	‘tonally	moving	forms’	or	‘tonally	animated	forms’–	describes	the	operation	of	an	abstract	object.	But	the	motion	of	this	object	depends	on	a	passage	of	time	that	is	itself	an	abstraction:	musical	 time	 is	altogether	distinct	 from	time	as	measured	by	a	clock.	Susanne	Langer	makes	a	distinction	between	 ‘experiential	 time’	and	‘clock-time’,	 arguing	 that	 music	 creates	 in	 the	 mind	 of	 the	 listener	 a	 ‘virtual’	temporality	that	has	powerful	effect	as	a	means	of	expression.60	Just	as	music	can	present	a	virtual	space	with	which	no	actual	space	accords,	Langer	argues,	it	may	present	 a	 virtual	 temporality	 that	 has	 little	 or	 no	 accordance	with	 actual	 time.	This	passage	usefully	summarises	the	concepts	of	experienced	time,	clock	time,	and	virtual	time	as	they	relate	to	movement:																																																									57	For	a	discussion	of	alternatives	to	the	conventional	Western	score	see	Luke	Windsor’s	PhD	thesis	(1995).	58	Zbikowski	(2002)	talks	about	the	spatial	metaphor	for	pitch	relationships	in	Conceptualising	
Music,	referring	to	it	as	“the	conceptual	metaphor	PITCH	RELATIONSHIPS	ARE	RELATIONSHIPS	IN	VERTICLE	SPACE”	and	notes	a	number	of	alternative	metaphors	employed	by	peoples	of	non-Western	cultures.	Pp.	66-68.	59	Samson,	Jim.	‘Analysis	in	Context’	in	Rethinking	Music,	47.	60	See	Langer	1953.	
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	 The	 elements	 of	music	 are	moving	 forms	 of	 sound;	 but	 in	 their	motion	nothing	is	removed.	The	realm	in	which	tonal	entities	move	is	a	realm	of	pure	duration.	Like	 its	elements,	however,	 this	duration	 is	not	an	actual	phenomenon…	but	is	something	radically	different	from	the	time	in	which	our	 public	 and	 practical	 life	 proceeds…	Musical	 duration	 is	 an	 image	 of	what	might	be	 termed	“lived”	or	 “experienced”	 time–	 the	passage	of	 life	that	 we	 feel	 as	 expectations	 become	 “now,”	 and	 “now”	 turns	 into	unalterable	fact.	Such	passage	is	measurable	only	in	terms	of	sensibilities,	tensions,	and	emotions;	and	it	has	not	merely	a	different	measure,	but	an	altogether	different	structure	from	practical	or	scientific	time.61		Music,	according	to	Langer,	engenders	an	order	of	 ‘virtual	time’	(ibid)	that	is	to	be	 separated	 from	 real	 time.	 Significantly,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 current	discussion,	 she	argues	 that	 the	 ‘semblance	of	 this	vital,	 experiential	 time	 is	 the	primary	illusion	of	music’	(ibid.)	The	effect	of	music	can	be	to	create	the	illusion	of	an	agent	held	in	relation	to	time	(and	space);	this	is	a	perceptual	illusion	given	that	 the	 listener	 does	 not	 believe	 there	 to	 be	 such	 an	 agent,	 and	 rests	 on	 the	tensions,	resolutions	and	expectancies	that	can	be	induced	in	the	listener.		The	 study	of	music	has	had	a	 lengthy	 collaboration	with	 the	 study	of	 time,	 for	example	 Edmund	 Husserl’s	 choice	 of	 a	 melodic	 motif	 to	 exemplify	 the	phenomenology	 of	 time	 consciousness.62	As	 mentioned	 above,	 Leonard	 Meyer	also	made	an	eminent	 contribution	 through	his	discussion	of	 expectancies	 and	their	potential	 to	provoke	emotional	response	 from	the	 listener.63	David	Huron	makes	reference	to	Meyer	when	developing	a	survivalist	theory	of	expectancies	in	music,	supported	by	a	plethora	of	psychological	studies.64		Several	 studies	 have	 focused	 on	 rhythm	 as	 the	 principal	 engine	 to	 establish	expectancies,	 but	 below	 I	 will	 consider	 a	 psychological	 model	 that	 may	 be																																																									61	Ibid	p.109.	62	Husserl	1991.	63	Meyer	1956.	64	Huron	2006	
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applied	 to	 various	 aspects	 of	 music	 just	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 they	 change	 in	time.	This	can	help	account	for	how	music	can	render	a	virtual	world	of	objects	that	 develop,	 disappear,	 interact,	 remain	 inert	 or	 change	without	 conceptually	acquainting	the	listener	with	properties	of	the	object.			
3.9	Cognitive	Categorisation.		As	 we	 orientate	 to	 our	 surroundings	 we	 are	 putting	 things	 into	 categories	 in	order	to	understand	them.	We	recognise	the	lines,	shapes	and	hues	of	objects	as	conceptual	 categories,	 and	 thus	 treat	 them	 as	 instantiations	 of	 the	 pertinent	concept:		 [Our]	 recognition	 of	 …	 things	 reflects	 the	 categories	 through	which	we	structure	our	thought:	to	recognise	a	book	is	to	identify	it	as	a	member	of	the	category	book;	to	recognise	a	tree	is	to	identify	it	as	a	member	of	the	category	 tree.	 Categorization	 occurs	 in	 all	 sensory	 modalities	 and	throughout	 the	 range	 of	 mental	 activities:	 we	 categorize	 smells	 and	sounds,	 thoughts	and	emotions,	skin	sensations	and	physical	movement.	Categories	are…basic	to	thought.	(Zbikowski	2002:	13)		In	his	book,	Conceptualising	Music	(2002),	Lawrence	Zbikowski	suggests	framing	music	analysis	in	cognitive	models,	one	of	the	models	considered	being	cognitive	
categorisation.	 While	 cognitive	 categorisation	 is	 well	 established	 in	 cognitive	science	 as	 a	 principle	 to	 account	 for	 basic	 aspects	 of	 perception	 and	 thought,	Zbikowski	 was	 the	 first	 to	 apply	 the	 particulars	 of	 the	 model	 to	 music	experience.		An	 implication	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 the	 way	 tonal	 music	 is	 designed	 and	experienced	 is	 related	 to	 the	way	 cognition	 operates,	 in	 a	way	 distinguishable	from	that	of	holding	in	some	relation	to	belief.	This	echoes	the	view	advanced	in	this	 essay,	 that	 certain	music	 experience	 should	 be	 understood	 at	 bottom	as	 a	
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psycho-acoustic	 phenomenon;	 as	 put	 by	 Arnold	 Schoenberg	 in	 the	 early	 20th	Century,	music	abides	not	just	by	the	laws	of	sound,	but	by	the	laws	of	the	mind:		 Tonality’s	origin	is	found—and	rightly	so—in	the	laws	of	sound.	But	there	are	other	laws	that	music	obeys,	apart	from	these	and	the	laws	that	result	from	 the	 combination	 of	 time	 and	 sound:	 namely,	 those	 governing	 the	working	 of	 our	minds.	 This	 latter	 forces	 us	 to	 find	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	layout	 for	 those	 elements	 that	 make	 for	 cohesion—and	 to	 make	 them	come	to	the	fore,	often	enough	and	with	enough	plasticity—so	that	in	the	small	 amount	 of	 time	 granted	 us	 by	 the	 flow	 of	 the	 events,	 we	 can	recognize	 the	 [musical]	 figures,	 grasp	 the	 way	 they	 hang	 together,	 and	comprehend	their	meaning.65		I	 argue	 in	 the	next	 chapter	 that	 Schoenberg	ultimately	has	 an	 abstract	 view	of	listener	experience.	However,	the	point	that	music	is	designed	by	tacit	reference	to	the	workings	of	the	mind	is	a	powerful	one,	given	that	the	established	tonal,	metrical	 and	 even	 timbral	 systems	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	complement	 and	 excite	 the	 perceptual	 machinery	 of	 human	 beings.	 There	 is	nothing	 specifically	 musical	 about	 categorization:	 it	 is	 the	 most	 basic	 of	perceptual	abilities,	but	its	basic	functionality	in	everyday	life	is	reflected	by	its	basic	role	in	music	perception.		The	musical	‘cohesion’	of	which	Schoenberg	speaks	is	brought	about	through	the	establishment	 of	 categories	 throughout	 the	 range	 of	 discernible	 musical	structures	 (rhythmic,	 melodic,	 harmonic,	 motivic	 (a	 combination	 of	 melody,	rhythm	 and	 harmony.))	 The	 notion	 of	 ‘category’	 to	 which	 Zbikowski	 refers	supplements	 the	 classical	 view,	 tracing	 back	 to	 Aristotle,	where	members	 of	 a	category	 are	 determined	 by	 considering	 objects	 alongside	 a	 set	 of	 jointly	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions.	On	the	classical	view,	categories	were	given	as	 stable	 and	 universal	 entities	 existing	 in	 the	 world,	 apart	 from	 any	 act	 of	perception	 or	 cognition.	 However,	 this	 view	 was	 challenged	 by	 Wittgenstein,	who	gave	the	example	of	‘game’	as	a	category	that	cannot	be	defined	in	terms	of																																																									65	Schoenberg	1926.		
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necessary	and	sufficient	conditions.66	Following	work	in	cognitive	theory	 in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	notably	by	Eleanor	Rosch,	a	conception	of	category	emerged	as	an	 aspect	 of	 knowledge	 rather	 than	 an	 aspect	 of	 things	 that	 could	 be	 known	(Zbikowski	2002:	30).67		Within	recent	cognitive	science,	an	alternative	conception	of	category	developed	partly	 to	 better	 represent	 the	way	we	 create	 and	 use	 categories	 and	 partly	 to	better	 understand	 the	way	members	 of	 a	 category	 relate.	When	we	put	 things	under	categories,	we	do	not	tend	to	employ	the	lowest	level	or	highest	level	of	a	taxonomy;	instead	we	tend	to	favour	the	mid-level.	I	would	more	likely	call	that	thing	 walking	 around	 my	 living	 room	 a	 cat	 rather	 than	 a	 vertebrate	 or	 a	
shorthaired	 domestic	 cat;	 the	 category	 cat	 is	 an	 example	 of	 	 ‘basic	 level’	categorisation,	where	the	category	has	a	small	enough	number	of	members	to	be	informative	 but	 can	 also	 be	 used	 with	 efficiency	 by	 limiting	 the	 number	 of	categorisations	 a	 person	must	make	 (there	 are	more	 contrasting	 categories	 at	the	level	of	shorthaired	domestic	cat	than	there	are	at	the	level	of	cat.).	This	‘level	is	psychologically	basic:	at	this	level,	people	name	things	more	readily,	languages	have	 simpler	 names,	 categories	 have	 greater	 cultural	 significance,	 things	 are	remembered	 more	 readily,	 and	 things	 are	 perceived	 holistically’	 (Zbikowski	2002:	32.)	The	basic	 level	also	has	several	distinguishing	 features:	 for	example	this	 is	 the	highest	 level	at	which	one	mental	 image	can	represent	 the	category,	implying	a	commonality	in	shape	and	form	of	its	members;	it	is	also	the	highest	level	at	which	an	individual	will	interact	with	all	members	in	a	similar	way.		If	you	were	to	draw	to	mind	an	image	of	a	basic-level	category	such	as	bird	what	you	 would	 likely	 picture	 is	 a	 prototype	 of	 that	 category.	 Eleanor	 Rosch	 and	Carolyn	Mervis	have	argued	that	categories	have	at	their	centre	an	example	that	seems	 to	 capture	 the	most	prevalent	 features	of	 the	 category;	 for	 the	 category	
bird,	 the	 prototypical	 members	 are	 robins	 or	 wrens.68	When	 an	 individual	 is	compared	to	this	prototype	it	can	be	said	to	exhibit	prototype	effects,	arising	from	the	values	shared	between	the	prototype	and	the	individual	being	compared.	In																																																									66	Wittgenstein	1953	31–	32.		67	Rosch	1978.	For	a	summary	see	Rosch,	1994.	68	Rosch	and	Mervis,	1975.	
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this	 sense,	 membership	 of	 a	 category	 is	 graded.	 How	 typical	 a	 member	 of	 a	category	is	will	depend	on	how	many	values	it	shares	with	the	prototype:	‘If	the	values	of	the	prototype	for	bird	were	small,	brown,	chirps,	and	flies,	then	a	wren	would	 be	most	 typical	 of	 the	 category,	 a	male	 cardinal	 (small,	 red,	 sings,	 flies)	would	be	somewhat	less	typical,	and	a	chicken	(large,	white,	clucks,	runs)	would	be	least	typical.’	(Zbikowski	2002:	42)	Zbikowski	provides	the	diagram	below	of	the	basic	category	bird,	with	labels	for	attributes,	values	and	individuals.		
	Fig.	3.2		‘A	 partial	 frame	 for	 the	 category	 bird	 (asterisks	 indicate	 the	 values	 of	 the	prototype	that	are	stored	in	memory)’	(ibid	p.42)		While	 the	 prototype	may	 be	 the	member	with	 the	most	 statistically	 prevalent	features	of	the	category	(most	European	birds	do	fly,	are	small	and	are	darker	in	colour),	 it	 is	 also	 determined	 in	 part	 by	 global	 conceptual	 models	 held	 in	knowledge.	In	effect	this	means	that	attributes	are	weighted	differently:	we	may	give	 more	 weight	 to	 the	 attribute	 locomotion	 than	 the	 attribute	 sound.	 These	
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conceptual	 models	 are	 wrought	 through	 extensive	 experience	 with	 category	members	 and	 the	 pertinent	 repeated	 development	 of	 local	models,	 along	with	broader	culturally	derived	knowledge.		The	 significance	 of	 this	 research	 for	 music-study	 is	 that	 many	 of	 the	 most	immediately	 salient	 aesthetic	 features	 of	 a	musical	work	 are	 perceived	 at	 this	basic	level,	the	melodic	motive	(or	motif)	being	a	prime	example.	Zbikowski	gives	an	in	depth	motivic	analysis	of	the	introduction	to	Beethoven’s	Fifth	Symphony,	the	 diagram	 below	 showing	 the	 ‘category	 structure	 for	 the	 category	 motive	forms	from	the	opening	of	Beethoven’s	Fifth	Symphony,	mm.1–21.’		
	Fig.	3.3	u=	unison;	-2=	descending	second	etc.		Statistically,	the	typical	member	of	this	category	will	be	played	solo,	piano	with	an	 intervallic	profile	of	unison,	unison	and	a	descending	3rd.	But	 this	does	not	
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reflect	the	typical	motive	form	that	would	be	brought	to	mind	when	considering	the	 opening	 motive	 of	 Beethoven’s	 Fifth	 Symphony,	 which	 would	 likely	 be	
fortissimo	 and	 tutti.	 The	 divergence	 between	 the	 statistical	 prototype	 and	 the	prototypical	mental	image	can	be	accounted	for	using	global	models,	such	as	the	psychological	significance	of	the	temporal	order	and	the	according	weight	given	to	 the	 opening	 bars.	We	 also	 have	 a	 global	model	 for	Western	 Classical	music	concerning	 the	 statement	 and	 development	 of	 themes,	 such	 that	 previous	experience	of	 classical	music	 from	 this	period	has	 informed	us	 that	 composers	will	 tend	 to	 follow	a	 clearly	 stated	motif,	 given	at	 some	privileged	point	 in	 the	piece	(such	as	the	beginning	of	a	section),	with	a	period	of	development	where	the	heard	themes	should	be	treated	as	transient.		Categorisation	 can	 help	 us	 understand	 how	 events	 in	 musical	 time	 are	established,	 segmented	 and	 developed.	 Zbikowski’s	 analysis	 of	 motive	 in	Beethoven’s	Fifth	demonstrates	how	a	complex	of	melodic	lines	can	relate	to	one	another	in	a	way	that	is	not	dictated	by	their	temporal	order	but	that	affects	their	
appearance	in	time.	To	say	that	a	motive	can	have	grades	of	‘prototype	effect’	is	to	say	that	a	motive	can	be	recognised	as	various	grades	of	a	previously	stated	motive,	 and	 as	 such	 refer	 back	 to	 an	 earlier	 moment.	 The	 first	 subject	 of	 the	exposition	 is	 felt	 as	 a	 flow	 of	 fading	 and	 reinforcing	 impressions	 of	 a	 theme,	perceived	with	 the	 same	 psychological	 processes	 at	 play	 in	 typical	 perceptual	function.	 There	 are	 empirically	 grounded	 psychological	 reasons	 for	 why	 a	motivic	 structure	 of	 such	 complexity	 can	 be	 perceived–	 its	 form	 (duration,	number	of	elements)	being	recognisable	as	a	basic-level	category–	and	for	how	an	 experience	 stretching	 over	 around	1	 and	 a	 half	minutes	 can	be	 unified	 and	tied	to	a	single	form	expressed	in	around	7	seconds.		 Because	categorization	is	an	active	response	to	the	environment,	it	always	has	 a	 temporal	 dimension:	 a	 comparative	 categorization	 of	 birds,	 for	instance,	demands	that	we	evaluate	each	in	turn.	With	music	the	temporal	aspect	 is	 slightly	more	prominent,	 since	musical	 entities	 are	 thoroughly	ephemeral:	 not	 only	must	 we	 evaluate	 each	musical	 entity	 in	 turn,	 but	
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also	this	evaluation	is	practically	the	only	evidence	that	the	entities	ever	existed	at	all.	(p.51)		One	obvious	issue	with	this	model	in	terms	of	how	it	complements	a	phenomenal	view	is	whether	it	can	be	treated	as	a	model	of	a	distinctly	nonconceptual	aspect	of	 psychology.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 theory	 on	 prototypes	 has	 influenced	 the	debate	 on	 how	 concepts	 are	 structured;	 correlatively,	 cognitive	 categorisation	seems	 to	 explain	 the	 process	 by	which	 concepts	 are	 structured	 in	 experience.	However,	the	process	by	which	a	concept	is	structured	can	be	distinguished	from	a	concept.	As	Zbikowski	admits,	cognitive	categorisation	explicates	syntax	rather	than	semantics–	the	ordering	of	meaning	rather	than	meaning	itself.	How	things	come	to	have	meaning	is	a	complex	issue,	as	mentioned	above,	but	it	can	be	said	that	 syntax	 alone	 will	 not	 furnish	 categories	 with	 content–	 understood	 as	 an	abstract	object	like	a	property	or	type.		It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 a	 cognitive	 category	 analysis	 of	 the	 opening	 of	Beethoven’s	 5th	 Symphony	 does	 suggest	 that	 experience	 of	 such	 motifs	 is	conceptual:	 a	 mental	 representation	 of	 the	 content	 ‘opening	 melodic	 motif	 in	Beethoven’s	 5th’.	 But	 this	 interpretation	 fails	 to	 capture	 the	 experience	 of	 the	passage.	 It	 is	 not	 in	 taking	 up	 a	 propositional	 attitude	 towards	 the	 content	‘opening	melodic	motif	 in	 Beethoven’s	 5th’	 that	 the	 experience	 consists;	 as	 the	analysis	suggests,	the	experience	of	the	opening	of	Beethoven’s	fifth	is	about	the	cognitive	 relations	 to	 a	 fluid	 prototype,	 rather	 than	 about	 the	 prototype	 itself.	Zbikowski	 notes	 this	 issue,	 accounting	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 content	 with	 a	mystical	view	of	musical	concepts:	‘Musical	concepts	are	of	another	world,	another	order,	because	they	extend	into	a	domain	that	is	beyond	words’	(p.326).		But	 on	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 such	 mysticism	 is	 unnecessary.	 Cognitive	categorisation	alone	reveals	a	significant	means	by	which	the	mind	responds	to	music	 that	 helps	 explicate	 musical	 movement	 without	 reference	 to	 concepts.	Zbikowski	 exemplified	 cognitive	 categorisation	 with	 motivic	 analyses	 of	numerous	Western	art	pieces	but,	as	he	puts	it,	while	this	‘is	a	good	example	of	a	musical	 category,	 categories	 can	be	much	more	various	and	 structured	around	
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whatever	set	of	musical	relationships	seems	best	 to	account	 for	what	 is	salient	about	 a	 particular	 repertoire’	 (p.59.)	 The	 principle	 themes	 of	 a	 cognitive	categorisation	analysis	are	establishment	of	a	prototype–	which	is	characterised	by	a	set	of	values–	and	the	instantiation	of	subsequent	forms	that	have	manifest	equivalencies	with	the	prototype.	It	seems	that	most	if	not	all	elements	of	music	structure	 would	 be	 amenable	 to	 such	 a	 model.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 see	 how	 the	establishment	 and	 development	 of	 a	 category	 is	 fundamental	 to	 rhythm,	phrasing,	 harmony,	 melody,	 perhaps	 even	 timbre	 (consider	 the	 dynamic	 and	structured	use	of	timbre	in	computer	music).	Indeed,	basic	to	formal	approaches	generally,	 set-theory	 in	 particular,	 is	 that	 relations	 exist	 between	 music’s	component	 parts	 (Cook	 1987;	 181),	 however	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 about	 the	relations	 in	 themselves–	 as	 they	 are	 presented	 in	 formal	 analysis–	 matters.69	This	is	a	way	of	closing	the	gap	between	formal	representation	and	experience:	by	placing	formal	relations	within	a	cognitive	framework	and	thus	viewing	them	as	states	that	relate	to	experience	generally.		Viewing	categorisation	as	both	a	fundamental	aspect	of	music	perception	and	a	fundamental	aspect	of	perception	generally	helps	indicate	how	the	complexity	of	music	 structure	 is	 effective	 in	 inducing	 activity	 of	 a	 nonconceptual	 process.	 A	profound	phenomenological	response	is	afforded	in	this	explanation,	even	if	the	
response	lacks	content.	The	constellation	of	categories	manifest	within	music	is	a	prime	indication	of	how	rich	experience	is	possible	without	concepts.		Another	line	of	argument	for	a	phenomenal	view	that	cognitive	categorisation	as	applied	 to	music	 perception	 helps	 uncover	 pertains	 to	 the	 fineness	 of	 grain	 of	perception	and	 the	 re-identification	 condition	of	 concepts	mentioned	above	on	the	 section	 on	 concepts.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 above	 analysis	 approaches	 cognitive	fidelity	to	the	music	listener,	we	are	able	to	discriminate	categories	within	music	at	a	finer	grain	than	our	conceptual	capacities	allow.	It	seems	that,	similar	to	the	example	of	shades	of	red	given	above,	I	would	be	able	to	discriminate	each	of	the	melodic	 motives	 in	 the	 opening	 of	 Beethoven’s	 Fifth	 as	 the	 concept	 ‘	 opening	melodic	motive	of	Beethoven’s	Fifth’,	but	without	musicological	training	I	would																																																									69	As	Cook	1990	argues;	see	chapter	3.	
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fail	 to	 re-identify,	 say	 ‘melodic	 motive	 occurring	 in	 mm.6-7’.	 While	 a	musicologically	 untrained	 listener	 would	 be	 apt	 to	 experience	 the	 passage	 as	music,	she	would	not	therefore	have	learnt	each	instance	of	a	motif	as	just	that	particular	instance	of	a	motif–	as	a	concept.		The	 phenomenal	 view	 argues	 that	 musical	 experience	 is	 characterised	 by	nonconceptual	 discrimination.	 Indeed,	 I	 call	 on	 this	 ability	 to	 differentiate	between	tones.	I	need	not	have	the	concept	of	the	pitch	classes	A	and	B	in	order	to	make	a	distinction	between	the	notes	A	and	B.	Even	if	told	the	names	of	each	tone	when	hearing	them,	it	is	not	assured	that	I	would	be	able	to	invoke	the	same	concepts	when	encountering	them	at	another	time;	to	do	so	I	would	need	perfect	pitch	or	 extensive	 ear	 training,	neither	of	which	 is	necessary	 for	me	 to	merely	distinguish	between	tones.			Two	 things	 should	 be	 clearly	 separated	 when	 discussing	 this	 ability	 to	discriminate:	 having	 the	 ability	 to	 discriminate	 and	 having	 the	 concept	 of	discrimination.	While	 a	housefly	has	 the	 ability	 to	discriminate–	between	 solid	surfaces	 and	open	 space,	 or	 between	 food	 and	non-food-	 it	makes	no	 sense	 to	suggest	 that	 a	 housefly	 conceives	 of	 discrimination.	 Humans	 can	 conceive	 of	discrimination,	 give	 it	 a	 term	 and	 use	 it	 in	 a	 thesis,	 but	 humans	 also	 use	 the	
ability	to	discriminate	everyday	in	highly	complex	ways.		It	may	be	argued	that	using	this	(nonconceptual)	ability	 to	discriminate	should	not	 in	 itself	 be	 phenomenologically	 salient.	 Certainly,	 at	 a	 local	 level,	 it	 seems	that	the	experience	of	the	difference	between	the	notes	A	and	B	is	not	likely	to	be	greatly	different	than	that	of	A	and	C.	But	there	is	some	difference–	there	must	be	in	 order	 to	 afford	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 pitch-class	 system	of	 categorisation.	 This	difference	 becomes	 more	 salient	 as	 the	 structural	 element	 becomes	 more	complex.	 Consider	 intervals:	 a	 major	 second	 will	 sound	 clearly	 different	 to	 a	minor	 third;	 a	 major	 second	 will	 also	 sound	 clearly	 different	 to	 a	 diminished	fifth;	 but	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 major	 second	 and	 minor	 third	 is	 itself	
experienced	 differently	 to	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 major	 second	 and	 the	
diminished	 fifth.	 So,	 while	 two	 distinct	 intervals	 are	 phenomenologically	
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discriminable,	two	distinct	sets	of	distinct	intervals	are	also	phenomenologically	discriminable.	These	layers	of	difference	can	accumulate	so	that	a	heteronomous,	complex	 experience	 is	 afforded	 without	 any	 need	 for	 content	 beyond	 that	 of	difference.	Consider	that	a	major	third	can	be	heard	as	not	only	different	to	each	other	interval,	but	also	as	differently	different	to	each	other	interval,	in	the	sense	that	a	difference	between	a	third	and	a	fourth	is	different	to	a	difference	between	a	 third	 and	 a	 fifth,	 and	 so	 on.	 Consider	 also	 that	 this	 structure	 of	 difference	pertaining	to	the	major	third	and	all	those	that	are	compared	to	it	will	 itself	be	different	 to	an	analogous	 structure	of	difference	pertaining	 to	a	perfect	 fourth,	and	that	both	of	these	structures	of	difference	will	be	different	to	that	of	a	major	sixth	and	so	on.	And	this	is	only	regarding	two	note	intervals;	three	or	four	note	chords	would	of	course	afford	far	more	differential	complexity.		Discrimination	does	not	need	conceptual	content	to	have	complexity,	since	it	 is	not	homogeneous:	a	distinct	interval	is	not	just	heard	as	distinct	from	any	other–	it	is	heard	as	being	distinct	in	its	relation	to	any	other,	so	that	each	interval	is	not	simply	isolated	as	a	thing	as	if	I	were	to	point	to	a	particular	square	in	a	perfect	grid.	 The	 distinct	 interval	 holds	 particular	 phenomenological	 values	 in	 its	particular	 relations	 with	 other	 intervals.	 The	 human	 auditory	 system	 can	 be	ascribed	 complex	 structures	 of	 perception	 without	 any	 recourse	 to	representation	or	 intentional	 engagement.	 	 This	 brief	 attempt	 to	 conceptualise	rudimentary	 tonal	 elements	 should	 show	 how	 unlikely	 it	 is	 that	 music	perception	 is	 an	 essentially	 conceptual	 practice,	 and	 that	 a	 listener	 can	experience	 vast	 array	 of	 heterogeneous	 structure	 solely	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 basic	perceptual	capacity	of	discrimination.			
3.10	Conclusion	and	Summary.		Before	 summarising	 the	 above,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 the	concept	 of	 ‘perceptual	 illusion’	 wrought	 above	 squares	 with	 the	 concept	 of	‘metaphor’	 wrought	 in	 chapter	 1.	 The	 previous	 chapter	 argued	 that	 musical	movement	is	metaphorical,	but	in	a	special	sense	that	denotes	a	mapping	across	
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domains	 from	 nonconceptual	 embodied	 experience.	 This	 chapter	 argues	 that	musical	movement	 is	 a	 perceptual	 illusion,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 experience	 of	musical	 movement	 conflicts	 with	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 music	 does	 not	 move.	 It	should	 be	 fairly	 simple,	 I	 argue,	 to	 subsume	 the	 notion	 of	 metaphorical	movement	 given	 in	 chapter	 1	 under	 the	 notion	 of	 perceptual	 illusion	 given	above.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 metaphorical	 image	 schemata	 concerned	 are	 held	responsible	 for	 the	experience	of	movement–	as	opposed	 to	 the	construction	of	utterances	that	contain	spatial	metaphors	like	‘I’m	feeling	down’–	it	can	be	said	that	 they	are	responsible	 for	an	experience	of	musical	movement	 that	conflicts	with	the	belief	that	the	music	does	not	move.		While	 it	 is	 fairly	 simple	 to	 subsume	 ‘metaphor’	 under	 ‘perceptual	 illusion’	 in	their	present	senses,	it	is	less	clear	that	the	reverse	is	true.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	clear	that	‘metaphor’	can	be	conflated	with	‘perceptual	illusion’.	Clarke	does	not	identify	the	ecological	perception	of	musical	movement	as	metaphorical,	and	it	 is	 necessary	 to	 make	 a	 clear	 theoretical	 distinction	 between	 ecological	perception	and	image	schemata.	However,	the	sense	of	metaphor	employed	here	is	probably	bespoke	in	that	it	prescribes	a	nonconceptual,	embodied	source.	The	application	and	value	of	broader	senses	of	metaphor	have	been	critiqued	above	and	in	chapter	1,	leaving	the	bespoke	sense	as	the	only	one	pertinent	to	musical	movement.	 As	 such,	 while	 a	 theoretical	 distinction	 is	 necessary	 between	ecological	 perception	 and	 image	 schemata,	 under	 the	 framework	 so	 far	developed	both	can	be	subsumed	under	 ‘metaphor’	 since	ecological	perception	can	be	understood	as	a	linking–	or	mapping–	from	a	nonconceptual	source	of	the	experience	 of	 movement–	 the	 perceiver’s	 nonrepresentational	 auditory	perceptual	system–	to	music.	There	is	an	implied	difference	in	the	mechanism	of	the	mapping,	and	in	the	nature	of	the	source	domain,	but	insofar	as	metaphor	is	understood	 as	 a	 mapping	 from	 embodied	 experience	 to	 another	 domain,	ecological	 perception	 seems	 to	 be	 metaphorical.	 Any	 qualms	 with	 the	 word	‘mapping’	when	referring	to	ecological	perception	may	be	a	terminological	issue	as	the	word	seems	to	 just	mean	 ‘application’	(indeed,	 the	word	 ‘mapping’	 itself	implies	a	spatial	metaphor.)		
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Without	recourse	to	the	bespoke	sense	of	metaphor,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	motion	Clarke	 ascribes	 is	 not	 too	 far	 from	 the	motion	 Scruton	 ascribes.	 Clarke	tends	 to	 use	 the	 word	 ‘virtual’	 while	 Scruton	 prefers	 ‘imaginary’,	 although	Scruton	 does	 also	 use	 ‘virtual’	 (1997:	 36.)	 Compare,	 for	 example,	 Scruton’s	notion	 of	 virtual	 ‘subjects’–	 ‘musical	 individuals,	 journeying	 through	 the	 tonal	space	which	is	their	element’–	(Scruton	1997:	63)–	and	Clarke’s	notion	of	virtual	‘agents’–	 ‘the	 cello	 and	violin	parts	 specify	 very	different	kinds	of	motion	 (one	assertive	 and	 energetic,	 the	 other	 receptive	 and	 accommodating),	 and	 for	 this	reason,	as	well	as	for	reasons	of	register	and	timbre,	they	specify	distinct	‘agents’	in	motion	relative	to	one	another–	two	separate	individuals.’	While	both	proceed	from	distinct	fields	of	enquiry	they	have	I	think	identified	the	same	phenomenon,	and	 it	 is	 not	 immediately	 clear	 why	 Scruton’s	 musical	 movement	 befits	‘metaphor’	while	Clarke’s	befits	‘literal,’	but	I	will	let	the	issue	rest	here.		In	 sum,	 the	 perceptual	 effects	 tied	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 metaphorical	 image	schemata	 in	 music	 can	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 perceptual	 illusion	wrought	above	as	a	conflict	between	some	aspect	of	perceptual	experience	and	belief.	Metaphorical	image	schemata	such	as	those	concerning	musical	forces	can	account	 for	 an	 illusory	 sense	 of	 movement	 just	 because	 they	 suggest	 the	engagement	of	aspects	of	our	psychology	that	allow	us	to	perceive	movement	in	tandem	 with	 a	 conceptual	 capacity	 that	 represents	 a	 lack	 of	 movement.	 A	primary	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	draw	together	researches	in	different	fields	so	as	to	 argue	 and	 dispute	 claims	 about	 fundamental	 aspects	 of	music,	 and	 as	 such	psychological	models	will	be	brought	under	the	phenomenal	view	just	if	it	can	be	argued	 that	 they	 explicate	musical	movement	 as	 an	 effect	 of	 embodied	 and/or	nonconceptual	psychology.		This	 chapter	 has	 augmented	 the	 case	 for	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 of	 musical	movement	through	investigation	of	the	relation	between	musical	movement	and	real	 or	 veridical	 movement.	 After	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 background	 into	psychological	 theories	 and	 the	 literature	 on	 musical	 movement,	 three	approaches	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 how	musical	movement	 relates	 to	 real	 or	 veridical	movement	 were	 developed:	 (i)	 abstract,	 (ii)	 humanist,	 (iii)	 phenomenal.	 (i)	 is	
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associated	with	 the	 specifically	musical	 and	 irreducible,	 (ii)	with	 a	 rejection	of	the	idea	that	musical	movement	is	paradoxical	or	metaphorical	and	(iii)	with	the	notion	that	musical	movement	is	a	perceptual	illusion.		The	phenomenal	view	offered	here	opposes	an	abstract	view,	but	can	be	aligned	with	 humanism	 in	 certain	 respects:	 both	 approaches	 aim	 to	 undermine	 the	boundary	between	music	and	human-life	with	the	common	argument	that	music	and	 life	 are	 interrelated.	 The	 important	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 views	reflects	 the	distinction	 I	have	been	developing	between	the	conceptual	and	 the	nonconceptual.	 Humanists	 such	 as	 Hamilton	 and	 Scruton	 conceive	 of	 the	 link	between	music	and	life	as	characterized	by	the	listener’s	intellectual	engagement	in	her	environment	and	its	representation	in	sound,	while	the	view	offered	here	makes	 links	 to	non-musical	 human	 life	 by	 conceiving	musical	movement	 as	 an	exercise	of	a	listener’s	nonconceptual	psychological	abilities.		Perceptual	illusions	were	characterised	as	experiences	that	conflict	with	what	a	subject	knows	or	believes	to	be	the	case,	and	contrasted	with	cognitive	illusions,	consisting	in	the	formation	of	false	beliefs.	Understanding	musical	movement	as	a	 perceptual	 illusion	 allows	 it	 to	 be	 elucidated	 in	 non-musical	 terms,	 through	examples	of	non-musical	perceptual	phenomena	such	as	the	Muller-Lyer	illusion,	through	 reference	 to	philosophy	of	mind	 (chapter	1)	 and	 through	 reference	 to	psychological	 models	 such	 as	 ecological	 theory	 and	 cognitive	 categorisation.	Ecological	theory	was	presented	as	a	model	that	explicates	musical	movement	as	a	 perceptual	 illusion.	 The	 utility	 of	 this	 model	 of	 nonconceptual	 perception	strengthens	 the	 argument	 that	musical	movement	 is	 nonconceptual	 and	 helps	illuminate	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 belief	 and	 experience	 can	 conflict	 in	 music	perception.		Time	was	 identified	as	a	 critical	 research	 topic	when	attempting	an	account	of	musical	movement.	Using	terminology	and	argumentation	from	Susanne	Langer,	music’s	ability	to	affect	a	sense	of	time	through	the	development	of	tension	and	expectancies	was	given	as	an	example	of	perceptual	illusion.	Zbikowski’s	use	of	the	psychological	model	of	cognitive	categorisation	to	analyse	music	perception	
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presents	 an	 efficacious	 means	 of	 explicating	 the	 musical	 sense	 of	 time	 that	conflicts	with	our	real	or	veridical	sense	of	time.	Cognitive	categorisation	further	strengthens	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 given	 that	 it	 explicates	 aspects	 of	 musical	movement–	the	sense	of	temporality	that	underpins	musical	movement–	as	the	exercise	 of	 nonconceptual	 psychological	 abilities	 that	 conflict	 with	 a	 listener’s	beliefs.	The	ability	to	categorise	was	linked	with	the	ability	to	discriminate,	with	the	 literature	 on	 the	 fineness	 of	 grain	 of	 nonconceptual	 experience	 providing	instructive	 background.	 It	 was	 argued	 that	 a	 listener	 has	 the	 potential	 to	experience	 highly	 complex	 hierarchical	 structure	 with	 only	 the	 ability	 to	discriminate.		 	
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Chapter	4		
	
	
Conceptions	of	Music	Experience:		
Internalist	versus	Externalist.			This	 chapter	 gives	 a	 fresh	 approach	 to	 the	 phenomenal/abstract	 distinction	made	in	the	previous	chapters,	in	order	to	further	clarify	and	expand	on	what	it	means	to	say	that	musical	movement	should	be	understood	under	a	phenomenal	rather	 than	 an	 abstract	 conception;	 it	 is	 structured	 broadly	 in	 line	 with	 the	following	aims:		 1. to	 connect	 phenomenal/abstract	 with	 a	 broader	 distinction,	 emerging	from	the	aesthetics	literature,	that	allows	for	further	argumentation	for	a	phenomenal	view.	2. to	 discuss	 a	 key	 consequence	 of	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 conception–	 that	 the	musically	aesthetic	is	determined	by	immediately	perceivable	sound.	3. to	 defend	 against	 the	 charge	 that	 this	 consequence	 commits	 a	phenomenal	 view	 to	 an	 untenable	 formalist	conception	 of	 the	musically	aesthetic.		The	 following	will	 tend	 to	refer	 to	 the	musically	aesthetic	generally	 rather	 than	
musical	movement	in	particular.	This	reflects	the	aim	to	situate	the	phenomenal	view	 in	 a	 broader	 debate,	 the	 research	 cited	 below	 rarely	 dealing	 specifically	with	musical	movement	 but	 rather	with	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 or,	 even	more	generally,	 the	 aesthetic	 (although	 I	 resist	 making	 any	 novel	 claims	 about	 the	
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aesthetic	per	se).	Musical	movement	is	a	central	aesthetic	feature	of	music,	and	as	such	a	phenomenal	view	of	musical	movement,	though	perhaps	does	not	depend	
on,	 is	 certainly	 supported	 by	 a	 coherent	 phenomenal	 view	 of	 the	 musically	aesthetic.		Conversely,	 the	 centrality	 of	musical	movement	 renders	 it	 a	 robust	point	 from	which	 to	 generalise	 over	 the	 aesthetic.	 That	 musical	 movement	 is	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 phenomenon,	 understood	 on	 a	 phenomenal	 conception,	 supports	 the	view	that	the	musically	aesthetic	is	also	as	such.	Some	might	call	this	an	inductive	argument	since	it	is	clear	that	while	the	premises–	musical	movement	is	psycho-acoustic	 and	musical	movement	 is	 a	 central	 aspect	 of	 the	musically	 aesthetic–	supports	 the	 conclusion–	 that	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	 psycho-acoustic–	 it	 is	nonetheless	 possible	 for	 the	 premises	 to	 be	 true	 and	 the	 conclusion	 false–	 if	some	other	aspect	of	the	aesthetic	cannot	be	understood	as	psycho-acoustic.	The	below	provides	argumentation	that	circumscribes	the	musically	aesthetic	in	such	a	 way	 that	 it	 can	 be	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 psycho-acoustic	 properties.	 The	overarching	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter,	 then,	 is	 to	 argue	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 of	 the	musically	 aesthetic,	 thus	 strengthening	 the	 phenomenal	 argument	 for	 musical	movement	along	with	using	the	above	work	on	musical	movement	to	support	the	more	general	argument	for	the	musically	aesthetic.			
4.1	Introductory	Summary.		The	 first	 section	 examines	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 can	 be	understood	without	presupposing	it–	a	primary	claim	of	the	phenomenal	view–	by	 identifying	 precedents	 in	 the	 aesthetics	 literature	 and	 by	 rebutting	 the	argument	from	Andy	Hamilton	that	circular	definitions	can	be	anodyne.		The	 second	 section	 introduces	 a	 new	 distinction	 between	 internalist	 and	
externalist	 that	 can	 be	 aligned	with	 the	 abstract/phenomenal	 distinction	made	over	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 and	 considers	 an	 important	 debate	 between	
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Beardsley	 and	 Dickie	 in	 aesthetics	 during	 the	 mid-20th	 century	 that	 provides	background	and	elucidation.		The	following	section	criticises	an	example	of	a	strong	externalist	view	of	music,	belonging	 to	 Benjamin	 Boretz	 (1970),	 that	 identifies	 all	 aesthetic	 features	 of	music	 with	 their	 representations	 in	 language	 or	 music-analytics.	 This	 critique	exposes	 a	 particular	model,	 pertaining	 to	 a	 vehicle/content	 distinction,	 that	 is	central	to	externalist	views	but	fatally	flawed.		A	vehicle/content	distinction	is	flawed,	I	argue,	because	it	cannot	accommodate	the	truth	that	any	aesthetic	experience	of	music	is	determined	by	how	the	music	sounds–	 understood	 as	 its	 immediately	 perceivable	 sonic	 properties.	 This	argument	 is	 developed	 by	 invoking	 the	 concept	 of	 supervenience,	 which	characterises	 dependence	 in	 one	 direction:	 any	 change	 in	 the	 way	 a	 musical	work	sounds	will	occasion	a	corresponding	change	in	its	aesthetic	features,	but	any	change	in	aesthetic	features	is	not	necessarily	brought	about	through	change	in	the	way	the	musical	work	sounds.		It	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 supervenience	 argument	 that	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 is	committed	 to	a	kind	of	 formalism,	 insofar	as	 formalist	views	prescribe	 that	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 immediately	 perceivable	sonic	 properties.	 However,	 the	 supervenience	 argument	 commits	 the	phenomenal	view	to	a	weak	version	of	formalism	that	acknowledges	the	role	of	listener	attitude	and	context.		Further	 delineation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 form	 in	 music	 experience	 is	 given	 where	
acousmatic	 listening	 is	 considered	 as	 a	 broader	 conception	 of	 the	 musically	aesthetic	whose	circumscription	extends	further	than	the	musicological	concept	of	 tones–	 taken	 as	 the	most	 basic	 feature	 on	 a	 formalist	 view.	 The	 acousmatic	then	 sets	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	boundaries	of	the	acoustic.	I	argue	the	acousmatic	thesis,	distinguish	it	from	the	Kantian	notion	of	the	disinterested	attitude	and	further	argue,	contrary	to	John	Cage,	that	the	acousmatic	does	support	judgements	about	aesthetic	value.	
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	The	penultimate	section	argues	that	acousmatic	 listening	can	be	understood	as	dependent	 on	 perception	 rather	 than	 as	 abstract,	 contrary	 to	 Hamilton	 and	Scruton.	 This	 argument	 questions	 the	 tendency	 to	 render	 intrinsic	 features	 as	abstract	objects	rather	than	psychological	processes	or	events.	 It	 is	argued	that	the	psycho-acoustic	conception	of	music	 is	particularly	 instructive	given	 that	 it	explains	two	apparently	conflicting	but	intuitively	correct	claims:	firstly	that	the	musically	aesthetic	can	be	understood	in	a	way	that	makes	no	prior	reference	to	the	 musically	 aesthetic,	 and	 secondly	 that	 that	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	experienced	as	intrinsic.		The	 final	 section	 considers	 an	 amalgam	 view	 where	 features	 from	 both	internalist	and	externalist	conceptions	are	combined	to	account	for	the	musically	aesthetic.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 compromising	position	 is	not	 feasible.	However,	 the	rejection	 of	 extrinsic	 features	 of	 music	 does	 invite	 questions	 about	 the	explanandum	 and	 how	 the	 ‘musically	 aesthetic’	 should	 be	 distinguished	 from	‘musical	experience’.			
4.2	Objectives	of	conceptions	of	aesthetic	experience.		A	strength	of	the	phenomenal	view,	I	have	argued,	is	that	a	central	aspect	of	the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	 accounted	 for	 in	 a	way	 that	 does	 not	 presuppose	 either	music	 or	 the	 aesthetic;	 this	 is	 achieved	 by	 endorsing	 a	 psycho-acoustic	conception	 of	musical	movement.	 This	 section	 argues	 that	 such	 a	 non-circular	definition	of	the	aesthetic	is	necessary	and	explanatory,	against	the	view	of	Andy	Hamilton	(2007.)		Two	objectives	can	be	distinguished	that	are,	I	suggest,	priorities	for	conceptions	of	the	musically	aesthetic.	Jerrold	Levinson	intimates	the	first	objective	when	he	gives	several	desiderata	that,	he	claims,	‘must	be	satisfied	for	a	characterisation	of	 aesthetic	 pleasure	 to	 be	 accounted	 a	 success’	 (1996:	 3),	 one	 of	which	 being	that	 ‘aesthetic	 pleasure	 [is	 construed]	 as	 in	 some	 fashion	 distinct,	 on	 the	 one	
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hand,	 from	 purely	 sensory	 or	 sensual	 pleasures,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 from	purely	cognitive	or	intellectual	ones’	(ibid.)	Insofar	as	aesthetic	pleasure	is	taken	to	 entail	 aesthetic	 experience,	 Levinson	 here	 indicates	 a	 concern	 with	 how	aesthetic	experiences	can	be	distinguished	 from	non-aesthetic	experiences	 that	are	 similar	 in	 certain	 ways.	 Gary	 Iseminger	 suggests	 a	 second	 objective	 by	demanding	an	account	is	given	‘in	a	way	that	appeals	neither	to	any	prior	idea	of	the	 aesthetic	 nor	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 art’	 (2003:	 99)	 even	 if	 he	 accepts	 that	 any	theory	 must	 account	 for	 the	 close	 connection	 between	 art	 and	 the	 aesthetic.	These	objectives	are	priorities	 for	conceptions	of	aesthetic	experience,	but	also	can	be	cast	as	more	general	conditions	for	theories:		 (A) that	the	explanandum	is	distinguished	as	the	property	or	thing	that	it	is	(B) that	the	explanation	is	non-circular.		(A)	should	be	granted	as	self-evident,	I	think,	although	there	is	some	contention	regarding	 (B)	 as	 related	 to	 aesthetic	 experience,	which	 is	 considered	 below.	 It	should	 be	 noted	 that	 (A)	 here	 may	 initially	 seem	 significantly	 different	 to	Levinson’s	desideratum	on	aesthetic	 experience–	which	made	 specific	mention	of	 ‘sensory’,	 ‘sensual’,	 ‘cognitive’	and	 ‘intellectual’	pleasures.	Although	on	closer	inspection,	Levinson	is	really	distinguishing	the	musically	aesthetic	from	all	that	is	‘pleasurable’	coupled	with	either	sensory	or	cognitive:	in	other	words,	all	that	is	pleasurable	experience.70		It	 has	 been	 questioned,	 however,	 whether	 a	 non-circular	 definition	 of	 the	aesthetic	 is	 feasible	 or	 even	 desirable,	 given	 that	 there	 are	many	 instances	 of	circularity	in	language	that	do	not	subtract	from	the	utility	of	component	terms.	Andy	 Hamilton	 gives	 the	 example	 of	 ‘monarch’	 and	 ‘subject’:	 ‘[t]he	 dictionary	defines	“monarch”	as	“sole	or	absolute	ruler	of	a	state”;	when	one	asks	what	the	state	consists	of,	or	who	monarchs	rule	over,	the	answer	must	refer	to	subjects,	while	“subject”	is	defined	as	one	ruled	by	a	monarch	or	other	absolute	authority’	(Hamilton	 2007:	 59.)	 Analytic	 conceptual	 holisms	 such	 as	 these	 are	 seemingly	
																																																								70	Nb	I	prefer	the	notion	of	aesthetic	‘value’	to	‘pleasure’	below	since	the	former	is	broader.	
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anodyne,	 and	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	 relation	 between	 art	 and	 the	 aesthetic	exhibits	a	similarly	innocuous	circularity.		To	 understand	 whether	 this	 circularity	 can	 be	 excused	 in	 a	 theory	 of	 the	aesthetic	 it	 is	worth	considering	an	example.	A	simple	circular	definition	of	the	aesthetic:	 art	 is	 the	 production	 of	 the	 aesthetic,	where	 the	 aesthetic	 is	what	 is	produced	by	art.	It	is	clear	that	such	a	definition	has	no	explanatory	currency	due	to	the	mutual	presupposition	of	‘art’	and	‘aesthetic’	in	the	definition.	However,	it	could	 be	 argued	 that	 Hamilton’s	 example	 is	 more	 instructive	 given	 that	 the	definition	of	‘monarch’	does	not	in	fact	contain	the	term	‘subject’,	but	the	circle	is	completed	 through	 a	 further	 step,	 by	 the	meaning	 of	 the	word	 ‘state’.	 But	 this	larger	circle	then	begs	the	question	since	the	circularity	evident	in	the	definition	of	 ‘monarch’	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 microcosm	 of	 language:	 all	 dictionary	 entries	 make	reference	to	one	another	in	definition,	implying	a	closed	system.	The	examples	I	gave	of	art	and	aesthetic	seem	far	less	useful	definitions	than	those	of	‘monarch’	and	‘subject’	just	because	they	make	a	smaller	circle.	Human	language	is	vast	and	complex,	 and	 were	 it	 not	 for	 its	 place	 in	 this	 vast	 circle	 the	 definition	 of	‘monarch’	 would	 not	 have	 any	 utility	 whatsoever.	 The	 presupposition	 in	 the	above	definition	of	‘art’	and	‘aesthetic’	ensures	that	neither	has	a	place	in	the	vast	closed	system	of	language.		It	is	plausible	that	‘art’	and	‘aesthetic’	could	be	interdependent,	in	the	sense	that	the	definition	of	each	 term	could	make	reference	 to	 the	other,	without	ensuing	circularity.	For	example,	any	description	of	 the	aesthetic	may	be	dependent	on	art	while	also	entailing	a	mental	state,	giving	a	definition	such	as:	 ‘the	aesthetic	attaches	 to	 experiences	 that	 entail	 taking	 attitude	 x	 towards	 artworks’	 and	‘artworks	are	objects	that	engender	aesthetic	experiences	when	perceived	under	attitude	 x.’	 In	 such	 definitions,	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘attitude	 x’	 may	 allow	 the	definitions	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 far	 larger	 set	of	 terms,	 affording	definition	 in	 terms	of	mental	states,	psychology,	perception,	or	broader	cultural	issues.	There	is	clearly	value	in	situating	‘aesthetic’	into	a	broader	system	and	ultimately	this	can	be	put	as	 the	question	of	whether	 ‘aesthetic’	 can	be	described	 in	 a	way	 that	does	not	presuppose	it.	
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	Certain	 aesthetic	 theories	 have	 fallen	 into	 disrepute	 for	 too	 thinly	 veiled	circularity,	for	example	George	Dickie’s	formulation	of	the	institutional	theory	of	art	 and	 the	 attempt	 to	 define	 art	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 ‘artworld’.71	He	 drew	 the	following	criticism	from	Levinson:		A	circular	definition,	however	segmented,	no	more	clarifies	anything	than	it	 informs	 or	 instructs–	 one	 simply	 cannot	 elucidate	 the	 content	 of	 a	concept	 by	 using	 and	 presupposing	 it	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 elucidation.	Philosophical	definitions	can	do	better	than	that.	(1987:	145)		If	 ‘aesthetic’	and	‘art’	adopt	positions	within	a	conceptual	holism,	an	immediate	concern	pertains	to	the	boundaries	of	such	a	holism–	how	far	the	circle	extends	outwards	 from	 these	 terms.	To	concede	 that	 such	 terms	cannot	be	understood	outside	of	 a	 circular	definition	 is	 to	 concede	 that	 they	are	 irreducible,	 perhaps	permitting	 them	 as	 brute	 facts	 in	 theories;	 but	 is	 a	 claim	 as	 substantial	 as	aesthetics	itself.		Two	 overarching	 motivations	 for	 this	 chapter	 and	 indeed	 the	 thesis	 more	generally,	 then,	 are	 (1)	 to	 distinguish	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 from	 other	experiences	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 (2)	 makes	 no	 prior	 reference	 to	 art	 or	 the	aesthetic	 while	 nonetheless	 accounting	 for	 the	 close	 relation	 of	 art	 and	 the	aesthetic.	 An	 effective	 definition	 of	 the	musically	aesthetic,	 it	 has	 been	 argued,	depends	 on	 clear	 distinction	 in	 terms	 of	 non-aesthetic	 ideas.	 The	 view	 offered	here	 attempts	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aforementioned	 desiderata	 by	 defining	 music	experience	in	contrast	with	the	conceptual,	as	psychological	process.	Rendering	the	 aesthetic	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 psychological	 is	 to	 render	 the	 aesthetic	 in	 non-aesthetic	 terms,	and	 it	 is	by	bridging	 this	gap	that	artworks	can	be	understood	more	broadly	as	a	part	of	psychology,	culture	and	the	physical	world.			
																																																								71	See	Dickie	1974	and	1984.	
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4.3	 A	 debate	 on	 aesthetic	 experience:	 Internalism	 and	
Externalism.		James	Shelley	uses	the	terms	internalist	and	externalist	to	denote	two	contrasting	conceptions	of	aesthetic	experience.	Internalist	views	appeal	to	features	internal	to	 experience–	 typically	 phenomenological	 features–	 while	 externalist	 views	appeal	 to	 features	 external	 to	 experience–	 typically	 features	 of	 the	 aesthetic	object	 (Shelley	 2015). 72 	Phenomenal	 and	 abstract	 can	 be	 subsumed	 under	
internalist	 and	 externalist,	 I	 argue	 below,	 the	 latter	 terms	 helping	 expand	 on	
phenomenal/abstract	by	giving	more	general	characterisations	that	are	rooted	in	conceptions	of	aesthetic	experience	rather	than	musical	movement.		Insofar	 as	 the	 internalist/externalist	 distinction	 can	 be	 used	 to	 divide	conceptions	of	the	musically	aesthetic,	and	the	phenomenal/abstract	distinction	can	 be	 similarly	 used	 to	 divide	 conceptions	 of	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 (rather	than	musical	movement	 in	particular),	 the	 former	will	be	a	broader	distinction	under	 which	 the	 latter	 can	 be	 subsumed;	 it	 can	 thus	 be	 said	 that	 the	 latter	implies	the	former.	It	is	coherent	to	be	an	internalist	who	does	not	recognise	the	role	 the	 phenomenal	 view	 gives	 to	 both	 psychology	 and	 nonconceptual	perception	(Dewey	and	early	Beardsley	provide	examples),	just	as	it	is	coherent	to	be	an	externalist	who	rejects	the	claim,	associated	with	an	abstract	view,	that	musical	movement	 is	 specifically	musical	 (humanism	 is	 an	 example	of	 such	 an	externalist	 view.)	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 subscribe	 to	 either	 internalism	 or	externalism	 about	 aesthetic	 experience	 while	 rejecting	 the	 respective	phenomenal	or	abstract	views,	but	the	reverse	is	not	true.		A	 phenomenal	 view	 implies	 internalism	 since	 the	 former	 is	 committed	 to	 the	features	of	the	latter,	key	amongst	which	are	(a)	aesthetic	features	are	attributed	to	the	experience	rather	than	the	object	that	is	being	experienced	and	(b)	music																																																									72	The	distinction	has	its	origins	within	philosophy	of	mind.	‘Externalism	with	regard	to	mental	content	says	that	in	order	to	have	certain	types	of	intentional	mental	states	(e.g.	beliefs),	it	is	necessary	to	be	related	to	the	environment	in	the	right	way.	Internalism	(or	individualism)	denies	this,	and	it	affirms	that	having	those	intentional	mental	states	depends	solely	on	our	intrinsic	properties’	Lau	and	Deutsch	(2016).	
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is	 assumed	 to	 be	 aesthetically	 evaluable	 through	 introspection	 alone,	 where	‘aesthetically	evaluating’	music	entails	ascribing	aesthetic	value	to	it.	I	will	argue	for	both	(a)	and	(b),	but	a	 full	argument	for	(b)	 is	withheld	until	chapter	5	and	the	 discussion	 of	 aesthetic	 value.	 In	 order	 to	 argue	 (a),	 what	 is	 meant	 by	‘aesthetic	features’	needs	to	be	established,	and	the	extent	to	which	‘experience’	is	elucidated	by	 the	models	of	nonconceptual	perception	 that	explicate	musical	movement	on	a	phenomenal	view	needs	clarifying.		Examples	 of	 ‘aesthetic	 features’	 taken	 from	 the	 literature	 are	 given	 in	 the	following	section	and	should	provide	some	elucidation,	but	I	will	go	on	to	argue	for	 a	prima	facie	 narrow	 formalistic	 or	 intrinsic	 notion	 of	 ‘musically	 aesthetic’,	the	primary	characterisation	of	which	generally	relies	on	terminology	developed	in	conventional	Western	musicology–	for	example:	key,	tone,	scale-degree,	sonata	
form,	 rhythm,	 harmony	 etc.–	 although	 there	 are	 formal	 or	 intrinsic	 musical	elements	central	to	western	music	but	not	captured	by	the	conventional	Western	musicological	 paradigm–	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 sound	 production	 (timbre)	 in	recorded	music	and	computer	music–	as	well	as	alternative	formulations	of	the	same	elements–	such	as	those	that	make	use	of	psychological	models.73		Another	way	to	characterise	this	notion	of	the	musically	aesthetic	is	as	all	those	features	that	cannot	be	described	as	contextual,	as	socio-politico-cultural	commentary	or	as	in	some	other	sense	extra-musical.	I	assume	that	musical	movement	counts	as	an	aesthetic	feature	or	is	constituted	by	aesthetic	features.		Given	 that	 the	 feature	 (a)	 of	 an	 internalist	 view	 was	 characterised	 above	 as	‘aesthetic	features	are	attributed	to	the	experience	rather	than	the	object	that	is	being	experienced’,	and	that	the	phenomenal	view	explicates	musical	movement	in	 terms	 of	 nonconceptual	 perception,	 the	 relation	 between	 ‘experience’	 and	‘nonconceptual	perception’	needs	to	be	considered	briefly	before	subsuming	the	phenomenal	view	under	internalism.	 ‘Nonconceptual	perception’	has	been	used	with	 the	 caveat	 that	 it	 entails	 ‘experience’,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 any	 sub-personal	perceptual/cognitive	functions	are	excluded.	It	was	made	clear	at	the	beginning																																																									73	‘Conventional	Western	musicology’	here	includes	the	sub-disciplines	of	music	theory,	music	analysis	and	Schenkerian	analysis.	‘Conventional	Western	musicology’	explicates	the	tonal	system,	or	the	elements	of	music	(Scruton	1997:	1–79;	Hamilton	2007:	40–65.)	
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of	 chapter	 1	 that,	 in	 attending	 to	 musical	 movement,	 my	 remit	 is	 strictly	 the	experiential,	and	any	psychological	models	appealed	to	so	far	have	demonstrated	the	 role	 nonconceptual	 perception	 has	 in	 musical	 experience.	 It	 might	nonetheless	be	maintained	that	there	is	a	question	of	whether	claiming	‘musical	movement	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 nonconceptual	 psychology’	 can	 be	equated	 with	 ‘musical	 movement	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 aesthetic	experience.’	 The	 view	 argued	 here	 is	 that	 the	 equivalence	 can	 be	made,	 since	insofar	 as	 musical	 movement	 is	 an	 aesthetic	 feature,	 and	 nonconceptual	perception	 is	 experiential,	 casting	 musical	 movement	 as	 an	 effect	 of	nonconceptual	perception	renders	musical	movement	an	aesthetic	feature	that	is	attributable	to	experience.		It	can	also	be	said	that	an	abstract	conception	implies	an	externalist	conception	insofar	as	the	former	is	committed	to	the	features	of	the	latter,	which	include	(i)	characterisation	in	terms	of	abstract	objects	that	are	independent	of	perception	and	(ii)	aesthetic	value	depends	on	correct	perception	of	 features	of	 the	object.	Again,	 concerns	of	 value	will	 be	mainly	dealt	with	 in	 the	next	 chapter,	 but	 the	below	explores	in	detail	how	externalist	views	seek	to	explain	experiences	of	the	aesthetic	 with	 a	 model	 of	 epistemic	 acquaintance	with	 the	 object:	 the	 subject	comes	to	know	something	about	the	object,	and	this	thing	the	subject	knows	can	be	 true	 or	 false	 and,	 relatedly,	 can	be	 a	 correct	 or	 incorrect	 appreciation.	 This	chapter	helps	develop	this	sense	of	epistemic	acquaintance	that	is	central	to	an	externalist,	 and	 therefore	 abstract,	 view.	 A	 main	 point	 of	 departure	 between	abstract	and	externalist	is	that	the	former,	as	argued	in	chapter	2	and	3,	presents	the	 musically	 aesthetic	 as	 specifically	musical,	while	 the	 latter	 does	 not	 make	such	a	commitment.		The	 utility	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘internalist/externalist’	 in	 understanding	‘phenomenal/abstract,’	 then,	 are	 that	 they	distinguish	 two	broader	and	 related	views.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	 make	 an	 argument	 for	 internalism	 when	 arguing	 a	phenomenal	 view,	 thus	 entailing	 an	 argument	 against	 externalism.	 Alongside	these	 more	 technical	 reasons	 for	 introducing	 these	 terms	 is	 the	 pragmatic	concern	 of	 acknowledging	 this	 chapter’s	 difference	 in	 focus	 in	 both	 sub-
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discipline	 and	 explanandum,	 given	 that	 the	 following	 uses	 writing	 in	 general	aesthetics	 to	 frame	 a	 theory	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 musical	 aesthetics	 (while	previous	 chapters	 used	musical	 aesthetics	 or	musicology	 to	 frame	 a	 theory	 on	the	phenomenon	of	musical	movement.)			
4.4	The	Internalist/Externalist	Debate	in	the	20th	Century.		The	consensus	in	aesthetics	moved	from	internalism	to	externalism	through	the	course	of	the	20th	Century.74	Tracking	the	debate	from	Dewey	to	Beardsley	and	through	 the	 various	 subsequent	 exchanges	 between	 Beardsley	 and	 Dickie	provides	both	detailed	 characterisation	of	 the	 terms	 internalist	and	externalist	and	 a	 brief	 background.	 In	 the	 early	 20th	 Century	 John	 Dewey	 argued	 an	internalist	viewpoint	by	suggesting	that	the	aesthetic	appreciation	of	an	artwork	be	related	with	what	he	 terms	an	experience.	An	experience	is	held	apart	 from	other	experiences	by	an	individualising	quality;	it	has	structure,	complexity,	and	builds	to	consummation;	it	is	unified	in	such	a	way	that	none	of	its	aspects	can	be	granted	 independence	 from	 any	 other.	 When	 we	 talk	 of	 the	 concluding	 V-I	cadence	 in	 the	 final	 movement	 of	 Beethoven’s	 Fifth	 Symphony	 we	 cannot	understand	it	apart	from	the	series	of	V-I	cadences	that	precede	it	in	the	Finale,	nor	the	three	and	a	half	movements	that	precede	the	finale.		An	experience,	however,	 is	not	exclusive	to	the	perception	of	artworks–	even	if	the	experiences	artworks	afford	are	exemplary.	In	the	everyday	we	may	have	an	experience:	when	eating	a	meal,	witnessing	a	storm,	solving	a	maths	problem	or	having	 an	 argument.	 Indeed,	 Dewey,	 a	 figurehead	 of	 environmental	 aesthetics,	found	 the	 aesthetic	 in	 all	 parts	 of	 life,	 even	 those	 that	 did	 not	 reach	consummation	 in	 the	manner	 required	 for	an	experience.	Most	 importantly	 for	our	 purposes,	 Dewey	 views	 the	 aesthetic	 as	 not	 attached	 to	 art	 but	 to	 the	experiencer,	inasmuch	as	it	is	specifically	experiences	that	have	aesthetic	quality:	the	aesthetic	is	created	by	an	experience	rather	than	vice-versa.																																																										74	See	Shelley	2015	and	Iseminger	2003.	
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The	 internalist	 view	 Dewey	 initially	 formulated	 was	 pursued	 by	 Monroe	Beardsley,	whose	 contribution	 deserves	 close	 attention	 given	 that	 he	 arguably	authored	both	 the	 final	detailed	 internalist	 theory	and	 the	 founding	externalist	one.75	Beardsley’s	 shift	 from	 an	 internalist	 to	 externalist	 thesis	 carried	 most	everyone	 else	 in	 tow	 such	 that	 the	 latter	 now	 enjoys	 a	 broad	 consensus.	However,	 while	 the	 strong	 internalism	 offered	 by	 Dewey	 has	 been	 widely	avoided,	 a	 vestige	 of	 internalism	 survives	 in	 recent	 literature	 as	 a	 narrower	thesis:	 internalism	about	value.	On	 such	 a	 view	 the	descriptive	 elements	 of	 the	aesthetic,	 such	 as	 ‘unity’	 or	 ‘coherence’,	 are	 attributed	 to	 the	 object	 while	 the	value	 those	 elements	 bring	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 experience.76 	This	 view	 is	considered	in	the	next	chapter.		The	 strongly	 internalist	 view	 proffered	 in	 Beardsley’s	 Aesthetics	 (1958)	prescribes	 that	 an	 aesthetic	 experience	 has	 not	 just	 unity	 but	 intensity	 and	complexity,	 and	 furthermore	 that	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 manifests	 in	 two	forms–	coherence	and	completeness.	An	object	has	aesthetic	value	only	 insofar	as	 it	 induces	 such	 experience,	 thus	 ensuring	 that	 evaluation	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 is	possible	solely	through	introspection.	The	view	that	aesthetic	features	should	be	ascribed	 to	 the	 experience	 was	 robustly	 challenged	 by	 George	 Dickie.	 Dickie	argued	 that	 a	 blinkered	 emphasis	 on	 phenomenal	 qualities	 leads	 us	 to	 take	experienced	properties	as	properties	of	experience;	we	mistake	an	experience	of	unity	 for	 a	 unified	 experience.	 Indeed,	 there	 appears	 nothing	 in	 the	 terms	themselves	will	justify	their	ascription	to	experiences	rather	than	objects.		 Note	that	everything	referred	to	[in	Beardsley's	description	of	coherence]	is	 a	 perceptual	 characteristic	 …	 and	 not	 an	 effect	 of	 perceptual	characteristics.	 Thus,	 no	 ground	 is	 furnished	 for	 concluding	 that	experience	can	be	unified	in	the	sense	of	being	coherent.	What	is	actually	argued	for	is	that	aesthetic	objects	are	coherent,	a	conclusion	which	must	be	granted,	but	not	the	one	which	is	relevant.	(Dickie	1965:	131)																																																										75	See	James	Shelley	2015.	76	Beardsley	occupied	this	position	in	transition	(1969),	see	below,	and	the	view	is	fairly	well	supported	today	(e.g.	Goldman	2005,	2006;	Budd	1995;	Levinson	1996,	2006;	Iseminger	2003.)	
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A	 property	 such	 as	 ‘coherence’	 belongs	 to	 the	 aesthetic	 object,	 according	 to	Dickie,	and	we	become	acquainted	with	this	property	through	perception.	When	we	 discuss	 particular	 aesthetic	 features	 we	 invariably	 assign	 properties	 to	objects;	as	such	it	seems	at	least	convoluted,	if	not	wholly	unfounded,	to	transfer	the	properties	of	aesthetic	objects	to	the	experience	of	those	objects.		Beardsley	 is	 gradually	 persuaded	 by	 this	 view,	 later	 characterising	 aesthetic	experience	 as	 ‘mental	 activity…	 that	 is	 united	 and	made	 pleasurable	 by	 being	tied	 to	 the	 form	 and	 qualities	 of	 a	 sensuously	 presented	 or	 imaginatively	intended	object’	 (Beardsley	1969:5;	 see	 Iseminger	2003.)	This	 is	 a	 transitional	period	in	his	thought.	While	the	aesthetic	is	now	in	some	direct	relationship	with	objective	 properties,	 it	 is	 still	 by	 nature	 phenomenal	 and	 evaluable	 through	introspection	 alone.	 This	 then	 is	 an	 example	 of	 internalism	 about	 value	 and	externalism	 about	 aesthetic	 structure,	 where	 value	 is	 given	 as	 intrinsically	mental	but	correlates	with	the	descriptive	elements	of	the	aesthetic,	exemplified	as	‘form	and	qualities’.	It	could	be	that	aesthetic	value	is	attached	to	experiences,	while	the	structure	of	those	states	reflects	that	of	the	artefact,	such	that	aesthetic	value	 cannot	 be	 understood	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 object	 in	 itself	 but	 the	descriptive	aspects	of	the	experience	can	be.	This	is	an	important	view	but	will	be	considered	in	full	in	the	next	chapter	where	value	is	a	main	topic.		Beardsley	 ultimately	 retreats	 almost	 entirely	 from	 an	 internalist	 viewpoint,	maintaining	 the	 Deweyan	 idea	 of	 unity	 not	 of	 an	 experience,	 but	 rather	 in	 a	broader	 sense	 of	 wholeness	 or	 coherence	 of	 self:	 ‘A	 sense	 of	 integration	 as	 a	person,	 of	 being	 restored	 to	 wholeness	 from	 distracting	 and	 disruptive	influences…	 and	 a	 corresponding	 contentment’	 (Beardsley	 1982:	 289).	 By	dropping	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 unified	 experience	 Beardsley	 no	 longer	 looks	 to	characterise	the	aesthetic	in	terms	of	experience,	but	rather	in	terms	of	objective	properties:		 To	adopt	the	aesthetic	point	of	view	with	regard	to	X	is	to	take	an	interest	in	whatever	aesthetic	value	X	may	possess	(Beardsley	1982:	19.)		
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The	 aesthetic	 value	 of	 X	 is	 the	 value	 that	 X	 possesses	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	capacity	to	provide	aesthetic	gratification	when	correctly	perceived.	(ibid:	26)77		Here	aesthetic	value	is	attributed	to	the	object	and	its	enjoyment	is	subject	to	the	criteria	 of	 ‘correct	 perception;’	 further,	 the	 word	 ‘experience’	 is	 now	 absent,	having	 been	 replaced	 with	 ‘gratification.’	 This	 last	 term	 refers	 to	 a	 subjective	quality	 engendered	 through	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 certain	 conditions,	 a	 practice	concerning	identifiable	properties	and	relations	of	or	between	objects:		 Gratification	 is	aesthetic	when	 it	 is	obtained	primarily	 from	attention	 to	the	 formal	 unity	 and/or	 the	 regional	 qualities	 of	 a	 complex	whole,	 and	when	its	magnitude	is	a	function	of	the	degree	of	formal	unity	and/or	the	intensity	of	regional	quality.	(Beardsley	1982:	22)		Aesthetic	 gratification	 dependent	 on	 correct	perception	 of	 an	 object	 evidently	precludes	 evaluating	 aesthetic	 experience	 introspectively,	 given	 that	‘correctness’	presumably	has	inter-subjective	pre-eminence.	Beardsley’s	revision	has	 been	 marked	 as	 a	 milestone	 in	 the	 recent	 trend	 towards	 an	 externalist	consensus.78		From	this	debate	we	can	glean	 the	 following	characteristics	of	both	externalist	and	internalist	views:		
• On	 an	 externalist	 view,	 aesthetic	 features	 are	 identified	 as	 properties	 of	the	 object–	 such	 as	 ‘formal	 unity’	 and	 ‘complexity’.	 The	 pleasure-	 or	‘gratification’–	 an	 aesthetic	 experience	 offers	 is	 engendered	 through	attention	 to	such	objective	properties.	This	pleasure	depends	on	correct	
perception:	 aesthetic	 perception	 can	 be	 right	 or	wrong.	 The	 correctness	condition	 of	 aesthetic	 perception	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 aesthetic	experience	is	epistemic:	a	subject	comes	to	know	aesthetic	 features	of	an																																																									77	See	Iseminger	2003:	104.	78	See	Iseminger	2003.	
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object.	By	conceiving	aesthetic	experience	as	a	form	of	knowledge,	it	is	by	implication	inter-subjective	and	sharable.		
• An	 internalist	 view,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	will	 describe	 an	 experience	 of	 a	particular	kind–	one	that	has	aesthetic	features,	on	which	aesthetic	value	depends.	 Objects	 of	 a	 certain	 kind	 may	 be	 special	 in	 inducing	 such	experience,	 but	 the	 aesthetic	 experience	 is	 attainable	 independent	 from	any	 particular	 class	 of	 object	 or	 property.	 By	 being	 independent	 of	 any	particular	 object	 or	 property,	 an	 aesthetic	 experience	 can	 be	 evaluated	introspectively.	 On	 the	 internalist	 view,	 then,	 aesthetic	 experience	 is	private	 and	 cannot	 be	 considered	 knowledge	 since	 it	 does	 not	 have	correctness	conditions.		
	
4.5	Criticising	an	Externalist	view.		The	 following	 is	 a	 critique	 of	 an	 externalist	 view	 of	 the	 musically	 aesthetic,	wrought	by	Benjamin	Boretz.	This	view	should	be	called	externalist	rather	than	abstract	because	Boretz’s	relativist	thinking	is	incompatible	with	the	notion	of	a	specifically	musical	domain.	 Further,	 the	 critique	 should	be	distinguished	 from	any	given	in	the	previous	chapters	since	it	constructs	a	negative	argument	about	the	 musically	 aesthetic	 generally	 rather	 than	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 musical	movement	 in	 particular.	 The	 aims	 of	 the	 following	 are:	 firstly,	 to	 support	 the	internalist	 view	 that	 aesthetic	 features	 are	 features	 of	 experience	 by	undermining	 the	 externalist	 view	 that	 aesthetic	 features	 are	 external	 to	experience;	 and	 secondly,	 to	 expose	 a	 flawed	 ‘vehicle/content’	 model	 that	 an	externalist	view	is,	I	argue,	obliged	to	adopt.		Externalism	attempts	to	account	for	aesthetic	experience	as	a	form	of	knowledge.	In	 his	Meta-Variations: Studies	 in	 the	 Foundations	 of	 Musical	 Thought	 (1970),	Benjamin	Boretz	demonstrates	 the	 extreme	 towards	which	 this	 view	can	 tend,	characterising	music	 as	 the	 ‘communication	 of	 ideas	 of	 relation,’	 (p.29).	Music	listening	is	here	considered	an	intellectual	endeavour:	sound	acts	as	a	‘means’	to	
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communicate	a	 ‘content’	(p.35),	and	we	as	listeners	engage	with	this	content	in	an	inferential	manner,	understanding	the	artefact	by	recognising	the	preeminent	‘identities’	 (p.29)	 of	musical	materials.	 On	 Boretz’s	 self-styled	 ‘cognitive	 view’,	then,	 listening	 is	 thinking.	 This	 musical-listening-thought	 is	 abstract,	 being	understood	in	terms	of	the	‘conceptual	framework’	(p.34)	of	a	particular	culture,	and	 as	 such	how	musical	 content	 is	 understood	depends	on	 the	 ‘constructions	placed	upon	patterns	of	differentiation	by	members	of	 the	 [particular]	 culture’	(p.35.)	 In	 other	 words,	 an	 externalist	 view	 such	 as	 this	 construes	 music	 as	 a	complex	of	abstract	objects	couched	in	a	sonic-temporal	structure	that	itself	has	no	direct	influence	on	experience.		Key	to	this	view	is	the	locution	‘hearing	as.’		 I	can	"hear"	any	piece	just	about	any	way	I	decide	to,	or	am	asked	to,	as	long	 as	 that	way	 is	 empirically	 realistic…	 I	 can	 decide	 to	 hear	 a	 "tonal"	piece	as	a	"twelve-tone"	one,	or	vice	versa.	What	I	cannot	do	is	hear	in	a	way	that	cannot	be	cognitively	delimited.	(p.57)		To	hear	as	is	to	project	a	‘construction’	onto	sound,	treating	sound	as	an	instance	of	 a	 particular	 such	 construction	 and	 thus	 rendering	 what	 Boretz	 calls	 the	‘musical	data’	from	the	‘musical	structure.’	Hearing	as	and	indeed	‘construction’	are	always	exemplified	by	musicological	terms,	as	is	such	in	the	quote	above,	and	the	 clear	 espousal	 of	 a	 cognitive	 model	 renders	 this	 an	 exemplary	 externalist	view.	 Boretz	 makes	 a	 robust	 separation	 between	 what	 can	 be	 understood	 as	nonconceptual	auditory	perception,	and	what	can	be	understood	as	conceptual	content–	 thus,	 ‘means’	 against	 ‘content;	 ‘patterns	 of	 differentiation’	 against	‘construction’,	‘structure’	against	‘data’.	Experience	of	the	musically	aesthetic,	on	this	 view,	 equates	 to	 knowledge	 of	 objective	 properties;	 perception	 of	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	 set	 against	 ‘normative	 criteria’	 (p.57),	 and	 will	 have	correctness	conditions	in	virtue	of	the	representational	model	under	which	it	is	conceived.		
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Boretz’s	argument	is	most	felicitous	for	the	purposes	of	this	essay	in	illuminating	what	I	take	to	be	a	necessary	commitment	of	an	externalist	view:	a	commitment	to	a	vehicle/content	model.	Such	a	model	is	deeply	problematic	when	applied	to	the	 musically	 aesthetic.	 The	 vehicle/content	 distinction	 has	 lineage	 in	 the	philosophy	of	mind	but	can	be	understood	without	much	technical	delineation.	It	is	 similar	 to	 the	 type/token	distinction	 considered	 in	 chapter	1	 in	how	 it	 links	abstract	 objects	 and	 concrete	 particulars,	 but	 is	 clearly	 distinguished	 by	 its	implication	of	a	respective	distinction	between	personal	and	subpersonal	states:	the	contents	of	mental	states	are	at	the	personal	level,	while	vehicles	of	contents	are	 causally	 explanatory	 subpersonal	 events,	 processes	 or	 states	 (S.	 L.	 Hurley	1998.)	 Types	 and	 tokens	 are	 not	 so	 constrained.	 As	 applied	 to	 the	 musically	aesthetic,	this	model	prescribes	that	‘sound’–	understood	in	contrast	to	cognitive	content	 (whether	 by	 recourse	 to	 acoustics	 or	 psycho-acoustics)–	 is	 the	(subpersonal)	 vehicle	 for	 content,	 where	 content	 is	 identified	 as	 an	 abstract	object	and	constitutes	personal-level	experience.	 I	argue	that	this	conception	 is	fatally	 flawed	since	the	aesthetic	 features	of	a	piece	are	tied	 inextricably	 to	 the	way	that	piece	sounds:	on	a	vehicle/content	model	it	is	possible	for	two	distinct	sounding	pieces	to	be	aesthetically	identical	(if	they	have	the	same	content.)	The	remainder	 of	 this	 section	will	 criticise	 this	model	 as	 it	 is	 evidenced	 in	 Boretz	(1970)	 before	 claiming	 that	 externalist	 accounts	 will	 be	 bound	 to	 this	 model	insofar	as	they	have	the	form	described	above.		One	 of	 the	 unfortunate	 corollaries	 of	 a	 vehicle/content	 view	 is	 revealed	 by	Boretz’s	claim	that	‘natural’	properties	of	sound	play	no	role	in	music:		 [A]lthough	people	evidently	invented	music,	some	people	appear	to	want	to	 find	 in	 it	a	manifestation	of	nature,	and	speak	about	 it	with	a	kind	of	idealism	 that	assumes	a	predetermined,	 inherent	 "natural"	model	of	 the	course	and	shape	of	musical	phenomena,	both	external	and	internal	to	the	human	 auditory	 mechanism.	 The	 pragmatics	 of	 this	 musical	 ontology	consist	 in	 an	 appeal	 to	 supposedly	 "natural"	 properties	 of	 sound,	 and	"natural"	dispositions	toward	the	hierarchical	primacy	of	certain	relations	
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of	auditory	phenomena,	 framed	as	an	appeal	to	the	"ear"	 in	the	sense	of	"psychoacoustic"	behavior	external	to	the	musical	context	(p.30.)		This	 dismissal	 of	 ‘natural	 properties	 of	 sound’	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	content/vehicle	 model,	 Boretz	 making	 clear	 that	 the	 vehicle–	 the	 ‘patterns	 of	differentiation’	 constituting	 sound–	 is	 empty	 while	 the	 conceptual	 content	gleaned	from	it	is	solely	responsible	for	aesthetic	experience.	Sound	is	‘external	to	 the	 musical	 context’	 (p.30).	 This	 approach	 tolerates	 very	 little	 scrutiny:	 if	sound	plays	no	part	in	individuating	the	musically	aesthetic,	then	a	musicological	representation	 of,	 say,	 a	 perfect	 fifth,	 should	 be	 aesthetically	 equivalent	 to	 the	sound	 of	 a	 perfect	 fifth,	 but	 this	 seems	 highly	 implausible.	 The	 position	 is	 not	greatly	helped	by	the	argument	made	to	support	it.	Considering	the	above	quote,	it	 is	 unclear	 why	 a	 phenomenon	 ‘invented’	 by	 humans	 could	 not	 utilise	 the	natural	 properties	 of	 sound–	 the	 argument	 that	 a	 particular	 facet	 of	 human	culture	cannot	have	ties	to	nature	merely	in	virtue	of	its	being	a	facet	of	human	culture	must	be	a	non	sequitur.		Another	seemingly	significant	aspect	that	must	be	excluded	on	Boretz’s	view	is	
temporality,	 presented	 as	 ‘just	 the	 time-order	 dimension	 among	 the	 totality	 of	information	 producing	 dimensions…	 Thus	 the	 observation	 that	 one	 pitch-complex	 slice	 is	 shorter,	 or	 longer,	 than	 all	 the	 others	 we	 have	 decided	 to	compare	 it	 to	 just	 creates	 a	 relational	 fact,	 and	our	 "surprise"	upon	noticing	 it	during	an	actual	audition	is	no	more	or	less	relevant	to	it	as	an	aspect	of	musical	structure	than	are	the	reactions	of	any	of	our	neighbor-auditors	who	happen	just	at	 the	 same	moment	 to	 fall	 asleep.’	 (p.39.)	 On	 this	 view,	 time	 is	 a	 framework	wherein	 content	 is	 ordered.	 To	 argue	 that	 time	 is	 not	 an	 aesthetic	 feature	 of	music	 is	highly	controversial,	but	 is	not	made	with	any	 force	by	Boretz:	 ‘As	 for	“expectation”,	which	appears	usually	to	be	used	to	account	for	the	sense	of	time-dependency	in	presented	musical	structures,	it	is	unclear	how	it	actually	does	so’	(p.39.)	 That	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘expectation’	 can	 adequately	 capture	 music’s	temporality	 is	 itself	questionable,	but	at	any	rate	 the	point	 ‘it	 is	unclear	how	 it	actually	does	so’	mounts	no	substantial	case;	this	is	just	a	flat	dismissal.		
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The	previous	two	chapters	have	rested	on	the	argument	that	a	central	aesthetic	feature	of	music–	movement–	can	be	explicated	in	terms	of	natural	properties	of	sound;	further,	a	nonconceptual	model	of	temporality	in	music	was	developed	in	chapter	3.	However,	it	should	stand	to	reason	that	the	credibility	of	any	view	that	rejects	the	features	of	sound	and	time	should	be	called	 into	question.	Aesthetic	features	 depend	 on	 music’s	 progress	 through	 time	 and	 its	 particular	 psycho-acoustic	features.		The	 weakness	 of	 this	 view	 is	 that	 it	 seeks	 to	 explain	 music	 experience	 using	ascriptions	of	content	 that	are	 independent	 from	particular	 instances	of	sound.	Consider	that	the	concept	of	‘A	above	middle	C’	can	be	expressed	in	a	number	of	ways–	 as	 written	 language,	 utterance,	 as	 the	 acoustic	 property	 of	 ‘440hz’	(written	or	spoken),	as	A4,	or	as	a	symbolic	representation	in	the	form	of	a	note	head	between	the	second	and	third	lines	of	a	musical	staff.	In	any	of	these	token	forms	 the	 content	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 identical;	 as	 such	 each	 are	 epistemically	
equivalent,	sharing	the	same	reference	(or	‘referent’).	It	then	follows	that	the	A4	in	 the	 third	 bar	 of	 Beethoven’s	 string	 quartet	 in	 C#	 minor,	 Op.131,	 is	epistemically	equivalent	to	the	A4	that	occurs	three	bars	 later,	along	with	every	mode	of	presentation	of	 ‘A4’	given	above.	But	clearly	this	epistemic	equivalence	does	not	match	up	whatsoever	with	aesthetic	experience,	given	that	each	of	the	exemplars	of	A4	given	above	afford	different	aesthetic	experiences.		An	externalist	could	attempt	a	rebuttal	by	appealing	to	context:	the	A4	in	bar	3	of	op.	131	has	a	different	contextual	ground	to	the	A4	in	bar	6	or	the	references	to	A4	 on	 the	 page	 above	 and	 can	 thus	 putatively	 account	 for	 the	 different	experiences	 each	 A4	 affords.	 Pursuing	 this	 line,	 any	 musical	 content	 can	 be	couched	 in	 terms	of	 a	 framework	of	 other	 content.	 So,	 any	difference	between	the	 A4	 in	 bar	 3	 and	 that	 in	 bar	 6	 of	 the	 quartet	 might	 be	 explained	 by	 the	difference	in	surrounding	features–	the	addition	of	accompaniment	in	bar	6,	the	differing	 placement	 in	 the	 bar,	 the	 distinct	 accidentals	 preceding	 each	 note.	Insofar	 as	 all	musically	 aesthetic	 features	 can	be	understood	as	 content	 that	 is	represented	in	experience,	appeal	to	context	allows	the	externalist	to	account	for	discrepancies	between	identical	musical	features.	
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	However,	 this	 point	 begs	 the	 question.	 Appeal	 to	 context	will	 only	 provide	 an	effective	 defence	 of	 an	 externalist	 view	 where	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 all	 musical	features	are	contents	and	that	all	differences	in	experience	can	be	accounted	for	by	 differences	 in	 content.	 But	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters	 that	movement,	 a	 central	 aesthetic	 feature	 of	 music,	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 in	terms	of	contents.	Further,	it	is	clearly	possible	to	have	distinct	experiences	with	identical	contents	where	the	difference	cannot	be	captured	by	a	difference	in	the	surrounding	 contents;	 perceiving	 the	 same	 contents	 with	 different	 sensory	modalities	provides	a	robust	example,	e.g.	the	contrast	between	hearing	the	tone	A4	 and	 reading	 ‘A4’,	 or	 between	 reading	 ‘A4’	 and	 hearing	 the	 utterance	 ‘A4.’	Relatedly,	 were	 a	 master	 musicologist	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 complete	 analysis	 of	 a	piece–	including	formal	analysis,	background	research,	contemporaneous	socio–cultural	 landscape	 and	 style–	 without	 hearing	 it,	 it	 seems	 she	 would	 then	experience	something	new	by	listening	to	the	piece	for	the	first	time.	Experience	will	depend	on	sensory	modality,	and	this	is	a	dependence	that	would	have	to	be	related	to	the	vehicle	rather	than	the	content.		Any	theory	of	the	musically	aesthetic,	then,	must	avoid	a	vehicle/content	model.	While	Boretz	provides	an	extreme	example,	I	argue	that	any	theory	that	commits	to	 the	 features	 of	 externalism	 outlined	 above	 will	 ipso	 facto	 commit	 to	 a	vehicle/content	model.	 Externalists	 commit	 to	 a	 vehicle/content	model	 insofar	as	 they	 commit	 to	 the	 view	 that	 aesthetic	 experience	 entails	 epistemic	acquaintance	 with	 properties	 of	 the	 object.	 Any	 features	 that	 are	 abstract	objects–	 that	are	 inter-subjective	and	sharable–	can	be	understood	as	contents	with	a	psycho-acoustic	vehicle		Musical	sound	is	participatory,	its	effect	will	depend	on	listener	involvement;	the	same	 passage	 of	 music	 will	 feel	 different	 when	 heard	 from	 a	 recording,	 at	 a	performance,	 or	 read	 from	 a	 score.	 A	 view	 that	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 the	 feel	of	music	 has	 no	 plausibility	 as	 a	 view	 on	 music	 experience.	 Indeed,	 it	 could	 be	argued	that	such	a	strong	externalism	based	in	epistemic	acquaintance	rebounds	altogether	from	music	experience,	serving	more	effectively	as	a	thesis	on	music-
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discourse.	This	concession	would	also	resolve	another	issue	proposed	by	Boretz,	concerning	the	relativist	nature	of	music	proposed:	it	is	trivial	to	say	that	music-discourse	 is	 relative	 to	 a	 culture,	whereas	 it	 is	 also	 trivial	 to	 say	 that	 sound	 in	time	is	not.79			
4.6	Supervenience.		I	have	argued	that	an	externalist	theory	of	the	musically	aesthetic	will	fail	given	that	 it	 necessarily	 relies	 on	 a	 vehicle/content	 model,	 where	 the	 musically	aesthetic	is	considered	independent	of	the	perception	of	sound.	Consistent	with	this	 failure	 of	 the	 vehicle/content	 model	 is	 the	 view	 that	 musically	 aesthetic	features	 are	 determined	 by	 psycho-acoustic	 features,	 where	 ‘psycho-acoustic	features’	entail	features	of	sound	as	perceived.	Insofar	as	content	is	independent	from	 vehicle,	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 cannot	 be	 identified	 as	 a	 content	communicated	 through	 sound	 as	 a	 vehicle	 since	 any	 difference	 in	 sound	 will	correspond	 with	 a	 difference	 in	 aesthetic	 feature.	 In	 which	 case,	 aesthetic	features	 are	 better	 understood	 as	 causally	 explicated	 perceptual	 processes	 or	states	 than	 as	 intentional	 states.	 This	 section	 is	 devoted	 to	 developing	 and	formalising	 this	 fixed	 relation	 between	 sound	 and	 aesthetic	 features	 using	 the	concept	of	supervenience.		The	debate	on	aesthetic	supervenience	has	been	shaped	 in	 large	part	by	Frank	Sibley’s	work	 on	 aesthetic	 properties	 and	 their	 essential	 character	 to	 ‘emerge’	from	non-aesthetic	properties	(Sibley	1959,	1965).80	Although	Sibley	never	uses	the	 term	 ‘supervene’,	 he	 is	 often	 taken	 as	 the	 standard-bearer	 of	 aesthetic																																																									79	Boretz	seems	to	backtrack	in	some	of	his	later	writings	(‘The	Logic	of	What?’	Journal	of	Music	
Theory	Vol.	33,	No.	1	(Spring,	1989),	pp.	107-116),	choosing	to	emphasise	phenomenology	over	conceptual	description,	which	is	favourable	to	the	argument	that	reifying	approaches	that	claim	music	is	a	complex	of	represented	objects	are	untenable.	In	his	opening	sentence	we	find	the	terms	“consciously	experienced,”	“determinate	feel,”	“perceptual	consciousness”	and	“experiencing	person.”	None	of	these	terms	are	found	in	Meta-Variations.	Further,	he	now	makes	a	distinction	between	“musical	meanings’	and	“technical	terms”	(p.2)	when	throughout	Meta-
Variations	he	conflated	the	two.	However,	he	maintains	a	certain	commitment	to	musical	concepts	(“music	existential	attributes”	(p.2),	“hearing	as…”	(p.3)).			80	See	also	Levinson	1984,	Zangwill	2010,	Brady	and	Levinson	2001.	
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supervenience	due	to	his	objectivist	tendencies	and	occupation	with	dependence	relations.	However,	 the	 term	has	a	deal	of	 flexibility	 in	 its	usage,	 a	prima	 facie	characterisation	given	in	‘Aesthetic	and	Nonaesthetic’:		 any	 aesthetic	 character	 a	 thing	 has	 depends	 upon	 the	 character	 of	 [its]	nonaesthetic	qualities	...	and	changes	in	its	aesthetic	character	result	from	changes	in	its	nonaesthetic	qualities.81		Crucially,	 Sibley	 does	 not	 commit	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 aesthetic	 qualities	 depend	
only	on	nonaesthetic	qualities,	 and	 the	 latter	part	 of	 his	most	 influential	 paper	‘Aesthetic	 Concepts’	 shows	 the	 import	 the	 contextual	 has	 in	 the	 aesthetic.	Furthermore,	 to	 impute	 a	 supervenience	 relation	 is	 not	 necessarily	 to	 say	 that	the	determined	features	(supervenient	features)	are	reducible	to	the	features	that	determine	(subvenient	base)	but	just	that	they	‘depend	on’	or	‘emerge	from’	this	base.		Supervenience,	 and	 its	 tie	 to	 Sibley,	 has	 been	 queried	 in	 a	 number	 of	 recent	papers	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 subvenient	 base	 cannot	 be	 suitably	circumscribed,	 extending	 as	 far	 into	 the	 background	 of	 an	 artwork	 as	 our	research	 interest	 carries.	 To	 be	 at	 all	 persuasive	 the	 supervenience	 thesis	seemingly	needs	to	 include	 far	more	than	the	apparently	 immediate	properties	of	 the	 object	 in	 the	 subvenient	 base:	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 very	 same	 A4	affords	 different	 experiences	 in	 different	 contexts.	 The	 continued	 revision	 of	particular	artworks	ensures	that	further	discriminations	can	effectively	be	made	indefinitely,	 thus	 leaving	 the	 subvenient	 open-ended,	 to	 be	 rendered	 ad	hoc.82	This	 version	 has	 been	 called	 robust	 supervenience,	 but	 as	 John	 Mackinnon	suggests,	 ‘[a]t	a	level	of	such	insistent	particularity…	supervenience	amounts	to	the	distinctly	uninformative	claim	that	a	work,	to	the	extent	that	it	is	that	work,	has	the	character	that	it	does.’83		
																																																								81	Sibley,	‘Aesthetic	and	Nonaesthetic’	p.	138.	82	Ibid	p.143.	83	Mackinnon	2001:	94.	
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The	failings	of	the	supervenience	thesis,	I	argue,	can	be	attributed	to	a	particular	component	 claim,	 namely	 that	 all	 broadly	 aesthetic	 qualities	 of	 a	 work	 are	‘entirely	 accountable	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 subvenient	 base.’84	With	 this	 claim	 the	thesis	 collapses	 into	 a	 reductionist	 thesis,	 leading	 to	 the	 aforementioned	problems	by	 substituting	 the	dependency-relation	with	one	of	 identity.	A	 view	that	 identifies	 all	 aesthetic	 qualities	 as	 non-aesthetic	 properties	 is	 not	 usefully	termed	 supervenience	 and	 as	 such	 in	 this	 guise	 supervenience	 appears	‘distinctly	 uninformative’.	 But	 if	 this	 reductionist	 tendency	 is	 eschewed	 the	thesis	 remains	 both	 defensible	 and	 instructive,	 whether	 or	 not	 we	 favour	 the	narrow	 sense	 of	 subvenient	 base–	 where	 context	 is	 excluded–	 or	 its	 broader	sense–	where	(successively	reconceived)	context	is	included.	It	can	be	true	that	
both	 the	 aesthetic	 qualities	 of	 a	 work	 can	 change	 while	 its	 non-aesthetic	properties	 remain	 the	 same	and	 that	 the	aesthetic	properties	of	 a	work	hold	a	dependence-relationship	with	 its	 non-aesthetic	 properties,	 if	we	posit	 that	any	
change	 in	 perceptible	 physical	 properties	 of	 a	work	will	 result	 in	 a	 change	 in	 its	
aesthetic	qualities.	No	 reductive	commitment	 is	needed	 to	make	 this	 claim,	nor	even	 a	 commitment	 concerning	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 listening	 or	 context	 of	artwork.	 Indeed,	 this	may	be	 the	 thesis	 that	 is	afforded	by	Sibley’s	 confessedly	negative	 argument,	 given	 that	 a	 dependence-relation	 is	maintained	where	 any	change	in	y	affects	a	change	in	x,	even	if	the	reverse	is	not	true.		‘Supervenience’,	then,	has	a	meaning	related	to		‘dependence’,	but	is	importantly	different	due	 to	a	particular	asymmetry:	 to	 say	 that	x	 supervenes	on	y	is	 to	 say	that	 x	 holds	 in	 a	 particular	 relation	 with	 y	 whereby	 any	 change	 in	 y	 will	necessarily	 bring	 about	 a	 respective	 change	 in	 x	 but	 any	 change	 in	 x	 is	 not	necessarily	brought	about	by	a	change	in	y.	In	the	case	of	the	musically	aesthetic,	this	 renders	 the	 highly	 congenial	 thesis	 that	 any	 change	 in	 the	way	 a	musical	work	sounds	will	occasion	a	corresponding	change	in	its	aesthetic	features,	but	any	 change	 in	 aesthetic	 features	 is	 not	 necessarily	 brought	 about	 through	 a	change	in	the	way	the	musical	work	sounds.	While	this	is	a	form	of	dependency,	it	 is	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 the	 claim	 that	 there	 can	 be	 no	 aesthetic	 change	without	 a	 non-aesthetic	 change,	 since	 the	 dependency	 is	 ‘one-way’:	 aesthetic																																																									84	Mackinnon	2000:	389.	
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features	 depend	 on–	 are	 determined	 by–	 the	 non-aesthetic	 base,	 but	 can	 vary	while	 the	 non-aesthetic	 base	 remains	 fixed.	 It	 should	 be	 stressed	 that	supervenience	is	distinct	to	reduction:	to	say	that	x	supervenes	on	y	is	not	to	say	that	x	is	reducible	to	y.		In	 sum:	 music's	 aesthetic	 value	 supervenes	 on	 sonic	 properties,	 where	‘supervenience’	is	not	assumed	to	be	reductive	but	prescribes	that	any	change	in	subvenient	base	results	in	a	change	in	supervenient	qualities;	an	externalist	view	that	 denotes	 music's	 aesthetic	 features	 as	 content	 and	 sound	 as	 vehicle	 is	contrary	 to	 the	 supervenience	 relation,	 rendering	 sound	 an	 auxiliary	 aspect	 of	music.	 There	 is	 a	 common-sense	 notion	 that	 the	 experience	 a	 piece	 of	 music	offers	is	contingent	on	the	way	that	piece	of	music	sounds.	It	is	a	requirement	of	any	theory	of	the	aesthetic	that	it	will	account	for	the	supervenience	relation	of	experience	 and	 sound,	 a	 requirement	 clearly	 fouled	 by	 the	 vehicle/content	model	on	which	an	externalist	view	rests.		While	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 resist	 overly	 technical	 explanation,	 it	 is	 worth	 briefly	summarising	 the	 supervenience	 claim	 in	 a	 completely	 non-technical	 way.	 It	 is	just	 the	 claim	 that	 any	 features	 that	 are	 both	 describable	 using	 the	 science	 of	acoustics	 and	perceptible	by	 a	human	 listener	directly	determine	 the	 aesthetic	experience	of	that	particular	object	(where	 ‘object’	 is	understood	in	the	 loosest	way	to	include	sound)	in	the	sense	that	if	the	so	described	features	of	an	object	were	 to	 change	 the	 aesthetic	 experience	 would	 also	 necessarily	 change.	 This	claim	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 identical	 objects	 can	 afford	 distinct	aesthetic	experiences,	but	 incompatible	with	 the	claim	that	distinct	objects	can	afford	 identical	 experiences.	 As	 an	 example,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 surface	 of	 an	object	 may	 appear	 different	 in	 colour	 in	 different	 light-conditions,	 but	 the	particular	pigmentation	of	the	surface	will	also	determine	its	colour-appearance	in	 all	 light-conditions.	 So	 while	 the	 surface	 can	 appear	 a	 range	 of	 different	colours	or	shapes	depending	on	the	light-conditions,	it	can	also	be	said	that	were	the	pigmentation	of	the	surface	to	be	changed,	its	colour-appearance	would	also	necessarily	change.	As	such,	the	colour-appearance	of	such	a	surface	supervenes	
on	its	pigmentation.	
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	It	 is	 important	to	make	this	supervenience	claim	because	I	have	argued,	 firstly,	that	an	externalist	view	that	does	not	take	aesthetic	experience	to	depend	on	the	perception	of	sound	is	incompatible	with	the	supervenience	claim	and,	secondly,	that	the	supervenience	claim	is	true.	As	such,	the	supervenience	claim	disputes	externalism	and	supports	internalism.			
4.7	The	attitude	of	disinterestedness:	Formalism.		It	 could	be	 argued	 that	 the	phenomenal	 view	assumes	 a	narrow	 conception	of	music,	 given	 that	 it	 advances	 a	 thesis	 on	 musical	 movement	 that	 proceeds	exclusively	 from	 matters	 concerning	 the	 internal	 relations	 and	 properties	 of	sounds	 (particularly	 when	 organised	 according	 to	 the	 tonal	 system)	 under	perception.	 This	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 narrow	 approach	 due	 to	 its	 rejection	 of	matters	concerning	context,	culture,	conceptual	narrative	and	any	other	feature	that	can	be	associated	with	the	experience	of	musical	movement	but	cannot	be	described	 in	 the	 aforementioned	 terms.	 I	will	 go	 on	 to	 describe	 how	 formalist	views	 emerged	 in	 the	 literature,	 their	 strengths	 and	 flaws	 and	 how	 a	phenomenal	 view	 that	 advances	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 viewpoint	 can	 be	distinguished	 from	 the	 strong	 version	 of	 formalism	 which	 I	 concede	 is	unworkable.		The	aesthetic	formalist	view	emerges	when	the	aesthetic	is	given	to	depend	on	a	particular	attitude	or	state	typically	described	as	disinterested.	When	taking	this	aesthetic	attitude,	other	mental	states	are	actively	suppressed	so	as	to	focus	on	the	 intrinsic	 perceptual	 aspects	 of	 sound.	 Such	 a	 conception	was	prominent	 in	the	 19th	 century	 following	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 who	 in	 the	 First	 Moment	 of	 the	
Critique	of	Judgement	argued	that	a	judgement	of	beauty	was	based	on	a	feeling	of	pleasure	 that	 is	peculiar	 for	neither	proceeding	 from	nor	 resulting	 in	desire	for	the	object.	While	this	treatment	distinguishes	aesthetic	judgment	from	other	forms–	 specifically	 judgments	 of	 the	 agreeable	 and	 of	 the	 good–	 Kant	 was	arguably	 more	 moderate	 in	 formalist	 inclination	 than	 were	 his	 immediate	
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successors.85	His	 distinction	 between	 free	 and	 dependent	 beauty,	 where	 the	latter	depends	on	the	object’s	adhering	to	a	particular	concept,	conflicts	with	the	stronger	 view	 proffered	 by	 Eduard	 Hanslick	 shortly	 after–	 as	 did	 Kant’s	favouring	of	the	dependent	beauty	of	poetics	and	consequent	demotion	of	music	to	 the	 lowest	 form	 of	 art	 (\§51–54).	 Hanslick	 (1854)	 exploited	 the	 notion	 of	disinterestedness	 to	 venerate	 the	 purest,	 most	 clearly	 non-representational	artform–	absolute	music–	although	some	have	noted	that	his	citing	of	movement–	an	 ostensibly	 extrinsic	 feature–	 as	 a	 defining	musically	 aesthetic	 characteristic	undermines	his	reputation	as	the	archetypal	music-formalist.86		The	strength	of	 the	conception	of	disinterestedness	 is	 that	 it	appears	 to	satisfy	the	desideratum	(A)	given	above:	an	experience	of	pure	 form,	void	of	any	real-world	concerns,	demarcates	 the	aesthetic	and	offers	a	characterisation	 thereof.	Indeed,	this	was	the	prime	motivation	behind	Clive	Bell’s	formalism	in	the	early	20th	century:		 What	quality	is	shared	by	all	objects	that	provoke	our	aesthetic	emotions?	What	 quality	 is	 common	 to	 Sta.	 Sophia	 and	 the	 windows	 at	 Chartres,	Mexican	 sculpture,	 a	 Persian	 bowl,	 Chinese	 carpets,	 Giotto’s	 frescoes	 at	Padua,	 and	 the	 masterpieces	 of	 Poussin,	 Piero	 della	 Francesca,	 and	Cezanne?	Only	one	answer	seems	possible–	significant	form.	In	each,	lines	and	colours	combined	in	a	particular	way,	certain	forms	and	relations	of	forms,	 stir	 our	 aesthetic	 emotions.	 These	 relations	 and	 combinations	 of	lines	 and	 colours,	 these	 aesthetically	 moving	 forms,	 I	 call	 "Significant	Form";	and	"Significant	Form"	is	the	one	quality	common	to	all	works	of	visual	art.	(1958:	417)		‘Significant	Form’	and	its	nature	as	a	common	aesthetic	feature	is	not	given	quite	the	depth	some	might	want	in	Bell’s	disquisition,	but	nonetheless	to	dismiss	this	point	 would	 be	 to	 beg	 the	 question	 of	 what	 the	 grounding	 features	 of	 the	aesthetic	could	be.																																																									85	See	Zangwill	2005.	86	See	Hamilton	2007:	81-9.	
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	Bell,	 and	 arguably	 Hanslick,	 are	 proponents	 of	 a	 strong	 version	 of	 formalism,	which	prescribes	that	all	aesthetically	relevant	features	of	a	piece	of	music	can	be	understood	 solely	 in	 terms	 of	 that	 piece’s	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties,	where,	in	the	case	of	music,	immediately	perceivable	properties	are	exemplified	as	pitch,	 timbre,	 loudness	and	duration,	and	the	more	complex	properties	from	which	these	derive	such	as	melody,	harmony,	rhythm,	and	dynamics	(De	Clercq	2011.)	Formalism	so	conceived	seems	combatable	with	a	phenomenal	view	that	accounts	 for	 aesthetic	 experience	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 internal	 relations	 and	properties	of	sounds	as	perceived.	However,	one	use	of	the	supervenience	thesis	wrought	above	is	that	it	distinguishes	a	phenomenal	view	from	a	formalist	view	that	 is	 reductive:	 a	 strong	 formalism	 views	 aesthetic	 experience	 as	 dependent	
only	 on	 immediately	 perceivable	 features,	 while	 the	 variety	 of	 aesthetic	experiences	 that	 are	 afforded	 the	 same	 object	 (by	 the	 same	 individual	 or	 by	multiple	 subjects)	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 differing	 abilities	 of	 the	 subject(s)	 to	understand	or	access	such	features.	To	understand	this	difference	it	is	felicitous	to	consider	the	most	important	argument	against	strong	formalism.		It	is	no	coincidence	that	many	of	the	theorists	that	expounded	strong	formalism	were	also	critics–	Bell	and	Hanslick	both	wrote	as	critics	and	as	such	their	views	were	likely	moulded	by	the	contemporaneous	art	culture.	As	modernism	became	established	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 formalism	 no	 longer	 accommodated	 the	prevailing	 art	 culture;	 indeed	 certain	 critiques	 might	 suggest	 that	 it	 never	completely	 accommodated	 any	 art	 culture.	 With	 his	 paper	 Categories	 of	 Art	(1970),	 Kendall	 Walton	 helped	 refine	 the	 position	 that	 any	 experience	 of	 the	aesthetic	is	shaped	by	prior	experience	and	enculturation.		When	 presented	 with	 the	 bust	 of	 a	 Roman	 emperor,	 it	 is	 only	 preeminent	knowledge	 of	 busts	 that	 draws	 focus	 towards	 the	 expression	 of	 the	 man	 it	represents–	like	his	world-wearied	brow	and	upward	glance.	Without	such	pre-eminence	the	prominent	features	of	the	bust	might	rather	be	the	severing	of	the	body	 below	 the	 chest,	 the	 lack	 of	 colouring	 and	 the	 character	 of	 complete	
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stillness.	Walton	gave	this	example	as	evidence	that	representational	properties	are	basic	determinants	of	aesthetic	character.		 The	bust’s	uniform	color,	motionlessness,	and	abrupt	ending	at	the	chest	are	standard	properties	relative	to	the	category	of	busts,	and	since	we	see	it	as	a	bust	they	are	standard	for	us.	(1970:	345)		Were	it	not	for	the	perceiver’s	acquaintance	with	these	properties,	he	would	not	perceive	 the	 object	 appropriately,	 since	 there	 are	 no	 immediately	 perceptible	properties	that	will	instruct	the	perceiver	as	to	the	appropriate	interpretation	of	a	 bust.	 Aesthetic	 experiences	 are	 category-based,	 inasmuch	 as	 the	 category	under	which	an	object	falls	determines	the	experience	of	it.	Walton	concedes	that	‘paintings	and	sonatas	are	 to	be	 judged	solely	on	what	can	be	seen	or	heard	 in	them—when	they	are	perceived	correctly.	But	examining	a	work	with	the	senses	can	by	itself	reveal	neither	how	it	is	correct	to	perceive	it,	nor	how	to	perceive	it	that	way”	(1970:	367).		This	argument	was	further	advanced	by	Arthur	Danto	and	now	has	widespread	support.87	As	Danto	showed	with	examples	of	Warhol’s	Brillo	boxes	and	Marcel	Duchamp’s	 “Readymades”,	 the	 state	 of	 the	 art-world	 did	 not	 support	 the	formalist	 picture.88	The	 Brillo	 boxes	 Warhol	 first	 exhibited	 as	 artworks	 are	identical	 to	 those	 that	 could	 be	 bought	 in	 a	 store,	 but	 considered	 art	 in	 one	instance	and	not	the	other.	The	received	aesthetic	legitimacy	of	such	conceptual	works	implied	that	aesthetic	value	can,	and	invariably	does,	operate	free	from	its	object.		If	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 is	 to	 be	 defended,	 this	 fact	 that	 any	 aesthetic	 feature	 is	determined	 by	 the	 category	 under	 which	 it	 is	 placed	 must	 reconcile	 with	 the	notion	that	aesthetic	features	are	determined	by	sound.	The	claim	that	aesthetic	experience	is	determined	by	immediately	perceivable	features	can	be	separated	from	 the	 claim	 that	 experiencing	 an	 artwork	 appropriately	 depends	 on																																																									87	Zangwill	2001	is	a	notable	exception.	88	See	Danto	1981,	94–95;	Danto	1986	30–31;	Danto	1997,	91;	and	Shelley	2015	for	review.	
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categorising	 it	 appropriately	 by	 considering	 the	 latter	 a	 trivial	 truth	 that	 is	applicable	 to	 all	 experiences.	 Consider	 that	 a	 formalism	 that	 rejects	 category-based	experience	would	describe	a	practice	of	high	obscurity,	virtually	without	precedent	 outside	 aesthetics.	 In	 what	 instance	 might	 I	 have	 a	 conscious	experience	 of	 an	 object	 that	 cannot	 be	 subsumed	 under	 a	 variety	 of	 different	categories?	I	might	consider	pine	an	excellent	material	to	construct	a	wardrobe	but	a	poor	material	with	which	to	construct	shoes,	unless	I	lived	in	the	Southern	Netherlands	where	clogs	are	an	acceptable	piece	of	fashion-wear.		A	set	of	knives	in	a	kitchen	may	appear	civilised	while	the	same	set	carried	about	a	person	may	seem	 barbaric.	 When	 an	 object	 is	 subsumed	 under	 a	 different	 category–	furniture/clothing;	utensil/weapon;	commodity/artwork–	the	value	of	the	object	alters,	and	this	must	be	true	of	all	things.	The	category	under	which	the	object	is	placed	determines	the	scope	of	its	value.		A	 formalism	so	extreme	as	 to	 insist	on	a	singular	all-encompassing	category	of	art	 would	 be	 plainly	 false,	 but	 this	 does	 no	 violence	 to	 the	 position	 that	 the	musically	aesthetic	has	 its	basis	 in	 the	 formal	qualities	of	sound	and	that	 these	qualities	 determine	 the	 aesthetic.	 The	 value	 a	 perceived	 object	 supports	 is	contingent	 on	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 perceiver,	 and	 musical	 artworks	 are	 not	insulated	 from	 this,	 as	 deeply	 personal,	 humanistic	 artefacts.89	If	 the	 perceiver	has	 no	 prior	 experience	 of,	 say,	 minimalist	 music,	 she	 may	 be	 confused	 on	hearing	‘Tabula	Rasa’	by	Arvo	Part,	given	that	it	presents	the	instrumentation	of	a	 symphony	 but	 employs	 repetitive	 ideas	 and	 intricate	 thematic	 development	without	 the	 large	 scale	 form	or	 harmonic	 depth	 of	 a	 sonata.	Her	 experience	 is	determined	by	the	style-related	categories	under	which	she	places	‘Tabula	Rasa’.	However,	the	point	that	aesthetic	experience	is	determined	by	listener	attitude	is	entirely	 compatible	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 aesthetic	 experience	 supervenes	 on	immediately	 perceivable	 properties.	 Aesthetic	 experiences	 of	 Tabula	 Rasa	will	differ	 depending	 on	whether	 the	 listener	 is	 aware	 of	 serialism,	 or	 knows	 that	Arvo	Part	has	been	the	most	performed	living	composer	in	recent	years,	or	that	he	was	 trained	 in	 Soviet	 controlled	 Estonia;	 but	 aesthetic	 experience	will	 also																																																									89	This	is	not	to	make	any	commitment	to	either	a	uniquely	aesthetic	or	disinterested	attitude.	‘Attitude’	above	is	not	characterized	in	terms	of	being	interested	or	disinterested	or	as	uniquely	aesthetic.	
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differ	 if	 in	 the	opening	bar	 the	 first	 violin	played	B5	 instead	of	A6,	usurping	an	octave	equivalence	to	the	second	violin	with	a	compound	maj7	interval.		Having	heard	‘Tabula	Rasa’,	the	listener	might	seek	out	the	music	of	Steve	Reich,	Phillip	Glass	and	Terry	Riley,	 after	which	she	could	better	 recognise	 the	subtle	changes	 in	 Part’s	 simple	 melodies	 and	 the	 driving,	 powerful	 quality	 of	 the	repetition.	This	fresh	experience	relies	in	part	on	appropriate	enculturation–	i.e.	knowledge	of	a	style–	but	such	enculturation	also	allows	appreciation	of	the	finer	formal	 details	 of	 the	 piece.	 When	 an	 object	 is	 supplanted	 from	 the	 mundane	everyday	to	the	artworld,	as	in	Warhol’s	Brillo	boxes,	its	altered	value	is	a	result	of	 the	 altered	 attitude	 with	 which	 it	 is	 approached.	 As	 shown	 by	 John	 Cage’s	‘silent’	 pieces	 (I	 use	quotation	marks	because	 the	point	 of	 said	pieces	were,	 of	course,	 that	 they	 could	 not	 be	 silent	 in	 the	 real	 world),	 all	 art	 depends	 on	listeners	bringing	a	particular	attitude.	The	argument	to	consider	is	whether	this	practice	 of	 treating-as-art	 is	 itself	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 aesthetic.	 Under	 normal	circumstances	 we	 proceed	 under	 a	 network	 of	 background	 assumptions	concerning	 relationships,	 context,	 standard,	 etc.,	 all	 of	 which	 narrow	 our	attention.	 These	 background	 assumptions	 are	 exemplified	 by	 the	 standard	aspects	 of	 a	 bust	 to	 which	Walton	 refers	 along	 with	 elements	 of	 style	 within	music,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 range	 of	 differing	 responses	 such	 background	 allows	 that	motivates	the	attack	on	formalism	that	swelled	through	the	20th	Century.	But	if	we	conceive	 this	background	 framework	as	a	perceptual	attitude	rather	 than	a	constituent	 of	 the	 artwork,	 akin	 to	 the	 separation	 made	 between	 everyday	objects	 and	 the	 categories	 under	 which	 they	 are	 placed,	 then	 we	 arrive	 at	 a	feasible	sense	of	formalism.		It	 is	worth	noting	another	way	of	making	the	anti-formalist	argument,	given	by	Gary	Iseminger,	who	relates	the	applications	of	formalism	with	its	origins:		 [Formalists]	must	have	some	reply	to	theorists	who	suggest	that	the	very	idea	of	the	aesthetic	as	it	is	understood	by	contemporary	philosophers	is	a	creation	of	the	eighteenth-century	European	bourgeois	Enlightenment…	and	to	anthropologists	who	find	it	highly	problematic	that	people	in	non-
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Western	 or	 pre-literate	 or	 pre-historic	 societies	 have	 anything	 like	 the	same	 kind	 of	 experience	 that	 we	 contemporary	 Westerners	characteristically	have	when	we	attend	to	works	of	art.	(2003:	106-7)		Listening	 for	 form	 does	 not	 necessarily	 originate	 with	 the	 Western	 Aesthetic	Enlightenment,	 however.	 It	 has	 been	 claimed	 that	 a	 disinterested	 attitude	 has	been	 a	 facet	 of	 art	 appreciation	 since	 the	 ancient	 Greeks.90	It	 could	 also	 be	queried	why	music's	aesthetic	value	should	be	bound	up	with	time	and	place	in	this	way–	an	indication	that	aesthetic	value	is	being	identified	with	the	cultural	component	of	the	music.	But	there	are	cross-cultural	musical	universals,	and	the	point	has	often	been	made	that	all	known	human	cultures	have	music.91	Perhaps	most	 significantly:	 Iseminger’s	 argument	 would	 appear	 immediately	 fallacious	were	its	subject	some	other	non-aesthetic	human	discovery	or	advancement.	No	physicist	would	seriously	claim	that	sub-atomic	particles	did	not	and	do	not	exist	outside	 of	 Western	 culture	 in	 the	 20th	 century–	 the	 culture	 that	 wrought	 the	theory.			
4.8	Summary.		In	the	above	I	argued	that	any	sense	of	formalism	that	rejects	the	role	of	listener	attitude	 is	 indefensible.	 Any	 experience	 of	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 must	 be	determined	by	 the	attitude	of	 the	 listener,	 just	as	 in	any	other	experience.	The	version	of	formalism	vulnerable	to	the	arguments	from	Walton	and	Danto	is	that	which	describes	 form	as	 the	 sole	 determinant	 of	 aesthetic	 value.	Above	 I	 have	argued	an	internalist	view,	describing	the	musically	aesthetic	as	determined	by	immediately	 perceivable	 properties	 of	 sound,	 but	 this	 view	 also	 concedes	 that	the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 determined	 by	 factors	 beyond	 the	 perceivable	properties	 of	 sound.	What	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 can	 take	 from	 formalist	 views,	however,	 is	 that	 the	musically	aesthetic	can	be	defined	 in	 terms	of	attention	to	immediately	perceivable	properties.																																																									90	Hamilton	2007	chpt.	1.	91	See	Stevens	and	Byron	2009.	
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	At	the	outset	of	this	chapter	I	gave	two	desiderata	or	conditions	for	a	theory	of	aesthetic	experience	to	satisfy	in	order	to	be	successful–	(A) that	the	explanandum	is	distinguished	as	the	property	or	thing	that	it	is	(B) that	the	explanandum	is	accounted	for	in	non-circular	terms.	A	 formalist	 view	 can	 satisfy	 the	 first	 of	 these	 desiderata	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	notion	 of	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties	 (unpacked	 above.)	 The	 musically	aesthetic	can	be	distinguished	as	 the	 thing	 that	 it	 is	by	appealing	 to	 the	notion	that	 an	 experience	 is	 characterized	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 immediately	 perceivable	properties	 of	 sound–	 or	 the	 tonal	 system,	 as	 is	 typically	 assumed.	 This	 is	 a	strength	 of	 the	 formalist	 viewpoint.	 However,	 any	 formalist	 approach	 that	conflates	 ‘form’	 with	 ‘musical	 elements’	 will	 not	 satisfy	 (B),	 since	 it	 is	 a	consequence	 of	 this	 view	 that	 ‘form’	 will	 be	 understood	 as	 insulated	 from	 all	non-musical	things	that	could	possibly	be	used	to	explain	it.	The	work	of	the	next	section	 is	 to	 suitably	 extend	 the	 notion	 of	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties	beyond	 this	 sense	 of	 form	 and	 thus	 define	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 musically	aesthetic.			
4.9	Acousmatic	listening	and	the	Abstractionist	Conception.		The	 acousmatic	 relates	 to	 the	 formal	 but	 is	 a	 looser	 and	 therefore	 broader	characterisation.	Musical	form,	as	noted	above,	is	understood	in	terms	of	musical	elements	such	as	harmony,	pitch,	etc.	In	other	words,	the	notion	of	musical	form	bottoms	out	at	 the	 concept	of	 tones:	discrete	 sound-events	 specifically	ordered	about	the	frequency-spectrum.	The	notion	of	the	acousmatic	does	not	share	this	constraint:		 Let’s	say	I	am	walking	in	the	woods	and	hear	a	creaking	sound	above	me.	An	acousmatic	response	would	be	“That’s	a	very	interesting	high-pitched	sound,	intermittent	and	rising	in	intensity”…	A	non-acousmatic	response,	in	 contrast,	might	 simply	 be	 to	 look	 up,	 while	 thinking,	 “Is	 that	 branch	about	to	topple	onto	me?”	(Hamilton	2007:	102)	
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	To	 attend	 to	 the	 acoustic	 properties	 of	 sound	 at	 the	 exclusion	 of	 real	 causes	would	be	to	attend	to	just	whatever	parts	of	the	sonic	array	can	be	perceptually	distinguished.	This	 then	 suggests	a	broader	notion	of	 ‘immediately	perceivable	properties’	that	does	not	refer	to	musical	elements.	Recourse	to	the	acousmatic	can	 thus	 be	 useful	 in	 giving	 a	 characterisation	 of	 musical	 listening	 as	 being	determined	 by	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties	 while	 not	 presupposing	musical	elements.		The	 term	 is	 associated	 with	 Pierre	 Schaeffer	 and	 the	 Modernist	 movement,	denoting	 a	 listening	 practice	 where	 acoustic	 qualities	 are	 favoured	 over	 the	literal	 origins	 of	 sounds.	 To	 listen	 acousmatically	 is	 to	 veil	 real-world	 causes	from	consciousness	and	attend	only	 to	 intrinsic	properties	of	 sound.	While	 the	acousmatic	was	 tied	 to	 art	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 electronic	music	 and	musique	
concrete	 in	 the	 20th	 Century,	 the	 term	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 ancient	 Greece	 and	
akousmatikoi–	an	ancient	term	used	to	refer	to	a	school	of	Pythagorean	thought.	Pythagoras	 is	 alleged	 to	 have	 given	 lectures	 from	 behind	 a	 screen,	 occluding	himself	so	that	his	students	could	focus	only	on	the	words	he	spoke	and	not	the	speaker–	 akousmatikoi	 translating	 as	 ‘those	 willing	 to	 hear’	 (Hamilton	 2007:	100.)	 Many	 centuries	 later,	 advances	 in	 sound	 recording	 techniques	 provided	another	 means	 to	 occlude	 sound	 sources	 and	 thus	 to	 ‘return	 to	 an	 ancient	tradition…	 restoring	 to	 hearing	 alone	 the	 entire	 responsibility	 of	 hearing	 a	perception	ordinarily	leaning	on	other	sensory	evidence.’92		It	 is	important	to	note	that	both	the	example	of	recorded	sound	and	of	a	sound	source	being	occluded	by	a	screen	present	the	acousmatic	as	a	way	of	 listening	that	 is	 forced	upon	 the	 listener:	 in	 each	 case	 the	 sources	 and/or	 causes	 of	 the	sounds	 are	 not	 available	 to	 the	 listener,	 ensuring	 that	 only	 the	 sounds	themselves	 can	 be	 attended	 to.	 The	 practice	 of	 listening	 to	 a	 concealed	 sound	source	implies	that	the	causal	origins	are	hidden;	sound	recording	can	be	hailed	as	a	particularly	efficacious	means	to	realise	the	acousmatic,	due	to	its	technical	capacity	 to	 dissociate	 sound	 from	 its	 source.	 This	 then	 is	 a	 strict	 sense	 of																																																									92	Schaeffer	1966:	91;	found	in	Hamilton	2007.	
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acousmatic	as	‘listening	without	seeing’.	However,	another	looser	sense	has	been	given	by	Scruton	(1999),	according	to	which	the	tacit	detachment	of	real	causes	is	a	necessary	and	basic	aspect	of	music	 listening,	one	 that	obtains	whether	or	not	 real	 causes	 are	 evident.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 2,	 Scruton	 envisages	 a	metaphorical	 sound-world	 where	 virtual	 causes	 and	 forces	 play	 out	 amongst	tones,	 breathing	 life	 into	 sound	 through	 musical	 organisation.	 This	 treatment	might	 seem	 to	 broaden	 the	 acousmatic	 by	 omitting	 any	 practical	 constraint	 in	favour	 of	 the	 intentional	 constraint	 that	 sound	 is	 ‘heard	 “apart	 from”	 the	everyday	physical	world’.93	If	acousmatic	listening	depended	only	on	bringing	a	particular	 intentional	 attitude,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mode	 of	 listening	 pertinent	 to	soundscape,	 musique	 concrete,	 tonal	 and	 atonal	 music	 alike.	 However,	 the	acousmatic	is	reserved	exclusively	for	cases	of	musical	organization	in	Scruton’s	(1999)	 view,	 where	 ‘musical’	 denotes	 that	 belonging	 to	 the	 Western	 tonal	tradition,	 although	 he	 does	 acknowledge	 a	 music-independent	 acousmatic	experience	in	later	work	(2009).94		The	concept	of	the	acousmatic	that	can	help	elucidate	a	phenomenal	view	does	not	 have	 the	 condition	 either	 that	 acousmatic	 listening	 is	 reserved	 for	musical	tones,	or	that	it	is	‘listening	without	seeing’,	although	I	concede	that	acousmatic	listening	does	entail	bringing	a	particular	intentional	attitude	of	detaching	sound	from	 its	 sources–	 such	 detachment	 is	 necessary	 for	 nonconceptual	 perception.	This	 notion	 of	 acousmatic	 can	 be	 considered	 an	 element	 of	 the	 Modernist	critique	of	prevailing	artistic	standards;	by	engaging	with	‘acoustical’	rather	than	‘musical’	 qualities,	 Modernist	 composers	 could	 lay	 claim	 to	 an	 artform	whose	borders	 stretch	 just	 as	 far	 as	 the	 sensory	modality	 in	 which	 it	 is	 grounded.	95	Much	of	the	justification	of	John	Cage’s	music	came	from	his	exploration	of	this	freedom,	 his	 willingness	 ‘to	 let	 sounds	 be	 themselves	 rather	 than	 vehicles	 for																																																									93	Scruton	1999:	19,	emphasis	added.	94	Hamilton	points	out	a	further	notion	of	acousmatic–	‘listening	without	knowing	the	cause’	(2007:	101).	95	However	an	interpretation	of	acousmatic	listening	that	includes	experiences	of	musical	movement	diverges	from	that	made	by	Schaeffer,	who	considers	a	sense	of	movement	as	being	not	an	aspect	of	the	sounds	themselves,	but	rather	a	perceptual	effect	of	the	sonic	materials.	For	Schaeffer,	the	listening	attitude	adopted	should	be	suppressive	of	such	effects.	Scruton’s	view	is	distinct	in	that	he	suggests	listeners	‘spontaneously	detach’	sounds	from	information	about	their	respective	real-world	causes.		
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man-made	 theories	 or	 expressions	 of	 human	 sentiments.’96	The	 irony	 of	 this	critique	 is	 that	 the	 Modernist	 celebration	 of	 the	 acoustic	 has	 at	 its	 heart	 the	traditional	aesthetic	notion	of	disinterestedness	where	purpose	is	subjugated	to	intrinsic	 quality:	 ‘To	 be	 interested	 in	 Satie	 one	must	 be	 disinterested	 to	 begin	with,	accept	that	a	sound	is	a	sound	and	a	man	is	a	man’	(Cage	1961:	81)	It	could	be	argued	 that	 acousmatic	 listening	has	a	 transformative	power	 to	enlarge	 the	aesthetic	significantly,	promising	that	music	can	obtain	in	any	sonic	form.		There	is	thus	a	danger	here	that	the	acousmatic	conception	merely	reiterates	the	Kantian	conception	of	the	disinterested	aesthetic	attitude,	and	as	such	it	is	worth	making	 absolutely	 clear	 the	 differences.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 acousmatic	provides	a	useful	means	of	denoting	a	particular	 listening	attitude,	pertinent	to	aesthetics,	whose	primary	characterization	is	in	terms	of	sound	rather	than	the	musically	aesthetic.	The	reasons	for	the	acousmatic	lacking	the	association	with	the	 aesthetic	 that	 the	 formal	 has	 relate	 in	 part	 to	 distinct	 lineage,	 with	 the	acousmatic	being	formulated	without	reference	to	art	or	the	aesthetic,	and	being	appropriated	by	Modernists	who	endeavored	 to	oppose	 the	hegemonic	 system	that	had	developed	since	the	enlightenment	and,	particularly,	Kant’s	framework.	But	perhaps	 the	 clearest	way	 to	distinguish	 the	acousmatic	 is	by	noting	 that	 it	makes	no	assumptions	of	value	or	pleasure,	central	 to	the	 judgement	of	beauty,	and	as	such	clouds	the	line	between	the	aesthetic–	which	must	have	some	value	component	 (even	 if	 not	 a	 pleasurable	 one)–	 and	 the	 merely	 perceptual.	 It	 is	perhaps	this	character	that	 for	Scruton	suggests	the	acousmatic	as	proto-music,	entailing	 the	 pertinent	 intentional	 attitude	 if	 not	 the	 organization	 that	 brooks	
value.		Indeed,	without	 the	 tonal	 framework,	 the	meaning	of	 sound	sources	or	artistic	precedence,	there	are	no	obvious	means	to	assign	value	to	the	acoustic	qualities	of	 sound,	 leading	 to	 Cage’s	 conjecture	 that	 there	 are	 no	 ugly	 sounds.	 The	 next	chapter	deals	with	value	in	detail,	although	it	is	apt	to	consider	Cage’s	claim	here	in	order	to	suitably	expand	on	the	notion	of	the	acousmatic	and	thus	indicate	the	boundaries	 of	 music	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 imposes.	 Acousmatic	 in	 the	 relevant																																																									96	Cage	(1961:	12.)	
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sense	 is	 merely	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	 acoustic	 coupled	 with	 ignorance	 of	 the	causal.	 I	 will	 attempt	 to	 show	 that	 acousmatic	 listening	 in	 this	 sense	 has	 the	potential	for	value	without	reliance	on	musical	elements	such	as	tones.		Many	 soundscapes	 might	 offer	 valued	 acousmatic	 experience	 due	 to	 their	richness	 and	 balance;	 consider	 for	 example	 a	 busy	 London	 coffee	 shop.	 One	might	hear	the	broken	rhythm	of	footsteps	panning	across	both	axes	as	a	waiter	moves	 between	 tables;	 the	 clinking	 of	 crockery	 as	 he	 clears;	 the	 scraping	 of	chairs	 and	 a	 slamming	 door;	 the	 whirring	 coffee	 machine	 and	 bubbling	 milk	frother;	the	distinct	hums	of	the	air-conditioner	and	fridge	combining	as	one	and	passing	 traffic–	 high-frequencies	 attenuated	 by	 the	 glazing–	 presenting	 as	infinitely	 variable	 waves	 of	 white	 noise;	 the	 room	 filled	 with	 conversations,	perhaps	 in	a	number	of	different	 languages,	 each	of	which	employing	different	vocal	 ranges	 and	 timbres	 along	 with	 individual	 dynamic-/pitch-contours;	 and	underlying	 it	 all	 is	 the	bed	of	 familiar	pop	music,	 tinnily	 sounding	out	 from	an	inexpensive	sound	system.	Such	a	scene	has	great	complexity	and	intricacy,	with	a	 range	 of	 sound	 sources,	 many	 of	 which	 are	 constantly	 traversing	 space;	 a	listener	is	active	in	this	spatial	complexity,	holding	the	potential	to	substantially	alter	the	phenomenology	of	the	scene	just	by	moving	her	head	towards	or	away	from	particular	sources.		It	seems	reasonable	that	one’s	attention	might	be	absorbed	by	this	soundscape,	but	 not	 out	 of	 desire	 for	 its	 sources,	 nor	 intellectual	 curiosity,	 nor	 its	musicological	 ingenuity.	Consider	 that	 the	words	used	 to	summarise	 the	above	experience	 are	 apt	 to	 describe	 an	 aesthetic	 object:	 ‘intricacy’,	 ‘complexity’,	‘richness’,	 ‘balance’.	 These	 are	 pervasive	 words	 in	 aesthetics,	 while	 still	 being	definable	without	 reference	 to	 aesthetics.	 Such	 a	 soundscape,	 then,	 completely	lacks	 the	order	of	 the	 tonal	 system	but	might	nonetheless	be	granted	aesthetic	credibility.	 However,	 while	 such	 an	 aesthetic	 experience	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 the	tonal	system,	it	nonetheless	depends	on	a	particular	order	of	elements:	if	a	baby	on	 the	 next	 table	 starts	 to	 cry	 loudly,	 attention	would	 be	 interrupted	 and	 the	value	 of	 the	 experience	 duly	 altered,	 just	 as	 it	 would	 if	 the	 pop	 music	 were	played	 so	 loud	 that	 the	 speakers	 resonate,	 or	 it	 so	 happened	 that	 all	
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conversations	ceased	but	one	and	attention	was	thus	drawn	to	 its	content.	The	experience’s	 potential	 for	 value	 is	 in	 fact	 delicately	 poised,	 mediated	 by	 the	acoustic	properties	of	the	soundscape.	A	complex	non-tonal	aesthetic	experience	depends	 on	 balance,	 variety	 and	 change,	 just	 as	 does	 a	 tonal	 aesthetic	experience,	 and	 these	 qualities	 are	 understood	 by	 invocation	 of	 acoustic	properties.	A	crying	baby	can	spoil	 the	experience	 just	because	 it	 is	a	sound	of	high	intensity	at	a	high	frequency.		There	are	no	reasons	to	suppose	this	experience	of	a	London	coffee	shop	cannot	be	 fully	 rendered	 in	 psycho-acoustic	 terms,	 and	 that	 the	 value	 of	 such	 an	experience	 cannot	 be	 described	 using	 terms	 that	 aestheticians	 use	 to	 ascribe	value.	 The	 distinction	 here	 is	 that	 the	 potential	 for	 such	 a	 soundscape	 to	 be	valuable	cannot	be	explained	using	a	musicological	analysis	in	terms	of	musical	elements,	 but	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 psycho-acoustic	 properties.	 The	musically	 aesthetic,	 then,	 depends	 on	 (i)	 bringing	 an	 acousmatic	 attitude	 to	sound,	where	real-world	causes	and	sources	are	ignored,	(ii)	finding	a	value	that	depends	on	an	ordering	of	psycho-acoustic	properties	that	(iii)	can	be	described	using	terms	that	have	utility	in	aesthetic	description.	This	invites	the	question	of	what	 relation	 (iii)–	 description	 in	 terms	 normally	 used	 to	 denote	 aesthetic	value–	truly	has	to	value,	but	this	is	a	question	for	the	next	chapter.			
4.10	Claiming	the	Acousmatic	as	Internalist.		Hamilton	 subsumes	 formalism,	 autonomy	 and	 acousmatic	 listening	 under	 the	‘abstractionist	position’	(see	chapter	3):	‘[t]his	position	detaches	music	from	the	world,	making	it	the	most	abstract	of	the	arts–	a	pure	“art	of	tones”’	(2007:	95.)	As	 mentioned	 previously,	 his	 use	 of	 ‘abstractionist’	 parallels	 the	 meaning	 of	‘abstract’	in	this	thesis,	referring	to	a	domain	that	exists	without	a	time	or	place.	Scruton	also	 endorses	 this	 view,	where	 acousmatic	 listening	 is	 taken	 to	be	 the	perception	 of	 properties	 that	 obtain	 in	 an	 abstract	 domain,	 external	 to	 the	listening	subject.	Such	a	view	is	partly	a	consequence	of	the	assumption	made	by	both	 that	 the	 pertinent	 properties	 are	musical	 elements,	 bottoming	 out	 at	 the	
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level	of	tones	(which	are	thus	assumed	to	be	abstract	objects).	However,	I	have	made	 the	contrary	claim	here	 that	 the	acousmatic,	and	 indeed	a	weak	sense	of	formalism,	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 internalist	 and	 dependent	 on	 the	 act	 of	perception.		On	 Hamilton’s	 view,	 the	 acousmatic	 and	 the	 formal	 can	 be	 cast	 as	 somewhat	distinct	expressions	of	the	abstract	model,	and	much	literature	since	Walton	can	be	seen	to	push	back	against	 this	model	 to	reaffirm	music	as	a	human	artefact.	The	prevailing	assumption	that	ostensibly	intrinsic	aspects	of	sound	and	tone	are	abstract	 forms	 may	 reflect	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 work-concept	 and	 the	 resultant	idealisation	 of	 the	 score	 that	 took	hold	 through	 the	18th	 and	19th	 centuries,	 as	Hamilton	 notes	 (2007:	 113.)	 Form	 is	 concretized	 by	 the	 score,	 allowing	 the	artwork	a	definitive	article	to	which	all	instances	of	performance	and	experience	refer.	 It	 is	 the	divorce	 from	 real	world	 truths	 that	 bore	 the	 artwork	 that	 leads	formalists	 and	modernists	 alike	 to	 the	 significant	 claim	of	 a	 distinct	domain	 of	relative	autonomy.	Music	listening	is	described	as	engagement	with	a	particular,	
sui	generis,	 set	 of	 rules	 and	properties	 that	 do	 not	 extend	 beyond	 the	musical.	The	 assumption	 that	 acousmatic	 and	 formal	 listening	 accords	with	 an	 abstract	model	 can	 be	 challenged	 by	 denying	 that	 the	 ostensibly	 intrinsic	 aspects	 of	sound	or	tone	evidence	aesthetic-specific	domains	of	sound	or	tone.	Were	it	not	for	the	Western	propensity	to	think	in	terms	of	work-concepts,	it	may	seem	quite	a	leap	to	make	this	move	from	intrinsic	qualities	to	abstract	domains.		The	 comparison	 with	 words	 is	 instructive.	 A	 particular	 word	 has	 a	 particular	meaning,	a	meaning	that	is	shared	amongst	a	people,	that	is	not	contained	by	the	word	itself	but	 is	referred	to	by	 it.	 I	can	only	grasp	this	meaning	 if	 I	have	been	informed	 of	 it:	 I	 could	 not	 work	 out	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	 word	 just	 from	 its	appearance.	Say	the	word	is	CAT;	there	is	nothing	in	the	placement	of	pixels	on	the	screen	that	 is	shared	with	 the	appearance	of	a	cat,	nor	 is	 there	anything	 in	the	 sound	 of	 the	 utterance	 CAT	 that	 is	 shared	 by	 the	 sound	 of	 a	 cat.	 So	 to	understand	the	word	CAT	I	need	to	be	acquainted	with	the	meaning	of	the	word	and	have	been	informed	of	the	reference,	where	the	meaning	of	the	word	is	not	contained	 in	 any	 locality	 but	 is	 independent	 of	 time	 and	place,	 is	 abstract.	But	
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this	 is	 not	 all	 there	 is	 to	 the	 word	 CAT	 because	 there	 is	 also	 the	 particular	position	 of	 pixels	 on	 the	 screen.	 The	 type/token	 distinction	 was	 discussed	 in	chapter	1,	and	it	can	be	said	that	the	particular	pixels	on	the	screen	are	a	token	of	the	abstract	object	(meaning)	which	is	itself	a	type.	However,	this	is	inadequate	since	a	token	can	only	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	type,	so	to	describe	CAT	as	a	token	is	merely	to	describe	it	as	a	concrete	instantiation	of	a	type.	It	seems	there	is	something	more	to	the	word	CAT	than	its	role	in	referencing	a	meaning,	since	I	can	 perceive	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	word	without	 considering	 its	meaning.	 To	deny	 this	would	be	 to	deny	 that	CAT	has	an	appearance	at	all.	 If	 I	 can	have	an	experience	merely	with	the	appearance	of	the	word	CAT,	without	considering	its	meaning,	 then	 I	 am	 engaged	 in	 perception	 without	 being	 acquainted	 with	abstract	objects.	This	should	not	be	a	major	claim;	it	is	just	to	say	that	I	am	able	to	perceive	the	appearances	of	things.		The	 meaning	 of	 the	 word	 CAT	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 conceptual,	 while	 an	experience	 with	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 same	 word	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	nonconceptual.	 There	 are	 no	 reasons	 to	 assume	 that	 an	 experience	 with	 the	appearance	of	CAT	 is	 abstract:	 it	 is	 an	experience	 that	 is	 realised	by	 the	act	of	perception,	and	is	possible	because	we	can	perceive	appearances	independently	of	 the	meaning	 to	which	 they	refer.	A	phenomenal	view	construes	 the	 intrinsic	qualities	 of	 sound	 or	 tone	 as	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 phenomenon	 that	 can	 be	distinguished	 from	 the	 extrinsic	 qualities	 of	 sound	 or	 tone	 for	 being	nonconceptual.		The	 experience	 of	 the	 intrinsic	 can	 be	 elucidated	 on	 the	 phenomenal	 view.	Consider	the	following	corollaries	that	reflect	the	desiderata	set	out	above:	(1)	a	central	aspect	of	the	musically	aesthetic	–musical	movement–	can	be	understood	without	presupposing	the	musically	aesthetic–	by	reference	to	garden	perceptual	functions;	(2)	the	musically	aesthetic	is	determined	by	immediately	perceivable	properties,	where	these	properties	are	understood	as	nonconceptual.	But	these	have	 another	 significant	 consequence:	 the	 musically	 aesthetic,	 in	 being	determined	by	nonconceptual	perception,	is	experienced	as	intrinsic	to	music–	as	having	 no	 connections	 to	 things	 beyond	 itself.	 Insofar	 as	 an	 experience	 is	
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nonconceptual	 it	 will	 not	 present	 extrinsic	 connections	 to	 the	 experiencer;	 it	appears	 as	 an	 experience	 of	 intrinsic	 qualities,	 such	 as	 ‘the	 redness	 of	 red.’	Without	ascribing	concepts	 to	a	percept,	 an	experiencer	 cannot	 think	about	 its	relation	to	other	things–	i.e.	she	cannot	bring	to	bear	a	 language	(a	 language	of	thought	or	a	natural	language,	see	chapter	1.)	This	feature	of	a	phenomenal	view	can	thus	help	explain	why	musical	movement	is	explicable	in	non-musical	terms	while	it	is	experienced	as	intrinsic.		A	 key	 advantage	 to	 the	 phenomenal	 view,	 then,	 is	 that	 it	 can	 satisfy	 both	 the	intuition	that	aesthetic	features	are	intrinsic	to	music	and	the	explanatory	goal	to	provide	an	account	of	the	musically	aesthetic	in	non-circular	terms.	In	entailing	nonconceptual	 perception,	 musically	 aesthetic	 experience	 represents	 nothing	conceptually	 to	 the	 experiencer,	 revealing	 no	 relations	 with	 the	 non-musical.	Conversely,	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 given	 a	 non-circular	 account	 on	 the	phenomenal	view	by	recourse	to	a	psycho-acoustic	conception.			
4.11	Amalgamating	 the	 humanist	 and	 abstract	 positions	 into	 a	
single	 view,	 and	 the	 relative	 value	 of	 the	 musically	
aesthetic.		Hamilton	does	not	acknowledge	the	internalist	view,	but	argues	that	the	abstract	model	 is	 too	 exclusive.	 His	 response	 is	 the	 ‘twofold	 thesis’,	 whereby	 intrinsic	properties	are	appreciated	alongside	extrinsic	properties	such	as	literal	causality	and	reference:	‘music	is	abstract	in	form	but	humane	in	utterance–	and	utterance	is	essential’	 (p.114.)	The	compromising	position	 is	a	persuasive	one,	but	 it	 is	a	compromise	based	on	a	problem	misconstrued	as	a	dilemma.	Form	need	not	be	conceived	as	abstract,	it	can	be	conceived	as	having	psychological	ground	and	as	such	being	in	the	world	as	an	aspect	of	psychology.	In	this	sense,	tones	have	not	been	designed	to	effect	their	own	autonomy;	they	have	been	designed	to	fulfil	a	certain	 psychological	 parameter,	 and	 their	 being	 stable	 and	 structured	 is	 a	reciprocation	of	 the	domain	 in	which	 they	operate	 (psychology).	This	 is	not	 to	
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suggest	that	tones	may	not	appear	to	exhibit	autonomy–	as	mentioned	above,	the	absence	 of	 pertinent	 reasons	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 form	 given	 to	 the	 listener	 can	suggest	 intrinsicality	 or	 autonomy–	 but	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 literal	causality	and	reference,	and	intrinsic	properties	is	one	pertaining	to	perception.	Literal	 causality	 and	 reference	 is	 experienced	 conceptually	 while	 intrinsic	properties	are	experienced	nonconceptually,	and	so	what	where	two	horns	of	a	dilemma	 can	 be	 cast	 as	 two	 interrelated	 modes	 of	 psychological	 engagement	with	sound.		I	argued	above	 that	 the	musically	aesthetic	 is	determined	both	by	 immediately	perceivable	properties	and	by	the	attitude	of	the	listener.	However,	a	critic	might	demand	clarification	of	precisely	what	this	means	in	terms	of	the	boundaries	of	the	aesthetic.	While	I	have	argued	a	view	of	the	musically	aesthetic	as	attention	
to	 immediately	 perceivable	 (sonic)	 properties,	 it	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	supervenience	thesis	and	the	argument	made	from	psychology	over	the	previous	chapters	 that	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 consists	 in	 psycho-acoustic	 properties,	which	 then	 implies	 that	 any	 references	 a	musical	 object	 has	 to	properties	 that	are	not	so	understood	must	be	taken	to	be	non-aesthetic.		This	might	 then	seem	a	 less	attractive	view	to	Hamilton’s	 twofold	thesis	 for	 its	failure	 to	 account	 for	 many	 phenomenologically	 salient	 features	 of	 musical	experience,	such	as	lyrics	or	socio-cultural	references.	However,	I	argue	that	the	musically	aesthetic	cannot	be	theoretically	demarcated	unless	the	term	is	used	to	refer	 to	 things	 that	 are	 independently	 musically	 aesthetic.	 And	 it	 seems	 that	lyrics	 or	 socio-cultural	 references	 are	 not	 independently	 musically	 aesthetic	given	 that	 if	 they	 were	 taken	 individually	 (apart	 from	 any	 ordered	 acoustic	background)	 they	would	 not	 be	musically	 aesthetic.	 Therefore	 I	 disagree	with	Hamilton	that	the	capacity	to	recognise	a	particular	instrument	as	that	particular	instrument	is	‘genuinely	musical,’	since	the	exercise	of	such	a	capacity	would	not	constitute	 musical	 experience.	 This	 can	 be	 shown	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 non-human	 things,	 like	 machines	 or	 animals,	 could	 demonstrate	 the	 capacity	 to	recognise	a	sound	as,	say,	a	piano,	while	such	things	will	not	be	having	musical	
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experience.	Relatedly,	were	lyrics	read	without	musical	accompaniment,	it	seems	they	would	not	be	experienced	as	musically	aesthetic.		Such	 a	 position	 would	 appear	 deeply	 unappealing	 to	 many,	 since,	 intuitively,	conceptual	 narratives	 like	 lyrics	 can	 be	 an	 integral	 aspect	 of	 a	 musical	experience;	indeed,	song	can	be	considered	a	musical	genre	in	its	own	right.	But	this	 objection	 rests	 on	 a	 particular	 presumed	 sense	 of	 ‘musical	 experience’.	‘Musical	 experience’	 is,	 evidently,	 a	vague	 term	 that	 could	 include	or	exclude	a	vast	 range	 of	 experiences	 depending	 on	 how	 it	 is	 intended.	 The	 two	 extremes	may	 be:	 	 (a)–	 all	 experience	 that	 can	 be	 related	 to	 an	 instance	 of	 listening	 to	music–	and	 (b)	 the	experiential	phenomenon	of	 sound	 that	 is	 ineliminable	and	sufficient	for	music	experience.	The	ostensible	danger	of	adopting	(b)	is	that	this	would	diminish	musical	 experience,	 permitting	 fewer	kinds	of	 experience	 than	music	 actually	 affords.	 This	 objection	 may	 stem	 from	 certain	 ideological	assumptions	 behind	 what	 the	 concept	 of	 music	 should	 capture.	 It	 would	 be	unsatisfying	to	believe	that	Wagner’s	distinctly	musical	genius	relates	only	to	the	formal	 aspects	of	his	operas;	 similarly,	 it	would	be	unsatisfying	 to	believe	 that	the	 socio-political	 commentary	 of	 Bob	 Dylan’s	 ‘Blowing	 in	 the	Wind’	 does	 not	contribute	to	its	value	as	music.		However,	it	is	reasonable	to	distinguish	the	‘musically	aesthetic’	(or	experiences	thereof)	from	‘musical	experience’,	and	to	allow	that	the	former	may	be	a	much	more	 exclusive	 term.	 Dissatisfaction	 with	 this	 distinction	 only	 arises	 if	proceeding	 under	 the	 hegemonic	 system	 associated	with	 Romantic	 composers	and	Absolute	music.	To	argue	a	view	where	the	musically	aesthetic	is	demarcated	from	extrinsic	aspects	of	music	 like	 lyrics	and	commentary	 is	not	 to	argue	that	the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 superior	 to	 such	 extrinsic	 aspects.	 The	 tendency	 to	ascribe	 the	 value-judgement	 follows	 from	 a	 hegemonic	 assumption	 about	 the	musically	aesthetic	that	is	completely	unsupported.		It	 may	 be	 that	 the	 prime	 focus	 of	 Frank	 Zappa’s	 ‘Magdalena’	 is	 the	 quick-fire	collage	 of	 perfectly	 executed	 musical	 ideas,	 approaching	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	rhythmic	complexity	with	an	ever-increasing	tempo.	Conversely,	a	listener	might	
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consider	the	highest	value	of	the	song	to	be	its	juxtaposition	of	music	and	lyric.	Magdalena	tells	a	story	of	 incestuous	sexual	abuse	over	a	musical	base	of	high-tempo	bouncing	bass-lines,	stylistic	clichés	and	exaggerated	falsetto	vocals.	This	narrative	certainly	affords	the	piece	a	far	more	powerful	effect,	since	the	jollity	of	the	music	encourages	the	listener	to	collude	with	the	abusive	father	who,	for	the	most	part	tells	the	story.	Eric	Clarke	calls	this	relation	between	music	and	lyrical	content	 subject-position,	 reinforcing	 the	 notion	 that	 musical	 elements	 can	interact	powerfully	with	conceptual	narrative.97	Whether	or	not	subject-position	is	a	wholly	aesthetic	concern	depends	on	whether	the	narrative	content	of	lyrics	is	taken	to	be	aesthetic.	The	view	given	here	is	that	such	content	is	not	aesthetic,	both	 for	 the	 supervenience	 argument	 above	 and	 also	 for	 the	 point	 that	 such	 a	narrative	would	 not	 have	 aesthetic	 value	 if	 it	were	 taken	 outside	 of	 a	musical	context.	 However,	 this	 only	 presents	 a	 problem	 if	 the	 aesthetic	 aspects	 of	 the	piece	 are	 considered	 autonomous,	 thus	making	 subject-position	 impossible;	 if,	conversely,	 the	 aesthetic	 features	 are	 understood	 as	 nonconceptual	 perceptual	features	it	is	clear	how	subject-position	can	obtain,	since	it	merely	indicates	the	kind	of	interrelation	between	conceptual	and	nonconceptual	features	that	is	apt	to	occur	in	everyday	perception.		The	 listener	 may	 adopt	 an	 attitude	 towards	 the	 narrative,	 the	 music	 or	 the	relation	 of	 the	 two	 and	nothing	 is	 taken	 away	 from	 the	 force	 of	 the	 statement	Zappa	 makes	 with	 his	 narrative	 structure	 by	 deeming	 it	 non-aesthetic.	 By	dismissing	 the	 concept	 of	 an	 aesthetic	 domain,	 the	 boundaries	 of	 music's	aesthetic	value	become	permeable.	The	mechanisms	by	which	music's	aesthetic	value	 emerges	 are	 identical	 to	 the	mechanisms	by	which	 all	 thought	 emerges–	those	 psychological	 processes	 responsible	 for	 engaging	 with	 stimuli.	 It	 is	possible	to	distinguish	the	aesthetic	as	nonconceptual	perception,	although	this	form	 of	 engagement	 inhabits	 the	 same	 domain	 as	 the	 practice	 of	 engaging	conceptually.	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 no	 implication	 that	 experiences	 ensuing	 from	intellectual	 endeavour	 with	 artworks	 should	 be	 less	 rewarding	 than	 those	ensuing	 from	purely	perceptual	 endeavour,	 just	 as	 there	 is	 no	 implication	 that	
																																																								97	Eric	Clarke	(2005).	
	 153	
these	 modes	 of	 perception	 might	 not	 interrelate	 or	 combine	 to	 enrich	experience.			
4.12	Conclusion.		To	 reiterate	 the	 desiderata	 set	 for	 conceptions	 of	 aesthetic	 experience	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 chapter:	 an	 account	 of	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 should	 (1)	distinguish	the	aesthetic	from	the	non-aesthetic	in	such	a	way	that	it	(2)	does	not	presuppose	the	aesthetic,	while	preserving	the	close	connection	between	art	and	the	aesthetic.		Boretz’s	externalist	approach	will	fail	to	make	any	distinction	between	aesthetic	and	non-aesthetic,	given	that	the	musically	aesthetic	is	understood	as	reducible	to	the	cultural,	social	or	theoretical	concepts	that	musically	aesthetic	objects	can	reference.	As	such,	it	is	unclear	how	the	musically	aesthetic	can	be	distinguished	from	 those	 same	 extrinsic	 references,	 and	 the	 supervenience	 argument	 that	acoustic	 properties	 determine	 the	 aesthetic	 prohibits	 such	 references	 being	identified	with	the	aesthetic.		While	 a	 strong	 formalist	 view	 that	 implies	 a	 musical	 or	 aesthetic	 domain	 can	distinguish	the	musically	aesthetic,	it	will	fail	to	account	for	it	in	a	way	that	does	not	 presuppose	 the	 musically	 aesthetic.	 Such	 a	 view	 can	 distinguish	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 in	 terms	of	 ‘significant	 form’,	 understood	as	 value	 found	 in	immediately	 perceivable	 properties,	 which	 in	 turn	 are	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	musical	 elements.	 However,	 this	 view	 cannot	 provide	 a	 non-circular	 account	given	that	 it	bottoms	out	at	 the	concept	of	 tones,	 implying	a	closed	musical	(or	musically	aesthetic)	domain.		In	 contrast	 to	 these	 externalist	 views,	 the	 phenomenal	 view	 offered	 here	 can	satisfy	 both	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 by	 ascribing	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 to	 psychological	processes.	 The	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 not	 reducible	 to	 extrinsic	 references,	contrary	 to	 Boretz,	 and	 is	 indeed	 determined	 by	 immediately	 perceivable	
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properties.	However,	these	properties	do	not	have	the	musicological	concept	of	tones	as	their	basis	but	rather	are	based	in	the	psycho-acoustic:	the	properties	of	sound	 as	 perceived.	 As	 such,	 this	 account	 broadens	 the	 aesthetic	 considerably	from	the	strong	formalist	picture,	in	accordance	with	a	conception	of	acousmatic	listening:	 attention	 to	 sound	 coupled	 with	 the	 occlusion	 or	 ignorance	 of	 the	causes	 and	 sources	 of	 sound.	 The	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 thus	 distinguished	 as	attention	to	immediately	perceivable	properties	of	sound	that	has	value,	and	this	account	 can	be	 given	without	 presupposing	 the	 aesthetic	 because	 immediately	perceivable	properties	are	understood	as	empirically	accessible	psycho-acoustic	properties.	 Finally:	 a	 close	 connection	 between	 art	 and	 the	 aesthetic	 is	maintained	 given	 that	 the	 particular	 value	 particular	 artworks	 have	 can	 be	supported	 by	 explicating	 their	 psycho-acoustic	 properties	 in	 terms	 of	conventional	aesthetic	evaluative	words	like	balance,	order	and	complexity.			
4.13	Summary.		An	extended	summary	using	the	sub-headings	above:	
	 –The	Meaning	of	Internalist/Externalist.	The	 terms	 internalist	and	 externalist	were	 introduced	 above	 to	 strengthen	 the	phenomenal	 argument	 by	 providing	 designations	 of	 broader	 views	 that	 are	implied	 respectively	 by	 phenomenal	 and	 abstract.	 Both	 Boretz’s	 cognitive	approach	 and	 Hamilton’s	 humanism	 exemplified	 externalist	 views	 that	 are	distinct	 from	 the	 abstract	 view	 by	 lacking	 any	 commitment	 to	 a	 specifically	musical	 domain.	 Further,	 Beardsley’s	 internalism	 lacks	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	psycho-acoustic	that	characterises	the	phenomenal	view.		A	debate	that	started	with	Dewey	but	developed	between	Beardsley	and	Dickie	was	 used	 to	 characterise	 the	 externalist	 and	 internalist	 positions.	 Some	 key	features:			
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Externalist	
• Aesthetic	features	are	identified	as	properties	of	the	object.	
• Experience	is	epistemic:	a	subject	comes	to	know	aesthetic	features	of	an	object,	ensuring	that	the	aesthetic	depends	on	correct	perception.	
• By	 conceiving	 aesthetic	 experience	 as	 a	 form	 of	 knowledge,	 it	 is	 by	implication	inter-subjective	and	sharable.	
	
Internalist	
• Aesthetic	features	are	aspects	of	experiences	
• The	 aesthetic	 experience	 is	 attainable	 independent	 from	 any	 particular	class	of	object	or	property	
• By	 being	 independent	 of	 any	 particular	 object	 or	 property,	 an	 aesthetic	experience	can	be	evaluated	introspectively			 –Criticising	an	Externalist	view.	An	 extreme	 externalist	 view,	 belonging	 to	Benjamin	Boretz,	was	 considered	 to	illuminate	 the	 problems	 with	 the	 externalist	 position.	 Boretz	 subjugated	 the	features	 of	 sound	 and	 time	 in	 music	 to	 contents	 described	 as	 variously	 as	‘musical	 data’	 or	 ‘constructions’,	 casting	 sound	 and	 time	 as	 means	 to	communicate	concepts.	This	critique	helped	delineate	the	vehicle/content	model	that	I	argued	was	entailed	by	an	externalist	view.	Given	that	sound	in	time	does	not	contribute	to	the	musically	aesthetic	on	such	a	view,	written	and	heard	music	must	be	considered	identical	due	to	a	common	epistemic	identity.		 –Supervenience.	The	problems	of	a	vehicle-content	model	support	a	supervenience	thesis	about	music	experience	that	states	that	the	musically	aesthetic	is	directly	related	to	the	acoustic	 properties	 of	 the	 object	 as	 perceived.	 This	 claim	 of	 supervenience	should	be	distinguished	 from	one	of	 reduction	 in	as	 far	as	only	 the	 subvenient	base	(acoustic	properties)	determines	the	supervenient	(the	aesthetic),	although	the	supervenient	is	not	solely	determined	by	the	subvenient.	Such	is	to	say	that	two	identical	sounds	may	afford	distinct	aesthetic	experiences	while	two	distinct	
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sounds	cannot	afford	identical	aesthetic	experiences.	The	supervenience	thesis	is	an	 expression	 of	 the	 base	 intuition	 that	 the	 aesthetic	 experience	 of	 a	 piece	 of	music	depends	on	 the	way	 it	 sounds.	Externalist	views	conflict	with	 this	 thesis	since	 they	 rely	 on	 an	 epistemic	 framework	 that	 allows	 distinct	 experiences	identical	content.		 –The	attitude	of	disinterestedness	and	the	intrinsic:	Formalism.	By	 favouring	 the	supervenience	 thesis	and	rejecting	externalism	the	 internalist	appears	 to	 be	 committed	 to	 formalism,	 the	 strong	 version	 of	 which	 being	characterised	 as:	 all	 aesthetically	 relevant	 features	 are	 determined	 solely	 by	
immediately	perceivable	sonic	qualities.	However,	 it	was	argued	 that	 this	 strong	version	 is	untenable	since	aesthetic	experience	depends	on	 the	category	under	which	an	object	is	placed.	I	have	conceded	that	aesthetic	experience	is	category-based,	inasmuch	as	the	category	under	which	an	object	is	placed	by	the	perceiver	will	 determine	 the	 aesthetic	 experience.	 However,	 as	 relates	 to	 the	supervenience	thesis,	while	any	identical	artwork	can	afford	distinct	experiences	dependent	 on	 the	 category	 under	which	 it	 is	 placed,	 any	 change	 to	 the	 formal	properties	of	a	work	will	necessarily	engender	an	aesthetic	change.		The	 sense	 of	 formalism	 that	 is	 implied	 by	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 thus	 includes	 a	qualifier	 of	 attention	 to:	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	
attention	 to	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties.	 This	 is	 a	 weaker	 version	 of	formalism	 given	 that	 it	 accepts	 that	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 determined	 by	something	other	than	immediately	perceivable	properties,	namely	the	attention	of	the	perceiver.		
–Acousmatic	Listening.	The	 notion	 of	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties,	 and	 thus	 the	 boundaries	 of	the	aesthetic,	can	be	extended	and	defined	by	developing	a	position	towards	the	
acousmatic.	It	 is	necessary	 to	extend	beyond	 the	notion	of	musical	 elements	 in	order	to	satisfy	(2)	above.	The	concept	of	the	acousmatic	has	a	different	lineage	to	 the	 formal,	 originating	 in	 ancient	 Greece	 and	 being	 associated	 with	 the	musically	aesthetic	 first	by	Pierre	Schaeffer	with	 the	development	of	 recording	
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technology	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 Century.	 Two	 construals	 of	 acousmatic	 were	distinguished,	 one	 which	 assumes	 that	 sound	 sources	 are	 hidden	 from	 view–	allowing	full	attention	to	sounds	in	themselves–	and	another	which	eschews	this	assumption	while	maintaining	that	real	causes	are	implicitly	repressed	in	typical	aesthetic	 experience	 as	 to	 induce	 the	 same	 focus	 on	 sound.	 Under	 the	 latter	construal,	 the	 pertinent	 base	 becomes	 the	 acoustic	 (or,	 more	 accurately,	 the	
psycho-acoustic),	in	contrast	to	the	formal,	and	as	such	acousmatic	listening	can	apply	to	all	musics	along	with	non-musical	sound	in	the	case	that	such	sound	is	approached	with	the	appropriate	attitude.		An	 acousmatic	 listening	 attitude	 can	 be	 distinguished	 from	 the	 concept	 of	Kantian	disinterestedness	by	noting	 the	evaluative	dimension	of	 the	 latter	 that	does	not	attach	 to	 the	 former,	along	with	 the	aforementioned	 inclusivity	of	 the	acousmatic	 that	diverges	significantly	 from	the	Kantian	notion.	The	notion	that	the	acousmatic	contributes	 to	an	abstract	view	of	music	 is	challenged	above	 to	favour	a	view	of	acousmatic	listening	as	psychological	engagement	with	just	the	acoustic	properties	of	sound.	Such	listening	does	not	presuppose	value	and	can	be	 cast	 as	 concerning	 intrinsic	 features.	 Acousmatic	 listening	 therefore	 is	 only	aesthetic	when	it	has	value.		 –The	Value	of	the	Aesthetic/Non-aesthetic.	A	 phenomenal	 view	 deems	 conceptual	 content	 non-aesthetic	 and	 thus	 may	appear	overly	 restrictive;	 however,	 such	 content	 admits	 of	 the	 vehicle/content	divide,	 contravening	 the	 supervenience	 thesis.	 It	 was	 suggested	 that	 any	conceptual	 content	 such	 as	 narrative	 or	 lyrics	 is	 not	 independently	 aesthetic,	given	 that	were	such	content	displaced	 from	 its	 context	 in	a	particular	work	 it	would	no	longer	be	considered	aesthetic.		An	acousmatic	viewpoint	only	diminishes	music	 experience	where	a	particular	conception	 of	 ‘music	 experience’	 is	 subscribed	 to.	 Here	 I	 adopt	 a	 narrow	conception	entailing	only	 the	 features	 that	would	 independently	be	regarded	as	
musically	aesthetic,	 for	 the	reason	that	any	other	conception	will	encounter	 the	problems	of	 externalism	and	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 distinguish	 the	 aesthetic	 from	
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other	kinds	of	experience	without	presupposing	the	aesthetic.	It	does	not	follow	from	this	that	the	extrinsic	aspects	of	the	musically	aesthetic	are	less	valuable.		In	 sum,	 this	 chapter	 has	 argued	 that	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 of	 the	 musically	aesthetic	 can	 be	 borne	 out.	 The	 above	 has	 extended	 the	 explanandum	considerably	 by	 approaching	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 generally	 rather	 than	musical	 movement	 in	 particular.	 I	 have	 defended	 an	 internalist	 conception,	which	 is	 implied	by	a	phenomenal	view,	by	 criticising	 the	opposing	externalist	view	and	by	refining	a	key	notion	of	the	musically	aesthetic–	its	dependence	on	sound.	The	defence	of	the	internalist	view	of	the	musically	aesthetic	supports	the	phenomenal	 view	 of	 the	musically	 aesthetic,	 and	 the	 inclusivity	 of	 acousmatic	listening	 dictates	 that	 that	 a	 phenomenal	 view,	 entailing	 a	 psycho-acoustic	conception,	should	be	favoured	as	a	view	on	the	musically	aesthetic	generally.	
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Chapter	5		
	
	
Musically	Aesthetic	Value:	an	internalist	view.	
	
	
5.1	Introductory	Summary.		This	 is	 a	 chapter	 on	 musically	 aesthetic	 value:	 how	 this	 value	 relates	 to	 the	immediately	 perceivable	 properties	 that	 were	 described	 in	 the	 previous	chapters;	how	this	value	relates	to	other	kinds	of	value;	how	this	value	can	be	or	cannot	 be	 explained;	 the	 inter-subjectivity	 of	 this	 value.	 I	 argue	 that	musically	aesthetic	 value	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 experience	of	nonconceptual	psychology	and,	relatedly,	 is	 non-explicable.	 The	 following	 is	 divided	 into	 sections	 that	 address	the	following	issues:	
	Understanding	musically	aesthetic	value:	normativity	and	survivalist	value.	–An	introduction	to	broad	issues	concerning	musically	aesthetic	value.		Using	the	terms	evaluative	and	descriptive.	–Defining	these	terms	as	they	relate	to	Beardsley	(1969)	and	arguing	that	a	psycho-acoustic	account	only	addresses	the	descriptive.		Giving	a	bespoke	characterisation	of	musically	aesthetic	value.	–Giving	a	characterisation	in	terms	that	do	not	presuppose	the	aesthetic	or	human	behaviour.			
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Intrinsic,	extrinsic	and	instrumental	value.	–Discussion	of	terms	as	they	relate	to	the	literature.		Criticising	externalism	about	intrinsic	value.	–Criticising	externalism	about	intrinsic	value	generally,	with	Budd	(1995)	invoked	as	an	example.		Externalism	about	the	descriptive	and	internalism	about	the	evaluative.	–Criticising	an	amalgam	view	that	attempts	to	overcome	the	problems	of	externalism	by	attaching	intrinsic	value	to	experiences.		Musically	aesthetic	value	is	non-explicable:	analysis	of	research	from	psychology,	musicology	and	aesthetics.	–Arguing	 that	 the	 fact	 of	musically	 aesthetic	 value	 is	 contingent–	 in	 the	sense	 that	 our	 descriptive	 models	 of	 music	 do	 not	 address	 it–	 using	researching	in	music-studies	as	well	as	philosophy	of	mind.		Inter-subjectivity	 of	 aesthetic	 response:	 The	 universality	 of	 the	 perceptual	apparatus	and	dealing	with	appropriateness	of	response.	–Showing	 that	 nonconceptual	 psychology	 can	 account	 for	 inter-subjectivity	 by	 criticising	 Budd’s	 response	 to	 Kant’s	 theory	 of	 aesthetic	judgement.		Analysis:	nonconceptual	psychology	beneath	free	conceptual	description.	–Strengthening	the	view	that	 the	 inter-subjectivity	of	aesthetic	response	is	accounted	for	by	commonalities	amongst	nonconceptual	psychology	by	linking	free	conceptual	description	with	the	nonconceptual	psychological	processes	that	are	coextensive	with	experience	of	the	musically	aesthetic.		Concluding	Summary.	–Given	in	extended	detail.			
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5.2	 Understanding	 musically	 aesthetic	 value:	 survivalist	 value	
and	normativity.		There	 is	 little	 consensus	 in	any	discipline	concerning	why	 listening	 to	music	 is	pleasurable.	 Some	 have	 argued	 that	 value	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 expression,	 where	expressive	aspects	of	an	artwork	induce	an	emotive	response	in	the	listener	that	can	be	appreciated	in	an	isolated	way,	safe	from	the	implications	such	emotion	would	carry	in	the	real	world.	Those	who	make	such	arguments	have,	however,	tended	 to	 deny	 expression	 a	 primary	 role,	 maintaining	 instead	 that	 music’s	abstract	elements	contribute	most	towards	its	value.98		While	emotion	is	a	major	subject	area	in	music	psychology	there	is	no	available	account	of	the	psychology	of	musically	aesthetic	value	in	terms	of	emotion	since:	(i)	 there	 are	 no	 available	 accounts	 of	 the	 causal	mechanism	 by	which	musical	materials	 can	provoke	emotion	 (despite	 the	popularity	of	 the	 research	area);99	and	(ii)	there	is	no	account	of	how	value	should	emerge	from	the	provocation	of	emotional	 states	 that	 are	 not	 associated	 with	 value.	 (ii)	 can	 be	 elucidated	 by	asking	where	else	in	psychology	can	an	explanation	be	found	for	why	perceiving	fear,	danger	or	tension–	emotional	states	often	ascribed	to	musical	experiences–	should	be	states	naturally	sought?		What	 seems	 to	 be	 clear	 is	 that	 the	 value	 of	 music	 is	 species-specific:	 there	 is	empirical	research	to	suggest	that	nonhuman	primates	not	only	 lack	the	ability	to	 find	pleasure	 in	music	but	 find	 it	distinctly	displeasing,	preferring	silence.100	On	the	other	hand,	it	has	often	been	noted	that	all	known	human	societies	have	had	 a	 music	 culture.	 The	 key	 to	 understanding	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 may	thus	lie	in	some	facts	of	human	affairs	or	culture.	Indeed,	while	physiological	and	evolutionary	accounts	may	be	forthcoming	for	the	value	of	food,	sex	or	warmth,	
																																																								98	Ridley	1995:	192–6;	Levinson	1982;	1992:	20–2;	1996:	124–5;	Scruton	1997:	380–91;	S.	Davies	1994:	271;	Budd	1995:155.	99	See	Juslin	(2009,	esp.	p.135.)	100	McDermott	and	Hauser,	‘Nonhuman	primates	prefer	slow	tempos	but	dislike	music	overall:’	2006.	
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there	is	no	analogous	account	for	the	value	of	music.	The	music-psychologist	Ian	Cross	notes	the	survival-inefficacy	of	music:		 ‘[Music]	appears	to	have	no	immediate	and	evident	efficacy.	Music	neither	ploughs,	sows,	weaves	nor	feeds;	in	itself,	 if	 it	can	be	considered	to	exist	without	 its	 context	 of	 use,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 being	 a	material	cause	of	anything	other	than	a	transient	hedonic	encounter.	It	is	inefficacious.’101		Insofar	as	an	aesthetic	experience	with	music	entails	a	listener	responding	with	pleasure	to	sound–	without	any	material,	physiological	or	situational	advantage–	the	value	that	music	provides	is	not	accounted	for	in	terms	of	preservation	of	the	individual	or	species.	As	such,	as	compared	to	other	pleasures	like	those	of	food	or	sex,	pleasure	in	the	musically	aesthetic	appears	mysterious.		In	 philosophy,	 this	 disparity	 between	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 and	 other	pleasures	is	often	taken	to	reflect	the	difference	between	factual	and	normative	statements,	where	 ‘normative’	statements	provide	an	evaluation,	or	an	account	of	 how	 things	 should	 be.	 The	 stem	 'norm'	 has	 the	meaning	 of:	 something	 that	
should	 be,	 or	 that	 should	 be	 pursued.	 Normative	 statements	 are,	 as	 such,	
prescriptive:	 they	 do	 not	 just	 express	 something	 that	 an	 individual	 values	 but	they	make	a	claim	about	something	everyone	should	value.		Given	 that	 an	 aesthetic	 judgement	 is	 based	 on	 a	 feeling	 of	 pleasure	 or	displeasure,	 rather	 than	 on	 empirical	 fact,	 it	 can	 be	 considered	 subjective.	However,	we	make	a	claim	to	universal	agreement	in	our	aesthetic	judgements.	As	Kant	suggested,	when	someone	makes	an	aesthetic	 judgement	 ‘it	 is	not	as	 if	he	 counts	 on	 others	 agreeing	with	 him	 in	 his	 judgment	 of	 liking	 owing	 to	 his	having	 found	 them	 in	 such	 agreement	 on	 a	 number	 of	 occasions,	 but	he	demands	this	 agreement	 of	 them’	 (Kant	 1790,	 p.	 52.)	 Aesthetic	 objects	 can	only	be	said	to	have	a	certain	value	if	a	group	of	people	agree	that	the	object	has	such	value	under	certain	conditions																																																									101	Cross	2003:	4	
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	If	our	aesthetic	judgements	meet	with	disagreement	from	others,	it	 is	our	wont	to	say	that	those	detractors	should	or	ought	to	make	the	same	judgement	as	we	do.	 It	 is	 this	 demand	 for	 agreement	 that	makes	 aesthetic	 judgements	 different	from	 other	 purely	 subjective	 judgements	 concerning	 preference	 of,	 say,	 a	particular	style	of	coffee:	 if	 I	prefer	black	coffee	and	you	prefer	a	 latte,	 it	 is	not	my	 wont	 to	 say	 you	 ought	 to	 prefer	 your	 coffee	 black.	 This	 appeal	 to	 ought-statements	makes	aesthetic	judgement	appear	an	ethical	or	moral	issue,	since	a	clear	extension	of	this	type	of	attitude	towards	aesthetic	judgements	is	that	one	might	take	offence	at	another’s	taste	in	art.	David	Hume	famously	made	the	point	that	 an	 ‘ought’	 cannot	 be	 derived	 from	 an	 ‘is’,	meaning	 ought-judgements	 like	
you	 ought	 to	 appreciate	 the	 works	 of	 Erik	 Satie	 are	 of	 a	 different	 type	 to	 is–judgements	 like	 Gymnopédie	 no.1	 is	 the	 first	 of	 a	 series	 of	 expressionist	 piano	
compositions	 that	 pre-empted	 Minimalism	 and	 Surrealism.	 More	 generally,	Hume’s	point	is	taken	to	mean	that	ethical	or	evaluative	conclusions	may	never	be	 validly	 inferred	 from	 any	 set	 of	 purely	 factual	 premises	 (Cohon:	 2010.)102	(There	are	notable	critics	of	‘Hume’s	Law’,	as	it	has	been	called,	including	Hilary	Putnam,	 who	 argues	 that	 Hume	 makes	 an	 evaluative	 claim	 when	 making	 the	distinction;	it	has	also	been	suggested	that	Hume	derives	an	ought	from	an	is	in	making	this	claim	(Baier	2010).)		Claims	about	musically	aesthetic	value,	then,	tend	to	be	demarcated	from	claims	about	the	empirical	or	theoretical.	An	account	analogous	to	that	which	could	be	given	for,	say,	the	pleasure	in	a	sweet	drink	on	a	summers	day,	cannot	be	given	for	aesthetic	value	for	two	reasons:	(1),	while	the	pleasure	of	a	sweet	drink	can	be	explained	by	referring	to	the	molecular	structure	of	the	drink	and	my	body’s	biological	 need	 to	maintain	 homeostasis,	 there	 is	 no	 analogous	 account	 of	 the	survivalist	 or	 physiological	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 has	value;	(2),	the	pleasure	in	a	sweet	drink	is	not	a	moral	or	ethical	issue–	I	do	not	take	offence	if	you	do	not	find	such	pleasure	and	do	not	demand	that	you	agree	that	such	a	thing	is	pleasurable.																																																										102	See	Cohon,	2010.	
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The	 following	 offers	 an	 alternative	 to	 this	 prevailing	 view	 of	 aesthetic	 value.	While	I	accept	(1)	above,	I	reject	(2)–	that	the	value	of	the	musically	aesthetic	is	necessarily	 entangled	 in	 ethical	 or	 moral	 issues.	 Aesthetic	 judgements	 may	demand	 universal	 agreement,	 but	 it	 remains	 that	 any	 such	 judgements	 rely,	initially,	on	a	subjective	feeling.	The	nature	of	this	feeling,	I	argue,	can	feasibly	be	separated	 from	 the	 moral	 aspect	 of	 aesthetic	 judgement.	 While	 I	 might	 be	offended	 if	 someone	 were	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 prelude	 of	 Tristan	 und	 Isolde	 is	bland	 and	 uninspiring,	 and	 think	 that	 others	 ought	 to	 share	my	 experience,	 it	remains	that	the	experience	I	had	that	convinced	me	of	the	value	of	the	prelude	does	not	itself	rest	on	moral	judgement	but	a	subjective	feeling.		The	term	‘normative’	can	be	used	in	various	ways,	with	the	intended	usage	above	having	 some	 prescriptive	 or	 proscriptive	 entailment:	 ‘others	 should/shouldn’t	hear	 such-and-such	 in	 a	 certain	 way.’	 However,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 relate	 an	evaluation	that	is	not	prescriptive,	like	‘I	prefer	cycling	to	running’	or	‘that’s	too	expensive	for	me.’	Such	statements	do	express	value-judgements,	but	not	of	the	sort	that	lay	claim	to	universal	agreement.	While	normative	statements	are	also	evaluative,	 we	 can	 distinguish	 a	 sense	 of	 evaluative	 that	 does	 not	 invoke	 a	normative	 standard.	 As	 such,	 the	 issue	 of	 expressing	 a	 subjective	 feeling	 is	distinct	to	the	issue	of	making	normative	or	moral	statements.	This	is	important	since	 it	permits	 that	 a	 judgement	 that	 something	has	musically	 aesthetic	 value	may	 be	 based	 on	 a	 subjective	 feeling	 that	 is	 common	 amongst	 all	 those	 with	similar	 psychology	 who	 bring	 a	 similar	 attitude,	 but	 that	 the	 tendency	 to	 be	prescriptive	plausibly	 stems	 from	another	 feature	of	musical	experience–	most	likely	related	to	the	significant	role	music	can	have	in	personal	and	social	life.		The	 following	 takes	 a	 view	 on	 the	 subjective	 feeling	 on	 which	 aesthetic	judgements	are	based,	but	not	on	issues	connected	with	prescriptive	or	morally	indicative	statements.	It	is	clear	that	aesthetic	judgement	has	a	normative	aspect	that	 can	be	understood	 in	 terms	of	 taking	a	moral	position	on	personal	 tastes,	but	such	issues	relate	to	social	intercourse,	reflecting	culture	and	milieu:	i.e.,	this	aspect	 of	 an	 aesthetic	 judgement	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 of	 a	 wider	 humanist	concern.	However,	I	have	developed	a	sense	of	the	musically	aesthetic	that	is	not	
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humanistic	 in	 this	way,	arguing	 that	 the	musically	aesthetic	 can	be	understood	with	a	psycho-acoustic	model.		While	the	argument	given	below	does	not	give	an	account	of	our	wont	to	make	
ought-statements	 about	 the	musically	 aesthetic,	 it	 does	 offer	 an	 account	 of	 the	universality	of	 judgement	by	invoking	universal	psychological	processes.	Under	such	 a	 view,	musically	 aesthetic	 value	 appears	 to	 be	 intrinsic:	 it	 is	 coextensive	with	 the	 operation	 of	 nonconceptual	 psychological	 processes	 under	 certain	conditions.	We	engage	in	perception	without	reason	or	understanding	(without	concepts)	and	the	attendant	experience	is	intrinsically	valuable.	The	experiences	of	 illusory	movement	 that	 music	 affords	 are	 worth	 having	 purely	 in	 virtue	 of	there	 being	 experiences	 of	 illusory	 movement:	 this	 value	 emerges	 from	 the	human	 prerogative	 to	 ignore	 the	 survivalist	 or	 biological	 value	 of	 an	environment	and	to	merely	be	engaged.	Music	has	been	designed,	cumulatively	over	 the	 course	 of	 human	 history,	 to	 facilitate	 such	 aimless	 or	 reasonless	engagement.			
5.3	Understanding	the	terms	descriptive	and	evaluative.		In	 his	 Aesthetics,	 Monroe	 Beardsley	 compared	 the	 term	 evaluative	 with	
descriptive	 and	 interpretative,	 where	 descriptive	 refers	 to	 non-evaluative	statements	 concerning	 features	 of	 the	 piece	 and	 interpretative	 refers	 to	 some	relation	between	the	piece	and	something	else.	To	say	that	Bjork’s	‘Unravel’	has	an	ethereal	beauty	would	be	to	make	an	evaluative	statement,	but	to	say	that	the	vocal	melody	exhibits	a	high	degree	of	metrical	 irregularity,	such	that	accented	notes	 almost	 never	 lie	 on	 the	 1st	 or	 3rd	 beat	 of	 the	 bar,	 would	 be	 to	 make	 a	descriptive	statement.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	I	say	that	this	music	I	am	listening	to	is	‘Unravel’	by	Bjork,	the	2nd	track	from	her	1997	album	Homogenic,	I	am	making	an	interpretative	statement.	The	relevant	distinction	for	this	chapter	is	between	evaluative	 and	 descriptive,	 since	 this	 distinction	 highlights	 a	 gap	 in	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 account	 of	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 that	 implicates	 value	 as	 non-explicable	or	intrinsic.	
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	To	 say	 that	 the	 descriptive	 and	 evaluative	 can	 be	 neatly	 distinguished	 is	somewhat	controversial.	Putnam	argued	that	all	 supposedly	descriptive	claims,	even	those	made	on	the	basis	of	strict	scientific	testing,	are	subject	to	distortion	from	the	analyst’s	own	normative	criteria.	Science	is	not	value	free,	according	to	Putnam:	 	 ‘values–	 epistemic	 values,	 such	 as	 "coherence,"	 "plausibility,"	"reasonableness,"	 "simplicity,"	 "elegance"	 and	 the	 like–	are	presupposed	 in	 the	activity	 of	 selecting	 scientific	 theories’	 (2002:	 141.)	 That	 the	 descriptive	 and	evaluative	 cannot	 be	 neatly	 distinguished	 is	 a	 persuasive	 point,	 but	 to	 suggest	that	 it	 is	 wrong	 to	 make	 the	 distinction,	 or	 to	 assume	 that	 there	 are	 not	 any	descriptive	 and	 evaluative	 terms,	 is	 a	 far	more	 substantial	 step.	 Indeed,	 there	seems	little	obstruction	to	describing	certain	of	those	value-laden	terms	Putnam	cites.	 ‘Simplicity’	 may	 just	 refer	 to	 a	 reduced	 number	 of	 elements	 relative	 to	other	 theories,	 and	 ‘elegance’	 may	 include	 ‘simplicity’	 along	 with	 another	condition	 like	 the	 feature	 of	 reducing	 a	 particularly	 complex	 phenomena,	 or	giving	a	single	feature	several	roles.	That	said,	it	should	be	clear	that	I	am	making	certain	assumptions	about	the	neatness	of	the	descriptive/evaluative	distinction	due	 to	 its	 utility	 in	 this	 discussion,	 and	 that	 a	 focused	 study	 of	 the	 distinction	would	bring	up	issues	that	cannot	be	properly	dealt	with	here.		Insofar	 as	 the	distinction	between	descriptive	 and	 evaluative	holds,	 it	must	 be	given	 that	 the	 psycho-acoustic	 properties	 a	 phenomenal	 view	 identifies	 as	musically	aesthetic	concern	descriptive	rather	than	evaluative	features.	The	chief	worry	of	calling	 these	properties	descriptive	aesthetic	features	will	 relate	 to	 the	aforementioned	objection	that	psycho-acoustic	properties	cannot	be	counted	as	aesthetic,	 although	 the	work	of	 chapters	2	and	3	was	 to	 show	 that	 they	 can.	A	phenomenal	 conception	 argues	 that	 aesthetic	 and	musicological	 issues	 can	 be	explicated	using	models	wrought	through	theories	of	psychology	and	perception;	however,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 how	 far	 this	 conception	 goes	 towards	 explicating	
evaluative	statements	about	the	musically	aesthetic.		
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5.4	 Giving	 a	 bespoke	 characterisation	 of	 musically	 aesthetic	
value.	
	Aesthetic	 value	 has	 commonly	 been	 understood	 in	 aesthetics	 and	 musicology	through	 either	 the	 ascription	 or	 analysis	 of	 evaluative	 terms	 like	 beautiful,	
balanced,	unified	or	chaotic.	Such	an	approach	is	problematic	since	some	of	these	words	appear	to	be	uniquely	aesthetic	evaluations	and	so	cannot	be	described–	e.g.	 beautiful	 or	 ugly–	 while	 others	 appear	 to	 entail	 a	 combination	 of	 both	descriptive	and	evaluative	elements.		Here	 I	develop	a	distinctive	approach	by	giving	a	 fundamental	characterisation	of	value;	this	is	apt	since	it	provides	a	characterisation	that	must	be	afforded	any	object	 that	 has	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 while	 also	 drawing	 lines	 of	circumscription	 much	 wider	 than	 the	 aesthetic:	 an	 object	 has	 value	 when	
acquaintance	with	it	has	the	effect	of	motivating	further	acquaintance	with	it.	Such	is,	of	course,	a	characterisation	of	value	rather	 than	of	aesthetic	value;	 it	 is	not	specific	 to	music,	 art,	 or	 even	human	behaviour.	Value	 in	 this	 sense	 cannot	 be	culturally	or	morally	 contingent	 since	 it	describes	not	 just	 the	value	music	has	for	a	human	experiencer,	but	the	value	the	flesh	of	an	animal	has	for	a	dog	and	the	value	pollen	has	for	a	honeybee.		It	may	seem	that	an	account	of	musically	aesthetic	value	understood	in	this	way	will	 be	 less	 instructive	 than	 an	 account	 that	 deals	 with	 exclusively	 aesthetic	issues	 such	 as	 the	 tie	 between	 aesthetic	 value	 and	 art.	 Conversely,	 using	 the	notion	 of	 motivating	 further	 acquaintance	 allows	 aesthetic	 value	 to	 be	characterised	 in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 presuppose	 it,	 and	 should	 also	 be	uncontroversial.	Such	a	characterisation	does	not	demarcate	a	human	behaviour,	and	so	is	in	line	with	the	approach	so	far	developed	that	looks	to	avoid	problems	concerning	 Hume’s	 Law	 and	 the	 fact/value	 distinction:	 the	 explanandum	 is	clearly	not	normative.	Characterising	musically	aesthetic	value	in	this	way	does	not	 in	 itself	 preclude	 that	 an	 account	 of	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 might	 be	humanistic,	 even	 if	 the	 account	 I	 offer	 is	 not;	 indeed	 it	 leaves	 room	 for	 any	account	that	explicates	this	characteristic	of	motivating	further	acquaintance.	
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	Musically	aesthetic	value,	 then,	has	been	wrought	above	as	a	 subjective	 feeling	that	 can	 be	 separated	 from	 prescriptive	 or	moral	 statements.	While	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 account	 is	 powerful	 in	 explicating	 the	 descriptive	 aspects	 of	 the	musically	 aesthetic,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 such	 an	 approach	 contributes	 to	 an	account	of	musically	aesthetic	value.	Rather	 than	attempt	 to	analyse	evaluative	terms	like	beautiful,	laden	in	discourse	and	presumptions,	I	have	sought	the	most	basic	characterisation	of	value,	involving	the	notion	of	motivating	acquaintance.	By	making	no	prior	reference	to	the	aesthetic	or	even	to	human	behaviour,	and	by	identifying	a	simple	effect	of	value,	this	should	be	the	easiest	characterisation	of	 value	 to	 explain:	 we	 have	 a	 subjective	 response	 that	 motivates	 further	acquaintance.		With	this	definition	in	mind,	it	could	be	argued	that	musically	aesthetic	value	is	non-explicable:	 (I)	 the	musically	aesthetic,	understood	 in	 terms	of	 immediately	perceivable	properties,	 is	 explicable	under	 a	psycho-acoustic	paradigm	 (II)	 the	ascription	of	value	to	the	musically	aesthetic	is	justified	and	(III)	the	value	of	the	musically	 aesthetic	 is	not	 explicable	under	 a	psycho-acoustic	paradigm;	 so,	 (C)	musically	aesthetic	value	is	non-explicable;	intrinsic.	The	following	will	examine	the	claim	that	value,	when	afforded	a	sense	 that	does	not	 imply	normativity,	 is	intrinsic	to	the	experience	of	nonconceptual	psychological	processes.			
5.5	Intrinsic,	extrinsic	and	instrumental	value.		To	argue	that	the	value	of	the	musically	aesthetic	is	intrinsic	to	the	experience	of	psychological	 processes	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 understand	 how	 aesthetic	 value	 is	conceived	more	generally	and	 in	 the	 literature.	Three	conceptions	of	value	can	be	distinguished:	intrinsic,	extrinsic	and	instrumental.103		The	concept	of	intrinsic	
value	is	closely	related	to	the	concept	of	musical	form,	insofar	as	form	is	taken	to	denote	 the	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties	 of	 sound	and	 intrinsic	 value	 to	denote	 a	 value	 that	 is	 attendant	 with	 such	 properties.	 Intrinsic	 value	 is																																																									103	See	Budd	(1995).	
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commonly	contrasted	with	instrumental	value–	the	value	a	thing	has	as	a	means	towards	 another	 thing,	 itself	 valued	 as	 an	 end.	 Another	 contrasting	 term	 is	
extrinsic	value,	which	attributes	the	value	to	a	source	distinct	from	the	object	in	itself.	 While	 all	 instrumental	 value	 is	 extrinsic,	 all	 extrinsic	 value	 is	 not	necessarily	instrumental.104		It	can	be	argued	that	intrinsic	value	proper	is	obviously	false.	To	ascribe	value	to	the	 object	 in	 itself	 and	 for	 this	 value	 to	 persist	 intrinsically–	 i.e.	 without	 any	external	mediation–	 it	 would	 follow	 that	 the	 object	 has	 a	 self-sufficient	 value,	irrespective	 of	 our	 involvement	 with	 it.	 This	 is	 not	 commensurate	 with	 our	understanding	 of	 art	 as	 part	 of	 the	 human	 experience,	 the	 typical	 usage	 of	‘intrinsic	 value’	 being	 to	 associate	 a	 mental	 state	 brought	 about	 through	
perception	 of	 the	 object	 in	 itself.	 In	 this	 sense,	 then,	 all	 aesthetic	 value	 is	instrumental	 insofar	 as	 some	human	 engagement	with	 it	 is	 necessary,	 since	 in	which	 case	 it	 can	 only	 serve	 as	 a	 means	 to	 an	 end	 outside	 itself	 (human	experience).		Acceptance	of	this	position	leads	to	the	unintuitive	notion	that	only	mental	states	can	be	valued	intrinsically,	given	that	mediation	from	perception	renders	value	extrinsic	 (Korsgaard	1996:	263.)	 Indeed	 it	might	be	 feasible	 to	extend	 this	 line	even	further	and	argue	that	if	I	do	not	identify	absolutely	with	my	mental	states,	given	 the	 background	 of	 my	 personhood,	 memories	 etc.,	 then	 a	 pleasurable	mental	 state	 is	 not	 strictly	 valued	 only	 in	 itself	 but	 for	 the	 enrichment	 of	 the	person	to	which	it	belongs,	thus	qualifying	as	instrumental	value.	It	may	be	that	this	 thus	 becomes	 a	 terminological	 issue	 of	 little	 consequence.	 Even	 were	 it	denied	 that	 value	 found	 in	 an	 object	 in	 itself	 is	 intrinsic,	 such	 objects	 would	nonetheless	sustain	their	sharp	distinction	from	objects	that	are	valued	for	being	a	 means	 to	 an	 end	 outside	 themselves.	 The	 latter,	 let’s	 say	 conventionally	instrumental	 values,	 while	 mediated	 by	 extrinsic	 reference	 will	 also	 still	 be	mediated	 by	 perception	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 conventionally	 intrinsic	 values.	Indeed,	 all	 experience	must	meet	 this	 condition	 of	 mediation	 and	 as	 such	 the	broad	usage	of	‘instrumental’	makes	no	instructive	distinctions	whatsoever.																																																									104	See	Robert	Stecker	(2003).	
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	It	may	be	more	instructive	to	assume	that	‘value’	is	relational,	and	has	the	strict	condition	of	obtaining	between	an	object	and	a	person.	On	 this	view	the	broad	sense	of	‘instrumental’	can	be	treated	as	a	confusion	between	something’s	having	value	and	something’s	being	valued:	a	feeling	of	pleasure	or	an	affirmation	of	life	is	 understood	 as	 coextensive	 with	 the	 realisation	 of	 value,	 wrought	 through	perception.	 In	 which	 case,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 make	 the	 aforementioned	distinctions	between	instrumental,	extrinsic	and	intrinsic	value,	with	the	caveat	that	value	is	realised	by	someone.	But	the	humanist	aspect	of	aesthetic	value	does	not	 justify	 the	ascription	of	 intrinsic	value	 to	objects	over	experiences,	or	vice-versa:	intrinsic	value	can	be	conceived	as	intrinsic	to	the	experiences	or	objects	even	while	being	conceived	as	value	 for	someone.	The	 following	considers	how	intrinsic	value	can	be	wrought	through	either	an	externalist	or	internalist	view.			
5.6	Criticising	externalism	about	intrinsic	value.		I	argued	in	the	previous	chapter	that	the	musically	aesthetic	can	be	distinguished	as	 attention	 to	 immediately	 perceivable	 properties	 of	 sound	 that	 has	 value–	where	‘immediately	perceivable	properties’	are	understood	as	psycho-acoustic–	and	it	seems	the	neatest	way	to	understand	musically	aesthetic	value	is	to	tie	it	to	 experiences	 of	 psycho-acoustic	 properties	 as	 intrinsic	 value.	 However,	 the	notion	 of	 intrinsic	 value	 can	 be	 used	 alongside	 an	 epistemic,	 representational,	model	 to	 provide	 a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 while	 maintaining	either	 an	 abstract	 or	 more	 broadly	 externalist	 view.	 In	 order	 to	 defend	 the	phenomenal	 position	 that	 only	 a	 psycho-acoustic	 conception	 will	 distinguish	musically	aesthetic	value	without	presupposing	it,	it	is	necessary	to	criticise	this	approach	where	intrinsic	value	is	integrated	into	an	externalist	view.		There	 are	 two	 approaches	 to	 such	 a	 view:	 a)	 intrinsic	 value	 is	 external	 to	experience,	 attached	 to	 the	 descriptive	 aspect	 and	 so	 experience	 acquaints	 us	with	 both	 the	 descriptive	 and	 evaluative;	 b)	 value	 is	 internal	 to	 experiences	while	 the	 descriptive	 aspect	 is	 external,	 such	 that	 we	 become	 epistemically	
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acquainted	with	features	of	the	object	and	in	so	doing	have	an	experience	that	is	itself	 intrinsically	valuable.	The	amalgam	view,	b),	was	mentioned	 in	chapter	4	when	 cited	 in	 Beardsley	 (1969),	 and	 has	 become	 well	 supported.105	In	 his	influential	Values	of	Art	(1995),	Malcolm	Budd	provides	a	view	 that	appears	 to	drift	between	both	positions,	and	so	I	will	address	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	 both	 views	 by	 using	 Budd’s	 writing	 as	 a	 cue,	 arguing	 that	 intrinsic	 value	cannot	 be	 accommodated	 either	 as	 a	 property	 of	 objects	 or	 in	 an	 amalgam	 of	internalist	 and	 externalist	 ideas.	Nb.,	 henceforth	 I	will	 use	 the	 following	 terms	interchangeably:	 ‘evaluative	 aspect’	 and	 ‘value’;	 ‘descriptive	 aspect’	 and	‘structure’.		Budd	claims	that	the	“artistic	value”	of	an	artwork	consists	in	the	“intrinsic	value	of	the	experience	the	work	offers’,	but	this	experience	the	work	offers	is	one	in	which	 the	 individual	 understands	 aesthetic	 qualities	 by	 becoming	 acquainted	with	 them.106	This	 would	 seem,	 then,	 to	 be	 an	 externalist	 view	 of	 aesthetic	experience	 in	 as	much	 as	 emphasis	 is	 on	 understanding	 and	 the	 notion	 that	 a	perceiver	 is	 acquainted	 with	 qualities	 of	 the	 object.	 However,	 it	 is	 somewhat	open	 whether	 intrinsic	 value	 is	 given	 to	 have	 the	 internalist	 trait	 of	 being	internal	 to	 experience	 rather	 than	 object,	 since	 while	 having	 an	 intrinsically	valuable	 experience	 is	 dependent	 on	 acquaintance	 with	 objective	 properties,	intrinsic	 value	 is	 nonetheless	 construed	 as	 attached	 to	 the	 experience	 rather	than	these	properties	themselves.		The	view	Budd	offers	could	ultimately	fall	towards	externalism	about	value	and	structure	 if	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 attributed	 to	 experience	 is	 taken	 not	 as	 a	 sui	
generis	quality	of	experiences	but	rather	as	a	representation	of	the	properties	of	the	object,	and	he	does	give	some	indication	towards	this	view.		He	contends	that	a	work	 ‘does	 not	 have	 a	 nature	 specifiable	 independently	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	work’	(Budd	1995:	4,)	although	this	terminology	carries	some	ambivalence	given	that	he	also	 intimates	 that	 the	 ‘nature	of	 the	work’	may	 feasibly	be	dissociated																																																									105	Advocates	of	internalism	about	value	and	externalism	about	aesthetic	structure	include	Budd	1985	and	1995,	Goldman	2006,	Walton	1993,	Levinson	1996	and	2006,	Miller	1998,	Railton	1998,	and	Iseminger	2004.	106	See	Budd	1995:	4;	12.	
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from	 the	 work.	 The	 stronger	 claim	 would	 be	 that	 a	 ‘work	 is	 not	 specifiable	independently	of	that	work’.		Indeed,	 there	 are	 arguably	 flat	 contradictions	 with	 Budd’s	 founding	 notion	 of	‘intrinsic	value	of	the	experience	the	work	offers’	apparent	when	this	position	is	being	defined:		 It	 should	 be	 remembered	 that	 the	 experience	 a	work	 of	 art	 offers	 is	 an	experience	 of	 the	 work	 itself,	 and	 the	 valuable	 qualities	 of	 a	 work	 are	qualities	of	the	work,	not	of	the	experience	it	offers.	(ibid:	5)		However,	this	apparent	contradiction	might	be	resolved	by	attributing	different	values	to	the	artwork	and	the	experience,	a	line	Budd	pursues	to	a	limited	degree	with	the	term	‘artistic	value’,	intended	to	denote	the	value	ascribed	to	the	object	particularly–	even	if,	as	noted	above,	this	value	is	said	to	consist	in	the	‘intrinsic	value	of	 the	 experience	 the	work	offers’.	 Later	passages	 go	 towards	disrupting	the	distinction	between	an	object’s	 ‘artistic	value’	and	an	experience’s	 ‘intrinsic	value’	but	it	will	be	instructive,	by	way	of	providing	an	example,	to	first	uphold	the	 distinction	 and	 treat	 this	 view	 as	 externalism	 about	 the	 descriptive	 and	evaluative,	where	the	artwork’s	value	is	considered	intrinsic	and	represented	as	such.		This	 position	 can	 be	 challenged	 by	 noting	 that	were	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 the	aesthetic	a	represented	property	of	objects	it	follows	that	the	representation	of	such	 value	will	 be	 true	 or	 false,	 and	 that	 the	 experience	 is	 thus	 contingent	 on	
correct	perception	of	the	value	that	lies	within	the	object.	Such	is	a	key	aspect	of	Budd’s	 argument,	 positing	 as	 he	 does	 the	 condition	 that	 ‘If	 you	 find	 the	work	intrinsically	rewarding	and	you	are	right	to	do	so,	then	the	experience	it	offers	is	intrinsically	 valuable’	 (pp.12-13	 emphasis	 added.)	 The	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 the	experience	is	subject	to	externally	governed	criteria	accordant	with	the	value	of	the	work,	by	which	rights	an	experience	can	be	right	or	wrong.		
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It	is	the	question	of	how	such	externally	governed	criteria	can	be	designated	that	is	crucial,	since	such	designation	seems	to	rely,	at	bottom,	on	intuition.	Granting,	as	 Budd	 does,	 that	 the	 conditions	 for	 correctness	 of	 aesthetic	 perception	 are	determined	 by	 consensus	 amongst	 experiencers–	 a	 consensus	 that	 could	alternatively	 be	 conceived	 as	 Hume’s	 ‘true	 critic’–	 intrinsic	 value	 appears	 a	component	of	aesthetic	perception	itself	since	no	referent	for	intrinsic	value	can	be	determined	that	is	prior	to	the	experience	of	intrinsic	value.107	In	other	words,	without	 conceding	 that	 the	 prior	 identification	 of	 intrinsic	 value	 is	 made	 by	experiences	of	 intrinsic	value,	and	to	echo	a	common	objection	to Hume’s	 ‘true	critic’,	appeal	to	a	consensus	amongst	experiencers	in	designating	intrinsic	value	in	 aesthetic	 objects	 leads	 to	 the	 circular	 reasoning	 that	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	artworks	is	identified	by	consensus	amongst	critics,	but	critics	identify	intrinsic	value	by	critical	consensus.	Due	to	this	circularity,	appeal	to	externally	mediated	criteria	 as	 the	primary	means	 to	 identify	 intrinsic	 value	 is	 deeply	problematic.	The	 prior	 identification	 of	 intrinsic	 value	 is	 made	 through	 experience	 with	immediately	 perceivable	 properties	 rather	 than	 by	 reference	 to	 a	 shared	criterion.			
5.7	Externalism	about	the	descriptive	and	internalism	about	the	
evaluative.		On	an	alternative	 reading	of	Budd	 (1995)	 intrinsic	 value	would	be	 attached	 to	the	experience	where	the	experience	is	wrought	through	epistemic	acquaintance	with	the	artwork.	The	following	suggests	this	position:		 It	is	the	nature	of	the	work	that	endows	the	work	with	whatever	artistic	value	 it	 possesses;	 this	nature	 is	what	 is	 experienced	 in	undergoing	 the	experience	 the	work	offers;	 and	 the	work’s	artistic	value	 is	 the	 intrinsic	value	of	this	experience.	So	a	work	of	art	is	valuable	as	art	if	it	is	such	that	
																																																								107	See	Hume’s	‘Of	the	Standard	of	Taste’.	
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the	experience	 it	offers	 is	 intrinsically	valuable;	and	 it	 is	valuable	 to	 the	degree	that	this	experience	is	intrinsically	valuable.	(p.5)		The	 value	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 art	 is,	 on	 this	 view,	 central	 in	 understanding	aesthetic	value,	but	this	is	a	value	that	obtains	through	perception	of	the	work’s	‘nature’.	This	‘nature’	‘endows	the	work	with…	artistic	value’,	and	the	experience	is	valuable	 insofar	as	it	 is	an	experience	of	the	‘nature	of	the	work.’	This	then	is	externalism	about	structure	and	internalism	about	value.	An	amalgam	view	such	as	 this	 might	 deflect	 objections	 to	 externalism	 by	 tying	 the	 descriptive	 to	 the	evaluative,	where	the	evaluative	 is	 intrinsic.	The	qualifications	of	Budd’s	use	of	the	term	‘intrinsic’	now	become	relevant	to	appraising	such	a	view.		‘Intrinsic	 value’	 is	 intended	 not	 to	 denote	 a	 value	 dependent	 on	 ‘internal	properties’	 (ibid),	 and	 as	 such	 is	 not	 to	 be	 contrasted	with	 ‘extrinsic	 value,’	 a	value	 transpiring	 through	 relations	 to	 other	 things.	 In	 short,	 Budd	 does	 ‘not	assume	 that	 something’s	 intrinsic	 value	 is	 dependent	 solely	 on	 its	 intrinsic	nature’	(ibid.)	Rather,	 intrinsic	value	 is	here	opposed	to	 instrumental	value,	 the	value	of	the	effects	aesthetic	experience	has	on	people	beyond	itself.	This	invites	the	 question	 of	what	might	 exemplify	 an	 embodiment	 of	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 the	relevant	sort.	Examples	given	include	‘the	invigoration	of	one’s	consciousness,	or	a	 refined	 awareness	 of	 human	 psychology	 or	 political	 or	 social	 structures,	 or	moral	insight,	or	an	imaginative	identification	with	a	sympathetic	form	of	life	or	point	 of	 view	 that	 is	 not	 one’s	 own…	 such	 benefits	 contribute	 to	 making	 the	experience	intrinsically	valuable	and	partly	constitute	the	ways	in	which	it	is	so’	(p.7.)	The	distinction	that	concerns	Budd	then,	is	that	between	a	consequential,	or	instrumental,	effect	of	an	experience	of	an	artwork,	and	that	experience	itself–	with	 the	 significant	 qualification	 that	 the	 experience	 itself	 may	 have	 extrinsic	value	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 value	 that	 transpires	 through	 relations	 to	 other	 things	(invigoration	of	consciousness	etc.).		The	 key	 problem	 with	 this	 treatment	 is	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘intrinsic	 value’	becomes	defeasible	when	reconciled	with	the	extrinsically	grounded	experiences	ascribed.	 It	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	 work	 is	 not	 ‘specifiable	 independently	 of	 the	
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nature	 of	 the	 work’	 if	 it	 is	 the	 case	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 work	 might	 be	something	extrinsic	like	providing	insight	into	human	psychology,	since	there	is	nothing	to	say	that	such	insight	could	not	be	gleaned	from	another	type	of	thing.	This	extrinsic	reference	will	be	subject	to	the	same	objections	given	in	chapter	3	concerning	externalist	approaches.	Insofar	as	aesthetic	value	is	identified	with	a	particular	 content	 not	 co-extensive	 with	 experience	 itself,	 distinct	 modes	 of	presentation	will	afford	identical	aesthetic	value,	thus	contravening	what	I	called	the	supervenience	thesis.		Indeed,	Budd	acknowledges	the	problems	relating	to	the	supervenience	thesis	in	a	 discussion	 of	 the	 ‘communication	 doctrine’	 of	 art,	 explaining	 that	 a	 popular	approach	 has	 been	 to	 conceive	 of	 art	 as	 the	 communication	 of	 the	 artist’s	experience.	Were	music	the	communication	of	experiences,	sound	itself	would	be	a	vehicle	 for	 the	 ‘message’	of	music,	 and,	 in	a	 similar	way	 in	which	 the	vehicle	that	 communicates	 a	 verbal	message	 (be	 it	 spoken	word,	written	word,	Morse	code,	 semaphore	 etc.)	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 message	 itself,	 the	 sound	 of	 music	would	 be	 distinct	 from	 its	 aesthetic	 ‘message,’	 the	 upshot	 being	 that	 different	media	could	act	as	vehicles	for	the	same	aesthetic	value.	This,	as	Budd	argues,	is	unacceptable:		 [T]he	 communication	 conception	 of	 artistic	 value	 misrepresents	 the	importance	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 work,	 crediting	 it	 only	 with	 an	instrumental	role	in	the	production	of	what	is	valuable	in	the	experience	of	art,	rather	than	locating	the	reward	in	the	experience	itself.	(p.15)		This	then	is	a	reiteration	of	the	point	that	a	piece	of	music	cannot	feel	the	way	it	does	unless	it	sounds	the	way	it	does;	it	will	not	be	valued	in	the	same	way	if	it	is	perceived,	say,	visually,	or	is	expressed	through	some	theoretical	analysis.	Music,	in	whatever	sense	it	is	immediate	experience,	is	auditory.	Budd	makes	this	clear:		 Our	attachment	to	the	works	we	value	as	art	is	an	attachment	to	the	very	experiences	 they	 offer,	 not	 to	 something	 detachable	 from	 them.	 To	
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appreciate	 the	 value	 of	 a	 work	 of	 art	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 undergo	 the	experience	it	offers.	(p.16)		It	could	be	queried	how	this	position	can	be	occupied	without	also	endorsing	the	view	that	intrinsic	value	is	tied	to	immediately	perceivable	properties.		Budd’s	examples	of	extrinsic	values	given	earlier	could	be	dismissed	by	the	same	argument	given	against	the	‘communication	conception.’	Indeed,	the	remit	of	this	argument	is	not	limited	to	the	notion	of	messages	being	transferred	from	artist	to	 audience–	 it	 includes	 any	 framework	 where	 aesthetic	 value	 can	 plausibly	operate	 independently	 of	 its	 respective	 experience.	 The	 examples	 Budd	 gives	above	include	‘moral	or	political	insight’	and	‘the	invigoration	of	consciousness’,	but	such	values	cannot	be	aesthetic	as	long	as	they	may	be	dissociated	from	the	experience	 of	 a	 particular	 artwork.	 And	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 how	 ‘moral	 or	 political	insights’	could	be	inextricably	attached	to	an	experience	of	a	particular	artform,	insofar	as	said	insights	relate	to	the	abstract	conceptual	schemes	of	morality	and	politics.	 Even	 as	 loose	 a	 notion	 as	 ‘the	 invigoration	of	 consciousness’	 seems	 to	float	 free	 of	 an	 experience	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 aesthetic	 object–	 could	consciousness	not	be	invigorated	analogously	with	another	object	that	functions	analogously,	like	drugs	or	sex?		Any	 form	 of	 externalism	 contradicts	 a	 truism	 of	 music	 experience,	 that	 it	supervenes	 on	 the	 way	 music	 sounds.	 If	 the	 way	 a	 piece	 of	 music	 sounds	 is	altered,	 the	 experience	 of	 it	 is	 altered:	 two	 artefacts	 with	 identical	 epistemic	contents	 but	 distinct	 sonic	 properties	 will	 be	 distinct	 in	 their	 aesthetic	 value.	This	is	why	the	formal	qualities	of	sound	are	essential	components	of	music,	and	why	theorisation	of	music	starts	at	the	level	of	formal	structure.			This	 claim	 about	 the	musically	 aesthetic	 supervening	on	 formal	 qualities	 is	 not	equivalent	to	the	claim	that	all	musically	aesthetic	qualities	are	formal	qualities.	Supervenience	 is	a	 relation	of	dependence,	but	not	a	reductive	one:	a	 formally-perfect	rendition	by	a	tribute	band	is	still	aesthetically	different	to	a	performance	by	 the	 original	 band.	 The	 idea	 of	 supervenience	 is	 that	 two	 such	 formally	
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identical	 pieces	 can	 have	 be	 different	 aesthetically,	 but	 that	 the	 aesthetic	experience	 of	 either	 performance	 is	 nonetheless	 determined	 by	 its	 formal	(psycho-acoustic)	qualities	given	that	if	those	qualities	were	altered	in	any	way–	e.g.	 to	result	 in	an	imperfect	performance-	the	aesthetic	experience	would	also	be	altered.			A	primary	argument	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	formal	qualities	of	sound	should	not	be	understood	as	operating	under	the	rules	of	their	own	domain,	or	that	of	the	epistemology	 of	 a	 person	 or	 persons,	 but	 that	 they	 should	 be	 understood	 as	physical	 properties	 of	 sound	 that	 provide	 conditions	 for	 psychological	mechanisms	 to	 operate.	 This	 section	 has	 argued	 that	 intrinsic	 value	 cannot	 be	understood	 as	 external	 to	 aesthetic	 experience,	 nor	 can	 it	 be	 understood	 as	internal	 to	 experience	 when	 aligned	 with	 an	 externalist	 view	 of	 aesthetic	structure.	 The	 available	 position	 is	 thus	 that	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 and	structure	 is	 internal	 to	experience.	The	 following	 section	argues	 that	musically	aesthetic	value,	in	being	intrinsic	to	experience,	is	non-explicable.			
5.8	 Musically	 aesthetic	 value	 is	 non-explicable:	 analysis	 of	
research	from	psychology,	musicology	and	aesthetics.	
	
Image	schemata	provide	a	successful	model	of	music	perception	for	a	number	of	reasons,	 chief	 among	 which	 is	 that	 they	 explicate	 a	 well-reported	 intuition	concerning	 musical	 movement	 by	 linking	 it	 with	 the	 non-musical	 world	 of	psychology.	 However,	 while	 the	 image	 schemata	 model	 seems	 to	 link	 the	descriptive	 aspects	 of	 musical	 movement	 with	 psychology–	 like	 the	 sense	 of	compulsion	towards	a	tonic	or	balance	of	phrasing–	there	is	no	account	of	how	the	 operation	 of	 image	 schemata	 themselves	 are	 intrinsically	 valuable.	 The	structures	themselves	are	value-neutral:	I	might	use	the	path	schema	to	describe	myself	as	being	on	a	path	to	success	or	conversely	on	a	path	to	demise;	I	might	lament	 a	 relationship	 that	 goes	 through	 cycles	 of	 painful	 separations	 and	reconciliations	or	alternatively	 I	might	describe	my	progress	 in	doing	a	PhD	as	cycles	of	activity	and	repose.	The	meanings	these	structures	afford	are	free	to	be	
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emotionally	positive,	negative	or	neutral;	to	make	sense	of	music	experience	as	a	kind	of	mapping	of	image	schemata,	value	needs	to	be	added	into	the	explanation	
ad	hoc.		The	 ecological	 perception	 of	music	 perception	 can	 be	 characterised	 in	 similar	ways.	 The	 model	 is	 explanatively	 powerful	 since	 it	 explains	 a	 much-reported	effect	 of	music–	 a	 sense	 of	movement–	 in	 a	 precise	way,	 by	 linking	 particular	properties	 of	 sound	 to	 particular	 behaviours	 through	 clearly	 defined	mechanisms,	namely	those	of	personal	and	evolutionary	development.	However,	the	spatial	features	specified	by	ecological	theory	lack	an	object	or	concept–	for	example,	increase	in	high-frequencies	and	dynamic	specifies	approach	of	a	sound	source,	but	 the	nature	of	 the	sound	source	 is	undetermined.	Given	that	what	 is	moving	 is	 central	 to	 the	 way	 any	 experience	 of	 movement	 is	 valued,	 such	 an	account,	while	explicating	 the	sense	of	approach	music	can	engender,	does	not	explain	why	we	should	be	motivated	to	experience	such	an	effect.		What	motivates	a	 listener	to	engage	with	music	 is	an	aspect	of	what	Zbikowski	calls	the	meaning	of	music.	While	he	provides	an	account	of	a	fundamental	aspect	of	music	perception–	grouping	into	categories–	these	categories,	such	as	‘motivic	forms	 of	 Beethoven’s	 fifth’	 have	 no	 object	 or	 concept;	 they	 are	 composed	 of	discrete	 sounds.	 Zbikowski	 acknowledges	 this	 gap,	 suggesting	 that	 musical	meaning	 is	 transcendent	 or	 otherworldly:	 ‘Musical	 concepts	 are	 of	 another	world,	another	order,	because	they	extend	into	a	domain	that	is	beyond	words’	(2005:	326.)		This	 transcendent	view	 of	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 is	 prevalent	 today,	 with	 a	lineage	 that	 traces	 back	 to	 Hanslick’s	 arguments	 on	 autonomy	 of	 form	 in	The	
Beautiful	 in	Music.	 Themes	 of	 such	 a	 view	 are	 protection	 and	 exclusion,	where	the	musically	aesthetic	is	taken	to	be	superlative	in	such	a	way	that	it	cannot	be	accessed	for	scientific	study	or	any	broader	non-musical	understanding.	Hanslick	is	an	archetype	of	this	line	of	thought:	only	instrumental	music	can	be	beautiful;	only	 geniuses	 (born	 in	 a	 particular	 part	 of	 the	 world)	 might	 make	 beautiful	
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music;	 only	 the	 highly	 expert	 can	 experience	 beautiful	 music;	 and,	 of	 course,	music	must	be	beautiful.		Many	of	the	hegemonies	and	elitisms	central	to	Hanslick’s	ideology	have	become	distinctly	 unattractive	 to	 contemporary	 writers,	 although	 the	 kernel	 of	 this	argument	maintains	significant	support.	The	conception	of	a	superlative	musical	meaning	has	been	robustly	defended,	and	it	could	be	argued	that	the	potential	to	occupy	 this	 position	 suggests	 that	 current	 thinking	 on	music's	 aesthetic	 value	leaves	space	for	it.	Consider	the	words	of	Roger	Scruton,	given	at	a	conference	on	the	(non-)possibility	of	a	scientific	account	of	music:		 It	is	obviously	the	case	that	advances	in	the	neurosciences	have	begun	to	impinge	upon	what	 for	me	was	a	sacred	and	protected	territory	[music]	and	one	has	to,	as	it	were,	heed	the	call	to	rush	to	the	boundary	to	defend	it108		This	 view	 also	 emerges	 beyond	 aesthetics,	 in	 musicology.	 Jim	 Samson,	 a	musicologist	 who	 has	 written	 on	 the	 transcendentalist	 doctrine,	 nonetheless	appeals	to	an	exclusivity	of	meaning	to	fill	the	gaps	in	our	understanding:		 Music,	 it	 might	 be	 argued,	 is	 so	 utterly	 and	 irreducibly	 specific,	 its	meaning	so	embedded	in	 its	essence,	that	we	are	forced	to	borrow	from	other	systems	of	thought	in	order	to	attempt	any	kind	of	description	at	all.	(Samson	1999)		Samson	had	tacitly	opposed	himself	to	the	traditional	transcendentalist	position	in	the	same	paper,	but	still	sees	exclusivity	in	this,	less	extreme,	form	as	justified.		Indeed,	 appeals	 to	 music's	 closure	 pepper	 the	 inter-disciplinary	 terrain.	Examples	can	be	found	in	analytical	musicology,	psychology	and	even	modernist	thinking.	John	Cage,	a	fierce	opponent	of	the	tenets	of	enlightenment	aesthetics,	still	dismisses	explanation	 in	 favour	of	a	 thesis	on	sound’s	 intrinsic	properties.																																																									108	Scruton,	‘Can	there	be	a	Science	of	Musical	Understanding?’	(2011).	
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Cage	 wishes	 to	 eliminate	 the	 composer,	 human	 control	 and	 expression	 from	music,	 but	 in	 so	 doing	 makes	 much	 the	 same	 claim	 as	 Hanslick	 does–	 to	 ‘let	sounds	 be	 themselves’	 (1961:	 12).	 The	 value	 of	 music	 is,	 for	 both,	 contained	exclusively	within	the	sounds	themselves.		Transcendentalism	is	a	response	to	an	explanatory	problem	about	music,	namely	that	 it	 is	 unclear	why	we	do	 it.	 It	 is	 the	 absence	of	 clear	 reasons	 for	musically	aesthetic	value	that	drives	the	view	of	an	exclusive	musically	aesthetic	domain	to	that	is	theoretically	closed.	It	is	the	division	between	aesthetic	experience	on	the	one	hand	and	everything	else	a	person	can	do,	on	 the	other,	 that	has	 fuelled	 the	elevation	 of	 music,	 the	 idolization	 of	 certain	 musicians,	 and	 the	 rejection	 of	musics	that	do	not	fit	the	requisite	ideological	expectations.		While	this	explanatory	problem	of	musically	aesthetic	value	motivates	claims	of	a	transcendent	value	that	critically	limits	our	understanding,	 it	can	also	be	said	to	prevent	 those	working	 in	 analytical	 or	 empirical	music-studies	 arriving	 at	 a	consensus	as	to	what	is	most	valuable	about	music.	A	set-theoretic	analysis	of	a	particular	 piece	 will	 be	 disposed	 to	 generate	 a	 practically	 limitless	 range	 of	relevant	relational	structures,109	whereas	a	Schenkerian	analysis	will	reduce	the	points	of	significance	in	the	same	piece	to	the	primal	structure,	or	Ursatz,	which	will	 be	 constituted	 by	 a	 very	 limited	 set	 of	 notes	 and	will	 abstract	 away	 from	most	 of	 the	 piece’s	 detail,	 including	 rhythm	 and	 instrumentation.	 Similarly,	 an	ethno-musicologist	 will	 tend	 to	 shy	 away	 from	 talk	 of	 universals	 in	 music,	possibly	citing	the	fact	that	many	African	languages	have	no	word	for	music,110	while	 experimental	 psychologists	 working	 in	 perception	 may	 cite	 certain	characteristics	 such	 as	 preference	 for	 low-integer	 ratio	 intervals	 and	 the	development	of	expectancies	as	cross-cultural	universals.111	It	is	clear	that	what	counts	as	significant	for	a	model	of	music	will	reflect	the	particular	concerns	and	predispositions	of	the	discipline,	the	sub-discipline	and	the	scholar	who	is	using	it,	 and	 that	 any	 determination	 of	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 will	 be	 hostage	 to	global	and	subjective	factors.																																																									109	See	Cook	(1994).	110	See	Jacqui	Malone	1996:	10,11.	111	See	Steven	and	Byron	2009.		
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	Value	is	not	a	major	research	topic	in	contemporary	music-psychology.112	It	may	appear	 that	neuropsychology,	as	 the	newest	empirical	science	of	 the	mind,	will	ultimately	bring	an	account	of	musically	aesthetic	value,	however	there	has	been	little	 progress	 thus	 far.	 Salimpoor	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 have	 used	 brain-imaging	techniques	 to	 link	 reports	 of	 intense	pleasure	 given	by	 the	 listening	 subject	 to	the	 release	 of	 dopamine	 in	 the	 brain,	 and	 have	 also	 correlated	 these	 peak	responses	 with	 other	 physiological	 data	 such	 as	 changes	 in	 heart-rate.	 While	research	like	this	might	have	significant	value	from	a	neuroscience	perspective,	it	 does	 not	 give	 us	 an	 account	 of	 how	music	 functions	 to	 produce	 value,	 but	rather	confirms	that	it	does	in	a	way	that	does	not	depend	on	subjective	report.		It	could	be	said	that	musically	aesthetic	value	is	a	contingent	fact,	given	that	the	aggregate	explanation	of	 the	 sense	of	musical	movement	provided	by	all	 those	musicological	 and	 psychological	 models	 hitherto	 considered,	 while	 offering	detailed	description,	 is	 independent	 from	 the	 fact	 of	 the	 experience	 of	musical	movement	 being	 valuable.	 Musicologists	 have	 rich	 and	 complex	 analytical	models	 that	 give	 description	 to	 musical	 structure	 in	 terms	 of	 relationships	between	parts.	Similarly,	psychologists	have	found	music	to	be	fertile	ground	on	which	to	employ	various	psychological	models,	suggesting	that	music	is	anything	but	 closed	 to	 analytical	 approaches.	 However,	 as	 has	 been	 suggested	 by	 the	discussion	of	image	schemata,	ecological	theory	and	cognitive	categorisation,	the	available	account	of	musicological	and	psychological	 function	explains	only	 the	descriptive	aspect.		The	view	of	musically	aesthetic	value	I	am	developing	here–	of	a	non-explicable	component	 of	 experience	 that	 emerges	 as	 a	 contingent	 fact–	 parallels	 the	problem	of	experience	that	has	occupied	philosophers	of	mind	particularly	over	the	 last	 few	decades,	 since	Thomas	Nagel’s	paper	 ‘What	 is	 it	 Like	 to	be	a	Bat?’	(1974).	While	we	might	ascribe	all	sorts	of	behaviours	or	physiological	attributes																																																									112	There	being	no	papers	on	musical	value	in	the	recent	major	collection,	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	
Music	Psychology	(2009),	nor	the	similarly	major	and	recent	joint	music-psychology	conference,	
ICMPC-ESCOM	2012.	(‘The	12th	International	Conference	for	Music	Perception	and	Cognition	and	8th	Conference	of	the	European	Society	for	the	Cognitive	Sciences	of	Music.’).	
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to	bats,	and	we	may	come	to	understand	how	a	bat	works	in	an	environment,	the	subjective	 quality	 that	 characterizes	 the	 bat’s	 experience	 is	 left	 out	 of	 the	description.	 Imagining	 myself	 hanging	 upside-down,	 using	 sonar	 rather	 than	vision	and	flying	rather	than	walking,	is	not	really	giving	me	the	bat-experience,	since,	 ‘[i]n	 so	 far	 as	 I	 can	 imagine	 this	 (which	 is	 not	 very	 far),	 it	 tells	me	 only	what	 it	 would	 be	 like	 for	 me	 to	 behave	 as	 a	 bat	 behaves.	 But	 that	 is	 not	 the	question.	 I	want	to	know	what	 it	 is	 like	for	a	bat	to	be	a	bat’	(p.439).	When	we	understand	 all	 of	what	 Nagel	 calls	 the	 objective	 facts,	 the	 subjective	 quality	 of	experience	 is	 unaccounted	 for.	 In	 music	 we	 can	 understand	 this	 subjective	quality	as	having	value	in	the	sense	that	we	are	motivated	to	seek	it.		The	 problem	 of	 experience	 has	 variously	 been	 called	 the	 hard	 problem	 of	
consciousness	 (Chalmers	 1995)	 and	 the	 explanatory	 gap	 (Levine	 1983),	 and	 it	relates	 to	how	we	conceive	of	 the	 subjective	quality	of	 experience–	 sometimes	called	what	it	is	likeness,	qualitative	feels	or	qualia.	Once	we	have	explained	away	the	 function	of	 all	 other	 aspects	 of,	 say,	 the	 visual	 perception	 of	 red,	 there	 is	something	 about	 the	 experience	 of	 redness	 that	 appears	 contingent	 (where	
functionalism	is	the	doctrine	that	all	mental	states	are	reducible	to	causal	roles	In	the	production	of	a	system’s	behaviour	(Chalmers	2003.))	As	the	neuroscientist	Jeffrey	Gray	claimed:		 given	 that	 there	 is	 a	 scientific	 story	 that	 goes	 seamlessly	 from	 sensory	input	 to	 behavioural	 output	 without	 reference	 to	 consciousness	 then,	when	we	try	to	add	conscious	experience	back	into	the	story,	we	can’t	find	
anything	for	consciousness	to	do.113		David	 Chalmers	 (1995)	 suggested	 that	 this	 problem	 is	 hard	 because	 the	 best	cognitive	psychology	can	do	to	explain	the	mind	is	to	give	accounts	of	function,	and	qualitative	conscious	experience	is	not	functional	in	nature.	Chalmers	urges	that	when	cognitive	psychology	has	done	the	work	of	explaining	various	mental	phenomena,	such	as	the	ability	to	discriminate,	categorise	or	report,	the	problem	of	experience	will	remain,	untouched.	Indeed,	one	of	Chalmers’	most	influential																																																									113	Gray	2004;	40,	his	emphasis.	
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arguments	has	been	that,	were	conscious	experience	eliminated	from	the	picture	altogether,	 nothing	 in	 the	 functionalist	 story	 would	 need	 alteration.	 This	suggests	that	beings	with	identical	functional	states	as	ourselves	could	well	exist	without	having	consciousness.114		It	 is	 instructive	 to	 note	 that	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 is	 an	 experiential	phenomenon	 that	 demonstrates	 the	 same	 explanative	 contingency.	 Our	analytical	 frameworks	 depend	 on	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 only	 in	 the	humanistic	sense	that	if	it	were	not	for	its	experiential	value	people	would	not	be	interested	in	analysing	music;	but	this	expresses	the	question	of	why	this	value	obtains,	 rather	 than	 the	 solution.	 A	 psycho-acoustic	 conception	 proffers	 an	account	of	central	experiential	effects	of	music–	such	as	the	sense	of	movement	and	the	relation	between	sound	and	tone.115	But	this	conception	has	no	bearing	on	the	fact	of	intrinsic	value:	if	we	were	not	motivated	to	listen	to	music	but	were	instead	coerced	into	listening	to	patterns	of	sound	by	an	evil	genius,	it	is	unclear	how	our	understanding	of	 these	central	experiential	effects	would	change.	 It	 is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	perception	of	illusory	objects	in	motion	might	just	as	 well	 be	 disorienting	 and	 disturbing.	 The	 concept	 of	 intrinsic	 value	 can	 be	omitted	from	our	account,	since	it	has	no	evident	functional	role.			
5.9	Summary.		Transcendentalism	 is	 the	 view	 that	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 is	 a	 sui	 generis	superlative	kind,	such	that	any	attempts	 to	understand	 it	 in	non-musical	 terms	are	ill-founded.	This	view,	I	have	suggested,	proceeds	from	an	apparent	absence	of	reasons	given	for	musically	aesthetic	value,	both	for	the	experiencer	and	the	analyst.	 The	 subject’s	 engagement	 with	 music	 consists	 in	 nonconceptual	processes	 that	 do	 not	 operate	 on	 a	 personal	 level,	 however	 a	 third-party	 is	 at	liberty	 to	 conceptualise	 aspects	 of	 his	 engagement	 with	 appropriate	 analysis.																																																									114	Known	popularly	as	the	zombie	argument,	see	Chalmers	1996;	also	called	the	conceivability	
argument,	see	Chalmers	2003.	115	In	Scruton’s	sense,	see	chapter	2.	
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While	this	third-party	analysis	can	render	a	detailed	account	of	the	experience	of	music–	as	argued	in	the	previous	chapters–	the	analytically	accessible	aspects	of	experience	 are–	 as	 argued	 above–	 descriptive	 rather	 than	 evaluative,	 and	 the	motivation	behind	transcendentalism	comes	not	 from	any	metaphysical	doubts	over	 the	 description	 of	 structural	 aspects–	 possibilities	 of	 which	 abound–	 but	rather	from	difficulty	squaring	these	aspects	with	valued	experience.	A	value	that	is	 inexpressible,	 that	 is	 without	 obvious	 grounding,	 provides	 a	 rationale	 for	arguments	 that	 elevate	music.	 The	 cause	 to	 engage	with	 sound	 aesthetically	 is	the	 insoluble	 issue	 to	 which	 the	 view	 of	 a	 domain-specific	 superlative	 music	provides	some	commentary.		It	 is	 important	 to	 dissociate	 the	 transcendentalist	 claim,	 (i)–	music's	 aesthetic	value	 is	 a	 superlative	 kind	 specific	 to	 a	 domain	 to	 which	 a	 listener	 becomes	acquainted–	from	the	claim,	(ii)–	that	musically	aesthetic	value	is	non-explicable.	I	have	argued	 that	 (ii)	 is	 the	primary	motive	 for	 (i),	 suggesting	 that	arguments	for	 (i)	 imply	 (ii),	 serving	 as	 reports	 on	 the	 absence	 of	 reasons	 for	 music's	aesthetic	value.	While	(ii)	drives	claims	for	(i),	as	it	does	for	transcendentalists,	it	can	also	motivate	the	phenomenal	view:	music's	aesthetic	value	is	intrinsic	to	the	experience	 of	 nonconceptual	 processes	 pertaining	 to	 music	 perception.	 While	arguments	 for	 (i)–	 the	 transcendental–	 imply	 (ii)–	 an	 absence	 of	 reasons–	 the	reverse	 is	 not	 the	 case:	 (ii)	 might	 support	 the	 view	 that	 value	 is	 intrinsic	 to	experience	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 does	 not	 imply	 a	 specifically	musical	 domain.	 I	have	 argued	 that	 (i)–	 insofar	 as	 it	 entails	 a	 conception	 of	 an	 abstract	 domain–	fails	as	an	account	and	in	so	doing	supports	a	phenomenal	view.			
5.10	 Inter-subjectivity:	 The	 universality	 of	 the	 perceptual	
apparatus	and	dealing	with	appropriateness	of	response.		An	important	 issue	for	conceptions	of	musical	experience	is	the	 inter-subjective	feature	of	value–	the	tendency	for	particular	pieces	of	musical	sound	to	provoke	a	 common	 valued	 experience	 amongst	 groups	 of	 people–	 and,	 relatedly,	 the	manner	 in	 which	 responses	 to	 such	 pieces	 can	 appear	 appropriate	 or	
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inappropriate.	 Claims	 to	 normativity	 of	 aesthetic	 value	 were	 discussed	 above,	whereupon	universal	 agreement	 is	demanded	of	 aesthetic	 judgements,	 but	 it	 is	reasonable	 to	 eschew	 these	 issues	 concerning	 prescriptive	 statements	 and	consider	the	basis	of	inter-subjectivity	just	in	how	it	proceeds	from	a	subjective	feeling.	 Externalists	 can	 fairly	 easily	 account	 for	 the	 inter-subjective	 quality	 of	musically	 aesthetic	 value	 by	 invoking	 the	 concept	 of	 understanding:	 listeners	may	share	a	common	response	because	they	come	to	know	the	same	properties	of	 the	 object;	 this	 understanding	 involves	 becoming	 acquainted	with	 a	 shared	conceptual	 framework	 the	object	 references	or	 represents.	The	 fixed	nature	of	the	 object,	 and	 the	 concepts	 it	 represents,	 reflect	 the	 fixed	 nature	 of	 the	experience	all	those	suitably	encultured	may	realise.		This	section	challenges	this	externalist	viewpoint	by	criticising	Budd’s	view	on	a	pertinent	 element	 of	 Kant’s	 aesthetics.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 (1)	 inter-subjectivity	does	 not	 imply	 understanding,	 and	 that	 (2)	 the	 inter-subjectivity	 of	 response	concerning	 musically	 aesthetic	 value	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 psychological	consistencies	amongst	experiencers,	in	line	with	Kant’s	framework	but	contrary	to	Budd.	It	is	the	aim	of	this	section	to	show	that	the	view	that	inter-subjectivity	of	 aesthetic	 response	 consists	 in	 nonconceptual	 processes	 rather	 than	understanding	 is	 coherent,	 but	 the	 following	 section	 will	 go	 further	 by	demonstrating	how	free	descriptive	statements	in	the	musicology	literature	can	be	 tied	 to	 their	 respective	 analytical	 representation	 in	 the	 score	 using	 the	psychological	models	of	nonconceptual	perception	discussed	in	chapters	2	and	3.		I	 argued	 in	 chapter	 3	 that	 Kant’s	 theory	 of	 aesthetic	 judgement	 can	 be	 called	
psychological,	given	that	it	conceives	of	aesthetic	judgement	in	terms	of	a	model	of	 psychology	 that	 extends	 beyond	 the	 aesthetic.	 Central	 to	 this	 model	 is	 the	notion	 of	 a	 free	 play	between	 the	 imaginative	 and	 conceptual	 faculties	 of	 the	mind.	One	of	the	aims	of	Kant’s	conception	was	to	account	for	the	‘universality’	of	aesthetic	 judgement	 by	 recourse	 to	 the	 fixed	 properties	 of	 the	 mind	 as	 they	relate	 to	 the	 fixed	 properties	 of	 the	 object	 (§§6–9.)	 Budd	 counters	 this	 claim,	suggesting	that	the	uniqueness	of	one’s	past	experience	is	evidence	that	aesthetic	experience	will	diverge	between	individuals:	
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	 ‘[E]ven	 if,	 as	 is	 not	 so,	 each	 of	 us	 had	 the	 same	 natural	 endowment	 at	origin,	we	have	been	shaped	by	our	pasts	in	innumerably	different	ways,	in	ways	that,	leaving	aside	the	different	desires	and	sensuous	preferences	engendered	in	us,	might	 find	expression	 in	the	different	kinds	of	objects	that	delight	us–	 in	 the	 forms	we	experience	with	delight,	 the	 forms	 that	seem	 to	us	peculiarly	well	 suited	 to	 exercise	our	perceptual	powers	on,	independently	of	any	other	interest.	(1995:	28)		It	should	be	acknowledged	that	an	individual	is	shaped	by	her	ontogenetic	past,	but	this	does	not	preclude	invariance	in	psychological	mechanisms.	We	may	each	live	different	lives	while	having	a	shared	psychology.	This	is	most	obvious	when	considering	 universals	 in	 audio	 perception,	 such	 as	 greater	 sensitivity	 in	 the	range	 of	 2000-5000Hz,	 having	 evolved	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 range	 of	 human	speech	 (this	 sensitivity	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 tendency	 for	melodies	 to	 occupy	 the	same	range),	and	the	tendency	for	sounds	having	the	same	frequency	bandwidth	to	mask	one-another	(good	music	producers	work	to	eliminate	this	masking.)116	Aesthetic	responses	are	not	utterly	folded	into	personal	life-experience:	research	in	 psychology	 has	 provided	 a	 range	 of	models	 on	 how	we	all	 tend	 to	 perceive	formal	qualities	(see	chapters	2	and	3).		Budd	 opposes	 Kant’s	 view	 that	 aesthetic	 value	 emerges	 from	 a	 particular	psychological	 process	 by	 attacking	 claims	 extending	 from	 the	 universality	 of	aesthetic	 judgment.	 Budd	 takes	 issue	 with	 certain	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 Kant’s	framework	for	universality:	aesthetic	judgements	are	given	to	be	communicable	insofar	 as	 an	 optimal	 value	 of	 free	 play	 obtains	 between	 imagination	 and	understanding	 that	 thus	 engenders	 an	 experience	 of	 aesthetic	 value.	 It	 is	 this	optimal	 value	 that	 makes	 Kant’s	 account	 intelligible	 by	 providing	 a	 point	 of	commonality	across	individuals.	Since	all	our	cognitive	faculties	are	broadly	the	same,	 the	 optimal	 relation	 between	 imagination	 and	 value	 by	 which	 aesthetic	pleasure	is	achieved	should	also	be	broadly	the	same.	The	issue	with	this	is	that																																																									116	See	Stainsby	and	Cross,	‘The	Perception	of	Pitch’	2009	for	a	discussion	of	the	psychophysics	of	bandwidth	masking;	for	a	discussion	of	universals	in	the	psychology	of	music	see	Meyer	2000;	also	see	Stevens	and	Byron	2009;	16.	
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there	are	no	guarantees	 that	 such	an	optimal	 value	does	obtain	 in	 the	manner	that	Kant	describes.	‘Kant	merely	asserts	that,	in	each	person’s	case,	there	must	be	an	optimal	value	for	the	relative	proportion	of	imagination	and	understanding	for	perceptual	 judgement,	rather	than	more	than	one	such	value	or	none	at	all.	But	 this	 is	 a	 substantial	 claim,	 not	 a	 trivial	 truth,	 and	without	 support	 it	 lacks	plausibility.’	(Budd	1995:	32)		The	notion	of	‘optimal	value’	within	Kant’s	framework	may	prone	to	objection;	it	seems	 unclear	 since	 the	 concept	 of	 free	 play	 between	 imagination	 and	understanding	 is	 obscure.	 However,	 a	 concession	 that	 Kant’s	 theory	 is	 flawed	would	 not	 in	 itself	 support	 an	 externalist	 view	 of	 aesthetic	 value,	 but	 rather	weaken	the	idea	of	a	free	play	between	imagination	and	understanding.	Insofar	as	 the	 ‘free	 play	 between	 imagination	 and	 understanding’	 is	 intelligible	 as	 a	mechanism	 for	aesthetic	pleasure,	 it	would	also	be	 intelligible	 that	 the	optimal	proportion	 between	 them	 was	 intersubjective,	 since	 imagination	 and	understanding	 are	 themselves	 intersubjective	 faculties	 (insofar	 as	 they	 are	mental	 faculties).	 Budd’s	 arguments	 focus	 on	 the	 relatively	 obscure	 ideas	 of	‘optimal	 value’	 and	 ‘free	 play’	 without	 addressing	 the	 more	 robust	 claim	 on	which	they	are	based,	concerning	similarities	in	our	cognitive	apparatus.	As	such	he	casts	no	doubt	on	the	claim	that	the	commonalities	in	psychology	can	support	commonalities	in	experience	without	reference	to	the	epistemic	character	of	the	object,	central	to	an	internalist	view.		The	obverse	of	the	inter-subjectivity	of	aesthetic	value	is	that	certain	responses	to	 an	 artwork	 seem	more	appropriate	 than	 others.	 Such	 claims	 to	 normativity	direct	 towards	 a	 view	 that	 aesthetic	 experience	 is	 dependent	 on	 a	 form	 of	
understanding,	 since	 the	most	 appropriate	 responses	 can	 thus	 be	 attributed	 to	greater	 understanding,	where	 this	 in	 turn	means	 having	 greater	 knowledge	 of	some	shared	conceptual	framework.	However,	it	does	not	follow	from	the	claim	that	 aesthetic	 responses	 can	 have	 different	 degrees	 of	 appropriateness	 that	aesthetic	 responses	 entail	 understanding.	 It	 is	 plausible	 that	 the	 relation	between	the	experience	and	the	object	is	of	a	different	kind	to	understanding.		
	 188	
There	is	an	important	difference	between	the	claim	that	aesthetic	experience	is	appropriate	 to	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 object	 and	 the	 claim	 that	 aesthetic	experience	consists	 in	understanding	the	properties	of	the	object;	correlatively,	there	 is	 an	 important	 difference	 between	 the	 claim	 that	 a	 certain	 aesthetic	experience	can	be	understood	or	justified	and	the	claim	that	aesthetic	experience	consists	 in	reasoning.	The	difference	pertains	 to	 that	between	 first–	and	 third–person	 viewpoints.	 We	 might	 say	 of	 an	 aesthetic	 experience	 that	 it	 is	 not	 as	appropriate	a	response	to	a	particular	artwork	as	another	experience	might	be,	and	we	might	proffer	reasons	as	to	why;	but	this	does	not	therefore	ascribe	such	reasoning	to	the	experiencer.	It	 is	plausible	that	the	experiencer	is	related	with	the	 object	 in	 a	 nonconceptual	 way,	 a	 way	 potentially	 in	 conflict	 with	 her	understanding	of	the	properties	of	the	object.	Indeed,	listeners	do	rely	heavily	on	virtual–	 or	 illusory–	 effects	 of	 artworks	 for	 aesthetic	 experience,	 as	 was	discussed	 in	 chapter	 3.	 There	 is	 a	 disparity	 between	 belief	 and	 aesthetic	experience,	such	that	aesthetic	experience	is	not	based	in	veridical	perception	of	properties	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 object.	 Aesthetic	 experience,	 rather,	 depends	 on	 an	individual’s	potential	to	subvert	real-world	truths	in	favour	of	the	engagement	of	her	own	psychology.		There	are	two	available	positions	on	the	inter-subjectivity	of	musically	aesthetic	value,	then:	(A)	we	come	to	understand	features	of	the	aesthetic	object	 in	their	relation	 to	 a	 shared	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 (B)	 the	 experience	 is	nonconceptual	 and	 can	 contrast	 with	 the	 experiencer’s	 understanding	 of	properties	 of	 the	 object.	 Budd	 argues	 for	 (A)	 by	 conflating	 correlation	 with	understanding:	 the	 response	 to	 an	 artwork	 might	 be	 constrained	 by	 the	properties	 of	 the	 artwork,	 and	 thus	 it	 could	be	 said	 that	 certain	 responses	 are	appropriate	while	others	are	not,	but	this	does	not	in	itself	suggest	an	epistemic	attitude.	There	are	 innumerable	ways	 in	which	 the	world	 is	perceived	without	understanding,	and	indeed	experience	of	music	is	often	difficult	to	capture	with	concepts;	giving	reasons	for	the	experience	one	has	requires	work,	certainly	for	those	without	musicological	training.		
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A	note	on	Budd’s	 formulation	of	the	externalist	view:	this	 is	a	subtle	version	of	the	 view,	 but	 nonetheless	 poses	 problems	 by	 falling	 foul	 of	 the	 supervenience	thesis.	It	also	contradicts	the	criteria	set	at	the	beginning	of	chapter	4,	by	failing	to	 circumscribe	 the	 aesthetic.	 By	 describing	 aesthetic	 perception	 as	 epistemic	acquaintance,	 there	 appears	 no	 utility	 for	 distinguishing	 aesthetic	 perception,	leaving	open	the	charge	that	any	form	of	understanding	is	aesthetic.	If	aesthetic	experience	is	understanding,	it	lacks	adequate	circumscription,	but	if	it	is	a	kind	of	 ‘aesthetic	 understanding’	 then	 the	 question	 begged	 is	 just	 what	 makes	 it	‘aesthetic’.	As	Gary	Iseminger	suggested,	‘the	entire	account	is	hostage	to	a	prior	understanding	of	the	concept	of	art’	(Iseminger	2003:	108.)		
	
5.11	 Analysis:	 nonconceptual	 psychology	 beneath	 free	
conceptual	description.	
	I	 have	 argued	 that	 our	 experience	 with	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	 based	 on	nonconceptual	psychology,	that	the	value	of	the	musically	aesthetic	is	intrinsic	to	experiences	of	nonconceptual	psychology,	and	that	the	inter-subjectivity	of	this	value	is	attributable	to	our	shared	perceptual	apparatus.	The	descriptive	aspect	of	 the	musically	aesthetic	 can	be	accounted	 for	with	a	psycho-acoustic	account	but	the	evaluative	aspect	cannot.	Our	shared	nonconceptual	psychology	accounts	for	 the	 possibility	 of	 hearing	 value	 in	 the	 products	 of	 alien	music-cultures,	 for	inter-cultural	 creativity	 and	 production,	 since	 our	 nonconceptual	 mechanisms	are	 common	 across	 cultures	 in	 a	 way	 far	 removed	 from	 our	 conceptual	frameworks.		While	listeners	are	apt	to	agree	on	musically	aesthetic	value,	they	are	not	apt	to	express	 the	 same	 conceptual	 descriptions	 of	 musically	 aesthetic	 value:	expressing	a	preference	 for	a	piece	 is	very	different	 to	describing	a	preference	for	 a	 piece.	 The	 following	 section	 supports	 the	 view	 offered	 here	 that	 value	 is	intrinsic	to	experiences	of	nonconceptual	psychological	processes	by	tracing	free	conceptual	 descriptions,	 which	 will	 entail	 evaluative	 as	 well	 as	 descriptive	claims,	to	the	operation	of	nonconceptual	psychology.	
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	Given	 that	 our	 experiences	 with	 music	 are	 nonconceptual	 we	 are	 given	 no	concepts	 to	 ascribe	 to	 the	 object.	 However,	 certain	 conceptualisations	 seem	appropriate,	and	this	appropriateness	can	be	understood	by	 linking	conceptual	descriptions	with	 nonconceptual	 psychology.	 By	 demonstrating	 that	 intuitively	appropriate	 conceptual	 descriptions	 of	 musical	 passages	 are	 based	 on	nonconceptual	 psychology	 that	 is	 also	 linked	 to	 the	musicological	 description,	this	 analysis	 should	 show	 that	 the	 inter-subjectivity	 of	 aesthetic	 response	 is	closely	related	to	nonconceptual	psychology.			
5.12	Alan	Moore’s	‘Where	is	Here?’		‘Where	is	Here?	An	issue	of	deictic	projection	in	recorded	song’	by	Allan	Moore	uses	 the	 ecological	 principle	 of	 specification	 and	 image	 schematic	 theory,	 in	conjunction	with	 conventional	 analysis,	 to	 evaluate	popular	music.117	Referring	to	‘Sea	Breezes’	by	Roxy	Music,	Moore	states:	“[t]he	track’s	environment	is…	vital	in	 its	 colouring	of	 the	 ambiguity	of	 the	 lyric	 through	 four	 specific	 devices.	The	first	is	the	plaintive	oboe	melody…	of	the	sort	frequently	described	as	‘desolate’.	The	 second	 is	 the	 bare	 electric	 piano	 which	 meanders	 (with	 little	 sense	 of	harmonic	 goal)	 through	 the	 same	 limited	 selection	 of	 pitches,	 analogising	 sea	breezes…”	 The	 further	 two	 points	 are	 not	 so	 amenable	 to	 scrutiny,	 but	 those	given	above	are	instructive.	A	melody	played	on	an	oboe	might	be	construed,	by	ecological	 principles,	 as	 specifying	 a	 limited	 volumetric	 space,	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	thin	texture.	The	purity	of	the	sound,	i.e.	its	likeness	to	a	sine	wave,	could	specify	simplicity–	 a	 focused	 source	 that	 goes	 undistorted,	 undisturbed	 by	 external	forces;	isolated.	Hence	the	descriptor	‘desolate.’	Thus,	even	without	reference	to	the	recording,	Moore’s	remarks	can	be	elucidated	by	explicating	the	underlying	psychological	mechanisms	at	play	on	perception	of	the	pertinent	sounds.		Image	 schemata	will	 also	 be	 operative	 in	 the	 experience	 that	 informs	Moore’s	interpretation:	How	does	 the	 ‘meandering’	 and	 ‘limited	 selection	 of	 pitches’	 in																																																									117	Alan	Moore	2010.	
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the	 ’bare’	piano	part	 ‘analogise’	sea	breezes?	This	may	be	less	transparent	than	the	other	description,	but	it	seems	that	the	limited	exploration	of	pitches	coupled	with	 the	 implied	 repetition	 would	 suggest	 the	 containment	 schema,	 and	 the	metaphor	 of	 a	 ‘meander’	 could	 share	 with	 the	 musical	 materials	 the	 wave	schema.	So	the	coupling	of	containment	and	wave	schemata	may	be	evident	in,	or	frequently	related	to,	typical	conceptions	of	a	sea	breeze,	taking	into	account	the	relentlessness	 of	 the	 wind,	 a	 person’s	 situation	 in	 relation	 to	 it	 as	 being	surrounded	 and	 engrossed	 by	 it	 (contained),	 and	 also	 of	 the	 continuous	fluctuation	 in	 ferocity–	moving	between	peaks	and	 lows.	Once	 the	sound-scape	of	waves	washing	up	on	the	shore	is	accounted	for–	a	part	of	the	track	mentioned	by	Moore	 shortly	 after	 the	quoted	passage	 above–	 the	 implication	of	 the	wave	schema	becomes	quite	clear,	and	its	role	in	Moore’s	musical	experience	is	reified.		Subsequently	Moore	 discusses	 the	 track	 ‘You’ve	 got	 style’	 by	 the	 band	Athlete,	isolating	 a	 passage	 in	 the	 track	 that	 ‘uses	 a…	 slow	 vibrato	 and	 a	 heavy,	claustrophobic	 texture…	 the	 signification	 is	 given	 in	 the	 repeated	 lyric	 “it’s	getting	hot	 in	here”’.	A	 clear	 link	between	 the	properties	of	vibrato	and	excess	heat	 is	 the	wave	schema.	 I	 experience	waves	of	 air	 convection	when	 the	 space	around	me	is	particularly	hot;	 likewise	the	fluctuations	in	pitch	associated	with	vibrato	has	the	structural	properties	of	a	peak	and	trough	of	frequencies,	where	the	sound	climaxes	and	withdraws	repeatedly.		The	 concept	 of	 a	 ‘heavy,	 claustrophobic	 texture’	 lends	 itself	 to	 elucidation	 by	ecological	 theory.	 A	 proliferation	 of	 instruments	 with	 broad	 frequency	bandwidths	 will	 fill	 the	 range	 of	 human	 hearing,	 specify	 a	 number	 of	 sound	sources	 and	 thus	 a	 ‘busy’	 environment,	 replete	with	 sound,	 hence	 the	 concept	‘claustrophobic’.	The	prominent	bass–	with	a	distorted	and	heavily	compressed	timbre–	also	specifies	‘weight’	or	‘largeness’	(‘heavy’),	since	low	sounds	naturally	emanate	 from	 the	 vibration	 of	 relatively	 large	 objects,	 with	 significant	 power	required	to	start	the	object’s	vibration.	
	
	
5.13	Scott	Burnham’s	‘How	Music	Matters’.	
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	‘How	 Music	 Matters:	 Poetic	 Context	 Revisited’118	by	 Scott	 Burnham	 reviews	 a	number	 of	 poetic	 accounts	 of	 music,	 partly	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 descriptive	validity,	 and	 partly	 to	 indicate	 the	 contrasts	 and	 relationships	 between	 theory	and	 poetics.	 He	 points	 out	 a	 number	 of	 particularly	 striking	 elaborations	 by	musicologists,	and	traces	 them	back	to	 formal	musicological	 theory.	Burnham’s	own	 discourse	 is	 often	 poetic	 and	 as	 such	 relates	 highly	 idiosyncratic	descriptions,	but	his	more	general	estimations,	regarding	the	value	of	particular	passages	 or	 pieces,	 are	 aligned	 with	 the	 canon.	 This	 tension	 between	understanding	 and	 value	 reflects	 the	 condition	 of	 music-studies:	 conceptual	elusiveness	coupled	with	broad	consensus	on	value.	The	phenomenological	view	predicts	 that	 Burnham’s	 free	 descriptions	 should	 evidence	 the	 same	nonconceptual	 psychological	 mechanisms	 that	 underlie	 the	 formal	representations	to	which	they	refer.		Consider	his	conception	of	a	passage	of	Beethoven’s	fifth	symphony:	‘the	music’s	sails	fall	slack	after	having	ventured	into	a	windless,	quietly	ominous	stretch	of	F	sharp	minor.’	Drawing	a	comparison	between	the	concept	of	a	yacht	and	a	piece	of	music	might	seem	obscure	at	first	glance,	but	few	would	find	any	problem	in	perceiving	 the	 underlying,	 schematic	 structures	 that	 are	 shared	 between	 a	typical	 experience	 of	 the	music	 and	 typical	 knowledge	 of	 a	 yacht,	 and	 as	 such	Burnham’s	metaphor	appears	coherent.	One	of	the	image	schemata	that	may	be	operational	 here	 is	 the	compulsion	 schema,	 even	 if	 the	 link	between	 the	music	and	the	concept	is	this	schema	operating	in	a	negative	way,	imposing	an	absence.	Where	what	might	be	described	as	a	force	is	required	in	wind	so	as	to	fill	the	sails	and	move	the	boat,	what	might	also	be	described	as	force	is	purportedly	absent	from	 the	music:	 no	 progress,	 direction	 or	 energy	 is	 ascribable	 to	 this	 passage.	This	 schematic	 structure	derives	 from	bodily	 experience	of	what	 can	be	 called	compulsion,	 and	can	be	 said	 to	 characterise	both	 the	poeticism	and	 the	 formal	representation.																																																										118	How	Music	Matters:	Poetic	Content	Revisited,”	in	Rethinking	Music,	ed.	Nicholas	Cook	and	Mark	Everist	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999),	193–216.	
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Consider	again	the	last	quotation.	How	can	music	be	ominous?	Burnham	expands	on	this	characteristic:	“the	recapitulation	is	heard	to	impend:	its	arrival	becomes	a	 matter	 of	 dramatic	 urgency.”	 ‘Ominous’	 could	 refer	 to	 apprehension,	 or	expectation.	Both	of	the	immediately	prior	quotations	imply	that	Burnham	hears	the	 pertinent	 passages	 as	 forecasting	 forthcoming	 events.	 This	 is	 a	 listening	attitude	 into	which	the	model	of	cognitive	categorisation	gives	some	 insight	by	explicating	musical	syntax	with	psychological	function.	Zbikowski	discusses	how	any	specific	piece	will	tend	to	conform	to	a	‘global	model’	(Zbikowski:	2005,	47).	A	global	model	can	refer	to	the	stylistic	norm	the	piece	abides	by.	In	the	case	of	the	structure	of	Beethoven’s	 fifth	symphony,	the	normative	paradigm	would	be	that	of	sonata	form.	A	listener	suitably	encultured	in	traditional	Western	music	will	most	likely	come	to	expect	a	repeat	of	earlier	material	around	three-quarters	of	the	way	through	the	piece,	after	a	series	of	other	structural	changes	that	are	relatively	coherent	with	the	global	model.	Once	the	listener	has	implicitly	applied	a	 particular	 global	 model,	 she	 will	 adopt	 an	 attitude	 towards	 the	 piece	 that	reflects	 expectations	 pertaining	 to	 this	 model.	 Global	 models	 can	 also	 entail	generic	 musical	 properties.	 For	 example,	 the	 listener’s	 response	 to	 the	developing	music	may	be	constrained	by	his	perception	of	recurrent	large-scale	structural	 patterns.	 So,	when	 I	 hear	 the	 quiet	 and	 indecisive	 passage	 of	music	constituting	the	re-transition	of	the	Finale	of	the	Fifth	symphony,	my	experience	is	 likely	 to	 be	 in	 part	 constituted	 by	 consistencies	 in	 my	 previous	 listening	experience,	 and	may	engender	 the	 expectation	 that	 a	 loud,	 emphatic	 section	 is	forthcoming.	 Such	 expectations	 can	 constitute	 experience	 without	 being	conceptualized.		On	 page	 206	 Burnham	 discusses	 a	 poetic	 depiction	 of	 the	 Scherzo	 theme	 in	Beethoven’s	Fifth	Symphony	given	by	the	novelist	E.	M.	Forster:		 Helen	notes	that	it	is	“as	if	the	splendour	of	life	might	boil	over	and	waste	into	 steam	 and	 froth”.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 inept	 assessment	 of	 the	 way	 the	dominant	is	presented	at	this	point	in	the	development…	[T]his	dominant	is	reached	climactically,	in	bar	132,	and	it	sounds	as	the	issue	of	the	entire	development.	But	 instead	of	 leading	to	the	tonic	of	the	recapitulation,	as	
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one	might	reasonably	expect	of	a	dominant	re-transition,	this	dominant	is	itself	 tonicized…	and	then	prolonged	by	a	process	of	arpeggiation	which	broadens,	grandly,	to	a	halt.	The	point	of	interest,	in	formal	terms,	is	that	all	this	grandiosity	is	expended	not	on	the	returning	tonic,	but	on	the	key	area	of	the	retransition.	In	this	sense	the	passage	may	indeed	be	heard	as	a	wasteful	bit	of	revelry,	splendour	allowed	to	boil	over.		Burnham	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 the	 formal	 object	 here,	 indicating	 how	 it	 might	correspond	to	the	poetic	description;	according	to	the	phenomenal	view	offered	here,	 then,	 underlying	 nonconceptual	 psychology	 should	 tie	 the	 formal	description	of	the	object	with	the	poeticism.		One	of	the	points	being	stressed	in	the	above	passage	is	how	the	repetition	and	circularity	 of	 the	 harmonic	 movement	 accompanied	 with	 the	 ever-growing	intensity	of	the	music	relates	to	the	concept	of	‘boiling	over’.	In	accordance	with	ecological	 theory,	 the	 growing	 dynamic	 of	 the	 music	 specifies	 an	 increased	intensity	of	the	sound	source,	and	the	broadening	frequency	range	would	specify	an	 increase	 in	volumetric	 space.	The	virtual	environment	of	 the	Scherzo	theme	then	 seems	 to	 be	 one	 of	 expansion	 and	 heightening	 intensity.	 This	 might	constrain	a	conceptual	inference	to	the	point	where	the	term	‘grandiosity’	would	seem	an	intuitively	apt	characterisation.		The	more	extensive	conceptualisation–	‘boiling	over	and	wasting	into	steam	and	froth’–	 involves	suitably	more	extensive	underlying	psychological	 function.	One	approach	would	be	to	refer	to	image	schemata	and	cite	the	containment	schema,	positing	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 music	 ‘boiling	 over’	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	metaphorical	projection	of	 containment	 that	 functions	both	 in	 the	concept	of	a	sustained	heat	source	coming	into	contact	with	a	body	of	water,	and	in	the	sound	of	 a	 static	 harmonic	 progression.	 It	 would	 then	 follow	 that	 the	 ecological	specification	 of	 intensity	 coupled	 with	 the	 containment	 schema	 is	 the	 shared	structure	 between	 a	 pot	 of	 water	 that	 eventually	 boils	 over,	 and	 Beethoven’s	Fifth.	 There	 is	 clearly	 a	 sense	 of	 progress	 and	 development–	 a	 burgeoning	intensity–	in	this	passage,	but	this	is	juxtaposed	with	the	recursive	harmony	that	
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operates	 as	 the	 containment	 schema.	 These	 underlying	 properties	 seem	 to	elucidate	the	free	description.		For	additional	clarification,	consider	the	theory	of	cognitive	categorisation.	The	passage	of	music	does	not	modulate,	nor	return	to	the	tonic,	‘as	we	might	expect’.	One	reason	‘we	might	expect’	one	of	these	outcomes	is	that	we	apply	our	global	paradigm	 of	 sonata	 form	 when	 we	 listen	 to	 the	 Fifth	 symphony,	 and	 such	 a	paradigm	 stipulates	 that	 the	music	will	 lead	 to	 the	 tonic	 of	 the	 recapitulation.	Also,	on	a	local	level,	it	is	possible	that	a	listener	would	have	come	to	recognise	a	tonal	 center	 in	 the	 piece	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 relationship	 the	 tonal	 structure	generally	 has	with	 a	 certain	pitch–	 the	 tonic.	Hearing	 the	music	modulating	 to	the	dominant	may	provoke	a	sense	that	it	should	return	to	the	tonic.	It	may	seem	intuitively	 valid	 to	 describe	 the	 piece	 as	 having	 ‘wasted	 to	 steam	 and	 froth’	because	 it	 defies	 an	 established	 category	 pertaining	 to	 the	 tonal	 focus	 of	 the	piece,	and	thus	on	reflection	appears	to	defy	completion;	it	moves	away	from	the	tonic	 to	 the	 readily	 associated	 key	 and	 should	 be	 expected	 to	 re-affirm	 that	relationship	 with	 the	 established	 key,	 but	 it	 actually	 simply	 ends	 on	 the	dominant.	After	 the	high	drama	of	 the	preceding	passage,	 the	music	 fails	 to	do	what	 is	required	of	 it	 to	affirm	this	 fundamental	category.	Such	experience	will	likely	 render	 unproblematic	 descriptions	 such	 as	 ‘inconclusive,’	 ‘unresolved,’	‘incomplete’	or	‘unsuccessful’	since	these	concepts	seem	to	cohere	with	the	given	categorical	structure.	These	words	are	necessarily	distanced	from	the	reality	of	the	listening	experience,	since	they	relate	specific	concepts,	but	they	express	an	underlying	structure	that	inheres	in	an	aspect	of	listening	experience.	Beethoven	here	 explores	 a	 response	 to	 formal	 structure	 that	 derives	 from	 expectation	propagated	 by	 a	 particular	 cognitive	 mechanism,	 the	 categories	 operating	 in	listening	themselves	being	conceptually	empty.		So	the	concept	of	the	piece	boiling	over	and	wasting	into	nothing	can	be	traced	to	the	musical	structure	by	uncovering	 the	shared	nonconceptual	psychology	 that	drives	 both	 free	 description	 and	 formal	 representation.	 Repetitive	 harmony	suggests	the	containment	schema;	an	increase	in	dynamic	and	spread	across	the	frequency	 range	 suggests	 the	 ecological	 specification	 of	 growing	 intensity	 or	
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expansion;	 and	 the	 music’s	 failure	 to	 cohere	 with	 its	 category	 of	 tonal	 centre	suggests	a	sense	of	it	failing	to	achieve	what	is	expected	of	it.			
5.14	Concluding	Summary.	
	The	first	section	introduced	musically	aesthetic	value	as	a	phenomenon	without	obvious	 explanation.	 This	 difficulty	 in	 giving	 an	 account	 of	musically	 aesthetic	value	in	factual	or	scientific	terms	has	been	attributed	to	the	difference	between	factual	 and	normative	claims,	 otherwise	 known	as	 getting	 an	 ‘ought-statement’	from	an	‘is-statement’	or	the	fact/value	distinction.	I	argued	that	this	distinction	does	not	necessarily	prohibit	factual	claims	about	musically	aesthetic	value	since	such	 value	 emerges	 from	 a	 subjective	 feeling	 rather	 than	 any	 moral	 or	necessarily	prescriptive	judgement.		A	 further	 sub-section	 defined	 the	 terms	 descriptive	 and	 evaluative,	 considered	some	of	the	challenges	with	making	the	distinction,	and	laid	out	certain	caveats	pertaining	 to	 their	 usage.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 distinction	 between	 descriptive	 and	evaluative	 holds,	 the	 psycho-acoustic	 accounts	 of	 music	 discussed	 in	 previous	chapters	 only	 explicate	 the	 descriptive	 aspects	 of	 the	musically	 aesthetic.	 This	then	suggests	that	a	psycho-acoustic	account	does	not	explicate	value.		The	 second	 section	 gave	a	 fundamental	characterisation	 of	musically	 aesthetic	value	that	does	not	rely	on	analysis	of	evaluative	terms	like	beautiful	or	complex.	This	characterisation	uses	the	notion	of	motivating	acquaintance	with	the	object,	and	clarifies	the	given	approach	to	musically	aesthetic	value	as	being	dissociable	from	 normative	 statements	 by	 eschewing	 any	 tie	 to	 the	 aesthetic	 or	 indeed	human	 behaviour.	 Value	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 simplest	 causal	 terms	 of	 a	subjective	feeling	that	motivates	further	acquaintance.	Under	such	a	conception,	it	can	be	argued	that	musically	aesthetic	value	is	non-explicable.		A	 sub-section	 then	 provided	 further	 background	 on	 how	 aesthetic	 value	 is	conceived	 in	 the	 philosophy	 literature.	 I	 described	 intrinsic,	 extrinsic	 and	
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instrumental	value,	showing	relations	and	contrasts	between	each	concept.	After	working	through	an	issue	with	intrinsic	value	pertaining	to	human	involvement,	it	was	emphasised	that	intrinsic	value	can	be	ascribed	to	objects	or	experiences	and	 that,	 as	 such,	 both	 internalist	 and	 externalist	 approaches	 need	 to	 be	considered.		Externalist	approaches	 to	 intrinsic	value	were	subsequently	given	a	section	 for	discussion;	such	approaches	either	ascribe	value	to	the	aesthetic	object,	where	a	listener	 becomes	 epistemically	 acquainted	 with	 it,	 or	 ascribe	 value	 to	 the	experience	but	conceive	of	 the	descriptive	aspects	of	 the	musically	aesthetic	as	external	to	experience.	Malcolm	Budd’s	Values	of	Art	provides	the	opportunity	to	consider	 and	 criticise	 both	 views.	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 first	 view,	where	 intrinsic	value	 is	 external	 to	 experience,	 is	 flawed	 since	 it	 relies	on	externally	mediated	criteria	 to	delineate	value,	 and	value	 in	 fact	 emerges	 from	a	 subjective	 feeling;	this	view	can	be	cast	as	circular.	The	second	view,	where	externalism	about	the	descriptive	 is	 combined	with	 internalism	about	 the	evaluative,	was	rejected	on	the	 grounds	 that	 it	 will	 be	 open	 to	 the	 same	 objections	 made	 using	 the	supervenience	thesis	in	chapter	4.		The	 following	 section	 argued	 that	 music	 is	 non-explicable	 using	 analysis	 of	research	 in	 psychology,	 musicology	 and	 aesthetics.	 Reviewing	 the	 three	 main	psychological	models	developed	in	chapters	2	and	3–	image	schemata,	ecological	
theory	and	cognitive	categorisation–	 it	 is	revealed	that	none	contribute	towards	an	 explanation	 for	 musically	 aesthetic	 value.	 Each	 model	 provides	 details	 of	psychological	mechanisms	or	 structures	 that	 are	 value-neutral.	 The	 absence	of	an	 account	 of	 value	 motivates	 what	 I	 described	 as	 the	 transcendent	 view:	musically	aesthetic	value	can	be	powerfully	felt	but	is	inaccessible	to	science	and	reasoning,	 suggesting	 a	 closure	 from	 the	 empirical	 world.	 Such	 a	 view	 takes	musically	aesthetic	value	to	be	a	superlative	kind	that	is	to	be	protected	and	from	which	other	things	are	to	be	excluded;	examples	of	the	transcendent	view	can	be	found	in	aesthetics,	psychology	and	musicology.		
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The	transcendent	view,	I	argued,	is	a	response	to	an	explanatory	problem	about	music,	namely	that	it	is	not	clear	why	it	has	value.	Musically	aesthetic	value	can	be	 considered	 a	 contingent	 fact	 about	 music,	 since	 the	 musically	 aesthetic	 is	amenable	 to	 detailed	 and	 precise	 models	 of	 musical	 description,	 but	 these	models	 appear	 to	 be	 independent	 from	 the	 fact	 of	musically	 aesthetic	 value:	 if	music	were	not	valued,	it	is	unclear	how	such	models	would	need	to	be	altered.	This	point	 is	drawn	out	by	 reference	 to	 recent	work	on	 the	phenomenology	of	consciousness	before	giving	a	summary.		Inter-subjectivity	 of	musically	 aesthetic	 value,	 as	 related	 to	 the	 universality	 of	perceptual	 psychology,	was	 discussed	 in	 the	 penultimate	 section	 above.	While	externalists	 can	 account	 for	 our	 shared	 responses	 to	 music	 by	 identifying	aesthetic	 features	 as	 objective	 properties	 that	 listeners	 come	 to	 understand	 in	their	experience,	an	internalist	can	give	the	same	account	by	identifying	common	features	 of	 our	 psychology	 that	 are	 operative	 in	 music	 perception.	 Budd’s	criticisms	of	Kant’s	aesthetics	were	invoked	and	rebutted	to	argue	for	an	account	of	inter-subjectivity	based	on	nonconceptual	psychology.		The	 final	 section	 above	 strengthens	 the	 internalist	 account	 of	 the	 inter-subjectivity	of	aesthetic	response	by	linking	free	conceptual	description	with	the	nonconceptual	psychological	processes	that	can	be	attributed	to	the	experience	of	musical	form.	Writings	from	Allan	Moore	and	Scott	Burnham	were	considered	and	their	descriptions	and	evaluations	were	linked	to	nonconceptual	psychology.	Since	experiences	with	the	musically	aesthetic	are	nonconceptual	we	do	not	have	concepts	to	express	them,	however,	free	conceptualisations	of	music	experiences	can	 be	 shown	 to	 express	 nonconceptual	 psychology;	 it	 is	 this	 psychology	 that	allows	 agreement	 across	 individuals	 and	 degrees	 of	 appropriateness	 of	description,	even	while	a	full	conceptual	description	is	unavailable.			 	
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